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RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

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INTELLIGENCE Essays

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The second volume highlights the formation and strengthening of Soviet foreign intelligence (1917-1933) as part of the political system of a qualitatively different state, which, however, retained the priority tasks and activities of the Russian foreign intelligence - the protection of national interests, authority and power of the country .

For a wide range of readers.

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Foreword

The second volume of The History of Russian Foreign Intelligence covers the initial period of activity of the Soviet foreign intelligence that arose after the revolution in Russia in October 1917.

The First World War, the collapse of the monarchy, the inability of the Provisional Government to keep the situation under control, the transfer of power into the hands of the Soviets led to the fact that the old socio-political structures fell apart or were destroyed as a result of the revolutionary process. Shaken to the limit, demoralized state apparatus was not able to perform its functions. On its fragments, another one was quickly formed, more suitable for solving qualitatively different problems.

From the very first steps of its activity, the Soviet government was forced to repel the blows of external and internal enemies, to defend the independence and territorial integrity of the young state, to bring it out of isolation. To protect national interests, along with other state bodies, special services were needed, including foreign intelligence. And they were created in the process of struggle and overcoming the incredible difficulties that the country faced.

The situation in it was difficult, crisis. Russia was still at war with Germany, the German army began active hostilities in Ukraine, Belarus, on the outskirts of the capital - Petrograd. The economy was hit by economic ruin. Inside the country, the white movement grew stronger.

Russia needed to urgently withdraw from the war, but to withdraw with a minimum of losses. It is no coincidence, therefore, that one of the first decrees of the new government was the Decree on Peace, in which all the belligerents were asked to immediately start negotiations on concluding a just, democratic peace.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, General Dukhonin, flatly refused to comply with the instructions of the new government to stop

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the conduct of hostilities and the establishment of contacts with the command of the enemy armies for the purpose of negotiating a truce.

The Entente countries ignored the proposals of Soviet Russia on peace negotiations and began to prepare an armed intervention against it, in order to support the internal anti-government forces, overthrow the regime that came to power in October 1917 and force Russia to fulfill its allied obligations. - to continue the war with Germany and its allies. Already on December 23, 1917, England and France concluded an agreement on the provision of

assistance to the White Guard movement and division of "zones of influence" in Russia. The English zone included the territories of the Cossack regions, the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, Kurdistan. In French - Ukraine, Bessarabia, Crimea!.

Germany formally accepted the offer of negotiations, but not at all in order to conclude a just peace. She tried to use the crisis situation in Russia to satisfy her territorial claims, impose favorable peace conditions for herself and transfer the released troops to the West to fight the Entente countries.

The lack of accurate information from the Soviet government about the situation inside Germany and the intentions of the German command led to the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was unfavorable for Russia. This was one of the first signals about the need for the immediate organization of reconnaissance work.

By the autumn of 1918, the European south of the Soviet state, part of Belarus and the entire Baltic were occupied by Germany. Huge regions - the Far East, a significant part of Siberia and the Urals, the north and south of the country, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, the Volga region - for a number of years alternately found themselves under the rule of the interventionists or the "governments" and "directorates" associated with them.

A huge danger for the young republic was posed by secret counter-revolutionary organizations, most of which were connected with foreign intelligence services and relied on their help and support.

Hunger and devastation, the flourishing of banditry completed the job. Sometimes it seemed to the enemies of the Soviet government that only a few days remained. And they didn't really hide that the next step was the dismemberment of the country, the brutal suppression of popular uprisings, the liquidation of Russia's independence, its colonization.

The crisis situation required adequate response measures. Already on December 20, 1917, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, the Cheka, was created to combat counter-revolution and sabotage. It was headed by the professional revolutionary F.E. Dzerzhinsky.

Felix Edmundovich's autobiography fit on 2.5 typewritten pages: "I was born in 1877. Studied in Vilna.

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In 1894, being in the 7th grade of the gymnasium, I entered the social democratic circle of self-development; In 1895 I joined the Lithuanian Social Democracy and studied Marxism myself, leading circles of craftsmen and factory apprentices. There I was christened Jacek in 1895. I leave the gymnasium voluntarily in 1896, believing that faith should be followed by deeds and one should be closer to the masses and study with them."

Thus began the revolutionary activity of the future chairman of the Cheka. Then - arrests, prisons, exiles, escapes...

Further in his autobiography, he writes: "Shortly after my arrival in Berlin, in the month of August (1902), our party conference, the Social Democracy of Poland and Lithuania, was convened. I am settling in Krakow to work on communication and assistance to the party from behind the cordon. Since that time I have been called Jozef... In 1912 I moved to Warsaw, on September 1 I was arrested, tried for escaping from the settlement and sentenced to three years in hard labor. In 1914, after the start of the war, they were taken to Oryol, where he served hard labor; sent to Moscow, where he was tried in 1916 for party work of the period 1910-1912. and add another six years of hard labor. The February Revolution freed me from the Moscow Central. Until August I work in Moscow, in August Moscow delegates to the party congress, which elects me to the Central Committee. I am staying to work in Petrograd.

I take part in the October Revolution as a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee, and then, after its dissolution, I am instructed to organize an organ for the fight against counter-revolution - the Cheka (December 7, 1917), of which I am appointed chairman.

Life quickly made its own adjustments: internal and external threats were too closely connected, and soon the Cheka was given intelligence and counterintelligence functions. Thus, due to the peculiarity of the prevailing historical conditions, intelligence turned out to be within the framework of power, repressive structures. It was difficult to separate the fight against internal secret organizations hostile to the new regime, receiving outside help, from counterintelligence and intelligence activities. An example of this is the so-called "conspiracy of ambassadors", well known in history, led by Lockhart. The British intelligence officer prepared it with the help of French and American representatives in Moscow and the British naval attache Cromie in Petrograd. Foreign consulates, using their immunity, gave shelter to Russian terrorists. Boris Savinkov, the leader of the Union for the Defense of the Homeland and Freedom, took refuge in the English consulate in Moscow. The testimony of one of the members of this terrorist organization, Staff Captain Pink, has been preserved: "We received a strong allowance from the allies. We received the allowance in money, but real power was also promised. The Allies expected us to set up a government on behalf of which they would be officially invited. Allied squads

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were mixed, so that neither side had an advantage. The Americans should have taken part too"?

The struggle of the organs of the Cheka with the counter-revolutionary organizations was mainly of a forceful nature. However, in the course of it, methods of reconnaissance activities were also used. Bodies of the Cheka carried out undercover penetration into hostile organizations, obtained information about their plans, personnel, and worked to decompose these organizations from the inside. This is how the basics of reconnaissance art were assimilated. Using the arsenal of means of the former special services, the nascent Soviet intelligence replenished it with its own experience, searched for and found new methods and forms of work, prompted by the peculiar situation, the conditions of the political struggle.

Archival materials show that already from the first months of the existence of the Cheka, attempts were made to conduct intelligence work beyond the cordon.

At the beginning of 1918, Dzerzhinsky attracted the former publisher of the Dengi newspaper, A.F. Filippov, who took a benevolent attitude towards the Soviet authorities, seeing favorable opportunities for the development of Russian statehood in the young republic and its politics. Fortunately, about A.F. Filippov preserved a lot of detailed information. He was sent several times by the chairman of the Cheka with assignments to Finland to collect information about the political situation in the country, the plans of the Finnish political circles and the White Guard in relation to Soviet Russia, the mood of the sailors and soldiers who were in Finland at that time. He managed to convince the tsarist admiral Razvozov to take the lead of the Russian fleet in the Finnish ports and go over to the side of the Soviet government with it. This is the first documented historical fact of establishing cooperation and sending an agent abroad to perform such large-scale and responsible tasks after 1917.

We know a letter sent by Dzerzhinsky in February 1919 to the plenipotentiary in Istanbul, with a request to help an agent of the Cheka in organizing intelligence work from Turkey. From the surviving documents it is clear that the agent acted under the name Sultanov RK. It was established that this was not his real name, but it was not possible to find any additional information about him, although his photograph is preserved in the archives.

With the beginning of the intervention and the Civil War, it became necessary to intensify the fight against the subversive activities of the foreign intelligence services of the army. In December 1918, a decision was made to create a Special Department of the Cheka in the army and navy in order to intensify the fight against counter-revolution and espionage. Special departments were created in the central office of the Cheka, in large military and naval units, and in some provinces.

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The first head of the Special Department of the Cheka was a professional revolutionary M.S. Kedrov. In August 1919, the chairman of the Cheka, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, later a member of the Board of the Cheka V.R. Menzhinsky. One of the future heads of foreign intelligence, A.Kh. Artuzov.

In order to strengthen the management of intelligence work in April 1920, a special subdivision was created within the Special Department of the Cheka - the Foreign Department, and with special departments of fronts, armies, fleets and in some provinces - foreign departments.

The instructions developed for the Foreign Department indicated that for each diplomatic and trade mission of the RSFSR in the capitalist countries, a residency would be created, headed by a resident, who should occupy an official position in the mission and as an intelligence agent could be disclosed only to the head of the mission. . The resident was entrusted with the responsibility of organizing undercover penetration into reconnaissance objects: institutions, parties, organizations, etc. "Each resident," the instruction stated, "sends information to the Center in encrypted form at least once a week"? This was the first step towards creating a network of "legal" residencies. The instruction provided that agents of the VChK should be sent illegally to countries that did not have diplomatic relations with the RSFSR.

Thus, initially, foreign intelligence originated in the depths of the Special Department of the Cheka, having not yet received an independent status and remaining within the structures of the army counterintelligence.

The war with Poland at the beginning of 1920, a complex set of relations with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland, all acutely raised the question of the need for information support for the country's leadership in order to make politically important and responsible decisions. Particularly detrimental was the lack of reliable information on the results of the Polish campaigns.

In April 1920, the ruling circles of Poland, incited by the Entente countries, provoked a war with the RSFSR. Initially, success accompanied the Red Army. Having repelled the offensive of the White Poles, she began to move towards Warsaw. At that moment, the Entente countries and the United States exerted strong pressure on the government of the RSFSR, demanding to stop the offensive. England sent a note to the Soviet government proposing an immediate armistice between Poland and Soviet Russia. The so-called "Curzon Line" was proposed as a border between countries, which on the whole met our interests. The United States, Britain and France provided Poland with very significant material, including military assistance, sent a large amount of weapons to the Polish army,

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equipment, military advisers. The balance of power has clearly changed not in favor of the Red Army.

The Soviet government rejected the British ultimatum and continued their attack on Warsaw. Having suffered a major defeat in the end, it was forced to sign peace with Poland on difficult conditions for itself: it had to cede the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus.

The defeat in the war forced the Soviet leadership to pay even more attention to the issue of intelligence. In September 1920, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) decided on its cardinal

reorganization. In particular, it said: "The weakest point of our military apparatus is, of course, the organization of undercover work, which was especially clearly revealed during the Polish campaign. We went to Warsaw blindly and crashed. Considering the current international situation in which we find ourselves, it is necessary to raise the issue of our intelligence to the proper height. Only serious, well-placed reconnaissance will save us from random blind moves>^.

To develop measures to improve intelligence activities, a special commission was created, which included I.V. Stalin, F.E. Dzerzhinsky and a number of others. On the basis of the proposals developed by the commission, on December 12, 1920, Dzerzhinsky gave the following order to the head of the Cheka: "I ask you to issue a secret order signed by me stating that not a single department of the Cheka has the right to independently send agents or representatives or informers abroad without my consent to that. Draw up a draft order on the Foreign Department of the Cheka (with the liquidation of the Foreign Department of the Special Department of the Cheka) and its head, and that all agents abroad from the Cheka can be sent only by this department?

Such an order of the Cheka No. 169 was signed by Dzerzhinsky on December 20, 1920 and was an administrative and legal act that formalized the creation of the Soviet foreign intelligence service, the legal successor of which is the current Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation.

Taking into account a certain stabilization of the situation in Soviet Russia, as well as changes in the international situation in January 1922, the country's leadership came to the conclusion that further implementation of emergency measures to protect the gains of the revolution was not necessary, and decided to reorganize the Cheka into the State Political Administration (GPU) under the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). After the creation of the USSR, the GPU was transformed into the United State Political Directorate (OGPU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The foreign department - foreign intelligence - became part of the Secret Operational Directorate created in the OGPU and became known as INO

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SOU OGPU. It was significantly expanded and strengthened with personnel, their number in the Center reached 70 people. At that time it was considered a large apparatus. The department was headed by Mikhail Abramovich Trilisser.

The Regulations on INO also determined the tasks of foreign intelligence, which, in order of their priority, were formulated as follows:

- detection on the territory of foreign states of counter-revolutionary organizations conducting subversive activities against our country;
- establishment abroad of governmental and private organizations engaged in military, political and economic espionage;
- coverage of the political line of each state and its government on the main issues of international politics, identification of their intentions towards Russia, obtaining information about their economic situation;
- obtaining documentary materials in all areas of work, including such materials that could be used to compromise both the leaders of counterrevolutionary groups and entire organizations;
- counterintelligence support of Soviet institutions and citizens abroad.

To solve these problems, six geographical sectors were created, which were supposed to be engaged in undercover work abroad. Subsequently, they began to be called departments, and their number increased as the number of residencies grew, the expansion of geographical

the scope of work and the emergence of new areas of intelligence activity. By 1930, the total staff of the INO increased to 122 people, of which 62 were employees of residencies abroad.

Intelligence obtained information not only about the hostile plans and intentions of foreign states in relation to Soviet Russia, but also revealed the forces that advocated the establishment of normal political and economic relations with it. Russia sought to get out of the international isolation that had been created around it.

In other words, a two-pronged task was solved: obtaining reliable information about the anti-Soviet plans of the main capitalist states and providing intelligence forces and means of assistance in breaking through the isolation of Soviet Russia, in developing political and trade relations beneficial for the country with the outside world.

There was also difficult work to be done to strengthen the positions of our country in the states where the special services were preparing subversive actions, trying to turn the border areas into a springboard for anti-Soviet activities.

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Intelligence is, first of all, people. The bulk of the cadres of the Cheka, the emerging counterintelligence and intelligence services were yesterday's underground revolutionaries, members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), people who had boundless faith in a new, just structure of society. Belief in the ideals of communism made them take risks and commit exploits.

At the same time, the pre-revolutionary counterintelligence apparatus was also widely used. It is well known that hundreds of former tsarist generals and senior officers went over to the side of the Soviet government. They helped to re-form the army and navy, to give their actions a purposeful and effective character, to win the first victories and not give up after defeats. But it is less known that many representatives of the old state apparatus, including the most experienced and capable counterintelligence officers and intelligence officers, agreed to put their outstanding abilities at the service of the new government, worked not out of fear, but for conscience, helping to expose conspiracies, reveal plans those who hatched plans for a new intervention, the occupation of Russian lands. The experience of the old cadres was invaluable for the new regime, helping to establish the security organs of the Republic of Soviets.

And what is especially important, acting on the motives of patriotism, realizing that the new government is inevitably aware of the continuity of Russia's geopolitical interests, the need to protect its sovereignty, these people came to the forefront of action, took up delicate state functions even when the counterintelligence, and intelligence did not even take shape. Thanks to their experience, dedication and dedication, it was possible to keep this "front line" until the arrival of cohesive and organized teams of ASSISTANTS.

N.P. Potapov, P.P. Dyakonov, A.A. Yakushev, who occupied major posts in the state apparatus of tsarist Russia, became brilliant employees of Soviet intelligence. Even before the creation of the INO, P.V. acted disinterestedly and bravely on the side of the Reds. Makarov, A.F. Filippov, A.N. Lutsky.

In our opinion, reflections on the motives and actions of these people, as well as many prominent foreign agents who provided invaluable assistance to the USSR, would be of interest to the reader.

The fusion of the experience and reliability of the old cadres with the enthusiasm and conviction of the revolutionary guard constitutes a distinctive feature of the core of Russian intelligence after the October Revolution.

That is why we begin the second volume of the publication with essays on those who voluntarily joined the Soviet foreign intelligence service when it was still at the initial stage of formation, and we will also introduce those who led this honorable but difficult service in the early years.

In the first two decades of the existence of the Soviet state, as already mentioned, one of the main dangers was represented by white émigré organizations that worked closely with foreign intelligence services.

In this struggle for the country's survival, it is difficult to overestimate the role of foreign intelligence. With the help of her agency, she managed to infiltrate practically without exception into all major active white emigre centers, obtained materials on the activities of white emigre, nationalist and foreign intelligence organizations, and led the decomposition anti-Soviet forces.

The reader will find in the volume many essays on these bold and interesting foreign intelligence operations.

In the 1920s, Western countries launched a fierce propaganda campaign against the USSR, grossly distorted its domestic policy, attributed an aggressive character to its foreign policy, and called for the political and economic isolation of the Soviet Union in the international arena. All this caused significant damage to the international prestige of the USSR and hindered the development of its foreign relations, trade and economic relations. In the organization and conduct of this campaign, the leading role was played by the secret services of the Western countries, who used their agents in the Soviet Union for this purpose, as well as white émigré organizations.

In January 1923, Deputy Chairman of the GPU I.S. Unshlikht, in order to organize the fight against enemy propaganda, proposed the creation of a special bureau for disinformation to conduct active reconnaissance.

On January 11, 1923, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Unshlikht's proposal was accepted. Thus, one of the most important areas of activity of the foreign intelligence of the Soviet state was born.

At various stages of intelligence work, operations to disinform the special services of opponents of the Soviet regime had several purely official designations: "actions of influence", "operational disinformation", "active measures", "operational games", "assistance measures", etc. .d. Despite the difference in terms, all of them represented and represent certain targeted actions to mislead the actual or potential enemy about their true intentions or capabilities, as well as to obtain a beneficial, practically unattainable by open methods reaction of the "object of influence" . In the "History of Russian Foreign Intelligence" the reader will find quite a lot of very specific and diverse examples of the successful work of the VChK-OGPU-KGB organs in disinforming the enemy.

The disinformation work carried out by the foreign intelligence service together with the Razveduprom contributed greatly to the protection

true state and military secrets, contributed to the country's foreign policy, helped to explain to the general public the real meaning of the policy pursued by the Soviet state.

In the 1920s, another new direction of activity of foreign intelligence appeared - economic intelligence. The country needed information that would help rebuild the economy and create a new material and technical base for the national economy. The need to establish and develop trade and economic relations with foreign states has increased. In these countries there were both supporters and opponents of the development of relations with Soviet Russia. Their positions needed to be known. The importance that the country's leadership attached to economic intelligence is evidenced, in particular, by a note sent in 1922 to

Head of INO Trilisser, Chairman of the GPU Dzerzhinsky. It emphasizes that materials about the actions of "the industrial, financial, commercial emigrating bourgeoisie are of the utmost importance for the leaders of our economic life." He suggested that the INO increase the extraction of information on economic issues and, together with Kuibyshev, who headed the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in those years, develop a procedure for familiarizing heads of departments and the government with it.

In October 1925, Dzerzhinsky raised the issue of organizing scientific and technical intelligence under the INO OGPU as a special body for obtaining information about technical achievements abroad. Soon such reconnaissance was created and separated into an independent direction of reconnaissance work. After the reorganization carried out in intelligence in accordance with the resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 30, 1930, the 8th branch of the INO began to deal with this work in the Center. The residencies abroad began to work on acquiring agents specially focused on obtaining materials on scientific and technical issues. In 1932, intelligence began to strengthen illegal residences in England, France, the USA, and Germany for this purpose. Fulfilling the requests of Soviet industry and military departments, foreign intelligence was able to obtain a large amount of secret technical information on various industries and types of weapons.

By the mid-1920s, foreign intelligence had managed to create good intelligence positions in a number of countries, including France, England, and especially Germany, "Legal" and illegal residences in Germany were the strongest in those years. The Berlin residency managed to acquire quite valuable sources in government institutions, in counterintelligence agencies, political parties, including the NSDAP, received political information

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people from various circles not only in Germany, but also in a number of neighboring European countries. Thus, in 1922, the Berlin residency received information that some influential representatives of the parliamentary circles and the government of France, in particular Poincaré, were gradually changing their opinion about Soviet Russia in a positive direction and expressing interest in developing relations with it. Such information allowed the Soviet leadership to more confidently pursue a policy of withdrawing the country from diplomatic isolation.

The decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated January 30, 1930 was of great importance in the history of the formation of Soviet foreign intelligence. And yet the work of intelligence did not satisfy the leadership of the country. The complex international situation required coverage of a broader range of issues. First of all, reliable information about the anti-Soviet plans and intentions of the main capitalist states was needed. It was also necessary to strengthen the positions of the USSR in the border countries, where the intelligence and special services of the capitalist states continued to carry out subversive work. It was clear that intelligence needed to be strengthened.

All these questions were considered at the meeting of the Politburo. Intelligence activities were subjected to careful analysis. In the adopted detailed decision, for the first time at a high political and state level, priority areas for reconnaissance work, tasks and directions of its activity were determined. Based on the need to concentrate all reconnaissance forces and means in the main directions, the INO OGPU was proposed to focus its efforts on deploying reconnaissance work primarily against England, France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Japan and the limitrophes - Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland. - LANDS.

Among the tasks set then for foreign intelligence were fundamentally new ones:

- disclosure of interventionist plans developed by the leading circles of England, [Germany, France, Poland, Rumania, Japan, and clarification of the timing of the implementation of these plans;
- revealing the plans of the leading circles of the listed countries for the financial and economic blockade of our state;
- obtaining documents on secret military-political agreements and treaties between the indicated countries;
- obtaining for our industry information about inventions, design and production drawings and diagrams, technical innovations that cannot be obtained in the usual way.

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The country's leadership showed serious concern for its external security, and this was reflected in the tasks assigned to foreign intelligence. The issue of preparing for a war against the USSR became the main subject of concern for Soviet foreign intelligence for many years. Revealing the positions, plans and intentions of the ruling circles of the main capitalist countries increasingly occupied a priority place in intelligence activities.

There were grounds for such concern for the fate of the country. Having suffered a defeat in the intervention against Soviet Russia, the Entente countries decided to use the fact that the Treaty of Versailles did not resolve the contradictions of the capitalist world. On the contrary, he created a broad base for the growth of revanchist and nationalist sentiments in Germany. Not resigned to the loss of its positions on the world stage, the German monopoly bourgeoisie demanded a redistribution of the world, hoping to get more. Expressing her views, the German Ulgra adopted geopolitical theories about the need to conquer the living space for Germany. It was going to war. The Entente countries sought to direct the aggressive aspirations of the German predator to the East and satisfy its appetites at the expense of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, from the second half of the 1920s, foreign intelligence paid more and more attention to the processes taking place in Germany. She closely followed the development of internal political events that could lead to power in the country forces that set revenge, aggression, the seizure of foreign territories, and the establishment of their own order in the world as the main goals of their policy.

Having a source in the immediate circle of the Reich Chancellor of Germany von Papen, Soviet intelligence reported to the country's leadership about his plans to put together an anti-Soviet bloc of European countries for the purpose of war against the USSR.

But the main danger lay ahead. Von Papen's bravado only betrayed the secret plans of the German imperialist bourgeoisie. Von Papen could not have been their leader; they did not associate their hopes for the redivision of the world with his name. Foreign intelligence, relying on information from its sources, including those within the fascist party, accurately predicted Hitler's rise to power and promptly informed the country's leadership about this.

The fact that already at the first, after his accession to the post of Reich Chancellor, secret meeting with the high military command of the German armed forces on February 3, 1933, Hitler proclaimed as the main goals of his policy "the capture of new living space in the East and its merciless Germanization.

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By 1933, when Hitler came to power in Germany, foreign intelligence was already a fully developed structure, with a well-formed central apparatus and almost four dozen foreign residencies with a fairly wide intelligence network.

Some sources of Soviet foreign intelligence were in the close circle of the head of the British government MacDonald, British Foreign Minister Henderson, German Chancellor von Papen, were employees of leading ministries, special services, apparatuses of political parties of capitalist countries.

The capabilities of foreign intelligence corresponded to the tasks set by the government to ensure the national interests of the USSR.

So, the reader is invited to get acquainted with the activities of the Soviet foreign intelligence in 1917-1933. It was during these years that its foundations were laid, experience was accumulated and professional skills were honed. If we take into account the range of tasks that were assigned to intelligence at that time, then the possibility of their implementation by the forces of the apparatus, which numbered only a hundred and a few people, may seem simply unrealistic. Nevertheless, intelligence worked quite successfully. It did not, of course, without failures and even failures. These cases are also reflected in the essays.

The year 1933 was chosen as the final temporal feature of the second volume not by chance. By this time, the stage of formation of the Soviet foreign intelligence had practically ended. 1933 became a turning point in the history of Europe. With the advent of Hitler to power in Germany, preparations began for a new world war. A global crisis of unprecedented power was brewing. Foreign intelligence faced yet another responsible task - to keep in view and, if possible, hinder the preparation of Nazi Germany for an attack on the USSR. But the reader will be told about this in the next, third volume of essays.

The writing of the second volume, as well as the first, was attended by veteran intelligence officers with solid experience in conducting intelligence operations abroad. In their work, they used extensive documentary archival materials, memoirs, and their own memories.

Acquainting the reader with individual episodes, directions and methods of intelligence work, with some outstanding intelligence officers, the authors set the task not only to acquaint him with the difficult, life-threatening, selfless work of intelligence officers for the good of the Motherland, but also to show the place that foreign intelligence occupied in the life of Soviet society, the role it played in ensuring the country's foreign policy, protecting its national interests and strengthening its defense capability.

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The excerpts from documents given in the second volume, to which there are no special references, are taken from the archival files of the SVR, preserving the stylistic features of that time.

'Oositep op Vgÿÿÿÿp ÿÿgeÿsp Roysu, 1919-1939. - I. 1949. - O]. 3. - R 369-370. By Kurdistan, the British obviously meant the regions of Soviet Russia inhabited by Kurds in the Caucasus.

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FSB archive, f. 1, op. 4, por.n. 13, l. 86.

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FSB archive, f. 8, op. 6, por.n. 161, l. 277.

Archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU, sector II, 34-A (6-6), l. 106-109.

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1

"Banker" from the Cheka

- What do you say his name is? Dzerzhinsky asked.

"Alexey Frolovich Filippov," repeated Lunacharsky. Yes, you must have heard of him. At one time he published Revel News, Russian Word, Kuban, Black Sea Coast. He was known as a scandalous newspaperman and was often out of favor with the authorities. He even sat in the fortress for his dashing newspaper assaults on the king and his entourage.

- No no. I don't know such a person and have never heard of him," Dzerzhinsky said after thinking. And he added: – Can his information be trusted? If earlier, before the revolution, as you say, he was repeatedly persecuted by the authorities, how do you know that he would not want to repeat everything from the beginning, only under a new government?

"If I had not known Filippov personally for many years, I would never have recommended him to you, Felix Edmundovich. And the information that Aleksey Frolovich told me is urgent. Is it a joke - the revolution of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the murder of Lenin!

This conversation took place at the end of December 1917, and a week later, on January 1, 1918, the Social Revolutionary uprising began, which was suppressed. The issue of trust in information A.F. Filippova disappeared by itself.

Shortly after these events, during a break between meetings of the Council of People's Commissars, Dzerzhinsky returned to Filippov's personality in a conversation with People's Commissar Lunacharsky.

- And what is your friend doing now, Anatoly Vasilyevich? he suddenly asked. — Does he continue his newspaper and publishing activity?

Wants to start a new newspaper business. But while sitting on the rocks.

- Could you, Anatoly Vasilyevich, do me the courtesy of introducing you to your friend? Get in touch with me - good. It won't work, it's his business. By the way, how did he take our revolution?

"I greeted her with all my heart," replied Lunacharsky.

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- That's excellent. I am waiting for him the day after tomorrow, at 12 o'clock in the afternoon, in my office.

Thus, Dzerzhinsky met one of the prominent representatives of the newspaper publishing business in Russia, 47-year-old Alexei Frolovich Filippov, known in the banking and financial circles of those days under the nickname Banker.

Recalling later about this acquaintance, Alexei Frolovich wrote in his diary:

"He (Dzerzhinsky) invited me to help him. It was at the very foundation of the Cheka, on Gorokhovaya, 2, when there were only four workers. I agreed, and moreover, free of charge, without receiving payment, to give him the information that I heard in industrial, banking and partly conservative circles (for at that time they were afraid of counter-revolutionary actions by the Black Hundreds).

But Dzerzhinsky recommended that work on collecting information be postponed for the time being.

"The main thing that worries the government now," said Felix Edmundovich, "is the state of the financial and banking business in the country. I will ask you, Alexey Frolovich, to prepare for me a detailed note on the state of affairs with our bank accounts and finances, taking into account the detrimental consequences caused by the strike of bank employees.

A.F. Filippov successfully coped with this work. It was not difficult for him, a graduate of the law faculty of Moscow University, to get in touch with the "luminaries" of the financial world of Moscow and Petrograd, who were familiar from his journalistic activities in the pre-revolutionary period. One of them, the Petrograd banker Zakhary Zhdanov, introduced Aleksey Frolovich into the narrow circle of the former financial tycoons of St. Petersburg.

Dzerzhinsky and Filippov began to meet constantly, their official contact gradually turned into a great personal friendship. Once, Dzerzhinsky asked Alexei Frolovich how he would react to the opportunity to go to Finland and, in addition to purely financial and banking news, bring political information from there.

"Your journalistic background will provide an excellent opportunity to collect information of interest to us," continued the chairman of the Cheka. ~ You can interview and talk confidentially with any person, attend any meeting and, of course, be a guest of any editorial office, even the most Black Hundred. Think, Alexey Frolovich, and take your time with the answer. It is a responsible matter and... - here Dzerzhinsky paused and added: - Risky... And we will select the newspaper - the newspaper on behalf of which you will act as a correspondent ...

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Thus, judging by the surviving archival materials, a precedent appeared for the withdrawal of an unspoken employee of the Cheka to work overseas for intelligence purposes. This happened in January 1918, that is, almost three years before the formation of the Foreign Department of the Cheka.

Alexey Frolovich Filippov was carried away by the proposed work. His information from Finland was extremely valuable.

"F.E. Dzerzhinsky (personally and confidentially). After a conversation with the Chairman of the People's Commissioners, Manner, I had a firm conviction that the Finnish government wants to maintain strict neutrality and will not take any actions that could cause interference in their affairs by any foreign power," said Alexei Frolovich to your addressee.

"German troops are planning to start capturing the Baltic Fleet based in Finnish ports. Without this, even the capture of Petrograd will not give them the desired victory. It is necessary to convince each of the crews of the ships located in this country of the importance of a common performance, since the Germans are only afraid of the fleet," said A.F. in another message. Filippova.

The reader may get the impression that the foreign correspondent F.E. Dzerzhinsky was a man very close to the problems of military strategy and well versed in the plans of the German command. To a certain extent, this was true. However, in fairness, it should be noted that the high military-political erudition acquired by Filippov during his work in Finland was only one of the components of the analytical talent of this outstanding specialist. Based on random information in the diplomatic corps of the Finnish capital, a brief newspaper report in the press or a conversation with a German businessman who was passing through Helsinki (Helsingfors), Alexei Frolovich had a clear idea of the state of affairs in general and the degree of danger of this situation for Soviet Russia in the first place. queue. An example of such analytical information is the following communication by Filippov:

"The situation of the Russian troops in Finland is the most desperate. Germany intends to put military pressure on Petrograd from the north and push Russia away from the sea in order to seize large food supplies in Helsingfors and Vyborg. It is planned to capture the Aland Islands by German troops. Urgent measures are needed," Filippov warned.

No less important for Soviet Russia was operational information from Finland about the state of the Russian fleet.

"The Baltic Fleet," wrote Aleksey Frolovich, "was hardly repaired due to the lack of the necessary materials for this (dyes, steel, lead, iron, lubricants). At the same time, these products are almost openly sent from Petro

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hail to Finland with subsequent reshipment through Finnish ports to Germany. The center of such criminal transactions is the cafe of the Petrograd "European" hotel, and the point of departure is Gutuevsky Island and the connecting line with the Finnish railways...

Of course, Filippov's "favorite dish" in the information menu was information about foreign exchange and financial transactions in Finland. And here Alexei Frolovich found the right turn, which would help solve Russian national problems.

"The unprecedented and unjustified arbitrary depreciation of the Russian ruble in Finland," Alexei Frolovich reported to Moscow, "is entailing great disasters for the Russian population. Finland buys our rubles at a low price and then sells them to Germany. In addition, payments for goods coming from Russia to Finland are made by Finnish banks in artificially devalued rubles, which leads to the outflow of banknotes abroad, while Russia does not receive the Finnish currency it needs. I propose to act in such a way that all settlements are made without fail through the Russian State Bank."

Information by A.F. Filippov about the state of affairs in Finland and around this country often became the subject of discussion by the government of the RSFSR. In some cases, when it was of a particularly important and confidential nature, V.I. Lenin.

February 15, 1918 Alexey Frolovich writes a note to F.E. Dzerzhinsky:

"Tomorrow I return back with a full, very important report. I am now conveying my most urgent request to talk to Ilyich about not taking decisive measures before we and you I'll take a date."

In this note, Filippov reported on the strengthening of the Finnish White Guard, on the activation of the German navy in the area of the Aland Islands, on the possibility of withdrawing a detachment of Russian ships to Kronstadt by tugboats, on rendering assistance to the Republic of Finland with food, fuel and lubricants, and warned of the need to take measures so that our supplies do not fall into the hands of the White Guards or, even worse, into the hands of the German army.

Aleksey Frolovich enjoyed great and well-deserved trust of Dzerzhinsky and performed tasks not only of an informational nature. It is known that the head of the Cheka asked Filippov to study in Finland and Reval (Tallinn) the work of the counterintelligence units of the tsarist army that had settled there after the revolution and make suggestions about the possibility of using them in the interests of the Cheka. Aleksey Frolovich successfully fulfilled this order, and a memorandum on the work done was placed on Dzerzhinsky's desk. In her resume

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It was believed that all these institutions "have the shortcomings of the former regime and, with a few exceptions, consist of officials who are only interested in salaries, but by no means in the results of work." Filippov recommended that instead of the old structures, the creation of "military control bodies" would give the Soviet government daily information by radio about the movement of German troops in the Baltic. His note to A.F. Filippov concluded with words addressed not only to Dzerzhinsky, but also to the government of Soviet Russia: "Issue the decree on counterintelligence immediately!"

In March 1918, Aleksey Frolovich returned from Finland to Petrograd, and then moved to Moscow, where he was made a tempting offer: the position of chief expert in drafting the charter of military counterintelligence and a salary of 500 rubles, which at that time was quite significant. amount (approximately corresponded to the salary of the Deputy People's Commissar). At the very moment when Aleksey Frolovich, as it seemed to him, was engaged in the work befitting his knowledge and experience, in the hands of the Chairman of the Petrograd Cheka, M.S. Uritsky turned out to be a letter intercepted by the Chekists from the merchant Goryadin, in which he claimed that A.F. Filippov was allegedly involved in compiling and distributing leaflets with anti-Semitic content in public places on behalf of the headquarters of the underground organization "Camorra of People's Reprisal". M.S. Uritsky was not very sympathetic to Filippov, obviously envious of Dzerzhinsky's good disposition towards him. Having "convincing compromising evidence" in his hands, M.S. Uritsky ordered the arrest of Alexei Frolovich and, under escort, to deliver him from Moscow to the famous Petrograd prison Crosses.

Filippov is completely at a loss. Yesterday - a high chair in a solid office, today - prison bunks.

The man was in trouble. How did his yesterday's friends and acquaintances, comrades at work, react to him? Did they extend a helping hand to him or hide it behind his back? Aleksey Frolovich wrote more than a dozen letters addressed to influential people in the state. Most of them did not respond to the scout's pleas for help. The rest split into

opinions: to help or not.

"I don't have any data incriminating Filippov," wrote P.P. Krestinsky. "New in all the cases when he addressed me, he gave me the impression of a man with ulterior motives, who sought to serve the interests not of ours, which he spoke about, but of other persons." (Did P.P. Krestinsky then think that the accusation of him that he served the interests of "not ours" would lead the former commissioner for justice two decades later to the dock, from which he would go to be shot?)

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Responded to the request of A.F. Filippov to "understand" his case only F.E. Dzerzhinsky. On July 30, 1918, he sent a letter to the Petrograd Cheka with the following content:

"Tov. Uritsky.

Dear comrade! A.F. contacted me. Filippov with a request to understand his position, that he is sitting in vain. I will not expand, I am writing to you because I consider it my duty to do so in relation to him as an employee of the Commission. I would only ask you to notify me of what exactly he is accused of. With regards, F. Dzerzhinsky."

Fortunately for Aleksey Frolovich, the investigation of his "crimes" did not last long. Already on September 3, 1918, Filippov was released from custody and left Kresty. An entry appeared in his personal file: "To the presented by A.F. He has nothing to do with Filippov's accusations. Based on the foregoing, we consider the present case completed and subject to storage in the archives of the Commission."

The next day after his release, Aleksey Frolovich again, as if nothing had happened, went to work.

— What will you do now? - the head of the internal security of the Petrograd Cheka asked him, betraying A.F. Filippov temporary pass.

- Work and only work! Filippov answered.

- We have? The head of security raised his eyebrows in surprise.

- Yes! Right here. In the Cheka," Alexei Frolovich said firmly.

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Adjutant of His Excellency

Witnesses and main characters of this extraordinary story have long been dead. No documentary materials have been preserved. Therefore, we will tell it as it appears according to the memoirs of its protagonist published ten years after the events!: this book became a bibliographic rarity back in the 1930s. The main outline of the essay is known to the reader from the film of the same name. However, in reality, much, apparently, was both more complicated and much simpler.

In the summer of 1919, Denikin's army successfully advanced along the entire front. The White Guard press claimed that in another month or two, the White troops would march victoriously through the streets of Moscow.

Rostov in those days looked festive and smart. Dapper officers with ladies strolled through the streets, horse patrols rushed from time to time.

One of these patrols, approaching the Moskovskaya Hotel, unexpectedly dismounted, and the Cossack officer, throwing the reins to the orderly, with a business folder rushed along the carpet to the office of the commander of the Volunteer Army, General Mai-Maevsky.

What can I serve? - A tall, dapper captain with adjutant aiguillettes met him with a question.

— An urgent package from the front to His Excellency.

- You were unlucky. The general left a quarter of an hour ago and will be back only tomorrow. May I be of service to you? the adjutant offered graciously.

"I have no opportunity to wait," replied the Cossack officer. — I would ask you, captain, to hand over this package to General Mai-Maevsky at the first opportunity. The package contains a plan for the regrouping of our troops before marching on Moscow. Sign to receive...

The captain took the package, put his signature in the registration book and put the documents in the safe.

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"That will be more reliable," said the adjutant of the commander, smiling at his thoughts.

Even in a bad dream, the Cossack officer could not assume that the adjutant of His Excellency General Mai-Maevsky was the red underground Pavel Makarov. By the will of fate, he ended up in the very thick of Denikin's military "kitchen", had direct access to all secret documents that came to the commander of the Volunteer Army. Pavel understood perfectly well what an invaluable service he could render to his own if he had the opportunity to regularly transmit the contents of these documents to the command of the Red Army. This possibility is not

was: he was in a dense enemy environment, but was intensely looking for a way out of the given position.

Pavel Makarov infiltrated the headquarters of the White Army with the intention of creating a military organization in its rear. Once on the territory occupied by the enemy, he took advantage of the favorable situation and took a position at the headquarters of the White Army, which even titled persons did not dare to dream of. It happened quite unexpectedly.

At the beginning of 1918, on the instructions of the Sevastopol regional revolutionary headquarters, he was sent with a small group of agitators to several regions of the Crimea with the task of attracting volunteers to the Red Army. The group printed an appeal to the population and held a number of rallies. The campaign was successful.

In one of the districts beyond Perekop, where the group arrived, they were informed that the Germans were advancing and the local authorities were evacuating, since it was dangerous to remain.

Makarov decided to go to Melitopol. However, the entry of the Germans into the city was also expected there. Pavel hurried to get out of the city, but on the way he was captured by a patrol of Drozdovites?.

The officer rudely asked who he was and where he was going. There was nowhere to go, and Makarov reported in a military manner that he was a staff captain, promoted to captain on the Romanian front.

- Which regiment, who is the commander? Questions poured in one after another.

- 134th Feodosia regiment. Regiment commander Shevardin. The regiment stood on the Seret River.

- Right!

The officer smiled.

I enlist you in the third company.

Private Makarov really served in this regiment during the First World War, but rose only to the rank of ensign, was wounded and shell-shocked. What to do next?

The first thought that came to mind was to run. Take advantage of the opportunity, break away from the company and start looking for your own. But then I thought: where are they, their own? The entire south is on fire. fast

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the pace of the formation of the white army. He understood that the Civil War was starting... But what if he stayed with the Whites and tried to benefit the Red Army? Get in touch with the underground party committee, and then decide how to help your own...

The more Paul thought, the more he became convinced of the need to organize underground work in the white troops. He decided to break into a staff job, although he understood that he did not have sufficient education for this. He decided to use for this purpose such a pretext as wounds and shell shock, which, as you know, sometimes frees him from military service. In addition, on the Romanian front, for some time he was engaged in encryption business. This is also a big plus for working at headquarters.

When the Drozdovites arrived in Stavropol, Makarov decided to take steps to infiltrate the headquarters of the detachment. Many officers already knew about his injury and shell shock, but there were many such people in the detachment. Then he unobtrusively mentioned a past job as a cipher clerk. This information reached Major General Drozdovsky. He summoned Makarov for a conversation, asked a few questions about his past service, and ordered that Captain Makarov be seconded to

to his headquarters. So the red agitator ended up at the headquarters of the White Guard detachment, which was soon reorganized into a DIVISION.

After Drozdovsky was severely wounded, the division was temporarily taken over by Lieutenant General V.Z. May Mayevsky. He bravely fought in the First World War, commanded a guards corps, had golden weapons and St. George's crosses of the 3rd and 4th degrees, was awarded the orders of Anna, Vladimir, Stanislav 1st degree. According to political views - a convinced monarchist, by nature - straightforward, did not like to engage in intrigues.

However, despite the military service record, the Drozdovites received the general rather coldly. They did not recognize as equals those who did not fight under Drozdovsky. Unflattering remarks about Mai-Maevsky could often be heard in private conversations, including among staff officers.

The general felt hostility towards himself on the part of the Drozdov officers and tried to rely on more loyal "newbies". In the current situation, he was interested in knowing about the moods of his subordinates, and Pavel in a cautious manner conveyed to him some of the officer's "gossip".

Gradually, the general gained confidence in Makarov, asking where he fought, where he was wounded, about his family, about his origins. Pavel introduced himself as the son of the former head of the Syzran-Vyazemskaya railway and said that their family estate was located in the Ryazan province. This area was far behind the Reds, and the possibility of verification was difficult.

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The general began to call him more often, to give personal assignments. Makarov tried to fulfill them quickly and accurately. Reporting on the performance, I often heard: "Well done, captain."

After the death of Drozdovsky, May-Maevsky was appointed head of the division. He summoned Makarov to his office and asked:

"Would you like to be my personal adjutant?"

- Your Excellency, I am grateful to you for your trust, but there are participants in the Kornilov hike...

"I am free to make such appointments at my own discretion. From now on, you will be my personal adjutant. Today I will issue an order about this in an order.

So Pavel Makarov became the adjutant of General Mai-Maevsky. Soon the general took over the corps, and then the army. Pavel became an adjutant to the commander of the army.

Many offspring of the noble nobility served in the army headquarters, the headquarters was visited by princes, counts and other noble persons. The adjutant had to be able to "rotate in the light." I had to learn the rules of etiquette on the go, kiss the ladies' hands, bow, snap their spurs and bow according to their ranks and ranks.

Pavel Makarov quickly learned how to draw up standard staff documents and developed a tactic of behavior. He paid special attention to the latter circumstance. In order not to get into a mess, he tried to be restrained in conversations, he was more silent and listened. Such behavior of a person holding a position with a big boss looked both natural and commendable.

Achieved by the underground? it was a big win. But certain circumstances worried Paul. One of them was the wary attitude of the head of the convoy, General Prince Murat.

Although the prince, in his official position, was not subordinate to the adjutant, he received all the instructions of the commander only through him and was largely dependent on Makarov. This circumstance aroused hostility in the head of the convoy, it was felt that he would not come to terms with the idea that a simple trench officer occupied a more influential position than a well-born general. Hence the desire to carefully observe the adjutant, try to look for facts that would compromise him, or even simply spread gossip about him.

Murat was becoming dangerous for Pavel, and he had to be removed from the road as soon as possible. The reason for the removal of the prince from office was the cruelty in the treatment of the local population, gross interference in the affairs of civil authorities. This was used to compromise him.

At every opportunity, as if by chance, Pavel tried to let the commander know that the local authorities had again received complaints about the prince's arbitrariness. Makarov referred to the action

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serious conflict situations that constantly arose between military and civilian the authorities.

After a while, Pavel felt that the general began to change his attitude towards the head of the convoy. And one day he said to the general:

"Your Excellency, another complaint against Prince Murat. Allegedly, he is involved in dark deeds, Yes, and speaks unflatteringly about you.

- And who will replace him?

"Prince Adamov, an officer of the convoy, could be a very good candidate," Makarov replied. "Combat officer and loyal to you.

- Prepare an order.

Two days later, Prince Adamov took command of the convoy, and Murat was sent to the front line. Pavel liked Adamov, behaved modestly, willingly carried out orders, informed about incidents and news that became known to him.

Before Adamov was appointed, Makarov talked to him, cautiously promising to support him in his promotion. Leading the convoy, Adamov realized what His Excellency's adjutant had done for him, and became a devoted man to Makarov.

The purge surrounded by the commander on Murat did not end. In the same way, they managed to remove two more officers and replace them with people whom Pavel trusted.

The most difficult problem that could not be solved in any way remained the connection with one's own. Several attempts to reach underground organizations in Rostov and Kharkov failed. Many of the organizations were destroyed by Denikin's counterintelligence, their members, as a rule, were shot without trial. Yes, and Makarov did not have time to search for underground workers. He was constantly with the commander and could leave only in rare cases.

One day Makarov asked the general to go to Sevastopol for two weeks on the pretext of visiting his sick mother. A day later he was at home. Seeing Pavel in an officer's uniform, brother Vladimir was shocked. But soon everything became clear. Vladimir was an underground Bolshevik, and through him Pavel hoped to establish contact with the command of the Red Army. Vladimir approved of his brother's actions. He himself had to leave with the retreating comrades, but due to a breakdown in the car, he ended up in the rear of the Germans and whites. Vladimir proposed to Pavel a plan to establish a connection

with his own: to move to Kharkov himself, closer to the headquarters of the Dobroarmiya, contact the underground, receive secret information from Pavel and pass it across the front line.

After the vacation was over, the brothers arrived in Kharkov. Pavel took up his duties, and Vladimir settled in the city and began to study the situation. It soon became clear that the main underground had been uncovered by counterintelligence, and provocateurs were operating in organizations that remained untouched.

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It was decided to place Vladimir at the army headquarters as a volunteer. He "did not pull" as an officer, since he did not serve in the army. The idea was that, being at Pavel's hand, Vladimir could carry out his tasks of establishing communication.

Vladimir received a detailed briefing from his brother and was ready to appear before his superiors.

"Look," Pavel told him, "stretch out like a military man, answer: "That's right," "no way." Don't say "yes", "ok".

Having seized a convenient moment, Pavel told the commander that his brother had come to him, who did not have time to graduate from a military school because of the revolution, and asked the general to enroll him in a convoy or security company.

- You're such a freak! Tell the general on duty to enlist him as an orderly for me.

The general talked to Vladimir, and he took up his duties.

Days, weeks passed, but there was no opportunity for communication. Only sporadically did Vladimir manage to send information over the front line. The brothers then decided to focus their attention on infiltrating the headquarters of the Volunteer Army.

They chose Mai-Maevsky himself as the central object. He treated his brothers with confidence, especially Paul, who was the only person who could enter him at any time without a report. Pavel met with the general from the very morning and accompanied him everywhere, even brought him often from personal meetings so drunk that he could not move independently, organized a "hangover". By mutual agreement, he explained to the staff officers the absence of the commander due to a cold or other ailments. The behavior of the commander, of course, affected the leadership of the army. Often the chief of staff, General Efimov, could not get through to Mai-Maevsky for days. As a result, orders to the troops were given out of time, and this affected the preparation of combat operations.

The situation worsened after the general got acquainted with the family of the Kharkov rich Zhmudsky. The general was attracted by their adopted daughter Anna Petrovna, for whom he had tender feelings. The youngest daughter Katya was not indifferent to Pavel. We went on dates together.

This suited the general, he even advised Pavel to marry a beautiful and rich girl. But Makarov needed something else. Through Katya Zhmudskaya, he had the opportunity to influence Anna Petrovna. More than once, when a critical situation developed at the front, Pavel called Katya and, asking her to spend the evening with him, arranged through her and Anna Petrovna an invitation to dinner for the general.

Mai-Maevsky could not refuse, and in the evening he appeared at the Zhmudskys'. Dinner was accompanied by copious libations, and Vladimir

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Zenonovich then stayed with his lady almost until the morning. And the next day, as a rule, having abandoned all the cases, he slept off.

In addition to visiting the Zhmudskys, Makarov used other pretexts to entertain the commander. He organized invitations to performances by gypsies, famous singers, meetings of the Kharkov merchants, dinners in the houses of large landowners, industrialists ... May Maevsky returned from there drunk to smithereens.

At the same time, using the rivalry between the commanders of corps and divisions, Pavel tried to bring discord into the plans for the operational interaction of units. The corps commanders Kutepov and Yuzefovich treated each other with hostility. General Kutepov loved denunciations and encouraged his subordinates in this. The general's shortcoming was known to many, and Makarov took advantage of it to quarrel him with Yuzefovich. This directly affected the combat operations of the corps. When the Reds pressed on Kutepov's corps, Yuzefovich, instead of supporting his neighbor, withdrew his own from their positions. As a result, the red units went to the flank of Kutepov's corps and inflicted heavy losses on him.

Kutepov was angry, he considered Yuzefovich's actions as a kind of tripping and for a long time could not forgive the offense. Being the backbone of the Volunteer Army, the corps acted side by side, but there was no need to talk about interaction.

The adjutant of His Excellency also introduced confusion into the leadership of the troops during their retreat under the blows of the Red Army. Of the reports that came to the commander, he reported those that no longer corresponded to the changed situation at the front. The rest were handed over to Vladimir, and he destroyed them without hindrance, since there was no registration. The orders given by the commanders ran counter to the measures taken by the unit commanders and increased the confusion among the troops.

The head of the counterintelligence of the army, Colonel Shchukin, felt something was wrong, he knocked down in search of the red conspirators, but did not achieve tangible results. Even when the front was stable, he proposed to the commander a number of measures to combat the corrupting activities of the Reds in the rear of the army.

Once, having appeared in the reception room, he asked Makarov to report to the commander of his request for an appointment on an urgent matter. Mai-Maevsky immediately received Shchukin. The colonel nodded in Pavel's direction.

- Nothing, you can speak in front of the adjutant.

Shchukin reported that, in his opinion, communists were working at the army headquarters, despite the measures taken. Operational reports disappear, various rumors spread, someone is trying to undermine the authority of His Excellency.

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The general politely interrupted the counterintelligence officer and said to him:

"Colonel, the last thing you need to worry about is my authority. Pay more attention to military units. You should be aware that at present the army is eighty percent prisoners. This is a constant threat: at the slightest failure, the army can burst like a soap bubble. That's where you look for, eradicate the infection of decay. The rest is nonsense.

After this meeting, Shchukin somewhat reduced his agility in spying on the employees of the army headquarters. However, when the retreat began along the entire front, counterintelligence again took up the check of the headquarters. But it was not possible to understand the causes of failures in command and control of troops.

In the meantime, Vladimir began to speak to his brother more and more often about the need to move to the Crimea, he suggested organizing an underground committee there and starting to prepare an uprising in the rear of the Whites. Pavel prepared documents for his leave, and Vladimir left for Sevastopol. He himself decided to stay at Mai-Maevsky and act in the future according to the situation.

The situation at the front worsened. Mai-Maevsky more and more cheered himself up with alcohol. One day General Shkuro came to see him. He was interested in the commander's assessment of the situation at the front.

"The situation is not important, it's hard to hold the Reds now," Mai-Maevsky answered him.

- Throw, father, this shop! Let's go to Italy. You won't save the situation anyway. Tell me, do you have money? Shkuro laughed ironically. - And then I'll give you, I have twenty millions. Enough for life.

"Stop all that nonsense, Andryusha," the commander said seriously, poring over the map. - I'm looking at how to level the front, at least temporarily delay the advance of the Reds.

"Now it's too late," Shkuro interrupted, "it was necessary to equalize earlier.

Shkuro announced that he was going to Denikin's headquarters, and from there to Italy. When he left, Mai-Maevsky looked after him with displeasure.

- Fight with such people, captain, - and, cursing, again bent over the map.

Makarov continued to manipulate the reports. The general cursed that he had not received this or that information earlier, but, given the chaos of the retreat, he did not think about the reasons for the late report.

— I understand that they are not up to reports there, but at least they were informed verbally!

One day a package arrived from Denikin's headquarters for the commander personally. The liaison officer handed it directly to Mai-Maevsky. Makarov got worried: could this be related to Vladimir's activities in Sevastopol?

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After reading the message, the general handed it to Makarov. It said:

"Dear Vladimir Zenonovich, I am sad to write this letter, reliving your heroic struggle to hold the Donets Basin and capture the cities: Yekaterinoslav, Poltava, Kharkov, Kiev, Kursk, Orel.

Recent events have shown that cavalry plays the main role in this war. Therefore, I decided: to transfer parts of Baron Wrangel to your front, subordinating the Volunteer Army to him, and to recall you to my disposal. I am firmly convinced that this will be a complete success in our further struggle against the Reds. The motherland demands this, and I hope that you will not go against it. With sincere respect to you

Anton Denikin.

Mai-Maevsky sighed, said that he had been waiting for this for a long time, and ordered Pavel to separate his carriage from the train, to prepare the locomotive. Prior to the arrival of Wrangel, he handed over the affairs to the chief of staff.

Arriving in Taganrog, May-Maevsky, accompanied by Makarov, went to Denikin's headquarters.

After the conversation and dinner, the commander-in-chief asked where May Maevsky intended to stay. The general asked to be allowed to stay in Sevastopol. Denikin agreed with this and said that he would instruct the commandant of the Sevastopol fortress, General Subbotin, to take care of the arrangement of Mai-Maevsky in the city.

Before meeting with Denikin, the general intended to stay in Kislovodsk or Novorossiysk. But this did not suit Makarov, and he convinced the boss to agree to move to Sevastopol.

This was very important for Makarov, since Mai-Maevsky, according to the situation, was supposed to receive front-line reports and other secret documents. The local authorities treated Mai-Maevsky's arrival in Sevastopol with caution. He was allocated a rich mansion. The newspapers wrote that he would soon take up the post of commander-in-chief for the civilian part and would be equal in rights to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of southern Russia.

Even before Mai-Maevsky arrived in Sevastopol, Vladimir managed to organize an underground committee to prepare an uprising. The Committee launched active agitation work among the population and military units, and militant worker squads began to be created at some factories and plants.

General Subbotin ordered his chief of staff to send top secret operational reports to Mai-Maevsky. Pavel received these reports on receipt, secretly made copies of them and handed them over to Vladimir.

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Since the reports contained a lot of materials about the defeats suffered by the white army along the entire front, the underground committee used them in its agitation and propaganda work. Often, information from the reports was used in leaflets that were pasted around the city. The effect they produced was enormous. In particular, they talked about the transition of entire divisions to the side of the Reds, about the arrest of Kolchak, about the catastrophe of the Denikin front. Under the Polish, of course, they understood that they were taking risks and the counterintelligence of the whites could "figure out" the source of information. Pavel understood this too, but saw no other way out for himself.

Once, at a dinner at Mai-Maevsky's, he overheard the following conversation:

— Vladimir Zenonovich, an interesting thing: operational reports are received by the captain, a participant in the Ice Campaign, reports are sent to us from him. No one reads them except me, the chief of staff, and you, and meanwhile they are pasted up all over the city. Apparently, there is a receiving station intercepting them.

Mai-Maevsky was struck by this message. He confirmed that immediately after reading the report, he burns it. After that, Makarov decided to be more careful, but did not stop working with reports.

The uprising in the city was scheduled for January 23. The situation seemed to be favorable. The local garrison was ready to take an active part in the uprising. Communication was also maintained with warships. Port workers prepared for its capture, a subversive group was preparing an operation to disable some ships.

The brothers thoroughly discussed the details of the future uprising and its leadership. Paul was concerned about the reliability of the committee. Vladimir assured that the guys are persistent, you can rely.

But the day before the uprising, members of the committee, including Vladimir, were arrested by naval counterintelligence. Massive arrests began in the city. Pavel felt himself being watched. He tried to enlist Mai-Maevsky's help in order to free his arrested brother. The general listened to his adjutant and said:

— Do you know that your brother was the chairman of an underground organization and that everything was prepared for the uprising?

At that moment the door of the room opened and a group of officers entered with revolvers in their hands. Pavel was arrested and taken to the naval counterintelligence.

The next day he was given a newspaper with a report about the arrest of the committee and the execution of its members. In the first place among the names of the executed was the name of the brother.

Soon, Pavel learned that in a day or two he would be taken to the North Side - the place of executions. An escape plan was quickly hatched. Of the suicide bombers, only six agreed to escape.

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They decided to escape in the evening during dinner. The whole day Paul was tormented by the thought: what if these six people refuse? One can't get out of here. But the decision was firm ~ death in combat is better than at the hands of an executioner.

During dinner, Pavel warned his comrades: "We'll start in a few minutes." He shouted to the sentry to urgently, on a very important matter, call the guard commander. When he arrived, Makarov whispered to him:

- Lieutenant, I have a very important matter, let's go into my cell for a minute, I can't talk in front of everyone.

When they entered the cell, Pavel said:

"Wait here a minute, I'll bring the document.

And, without waiting for consent, he went out the door and immediately closed it with a bolt.

He signaled to his accomplices, who attacked the sentries and took their rifles. The group then broke into the guardroom and instantly disarmed the rest of the guards.

The guard was so confused that they offered no resistance. And there were 40 guards in total Human.

With weapons in their hands, the prisoners left the fortress and fled the city. Shots were fired after them, but the distance was great and the bullets did no harm.

We spent the night in a remote village. Later they moved to an even more secluded place, where they managed to form a small partisan unit. Soon it grew into a large rebel detachment and, ultimately, into a rebel army in the Crimea. Makarov became the commander of the regiment of this army ...

And what about General May-Maevsky? After Makarov's arrest, he found himself in even greater disgrace. Flatly refusing to go abroad, he stayed in Sevastopol and continued to drink. On October 30, 1920, he died at the age of 53.

After the defeat of Wrangel, Pavel Makarov worked in the Cheka, fought against the gangs that were then operating in the Crimea. Makarov's activities were reported to Moscow.

In 1921, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 2nd Cavalry Army, Konstantin Makoshin, was illegally sent to Turkey, where Wrangel's troops were at that time, with a special assignment. The mission was extremely dangerous. Instructing Makoshin, Dzerzhinsky strongly recommended that he meet and consult with Pavel Makarov, about whom he spoke very well.

After the Civil War, Pavel Vasilyevich wrote his memoirs. And when the Great Patriotic War began, the Chekist again took up arms. He became one of the leaders of the Crimean partisans.

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After the Great Patriotic War, Makarov's memoirs "Partisans of Tavria" were published, which included vivid episodes of the struggle against the Nazis for the Crimea.

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Makarov P.V. Adjutant General Mai-Maevsky. - L.: "Surf", 1929. - S. 12.

2 Drozdovites - military personnel of the division of Major General of the Volunteer Army Mikhail Gordeevich Drozdovsky (1881-1919).

3 Subsequently, after the creation of the INO VChK, the so-called "illegals".

5

Storm barometer

... Nature, as it were, deliberately tried to scatter frequent copses over the endless ridge of hills overgrown with small bushes. It was easy to hide behind them, get into the depths of the territory of Transbaikalia controlled by the border guards and deceive the vigilant guards of the border. Two scouts, successfully equipped as local Buryats, on a peasant wagon with hay, which dozens passed, calmly and slowly moved ... right into the hands of the border guards. It was 1918.

The Japanese intelligence officers did not suspect that the Russians knew in advance the exact place of the border crossing, the approximate time, and even the size of the task force. The border guards did not know only the real names of the spies and some details of their further secret actions. But this gap was quickly closed. During the seizure and search, in the clothes of spies, skillfully sewn letters were found in Russian and Japanese, addressed respectively to the chief of staff of the Far Eastern Committee for the Defense of the Motherland and the Constituent Assembly, General Khreschatitsky, and the Consul of Japan in Irkutsk, Mr. Sugino. They outlined Tokyo's secret plans for the Far East and gave instructions for the further use of scouts Dzigino and Abe, who were hiding under Buryat clothes.

The captured scouts confessed that they acted on the instructions of the Harbin branch of the Japanese special services and were supposed to obtain "as many as possible" secret large-scale topographic maps of Transbaikalia and Primorye, as well as information about the condition and capacity of the only railway line passing through Soviet territory.

The most interesting information for the Chekists was information about Japanese agents in Primorye, with whom Dzigino and Abe were to meet during their espionage trip to Soviet Russia. The Japanese called names, safe houses and places of work

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four "responsible" Russian citizens with whom Japanese intelligence once established secret ties. One of them was Colonel Korzin, former head of the military topographic department of the Irkutsk military district, who was in an illegal position.

Among the Chekists who met the Japanese "guests" on Russian territory was the former staff captain of the tsarist army, Alexei Nikolaevich Lutsky. Through reliable agents in the Japanese intelligence group in Harbin, he knew about the plans for the penetration of Japanese spies into the territory of Transbaikalia. Moreover, Lutsky was personally acquainted with some employees of the Japanese special services, including the Harbin consul Sato.

The thirty-seven-year-old native of Kozelsk, after graduating from the theological seminary, first went to serve in the army, and then became a professional intelligence officer. Perhaps no one, except Alexei Nikolaevich himself, could explain the rapid changes in his fate in such a figurative way.

"Every person," Alexey Nikolaevich joked, "has his own life barometer. For some, it shows more "clear", for some it shows more "cloudy", and for me it mostly shows "stormy".

Indeed, Alexei Nikolayevich's life is full of vicissitudes and deep emotional experiences. Russo-Japanese war: in the battle of Mukden, he barely survived, fleeing from Japanese captivity, fled with the remnants (literally a few people) of the defeated East Siberian regiment, joined the headquarters of the retreating Russian army.

The new duty station after the war is the 13th Siberian Regiment in Harbin. But there is no peace there either. A.N. Lutsky, by nature conscientious, fair, direct, participates in revolutionary actions of officers and soldiers. Miraculously escapes reprisal in a military field court. But several months pass, and Aleksey Nikolaevich himself takes off his shoulder straps and leaves the army in protest. He is looking for a job and finds it with difficulty in the management of the Ryazan-Ural Railway, but life in a "quiet backwater" is not in his nature. He again submits a request to return to the army, to his native East Siberian regiment, where he begins to study Japanese in his free time.

This "hobby" of an army officer did not go unnoticed in the regiment. On the life path of Lutsky again there is a sharp turn. Russian military intelligence drew attention to a capable "self-taught linguist" and, selecting him from a dozen other applicants, sent him to Tokyo "for further study of Japanese customs, the Japanese language and acquaintance with the organization and methods of intelligence activities in Japan."

Lutsky enthusiastically gets down to business and establishes informal contacts with some officers from the Russian department of the General

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headquarters of Japan. And, as it turned out later, it was not in vain. Many years later, one of these officers, already working in Harbin, became a valuable source of information, warning in advance "former staff captain Lyuskov" (as the name of Alexei Nikolaevich was pronounced by the Japanese) about all the actions of Japanese intelligence known to him against the Russian Transbaikalia and Primorye.

But this happened already in Soviet times, in 1918, when Alexei Nikolayevich headed the "special service" of the "Far Eastern Border Detachment" in Irkutsk. But Aleksey Nikolayevich did not have to work in Irkutsk for a long time.

The barometer again crept towards the "storm" in connection with the rebellion of the Czechoslovak Corps. In June 1918, Lutsky was urgently evacuated from Irkutsk to the Far East. He rides in a carriage, which contains the entire border department of Transbaikalia with their families, as well as the headquarters of the military district and the official secret archive. This railway "ark", coupled with an armored train, hurries to the east, not suspecting that the Japanese are already waiting for it there, who have occupied Khabarovsk and started moving further along the railway line. On one of the crossings, Lutsky learns about the Japanese invasion and in the city of Svobodny, before reaching Blagoveshchensk, taking his wife, two young sons and a secret archive with him, he leaves the armored train.

Having settled in a private apartment in the suburbs of Svobodny, Aleksey Nikolaevich changes his passport, appearance and goes underground. But unfortunately, it is not the Japanese who enter the city, but Kolchak's units, who search literally every house in order to find "Bolshevik commissars" and their accomplices. The line reached the house where the Lutsky family was hiding. By this time, Lutsky had buried most of the archive in a cache, leaving only a few secret maps taken from the frontier posts for work. These cards almost became deadly evidence for Alexei Nikolaevich. The situation was saved by the sons. Before the eyes of the White Guards, they took out of the house several school geographical maps, hiding inside the roll those that threatened a big disaster.

It seems that everything worked out. But not for long. A second search brought a completely unexpected result: the Kolchakites found documents in the name of the captain of the East Siberian regiment of the tsarist army, Alexei Lutsky, at the bottom of the schoolbag of the son of Lutsky.

- Here are those! Colleague! exclaimed an officer of Kolchak's counterintelligence. "What, you don't want to serve Russia anymore?" he asked Lutsky caustically.

There was no exit. And Alexey Nikolaevich continued his service, but already in Kolchak's army. Being at the headquarters of one of the divisions, Lutsky, in conversations with talkative officers, began to collect information that was of interest to the Far Eastern Red Partisan detachments. He skillfully conveyed information "addresses

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there "through reliable liaisons from among the underground. It would seem that things got better again... But it had to happen like this - at the service entrance to the headquarters of the division, Lutsky collided head-on with a small merchant, whom he had once interrogated in Soviet counterintelligence, suspecting him of connections with the Japanese.

- Mr. Lutsky! What fates? I see you've changed your color. Well, just like a radish: red on top, white on the inside! What's happened?

"Nothing," Lutsky answered evasively. - I did not change colors, as I was a military man, I remained.

- Do they know about it? - and the shopkeeper looked at the headquarters building.

- I think not, if you do not fill this gap ...

- What are you, what are you, Mr. Lutsky! How can you think that of me?

... Alexey Nikolaevich was arrested literally an hour later. And death hung over his head again. No tricks could save the Chekist-intelligence officer. The only hope is escape! But it did not take place. Taking into account the special situation of a dangerous prisoner, it was decided to immediately transfer Lutsky to the Harbin prison for a subsequent trial and reprisal.

However, completely different political winds were blowing in Harbin. The city was seething, a popular uprising was brewing. On January 31, 1920, the workers of Harbin staged a demonstration and demanded the release of all political prisoners. The demand was granted, but Lutsky and six of his cellmates remained behind bars. The prison administration then intended to transport the "seven" to Chita for reprisals against Ataman Semenov.

It didn't work out. The Chinese convoy guarding the prison rebelled and released the seven suicide bombers. And just a couple of days later A.N. Lutsky was already in Vladivostok. The provisional government of Primorye, which sympathized with the Bolsheviks, offered him a post in the so-called military council, and he began to deal with intelligence and counterintelligence issues. The thing went.

"Already on the tenth day of his work in the Council," he wrote in his memoirs about A.N. Lutsky, his colleague M.M. Nikiforov, - I met Alexei Nikolaevich, who was walking from an operational meeting with a Japanese tablet in his hands. It contained several secret instructions and orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese occupation forces in the Far East. And since all the documents were in Japanese, Alexei Nikolayevich himself translated their content into Russian with obvious pleasure, causing genuine amazement of the entire operational staff of the Council.

But the "storm" still overtook him. On the night of April 5, 1920, Japanese soldiers suddenly surrounded all government offices in Vladivostok and, breaking into the Military Council, arrested

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who were in the building of A.N. Lutsky, S.G. Lazo and V.M. Sibirtsev. Those arrested in the morning were thrown into the torture chamber of the Japanese military counterintelligence. The invaders knew perfectly well who they were dealing with and what they wanted to achieve from them. Interrogation followed interrogation, and this went on for more than a month. Interrogation protocols are not known to us. Perhaps they are kept in the Japanese military archives of those years. But it is hardly worth looking for another document there - evidence of the last minutes of the life of three courageous people. Killers don't like to document their crimes. Sergey Lazo,

Vsevolod Sibirtsev and Aleksey Lutsky, after being beaten and tortured in a Japanese dungeon, were hastily taken out of Vladivostok and in May 1920 died a martyr's death in the city of Ussuriysk.

Half a century later, a monument was erected at the place of their execution. On a bronze plaque mounted on a locomotive-monument, the words: "In the furnace of this locomotive in May 1920, the White Guards and Japanese interventionists burned fiery revolutionaries - fighters for Soviet power in the Far East: Sergey Lazo, Vsevolod Sibirtsev and Alexey Lutsky.

4

First head of INO

The order to create foreign intelligence was signed. The premises were found, the personal composition was determined and a meager budget was allocated. It was more difficult to deal with leaders. Many people wholeheartedly believed in the ideas of the October Revolution; they were ready to defend her to the last drop of blood. But that wasn't enough. For the position of the head of the department, a person was required not from a machine tool, not from a plow, and not even from a university department. He had to have a fairly broad political outlook, to know foreign languages, to have the art of attracting people to him and be able to organize them, to know the secrets of illegal work. In those December days of 1920, it was not easy to find such people, and Dzerzhinsky paid paramount attention to the issue of their selection.

The first chiefs of the INO VChK, approved by F.E. Dzerzhinsky, were not professionals. These were party intellectuals who had experience of underground work and came to the Cheka by decision of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. They could successfully lead an army unit, an industrial concern or a diplomatic department. But it was very difficult for them to defeat or significantly weaken the internal and external counter-revolution, break through the economic and political blockade of the young Soviet Republic, and wage an uncompromising struggle with the Entente secret services. Nevertheless, circumstances demanded it, and the first leaders of the Soviet foreign intelligence coped with the task entrusted to them. Who these people were is our story.

It was 1919. On one of the fine May days, a man and a woman, outwardly similar to foreigners, descended from the board of a French steamer onto the Russian coast. The elegant couple, seated in the cab, were about to set off, when suddenly a bearded man in a soldier's overcoat thrown over his shoulders ran down from the ship's gangway and, rushing to the departing, grabbed a black trotter by the bridle.

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— Comrades! - he exclaimed loudly, - do not leave! One minute!

From the deck of the ship, like a clap of thunder, came a deafening threefold "cheers". Thus, thousands of soldiers, members of the former Russian expeditionary corps in France, who returned to their homeland, thanked their liberators - members of the Russian delegation of the Red Cross, who put a lot of effort into making war-weary people return home.

- Bon Voyage! - flashing a white-toothed smile, said the bearded man and, turning to the soldiers, strictly commanded: - Come out! Line up...

The well-known revolutionary Inessa Armand met her colleague on the Red Cross mission Yakov Davtyan (also known by the surname Davydov) in exile. As a student in St. Petersburg, he joined the RSDLP in 1905. Three years later he was arrested for political activities, and then emigrated to Belgium and, continuing his studies, received an engineer's education there. In 1915, Davtyan had to get to Russia by a roundabout way, without avoiding imprisonment in a German prison for internees of Russian citizens.

On the day of Yakov Khristoforovich Davtyan, the son of an Armenian businessman, the mission of the Russian Red Cross in Paris was an important milestone in his biography. This work contributed to the expansion of his political horizons, enrichment with knowledge of world culture. He acquired excellent manners and a brilliant knowledge of three European languages. In Paris, Davtyan could often be seen at art exhibitions, concerts of famous masters of art, in the theater. Many years later, already in Moscow, Yakov Khristoforovich met and maintained friendship with famous Russian artists and painters. The great Russian singer Nezhdanova loved to visit the hospitable house of Davtyan and his wife Elena Alexandrovna... In memory of his stay in France, Y. Davtyan carefully kept an official document:

"Certificate.

This has been given by the Central Committee of the Russian Red Cross Society to Yakov Davtian! in that he is a member of the mission of the Russian Red Cross Society in the International Commission for the Care of Russian Soldiers in France. Please provide Y. Davtian with all possible assistance in the performance of the duties assigned to him."

Returning to his homeland, Yakov Khristoforovich turned to the Central Committee with a request to help him get a job, taking into account the acquired foreign experience. They helped Davtyan. But how? About this

A surviving document dating back to August 1919 testifies.

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"Tov. Davtyan is instructed to restore order in the area of the Kiev railway junction, stop the excesses of military echelons, detain deserters, evict all persons from the cars who, according to the states, are not supposed to use them. Tov. Davtyan has the right to arrest and then bring to trial the Revolutionary Military Tribunal, which is attached to him, of everyone who does not obey his order, the right to use direct wires, telephone, telegraph, the right to travel on any train and use a separate steam locomotive ... "

At the beginning of 1920, Ya.Kh. Davtyan was urgently summoned to the capital to work in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Literally a few days later, the appointment to the post of head of the department for the Baltic countries and Poland followed - immediately, bypassing entire "flights" of the hierarchical ladder.

In those days, there was a great "hunger" in the personnel, and every good, conscientious worker became the object of close attention of various bosses and departments. Davtyan soon became interested in one of the most powerful organizations - the Cheka and personally Dzerzhinsky. It was he who recommended Yakov Khristoforovich to work in the Foreign Department of the Cheka, having heard many flattering comments about Davtyan from Inessa Armand. It must be said that in those years, sometimes even a verbal recommendation from one of the well-known underground revolutionaries was enough to decide on the appointment of one or another candidate to a leading position. True, this case required a special decision of the Central Committee.

Dzerzhinsky's appeal to the highest party authority with a request to second Ya.Kh. Davtyan from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the Cheka for appointment to the newly created position. head of the Foreign Department (INO) was quickly reviewed. A document was born that played a big role in the future fate of the novice diplomat:

"From the minutes of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of November 12, 1920. Satisfy Comrade Dzerzhinsky's request. Send comrade Davtyan at his disposal."

The moment has come, the drama of which we can only guess. Apparently, such a dizzying rise alerted, alarmed Davtyan, raised some doubts: one thing is a diplomatic path. Here, much of what was to be done was familiar to him. At least some foreign policy issues have already been dealt with.

Intelligence, on the other hand, is a new business, moreover, as a leader, and moreover, as an organizer of the INO ... Ya.Kh. Davtyan was then thirty-two years old.

The word "command" gave Yakov Khristoforovich some chances for maneuver, and he decided to convince the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Cheka that the best option for using it would be one

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temporary work in both political departments. So the head of the department of the Baltic countries and Poland became the acting head of the Foreign Department of the Cheka, since both departments were then located almost nearby.

Davtyan plunged headlong into the creation of INO. Separate successes and good luck gave strength and confidence. But one circumstance constantly disturbed the first chief of overseas intelligence. If in the NKID he was a full-fledged and officially approved head of the department, then in the Cheka his status was less certain. Yakov Khristoforovich hinted to the authorities of the Cheka about the need to "bring in line" his official position, but for some unknown reason this was not done. Apparently, Dzerzhinsky looked closely at him and believed that the probationary period had not yet expired.

Eleven months after starting work at INO, Ya.Kh. Davtyan writes a memo to the Department of Affairs of the Cheka, which makes it possible to judge his state of mind:

"To the Office of Affairs. In view of the fact that, acting as Head of the Foreign Department since November 30, 1920, I am on the reserve for the appointment of the Administrative Department, I ask you to take me by order to my position.

But this time, Davtyan's request hangs in the air. Perhaps this circumstance, or some tempting prospects of working abroad, prompted him to raise the question of switching to diplomatic work before the leadership.

The leadership made a Solomon decision: while remaining in Chicherin's department and working abroad, Davtyan had to carry out Dzerzhinsky's instructions.

With the first diplomatic trip abroad, Yakov Khristoforovich was not lucky. He was appointed advisor to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR to the Hungarian Soviet Republic. And while Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L. Karakhan was preparing the relevant documents for Davtyan, the Hungarian revolution was defeated. The question of a diplomatic mission fell away by itself. Davtyan stayed at home, but not for long...

For fifteen years of foreign service, Yakov Khristoforovich held high positions in eight diplomatic missions of the RSFSR and then the USSR, Estonia was replaced by Lithuania, Lithuania by China, China by Tuva. From Tuva, Davtyan left for France, then he was the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Iran, Greece, and Poland. If we take into account that during the same period, Yakov Khristoforovich was appointed rector of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute, then one can imagine the amount of physical and psychological stress that fell on this truly outstanding person.

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But from all this kaleidoscope of places and events, Davtyan most often recalled Beijing in 1922.

The Chinese capital met him unfriendly. The autumn cold wind drove clouds of gray dust creaking on the teeth. The hopeless poverty of the Beijing outskirts was striking. All this evoked a gloomy mood. But Yakov Khristoforovich was not one of those people who plunge into mental illness for a long time. On the contrary, he was energetic and worked with full dedication. Demanding the same from

his subordinates, Davtyan sometimes showed excessive emotionality and categoricalness. But such were the features of his character.

A couple of weeks after arriving in Beijing, Y.Kh. Davtyan wrote to his successor as head of the Foreign Department of the Cheka, Mikhail Trilisser:

"Our work here is extremely important, and I believe there is much that can be done."

Indeed, Davtyan vigorously set to work. He worked in two directions: as an adviser to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and as a resident of foreign intelligence of the Foreign Department of the Cheka. Moreover, in the second case, Yakov Khristoforovich practically performed the role of the chief head of all regional Soviet intelligence residencies in China. And there were at least ten of them ...

"The work here is very interesting, exciting, huge, but very difficult, extremely responsible. The remoteness of Moscow, poor communication, mutual misunderstanding complicate our work even more... I have never (even at INO) worked so hard as here, and it has never cost me such nerves," he wrote six months later to M .A. Trilisser.

Unfortunately, not without internal conflicts in a large team. Yakov Khristoforovich had a particularly difficult relationship with the head of the INO station in Beijing, Aristarchus of Rylsky. Davtyan's letters to the Center quite eloquently show that his assessment of this employee often depended on his mood. Here are some excerpts from Davtyan's correspondence with Moscow.

From a letter dated December 9, 1922: "I can't say anything bad about Rylsky, but I can especially praise him too. He pulled himself up a lot with my arrival, and there is hope that he will be useful. Let's see..."

However, after him a new message went to the Center: "I will ask you to replace Rylsky. He absolutely does not cope with his tasks, as he is lazy and lethargic ... "

Literally a month later, on January 9, 1923, after the New Year's Eve and several holidays that fell to the lot of the chief resident, Trilisser received a new letter:

"Contrary to my former opinion, Rylsky turned out to be more likeable than I expected. He has some lethargy in his work,

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but on the whole it works well and behaves very well. I am almost satisfied with him and ask him not to replace him, he worked well with me.

The last mention of Rylsky seemed to put an end to the relationship between these two people. But no: in one of the following messages to the head of the INO, Davtyan again speaks negatively about Rylsky.

Probably, Yakov Khristoforovich was not entirely fair to his colleague: the diplomatic career of Rylsky (Aristarkh Aristarkhovich Rigin) by no means ended in Beijing. The Center assessed his services to intelligence and personal qualities in a different way. A few months later, Rylsky traveled to Denmark, then to France and a number of other countries, where he successfully worked in the line of "legal" and illegal residencies. Several times the paths of Davtyan and Rylsky and later crossed during intelligence work abroad.

Meanwhile, life in China did not allow too much attention to be paid to personal likes and dislikes. A lot of hard work was going on, because, as Davtyan noted in his messages to Moscow, "here is the knot of world politics and the Achilles' heel not only of world imperialism, but also of ours. And the conquest of strong positions in the Far East depends solely on us."

Of course, China was not the only and not the most important "node of world politics", but intelligence work in this region was of great importance for ensuring Russian interests in the Far East. A year after his arrival in Beijing, Davtyan reported to the Center:

"A few words about our special work. She's going well. If you follow the materials sent, you obviously see that I managed to cover almost the whole of China, nothing significant escapes me. Our ties are expanding. In general, I can safely say that not a single step of the Whites in the entire Far East remains unknown to me. I know everything quickly and in advance.

It must be said that Yakov Khristoforovich's self-confident assessments of his own activities by today's standards had some grounds. The Mukden residency, through its agents in the Japanese special services, received a unique archive of white counterintelligence documents from the entire Far East. It was an amazing and significant success (literally and figuratively). Davtyan, by a special courier, sent the received documents to the Center and a cover letter addressed to the leadership of the INO VChK. "Dear Mikhail Abramovich," he wrote on his own letterhead. - With today's courier I am sending you the entire archive of the White Guard counterintelligence received in Mukden. I ask you to take measures so that this archive is not marinated and used ... "

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Success inspired Yakov Khristoforovich, and he began to write about achievements much more often:

"I have greatly developed the work ... Already now there are decent agents in Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, Mukden. I am installing a serious apparatus in Harbin. There is hope to penetrate Japanese intelligence..." he reported with inspiration to the Center on February 11, 1923.

"We have established a very large agent in Changchun. Two people who will work for us are connected with the Japanese and the Russian White Guards. I expect a lot of interesting things," continued Yakov Khristoforovich.

Not everything, however, went cloudlessly and smoothly. The archives impartially preserved for intelligence historians the emotional statements of Yakov Khristoforovich: "I think it would be advisable for me to refuse to work in the INO, I absolutely cannot agree with your methods of action ... "he wrote to the head of the INO about the instructions he once received.

Or else: "I believe that in Beijing you can see the state of affairs better than from Moscow. If you do not agree with this, then I ask you to release me from work completely," he wrote to Trilisser in a personal letter dated September 6, 1923.

Passion for Chekist operational work, apparently, somewhat alienated Davtyan from the performance of diplomatic duties. Not everyone manages to perform equally successfully in two guises, and Yakov Khristoforovich began to receive from the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs soft in form and fair in essence wishes to "undertake", "strengthen", "organize", "achieve", etc. This circumstance clearly puzzled Davtyan, and in his personal letters more and more complaints began to appear about colleagues from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. In one of these letters, he complained that he was constantly being detained by the NKID, in another he complained about the unfair, in his opinion, reprimand of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat, in the third he was sincerely indignant at the attitude of some employees of the NKID towards employees of the foreign intelligence service in Beijing mission. Frustrated by yet another "injustice," Davtyan writes angrily to Moscow: "I think that Beijing will be my last job in this nice institution. I want to work in Moscow or at least in the West. I would prefer to break with the NKID altogether, because after all I can't get along with them."

Emotions, emotions! And a thirst for action. Such was Yakov Khristoforovich Davtyan by nature – a man of great temperament, hard work and... quarrelsomeness.

Life of Ya.Kh. Davtyan untimely ended in 1938. In 1957 he was rehabilitated.

Of course, today in our understanding of the work of the first head of the INO, many shortcomings and flaws can be noted; By

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hasty, not always justified conclusions and decisions. But, remembering the days when Davtyan headed the Soviet foreign intelligence, the most appropriate, perhaps, would not be words of reproach, but an expression of sincere gratitude and recognition of the merits of this outstanding person. It was he who laid the foundations for the creation of a professional foreign intelligence apparatus, took the initiative to recruit Soviet agents in the ranks of the Russian counter-revolutionary emigration, which served as a good basis for the further work of the Soviet foreign intelligence in this direction. The good deeds of Davtyan to improve the financial situation of the first workers of the INO remained in the memory of the security officers-intelligence officers. And although these "pioneers" of the Soviet foreign intelligence were a little more than the fingers on one hand, Davtyan organized a kind of fund to help the most needy employees. There was no case that Davtyan hesitated, let alone refused to provide such assistance to any of his employees.

Yakov Davtyan was, of course, an honest, devoted to the Fatherland, widely erudite and active worker. This is how he remained in the memory of his contemporaries, in the documents of those years, the first organizer of the Foreign Department of the Cheka, who made a lot of efforts to successfully implement the new foreign policy line of the young Russian state.

! So in the original text.

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Man in a blouse

One December morning in 1906, the inhabitants of Vyborg saw flashy invitations on the lampposts to gentlemen officers of the local garrison and the gendarmerie corps to attend a charity ball, which eminent residents of the city arrange in their honor on the eve of the Christmas holidays.

Invitations also appeared in the area of the Vyborg guardhouse, where about a hundred arrested sailors and soldiers were kept. They were to be tried for participation in an armed uprising.

"Are we going to have some fun, too?" the guards rubbed their hands in anticipation of pleasure.

And they were not wrong. As soon as the orchestra struck in the hall of the noble assembly, a britzka drove up to the guardhouse. The shattered clerk began distributing Christmas souvenirs to the "gentlemen of the guards" and generously poured pile after pile.

The cart drove off, the guards, feeling a pleasant bliss in the body, joking good-naturedly, went to a warm guardhouse. Half an hour later they were asleep, not knowing that the keys had been stolen from them and several covered wagons had gathered at the entrance to the guardhouse. Having taken all the inhabitants of the guardhouse, the horse caravan set off.

The fugitives were missed only in the morning, but, as they say, they were gone. They took refuge outside the city in barns insulated with hay, then in groups of 2-3 people were taken to the Swedish border.

The daring escape was led by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the RSDRI. The soul of the operation was a young man named Anatoly. The head of the Finnish Gendarmerie Directorate in the city of Helsingfors reported about him to St. Petersburg: "Anatoly" is a deputy from the Finnish military organization of the Russian Social Democratic Party - of medium height, Jewish type,

black hair, wears pince-nez. He is dressed in a black coat, under it is a blue kosovorotka with a standing collar.

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A few weeks later, the Russian police department was informed that "Anatoly", aka "petty-bourgeois Stolchevsky", aka "Kapustyansky", aka "Mursky", aka "Pavel-glasses" - one and the same person, a native of Astrakhan Mikhail (Meyer) Trilisser. In a report marked "Very necessary. Top Secret," Gendarmerie Colonel Yakovlev reported that the chief organizer and head of the Finnish military organization of the RSDLP had been arrested and taken to the Shlisselburg Fortress for a detailed investigation and further trial.

It is unlikely that any of the jailers who sent Mikhail Trilisser to indefinite hard labor in Siberia after the trial could assume that he was dealing with the future chief of Soviet foreign intelligence.

But this will happen much later, in 1921, and before that Mikhail Trilisser will become a member of the Soviet Military Commissariat for Eastern Siberia and Transbaikalia, and will become the government emissary of the Amur Region of the Far Eastern Republic. He will create the first special cipher service in the Soviet Far East to communicate with the Center and begin to form an intelligence agent apparatus.

The skilful organization of the intelligence business by Mikhail Trilisser did not go unnoticed in Moscow. The Cheka constantly received encrypted telegrams from the Far East about Trilisser's official negotiations with the commanders of the Red Army, who acted against the White Guard underground centers, as well as the rebellious officers of the Czechoslovak Corps and Japanese military units that occupied large areas of Primorye. One of these telegrams, sent to the Center by Trilisser, reported:

"I received information that the Japanese command is raising the issue of peace negotiations. The meeting place is assumed to be Harbin. The enemy hurriedly retreats, blowing up a pumping station and dismantling the railway tracks. Is it possible to get an airplane for reconnaissance?"

The information transmitted by Trilisser was of interest not only to the leadership of the Cheka. They were also given attention in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. It is no accident that Trilisser and his comrades received a telegram from Commissar G.V. Chicherina: "Your vigorous activity and the measures taken are fully approved and strongly supported by the central government"?

In February 1921 M.A. Trilisser, as a delegate from the communists of Transbaikalia, participates in the work of the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b). Once, in the credential commission of the congress, Mikhail Abramovich was handed a note from the administrative department of the Central Committee. The note spoke of the need to postpone the departure to the Far East and stay in Moscow

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after the end of the congress. The days of waiting for a call to the administrative department dragged on, and soon it took place. M.A. Trilisser was invited to work in the apparatus of the Central Committee: to deal with the management of party organizations in the Far East. Mikhail Abramovich agreed.

Six months passed, and one August evening, Dzerzhinsky came to the apartment of the spouses Mikhail Abramovich Trilisser and Olga Naumovna Loganson. Came alone, without protection.

"Sorry for the unexpected visit," Olga Naumovna later recalled Dzerzhinsky's words. Felix Edmundovich immediately got down to business: "I want to inform you, Mikhail, that yesterday a decision was made on your transfer to work in the Cheka, in the Foreign Department. You don't mind?" Trilisser froze in surprise. If someone else had said it, Mikhail Abramovich

I would take it as a joke. But before him stood Dzerzhinsky, with whom he had been intimately acquainted since the time when, during the years of the first Russian revolution, he worked in the military organizations of the party.

"I agree," Mikhail Abramovich replied. - From what date do you start work?

"Consider that today your first working day has already ended," Dzerzhinsky laughed ...

When Trilisser arrived at the department, his entire staff was housed in one large room, divided into sections by bulky oak desks. Trilisser's task was to organize intelligence work in the countries of Western and Eastern Europe. He asked the leadership of the Cheka to change the western region to the eastern one (China, Korea, Japan, Mongolia), which, as it seemed to him, he knew well. But his request was ignored.

The age-old question arose - "Where to start?". Firstly, he tried to clearly outline the scope of his duties, and secondly, to create a fairly stable team capable of

perform the most difficult tasks.

In December 1921, when the second head of the department, Mogilevsky, died in a plane crash without having worked at the INO for several months, M.A. Trilisser is appointed the third head of the Foreign Department.

Dzerzhinsky did not leave time for "buildup". Literally a few days after his appointment to the post of head of the INO, Mikhail Abramovich began to receive inquiries about the subversive actions of the White Guard emigration in the countries of Western Europe. Recommendations were needed to combat the intrigues of foreign intelligence services against the RSFSR. Requests followed one after another. And so year after year. Here is one of them, written by Dzerzhinsky himself, however, already four years after Mikhail Abramovich headed the INO.

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"Tov. Trilisser.

Please compile for me a summary (which can then be supplemented) of all the machinations of England against us after the fall of MacDonald - according to our and NKIndel data. I am thinking of going to the Politburo with this question. In my opinion, it is necessary to form a secret committee to counteract these British machinations through a whole series of measures, not only diplomatic, but economic, KGB and military.

F. Dzerzhinsky.

With the advent of Trilisser to the position of head, the department is, in essence, deploying activities at full scale. Trilisser's archive file contains his note, dated May 1922, with thoughts about the goals and objectives of his unit. This was, perhaps, one of the most difficult periods of the struggle of the Soviet Republic with internal and external counter-revolution, which by that time had switched to more cunning and cruel methods of "secret operations".

"All intelligence work in foreign countries," Trilisser wrote, "should be carried out with the aim of:

- the establishment on the territory of each state of counter-revolutionary groups conducting activities against the RSFSR;
- careful intelligence of all organizations engaged in espionage against our country;
- coverage of the political line of each state and its economic situation;
- obtaining documentary materials in all the indicated areas of work".

Trilisser understood that these considerations would remain only wishful thinking unless a qualified zakordonny apparatus headed by experienced resident leaders was created.

"The resident," Trilisser wrote, "should provide full assistance to the plenipotentiary in the work... GPU of funds".

Forming his service "team", Trilisser paid great attention to the operational training of personnel, knowledge of foreign languages, the ability to work with agents and adapt to rapidly changing conditions. He recruited some old comrades-in-arms in the underground struggle in Siberia and Primorye to work in the INO. S.G. became his deputy. Velezhev - former head of the reconnaissance department of the command troops in Siberia; The responsible employees of the department were J. Minsker, A. Neumann, A. Muller, who at one time carried out reconnaissance operations in Manchuria.

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The department worked hard, relying on modest intelligence and foreign exchange capabilities. Residents left for London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna and other capitals of European states. In Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul, Harbin, illegal operational units began to operate actively. There were tangible results: a resident in Seoul, I.A. Chichaev reported to the Center that he had received a secret Japanese memorandum from Tanaka with plans to start an aggressive war against the USSR, China and a number of countries in Southeast Asia; information was received from a resident from Vienna about the recruitment of a valuable agent; Information was received from Berlin about an impending attempt on the lives of Soviet diplomats by White Guard emigrants.

"According to reliable data," one of the Berlin telegrams addressed to Trilisser said, "the "Commercial, Industrial and Financial Union" in Paris, which unites the biggest aces of tsarist Russia, has created a special secret council, the purpose of which is to organize terrorist acts against leading Russian figures. For the special task of organizing terrorist acts, a fund of one and a half million francs is allocated.

Naturally, having received such a message, Dzerzhinsky and Trilisser thought about the alleged "object" of the operation. We stopped, comparing with other sources, on the Soviet delegates of the conference in Genoa. And they weren't wrong. To prevent the recognition of the Soviet Republic, to take measures to disrupt the peace conference - this was the goal not only of emigre anti-Soviet organizations, but also of some conservative Western politicians who lost their capital in Russia.

In the meantime, preparations for the terrorist act were in full swing, and the information received by Trilisser was urgently sent to the name of F.E. Dzerzhinsky. Thus, it became known in Moscow that the conspirators had acquired a batch of Mauser pistols with broken numbers, as well as several special canes, into the tips of which syringes with potassium cyanide were inserted. The names of almost all the participants in the Genoese conspiracy, including their leader, Boris Savinkov, became known.

Trilisser and the INO staff were quite fully aware not only of the plans, but also of the moods of the conspirators, who often did not get on with their work. One of the intercepted messages read, in part:

"The established watch, including in cars, did not produce results, since Chicherin and other members of the delegation drive cars of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, outside of any city driving rules, can reach any speed, and in an ordinary car

no way to keep up with them.

Several cases of visiting cafes, theaters, meetings, where, according to information, Soviet delegates were supposed to be present,

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were not crowned with success, because either they lost sight of the observed persons, or the information turned out to be inaccurate and the chase turned out to be useless ... "

Employees of the INO did everything to prevent the terrorist action against People's Commissar Chicherin and his employees from taking place.

M.A. Trilisser did not belong to the category of armchair bosses who liked to lead subordinates without getting up from their familiar chair. He was active, brave and... inquisitive. He himself wanted to be "in the shoes" of a simple operative, to feel his anxieties and doubts, to expose himself to risks and dangers that are familiar to almost every "fighter of the invisible front" when entering a secret meeting with a valuable agent.

"In order to give orders," Mikhail Abramovich liked to say, "it's not enough to know what you want from a security officer, you need to clearly imagine how he will carry out this order..."

And soon such an opportunity presented itself. Trilisser, under the guise of a gothic specialist, leaves for Berlin to re-establish contact with a valuable agent. The trip was preceded by a lot of preparation and a lot of parting words from Dzerzhinsky. It's no joke - the chief of foreign intelligence of the Cheka himself leaves for the reconnaissance operation! All preparations were kept in the strictest confidence.

- I know about your trip to meet with T., my deputy - Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Menzhinsky, you and your wife. Nobody else," Felix Edmundovich warned.

But here's the bad luck - the chief of intelligence did not have another suit, except for the one in which he went to work. The white shirts were also bad. Remember, gendarmerie colonel Yakovlev once wrote about Trilisser's blue blouse? So, the head of the INO continued to wear blouses almost until the end of his days, even at a resort in the Crimea, where he once had the good fortune to go with his wife and son.

The suit was urgently made to measure, shirts were bought at the Moscow Passage and a pair of ties, which Mikhail Abramovich could never learn to tie well, were bought there.

In Berlin, using the operational "tricks" and checks that are due in such cases to avoid the all-seeing eyes of counterintelligence, Trilisser "clean" went to the meeting place with the agent. Reseeding in his car, they drove silently to the safe house. A conversation took place over a cup of strong coffee. The agent handed over to Trilisser valuable political documents on the situation in Germany, spoke about trusting ties in European countries, and complained about the difficulties in his work.

— We will try to teach you how to overcome some difficulties. But here in Berlin, this is not possible. That's why I want

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after some time to invite you to Moscow. There you will rest, take a course of special training and return home. Agreed?

..With the first rays of the July sun, Trilisser, having checked himself, returned to his hotel. His absence, by all indications, was not noticed. Mikhail Abramovich was satisfied. Contact with the agent, who later played a significant role in the underground anti-fascist movement in Nazi Germany, was restored.

Many more such connections were established and personally renewed by the chief of the INO OGPU. The work was going well, and Dzerzhinsky went to the Central Committee with a proposal to promote Trilisser. In 1926, Mikhail Abramovich became deputy chairman of the OGPU. However, he did not leave the post of head of the INO and continued to enthusiastically engage in intelligence affairs.

A few years later, life nevertheless made its own adjustments to the biography of M.A. Trilissera. In December 1930, I.V. unexpectedly called him to him. Stalin.

"Comrade Trilisser, we have decided to give you a new assignment. It is necessary to strengthen the work of the organs of our Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate. As you know, I am far from being indifferent to this work. Of course, you remember that from March 1919 to April 1922, Comrade Stalin was the People's Commissar of the RKI RSFSR. If you don't mind, I'll tell you now what exactly needs to be done there in the first place...

"I agree, Comrade Stalin," Mikhail Abramovich answered, slightly pale from nervous tension.

_ Well, that's great. Get to work...

And eight years later, Iosif Vissarionovich finally decided the fate of the former head of the INO. At the beginning of 1938, Stalin was informed about the planned arrest of a large group of employees of the foreign affairs agencies, among whom was Trilisser, an employee of the Comintern. After reading the list of the doomed, Stalin marked his visa with a blue pencil.

! TsGAKA USSR, f. 25853, op. 7, d. 18, l. 99. 2 The power of labor (organ of Central Siberia). - No. 85. - May 12. - 1918

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Arthur Khristianovich

The meeting in the Kremlin was scheduled for midnight. The secretary on duty, who replaced the cold Poskrebyshchev that evening, marked with a red pencil the arriving representatives of departments. One by one they entered the softly lit room of Stalin's secretariat, trying at least approximately to guess from the list of participants in the Last Supper the content of the upcoming conversation with the leader. Even the all-knowing and all-seeing head of the press service of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Karl Radek, experienced a feeling of insecurity that was rare for him. "What's happened? Why are we all here at the same time?" Radek asked himself, looking at the faces of the conference participants: the heads of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army and the Foreign Department of the OGPU, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, a senior official of the Foreign Trade. No one could say anything definite and did not try to do it.

Stalin greeted each of those who entered his office and motioned for them to sit down at a long table covered with green cloth.

"It will soon be six months since Hitler came to power in Germany," Stalin began the conversation. He looked around at the audience and slowly continued: "It is not difficult to imagine his immediate military plans. In fact, he never hid them. Aggression in the East is its main goal. But in order to attack us (Stalin emphasized the word "us"), Hitler still has short arms. It is hindered by Poland, which has been literally rushing about between Germany and the USSR of late. However, recently our ambassador in Warsaw, Antonov-Ovseenko, said that the Poles were supposedly going to change their anger for mercy and try to get closer to us. This would be a reasonable step on their part," Stalin remarked, "but is it really so? And can such reports be trusted at all?"

In a long pause, the impulsive Radek was the first to speak.

"I think the ambassador in Warsaw is absolutely right. Logic dictates that the Poles have nowhere to go: the German eagle with sharp

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knives, claws, is much more terrible for the Poles than the Russian bear, which is familiar to them. That is why they seek rapprochement with us, counting on our support in the event of Hitlerite aggression...

Radek's point of view was readily supported by the other participants in the conference. Only Artur Khristianovich Artuzov, head of foreign intelligence of the OGPU, sitting at the edge of the table, imperturbably continued to remain silent. Stalin noticed this and turned to the chief of INO.

What does intelligence think about this?

Artuzov raised his head and, choosing his words carefully, answered:

"Comrade Stalin, we have somewhat different information. Our source recently reported from Warsaw that the Poles are playing a dishonest game. They're just pretending they're going to get close to us. In fact, Poland is probing the ground for agreements with Hitler, counting on his "indulgence".

Stalin did not answer Artuzov's words, but silently continued to walk around the office, silently stepping along the carpet. The meeting was drawing to a close. The decision was never made. Stalin, obviously, did not count on this. It was important for the leader to "set the problem" and focus the attention of diplomats and intelligence services on the "Polish question".

And after the meeting, Stalin invited its participants to the next room, where tables with light snacks and wine were arranged.

Raising a glass, the leader said a few pleasant words to each participant of the meeting, wished them good health and success in their work.

When it was Artuzov's turn, Stalin, looking directly into the eyes of the head of the Foreign Department of the OGPU, paid tribute to the intelligence efforts, but unexpectedly for everyone asked Artuzov in a joking, slightly ironic manner:

– Well, don't your sources, or whatever you call them, misinform you?

Embarrassed by surprise, Artuzov assured "the party, the government and Comrade Stalin personally" that intelligence would make every effort to recognize disinformation and continue to report only verified and accurate information to the country's leadership. Stalin chuckled slightly through his mustache, but did not continue his thought or explain it.

Artuzov was tormented by conjectures: what was the matter? Why did the Polish leader not like the Polish information? Did he, Artuzov, become a victim of deception by an agent? Stalin couldn't be wrong, could he?

Time has put everything in its place. Indeed, Poland soon signed an agreement with Germany, which confirmed the anti-Soviet, pro-German political course of Warsaw, and at the same time, the reliability of Artuzov's information presented at the midnight meeting in the Kremlin. Stalin, in his characteristic spirit, assessed the situation and paid tribute to his chief advisers on the Polish question: Ambassador Antonov-Ovseenko was recalled from Warsaw and fell into disfavor, and on

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Artur Khristianovich Artuzov, head of foreign intelligence of the OGPU, became concurrently and one of the deputy heads of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army ...

It is unlikely that anyone would have undertaken to predict in his time such an unusual political rise, which struck the imagination of many, the son of a Swiss citizen Christian Frauchi, who settled "on a commercial basis" at the end of the last century in the Tver province. Yes, and Arthur himself in his youth was very far from the idea of linking his fate with the activities of the Russian secret services. After graduating from high school, he entered the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute and prepared himself for a career as a certified metallurgist. Arthur also had another serious idea - to finish the conservatory. So his friends advised him, who highly appreciated the lyric-dramatic tenor of the future engineer. However, Artur Frauchi did not become either a professional theatrical stage or a successor to the work of Professor V.E. Grum-Grzhimailo, who, after graduating from the institute, invited him to work in his Metallurgical Bureau, known throughout Russia. Instead, he chose - under the name of Artur Artuzov - the thorny path of a revolutionary, prompted by his uncle M.S. Kedrov. "Like many young men from intelligent families, I rushed about for a long time until I found myself and that only truth of the earth, without which an honest person cannot live," wrote A.Kh. Artuzov. "She, this truth, lies in the fact that people who work are fed and free ..."

A strong life and service chain forever linked Mikhail Kedrov and Artur Frauchi, who was devoted to him. No matter what positions Mikhail Sergeevich was appointed to, his nephew and younger friend Artur Khristianovich Artuzov always stood shoulder to shoulder next to him. So it was in December 1918, when by decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) Kedrov became the head of the Special Department of the Cheka. Artur Artuzov was appointed special commissioner of the department.

Years of hard, life-threatening work began. A document of those days, signed by Kedrov and his secretary Artuzov (Frauchi), has been preserved. The document is addressed to the British, French and American missions. It stated unequivocally that "the arrival of a foreign warship, especially with an armed crew, in Arkhangelsk, where a huge amount of military and explosive material is concentrated, will be considered as the beginning of active operations that can have the most dire consequences".

Having abandoned direct military and force pressure on the RSFSR, the Entente countries switched to intensifying espionage and sabotage activities against Russia. With the money of Western intelligence agencies, counter-revolutionary organizations and centers were created in many large cities, which were united under the banner of the fight against the Bolsheviks.

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underground groups of white officers and monarchist-minded layers of the intelligentsia. In Moscow and Petrograd, taking advantage of the absence of the revolutionary part of the army that had gone to the front, the "National Center" began an active subversive activity in the fight against the Bolsheviks. In 1918, the Cheka defeated several branches of this "center", but the main core was unaffected. The young security officer Artur Artuzov began to deal with the operational work of penetrating the Moscow and Petrograd centers.

... The case helped. During a raid on the Maltsevsky market in Petrograd, security officers detained a 15-year-old girl. She tried to discreetly get rid of the revolver hidden in the old coat. Georgette, that was the name of the girl, turned out to be the daughter of a former French citizen Kurtz, who was once used by the tsarist secret services as an unofficial collaborator. During a search in the apartment of the "French teacher" a hiding place was discovered, in which an archive with spy reports and addresses of visits was kept. At the very first interrogation, Kurtz confessed that he had taken part in the preparation of a counter-revolutionary uprising in Petrograd and had secret contacts with the leadership of the National Center. Georgette's father did not hide his underground connections, and her daughter even gave the Chekists signs of one "Miss", whose note, found during the search, contained alarming information about the plans of the conspirators.

At the Lubyanka, the "miss" interrogated A.Kh. Artuzov. He did it politely, intelligently, as if he were talking to an old friend. During this conversation, "miss" - she is Nadezhda Vladimirovna

Petrovskaya not only told about her connections and gave the necessary addresses to the Chekists, but she herself volunteered to go to the "place" in order to track down one "very important gentleman" who "usually walked with a white dog."

The owner of the white dog was quickly found, his address was found out, and a search was made. It was he who turned out to be the head of the "centre", associated with the resident of British intelligence in Russia, Dukes.

For Artuzov, the exposure of the "national center" was, perhaps, the first substantive lesson that there was no large-scale counterrevolutionary organization in Russia that would not cooperate in one way or another with the special services of the Entente countries.

Outwardly, Artuzov was not a very noticeable person: short, with a large head, broad-shouldered, with a beard and trimmed mustache. In a black kosovorotka, girded with a soldier's belt, he gave the impression of a Narodnaya Volya survivor who had survived exile. Abundant gray hair in his hair made Artuzov older than his years. But Artuzov's inner strength, dignity and charm attracted people to him.

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"Arthur Khristianovich's character was even and, one might say, easy," one of his work comrades recalled about him. – Of course, sometimes he was in a bad mood, but he never transferred it to the people who came into contact with him during these moments at work. Artuzov was always polite and correct. He knew how to patiently, and mostly kindly listen to the interlocutor. He always looked people straight in the eyes, his gaze expressed curiosity and interest in the interlocutor. As a storyteller and lecturer, he was exceptionally interesting. Possessed correct and competent Russian speech, flavored with warm humor."

But there were times when he could not contain his anger. It is known that during the operation "Trust" one of Artuzov's assistants asked the British agent Sidney Reilly to provide this "organization" with financial assistance. He responded by saying that in Russia there are huge art treasures that can be sold profitably and replenish the Trust's cash desk. Artur Khristianovich, who "played" the role of the leader of a fictitious monarchist organization, according to eyewitnesses, had a whitened face and clenched his fists. But, having regained his composure, Artuzov calmly asked: "Could you, Mr. Reilly, list in writing the Russian artistic treasures that would be of interest to you?" Self-confident Reilly calmly took a piece of paper and, after a moment's thought, wrote:

1. Etchings by famous Dutch and French masters, primarily Rembrandt.
2. Engravings by French and English masters of the 18th century with uncut edges. Miniatures of the 18th and early 19th centuries.
3. Antique gold coins with clear minting.
4. Italian and Flemish primitives.
5. Masterpieces of the great masters of the Dutch, Icelandic, Italian schools.

Having received this list, Arthur Khristianovich could not hide it in his pocket for a long time: his hands were shaking with rage ...

But perhaps the most remarkable features of Artuzov were his crystal honesty and extraordinary conscientiousness. He sincerely experienced other people's failures, often attributing them to his own "flaw", "inability" to understand the situation in a timely manner and see the negative consequences of this or that event. When one of the "heroes" of the "Trust" operation, Chekist Staunitz-Opperput, volunteered to bring the well-known terrorist Zakharchenko-Schultz to the border with Finland, but instead, picking up her suitcase, quickly disappeared into the bushes on the Finnish

territory, Artuzov, when reporting this emergency to the leadership of the OGPU, took the blame, explaining that he "did not show" "revolutionary Chekist vigilance" in relation to Staunitz-Opperput. Many years later, shortly before his arrest, Artur Khristianovich wrote in his own hand

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He will write the following lines to Yezhov, the executioner: "You don't know, of course, that I never violated Dzerzhinsky's precepts - not to lie, not to hide my guilt. He taught me that in case of failures, you need to scold only for what is unfinished, hidden by the worker ...>

The trial inspired in 1930 against the so-called "Industrial Party" highlighted another trait of Artuzov's character - political courage. Being one of the participants in the trial of prominent representatives of the old, pre-revolutionary technical intelligentsia, Artur Khristianovich caught the falsity and deliberate juggling of facts on the part of the prosecution. He informed the leadership of the OGPU about this and was immediately rebuked by Yagoda: "Don't meddle in your own business!" - read the resolution on Artuzov's memorandum.

By directing Artuzov in 1935 to work in the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, Stalin pursued two goals: to take the work of military intelligence under the vigilant control of the Chekists and to improve the "production indicators" of this most important unit of the General Staff of the Red Army. Artuzov, well known to Stalin from his work in foreign counterintelligence and intelligence, was, in the opinion of the leader, a suitable figure for such tasks.

Artuzov accepted the new appointment not without hesitation. He understood that military intelligence officers would be very wary of the arrival of a "man from Lubyanka", who, moreover, "took" with him (with Stalin's permission) about 30 security officers, professional intelligence officers. And Artuzov, alas, was not mistaken in his fears. A few months after starting work in the Intelligence Agency, he sensed something was wrong. He, the deputy chief, was no longer invited to operational meetings of the leadership of the Intelligence Agency. Gradually, he was taken away from the current work in two subdivisions previously accountable to him, and they began to impose unjustifiably serious penalties on the former Chekists, whom Artuzov had brought with him. Trying to rectify the situation, Artur Khristianovich, with his characteristic frankness, addressed a personal letter to the head of the Intelligence Agency, S.P. Uritsky.

"I think that you have changed your attitude towards the comrades who came with me, Semyon Petrovich," Artuzov wrote. - For what? I don't understand. I don't want to think that you were touched by a wave of some unhealthy sentiments among many of your comrades towards the Chekists ... But I think that I brought good people to the Intelligence Agency. He lacks a military school, he has many shortcomings, but he is useful for intelligence and there is no need to get rid of us."

Artur Khristianovich named only a consequence of the unfavorable situation around him. He did not even suspect the real reasons for it. And they, these reasons, were by no means of an "objective", "production" nature, but purely subjective. Having read the letter addressed to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin and the People's Commissar

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Defense of the USSR to Voroshilov "Report of the Deputy. early Head of the Directorate of the Headquarters of the Red Army Artuzov on the state of intelligence work of the Directorate and measures to improve it, "the latter summoned the head of the Intelligence Department.

- What problems does Artuzov deal with for you? the people's commissar asked sternly. Uritsky explained, although Voroshilov was already well aware of the activities of Arthur Khristianovich.

— And why not you, but he gives an assessment of the activities of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army? Voroshilov continued.

Uritsky shrugged.

"May this be the last time!" - sharply cut off the People's Commissar of Defense.

- I'm listening! – sounded in response... Artuzov was dismissed from the Intelligence Agency, then removed from his duties in the Foreign Department of the NKVD and arrested on a false, standard at the time "charge" of espionage. Hopes that with Yezhov coming to the leadership of the state security agencies "justice will prevail" were not destined to come true.

In the face of almost inevitable death, Artuzov tried to maintain his composure and give his own assessment of what was happening. In a letter to Yezhov, he wrote:

"I deeply understood how dissatisfied with me and how indignant Stalin must be. He sent me to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff to correct the work. It is especially hard to realize that I let him down in front of the military, because he hoped that I would be his eye in RU."

This was Artuzov's penultimate message. The last was an unfinished note, written in a prison cell with his own blood:

"Citizen investigator! I present evidence that I am not a spy. If I were a German spy, I would take care to obtain through the Germans a transit document for going abroad..." The note breaks off. They came for Artuzov.

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Flashes in the Don and Kuban

In the first decade and a half, when the Soviet foreign intelligence service was headed by Davtyan, Trilisser and Artuzov, its main task was to stop the attempts of the foreign Russian counter-revolution to restore the former order and its positions in Russia.

The fulfillment of this task could be successful only under the condition of close cooperation between counterintelligence and the OGPU behind-the-cord intelligence.

In a number of subsequent essays, the reader will get acquainted with the most striking episodes of the fierce struggle between the two sides in different regions of the Republic of Soviets.

After the defeat of the Volunteer Army, the remnants of which fled to the Crimea, then to Constantinople, Denikin decided to leave the post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the South of Russia and leave Russia forever. Denikin was soon followed by Wrangel.

But the struggle for power is not over. In an atmosphere of hopelessness, the white command is relying on secret agents left in Russia to ignite the fire of revolts in the Don, Kuban, among the mountain peoples of the Caucasus and in other regions.

In the mid-1920s, a difficult situation developed in the south of the country, in particular on the Don. Here, as in the years of the Civil War, one of the most tense and decisive knots of confrontation began.

First in Sofia, and then in Paris, the foreign intelligence service received secret information that Baron Wrangel was preparing a landing party somewhere on the Russian coast of the Black Sea. It was assumed that the base for the landing would be provided by an underground organization, the center of which was in Rostov-on-Don.

According to the data received by the OGPU from foreign intelligence, it was led by a major tsarist general. However, it was not possible to establish his surname for a long time. In Sofia, he was called "important face"...

The OGPU sought to uncover and paralyze the underground on the Don, to prevent the resumption of the war. An action plan was developed, and a special team was sent to Rostov to carry out this task. Gradually, information began to come in confirming the presence in the city of a widely branched, conspiratorial organization called the Salvation Army of Russia. There were about two hundred militants in an illegal position in Rostov, mostly former tsarist officers, there were weapons depots. In the reed thickets on the Don River, two detachments of Cossacks numbering about three thousand were based. The underground had its own agents in city institutions and, as it turned out later, even at the headquarters of the North Caucasian military district, which gave the conspirators the opportunity to constantly receive accurate information about the location, number and armament of the parts of the district. Lists of Soviet and party leaders of the city, Chekists were compiled, the massacre of which was supposed on the very first day of the rebellion.

As a result of a complex operation, the OGPU managed to introduce its employee, who acted as a White Guard officer, into the headquarters of the Salvation Army. Soon, this officer became a close associate of the head of headquarters, got access to the documentation of the underground, the lists of militants who were in Rostov. The entire leadership of the organization, secret apartments were revealed, methods of communication between individual subdivisions of the underground and detachments of rebellious Cossacks were established.

It was also possible to find out the name of the leader, an "important person". It turned out that the headquarters of the Salvation Army was headed by Lieutenant General of the tsarist army, Prince Ukhtomsky. A hereditary aristocrat, he was considered a major authority in the field of military science. He was predicted to be the chief strategist of the White Guard army. However, during the hostilities he was wounded and later brought to cooperation with Denikin's intelligence.

S.M., who was in Rostov at that time. Budyonny, to whom Ukhtomsky was personally known, suggested that, probably, the prince was hidden by the Whites under a false name in one of the Rostov Infirmaries with the expectation to subsequently organize an extensive underground network around this figure ...

In a small room of a house on the outskirts of the city, at a desk lit by a kerosene "lightning" lamp, sat an elderly man with short-cropped gray hair. He was dressed in a linen summer jacket and loose gray trousers. From the outside, it seemed that this was a conscientious and strict school teacher, checking the notebooks of his students. However, according to the documents, he was listed as a retired teacher Konstantin Ivanovich Kubarev, who lived in Nakhichevan together with his relative.

The old man's pen quickly ran over the paper: "In view of the continuing information about new formations of detachments and units at the headquarters of the Salvation Army of Russia, and also in view of the insufficient awareness of these units and the weak connection between them, I hereby believe:

1. All formations should be carried out with the preservation of official military secrets.
2. All commanders of detachments should take all available measures to establish communication with each other.
3. The heads of detachments that are being formed and are already ready for action communicate with the Rostov Central Directorate personally or through the designated liaison officers for this purpose, who must be personally known to the chiefs of the detachments.
4. The moment and signal of general readiness is appointed ... "

We must pay tribute to General Ukhtomsky - he knew his job well. The Rostov Chekists, who soon obtained this text, were convinced that, despite the difficult situation of the underground,

The prince managed to develop an effective system of mobilization of forces in case of a landing of the White Guard army on the Black Sea coast.

It was clear that the organization could be liquidated only after all its ties with foreign countries were established. However, there was little time left. A cipher telegram arrived from Moscow stating that, according to information from Sofia, the Rostov underground should begin active operations in July 1921.

By this time, intelligence had managed to infiltrate its people into the headquarters of the united Russian army abroad, and one of them was sent as a messenger to the Rostov underground. Ukhtomsky met with him under the invisible control of the OGPU. The messenger handed over to the prince the last instructions for preparing for the rebellion, money, and named the start date of the speech - July 23.

At this time, again from abroad, information was received that Wrangel's fleet had left Bizerte and headed for the Black Sea. In the region of the Dardanelles Strait, five transports with troops were waiting for him. The possibility of the transfer of white troops on foreign ships was not ruled out.

The leadership of the Rostov Chekists was informed about the received data. The situation was heating up, the rebellious detachments of the Cossacks, hiding in the Don floodplains, behaved especially aggressively. At any moment one could expect their action - and then bloodshed would not be avoided.

Under such conditions, it was decided to complete the operation to defeat the White Guard underground. Soon, General Ukhtomsky and his inner circle were arrested. It was necessary to convince the prince to contribute to the bloodless liquidation of all branches of the organization and its armed detachments. Ukhtomsky stubbornly

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refused this. And only after a long face-to-face conversation, the commander of the First Cavalry Army, S.M. Budyonny and Ukhtomsky, the latter agreed to help complete the operation.

The main thing was to prevent two detachments of rebellious Cossacks hiding in the reeds of the Lower Don from coming out.

One of the detachments was commanded by the cornet Govorukhin. He was almost constantly drunk and was ready for any recklessness. He drank from the very day when he learned that Colonel Nazarov had turned up in the reeds near Yelizavetinskaya.

He remembered the August night of 1920, when they sailed together with the colonel across the fast river Manych. It was a year ago. By order of Wrangel, a Cossack landing force of one and a half thousand checkers under the command of Colonel Nazarov was thrown from the Crimea near Taganrog. Half of the landing force lay down on the deserted Azov coast during the landing. Nazarov managed to take the other half to the north, to the Don, bypassing Rostov. For a month they walked along the right bank of the Don, perpetrating reprisals against Soviet workers, small detachments of the Reds. But at the village of Konstantinovskaya, the Reds threw regular units at them from both sides.

The battle went on for two days, and the cornet could not understand how he managed to leave then. With ten Cossacks, he and Colonel Nazarov decided to make their way to the Kuban. They knew that after them the detachments of Generals Cherepov and Ulagay were sent to the Kuban.

But along the way, the Cossacks fled, did not want to go to other people's places, and at Manych itself, near a small farm, some detachment overtook them - either Reds, or a gang. The horses were shot, the colonel was wounded in the shoulder. Nevertheless, they left, sat out in the copse until evening, and at night they sailed through Manych. The cornet took the colonel's weapons. We had already reached the middle when the colonel began to sink. He tried to grab onto the cornet, but he twisted away and kicked the drowning colonel away with his foot. Since then, Govorukhin has not heard anything about Nazarov.

"A three-wire devil has surfaced," the cornet muttered when he heard the news that Nazarov was alive and wanted to meet him.

It was so inopportune ... Govorukhin after the death of Nazarov became the second figure in the white underground. At first, after the defeat, he tried to reach the Ulagai detachment - he did not reach. Hearing that the Kuban landing force was dispersed, he returned to the Don. Here he was found by a representative of the underground headquarters of the Salvation Army of Russia. The Rostov organization provided him with money, promised a promotion in the event of the success of the Wrangel landing planned for mid-summer from the Black Sea and the proclamation of the independence of the Don.

By the spring, Govorukhin managed to place a total of 1,500 sabers under his command. He did not hold all his strength together: some in the reeds, some in the farms. However, if necessary, he could gather everyone in a few hours. The staff with which he supported

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constant communication, ordered not to make small performances for the time being, but to keep the fighting force ready.

The cornet was told that he was valued at the headquarters and Baron Wrangel himself was informed about his efforts.

And suddenly this Nazarov! This is where he got drunk.

Soon a representative from Nazarov, who led the second detachment of the rebellious Cossacks, came to Govorukhin with a proposal for a meeting. After hesitation, the cornet came to the conclusion that it would be better not to evade her. We agreed to meet at an abandoned mill. When Govorukhin entered there, he was literally dumbfounded: in front of him, legs wide apart on the white earth soaked with flour, stood a stranger.

Who was hiding under the name of "Colonel Nazarov"? This was the secret of the Rostov Chekists, who skillfully used the false Nazarov to disarm the Cossack detachments.

When "colonel Nazarov" arrived in Rostov for an allegedly important meeting of the leaders of the underground, he was arrested. During interrogation, he was offered to write an order - the detachment to hand over their weapons, ordinary Cossacks to go home, register with the executive committees and work peacefully. Officers to confess to the commission of inquiry. In case of refusal, the Chekists promised to tell the Cossacks who he really was.

— Who is it? the prisoner asked fearfully.

One of the Chekists took a blue folder with papers from the table and began to read slowly. From the documents it followed that a year ago, Nazar Moiseev, the tsar's policeman in the fourth part of the city of Tsaritsyn, killed the wounded marching ataman Nazarov on the banks of the Manych, appropriated his documents and, having made his way to the Don, fraudulently entered into the confidence of the Cossacks and became the commander of the rebel detachment. Realizing that he was completely exposed, the arrested person accepted the offer of the Chekists and wrote an order for surrender. They also organized a meeting between him and Govorukhin.

After that, S.M. Budyonny met with representatives of the rebellious Cossacks in Rostov, and then, together with them and a member of the Cheka, went to the village, where the Cossacks of Govorukhin's detachment had gathered. Budyonny managed to convince the Cossacks of the futility of further struggle and lay down their arms.

Simultaneously, militants of the Russian Salvation Army were arrested in Rostov. Thus ended the complex KGB operation to eliminate the White Guard underground in southern Russia, which threatened to raise a rebellion and start a civil war again.

Prince Ukhtomsky was sentenced to capital punishment. The Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee replaced the shooting with a long prison term. In 1932 he was released from the camp near Vyatka.

and wrote a letter to Budyonny. Here are excerpts from that letter:

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"On December 16, he was released after a 12-year sentence. Through these years of imprisonment, I meekly and patiently atoned for my crime. Having received (in conclusion) official permission, I set to work on my own, "A Strategic Outline of the World War of 1914-1918." in 2 volumes. This work of mine was repeatedly considered and encouraged by some representatives of the highest authorities ... German and Russian writings relating to the war were delivered to me, and the question of publishing a ready-to-print edition was already raised. But in December 1929, my transfer from the Lefortovo prison to the concentration camps of the OGPU interrupted my work...

I am now oppressed by a terrible need ... Meanwhile, I feel and am deeply convinced of this that under other conditions of life I could still bring significant benefits to military affairs.

How did the representatives of the "higher authorities" react to this appeal of the prince? A note by K.E. Voroshilov with the following content:

"Tov. Budyonny.

It is urgent to find out:

1. At the prison department, how Ukhtomsky behaved in prison, which is his literary work.
2. At the OGPU, how it relates to the question of Ukhtomsky's moving to Moscow and to using him in any kind of work.
3. Where is Ukhtomsky's literary work now, and is it possible even now to derive any benefit from it for the cause?
4. Think about whether it is possible to send Ukhtomsky, if he really repented, a certain amount in the form of an advance payment for his literary work.

This note was the last document in the archives of the Salvation Army of Russia...

But even after its defeat, separate rebellious outbreaks arose for a long time in the Don and Kuban. The leader and organizer of this movement was already the Russian All-Military Union, where the Cossack General Ulagay played a prominent role. While in exile, he maintained constant contacts with the Cossack underground in southern Russia through messengers. One of these liaisons was Yesaul Venerovsky, who was under the close supervision of behind-the-scenes reconnaissance.

Venerovsky Dmitry Konstantinovich, a native of the city of Pyatigorsk, a former captain of the Terek army, adjutant of General Ulagai S.G. emigrated to Iran in 1920 with the remnants of the White Army, became an active member of the Russian All-Military Union.

In 1925-1926, Venerovsky, on the instructions of General Ulagay, who settled in France, made an illegal crossing of the Soviet border, made his way to the Don and Kuban, met there with representatives of underground Cossack organizations.

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Returning to Iran, Venerovsky immediately went to France and reported the results to the Ulagin. In 1928, Venerovsky settled in Tehran, graduated from the driver's school, worked first as a driver's assistant, and then independently in one of the firms. At this time, he actively cooperates with the ROVS branch in Iran, maintains close relations with M.I. Gryaznov.

Information from archival documents of the Cheka-OGPU: Gryaznov Mikhail Ivanovich - a former colonel of the White Army. Among the white emigration in Iran, he played a leading role. A member of the foreign counter-revolutionary organization "Brotherhood of Russian Truth" (BRP), on the instructions of which he carried out active subversive work against the USSR, closely cooperating with the ROVS, maintained contacts through Colonel Lepekhin with the head of this organization, General Kutepov. He had connections with British intelligence, passed on to it information about the situation in the USSR, obtained through his agents, who made illegal forays into Soviet territory. Maintained ties with the major leader of the Basmachi Ibraim-bek, trying to involve him in the bloc anti-Soviet forces.

Venerovsky was also in the field of view of intelligence in the summer of 1930 in the city of Tabriz, in northwestern Iran. It was there that a middle-aged man appeared, in whose appearance a military bearing was clearly felt. He settled with his old acquaintance, Islenyev, a white émigré, an employee of the Italian company Marobio, which sold car accessories.

Venerovsky arrived in Tabriz with the aim of preparing an illegal transition to the territory of the USSR, having received instructions and money from General Ulagay for this. Taking into account the experience of the first illegal raid on Soviet territory, he decided to use the previously laid route and cross the border in the Araks region. But first it was necessary to get Soviet documents.

Tabriz lived the measured life of a provincial town. In the East, it is not customary to rush, here no one tries to set a "record in running". Haste, haste here cause only ridicule and, of course, are a sign of a low, subordinate position in society, since a "worthy" gentleman is never in a hurry.

A week later, Venerovsky got involved in the rhythm of Tabriz life and, without advertising the purpose of his stay, nevertheless went to the market every day or visited other meeting places of defectors from the USSR.

The Oriental Bazaar is a blessed place, how many laudable, enthusiastic words have been written about it! Here you can find everything that a person needs. News not only from Tabriz and its environs flocks here. Here you can find out what is going on in the capital of Iran, neighboring states, including on Soviet territory.

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The second month of Venerovsky's stay in the city was expiring, but there were still no documents. And then one day he was lucky: at the bazaar he met an emigrant who arrived from the USSR. The officer bought a railway conductor certificate from him for little money. And soon luck smiled at him again: he managed to get a driver's license.

With these documents it was possible to start crossing the border. A guide was needed. For 30 fogs! a reliable person was found who knew well the places of border crossings and who repeatedly accompanied the defectors.

On a dead September night, Venerovsky safely crossed the border through Arak. The ease with which he managed to cross the border was reassuring, but the captain was collected and vigilant. Going to the railway station, he bought a ticket and on the new railway running along the Araks he reached Baku without any complications; then the white officer proceeded to the Kuban and the Don, where he met, according to the appearances and addresses given to him, with like-minded people of General Ulagay.

As Venerovsky later wrote in his report, during the four months of his stay in the Soviet Union he visited Transcaucasia, Dagestan, Chechnya, Terek, Kuban and Don regions, Voronezh, Ryazan, Moscow, Penza, Samara provinces, Orenburg region, the Kirghiz steppe, Trans-Caspian Territory and Turkestan.

He also visited Moscow, met with relatives, to whom he "explained" that he had returned to the Union in the summer of 1930, was allegedly arrested by the OGPU and spent four months under investigation, but was

released. Now he lives in Krasnodar, works as a driver. In Moscow, he turned out to be passing through, following on a business trip.

Considering his task accomplished, Venerovsky set off on his return journey. He wanted to use the same route - through Transcaucasia. However, having learned that entry into the border zone was prohibited, he changed his route: he went through Samara to Orenburg and Tashkent. He did not stay in Tashkent for long, using this time for rest, then he left by train towards Ashgabat, but at one of the small stations he got off the train and headed towards the border, strictly adhering to the direction to the south. In the evening he reached the mountains and spent the whole night moving over the mountain ranges. Good luck accompanied him, by morning he went out into the valley, where an Iranian village was spread.

Venerovsky experienced a natural sense of relief when he found himself on Iranian territory. Behind him was a four-month stay full of dangers in his homeland. However, his adventures did not end there. He was detained by the Iranian authorities and spent about two months in detention. He was threatened with deportation to the USSR, and only the efforts of Gryaznov helped to avoid such an undesirable ending.

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After his release in February 1931, Venerovsky arrived in the city of Mashhad and in early March was in Tehran.

As early as March 11, Venerovsky sent a coded letter to General Ulagai in Marseilles announcing his return to Tehran.

Venerovsky does not tell anyone in Tehran about the results of his stay in the Soviet Union, not even his savior Colonel Gryaznov.

This was, of course, a blunder of the OGPU and intelligence, since Venerovsky's second trip to the Union became known "after the fact." However, intelligence managed to get a written report on the situation in the USSR, which he compiled on the basis of his trip.

Here are excerpts from that report:

"Top secret REPORT D.K. VENUS CENTER OF PARIS

The following report was compiled on the basis of personal observation during a trip in late 1930 and early 1931 through the Transcaucasus, Dagestan, Chechnya, Terek, Kuban and Don regions; Voronezh, Ryazan, Moscow, Penza and Samara provinces; Orenburg region, the Kyrgyz steppe, Turkestan and the Transcaspian region.

The economic situation of the frontier strip of Transcaucasia and the Transcaspian Territory is incomparably better than that of Central Russia, with the exception of Moscow. This is explained by the fact that the Soviet government, fearing to arouse discontent among the local population on the outskirts, in the border zone, first of all, seeks to satisfy the interests of the local population at the expense of the central provinces, which are more distant from the border. But, despite all the efforts of the Soviet authorities, a particularly rousing mood is strongly developed precisely in these border zones, due to their geographical location, which makes it easier to leave for the territory of a neighboring state and raids from there in the form of various partisan detachments. There is a tendency among this population to separate from the Sov. Russia and the accession of these regions to the neighboring states - Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey. Comparing the position of these national minorities inhabiting the border areas with the position of the peasants of the central provinces of Russia, one is surprised at such long-suffering of the latter, despite their much worse position. According to the peasants of the Volga region, by the beginning of 1931, they baked bread half surrogate and in a very limited

number of ... "

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While in Tehran, Venerovsky is busy with obtaining a French visa and maintains a constant correspondence with General Ulagai.

During his stay in Iran, Venerovsky was in the field of view of our intelligence. Here is a brief extract from a message dated June 1931: "Former agent in the USSR of General Ulagay Yesaul D.K. Venerovsky is currently in Tehran, living with Colonel Gryaznov. The financial situation is difficult, he has no money, and he wrote a letter to General Ulagay asking him to send money and a visa to travel to Paris.

On September 17, 1931, Venerovsky left Tehran, heading for Paris via Baghdad-Beirut Marseille.

From that moment on, intelligence for a long time lost track of the captain of the Terek army.

However, already after the end of World War II, Venerovsky was arrested in January 1946 on the territory of the USSR and convicted by a military tribunal for anti-state activities to imprisonment.

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Tuman is an Iranian gold monetary unit of the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th century.

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The end of the "Gaezhny headquarters"

In November 1922, the Red Army under the command of I.P. Ubovich, breaking the resistance of the enemy, liberated Spassk, Volochaevsk and Khabarovsk, defeated Kolchak's army, liberated Vladivostok.

The civil war is finally over. The scattered remnants of the White Army retreated to Korea, Shanghai and Manchuria. However, American and Japanese agents settled on the territory of Primorye and the Far East, and underground sabotage and terrorist formations continued to operate actively.

More than a year has passed since the liberation of the Far East from the invaders, but the situation in the region continued to be unsettled. Large, well-armed detachments of terrorists were actively operating, hiding in the forests, attacking villages, cooperatives, small police stations, vehicles transporting money, mail and food, cutting communication lines, blowing up bridges. In some areas, they felt almost complete masters. In these speeches, an invisible guiding hand and a certain "handwriting" were visible. However, it was not possible to get the captured terrorists who led them, only a few of those arrested mumbled indistinctly about a certain "Taiga Headquarters", but where is this headquarters, who commands it, how is communication maintained between it and underground formations - none of them knew about it.

Finally, a captured former white officer said that the "Taiga Headquarters" really existed, although he did not know its exact location. We managed to establish one important detail: the headquarters is not the last resort, all instructions, money, weapons were sent from Harbin. It was there that the leading center of the UNDERGROUND should be sought.

..Before the Civil War, Harbin was known as the "capital of the CER" - the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was under

Russian jurisdiction. Now the remnants of the Kolchak army, the troops of Ataman Semenov, Baron Ungern, Dieterikhs, and many refugees were concentrated here.

Emigration lived its own life: the rich, who had time to take out their goods or grab someone else's, prospered, the poor - were poor. Poverty, even among the former officers, was appalling. It is no coincidence that the Harbin prisons were filled with Russian criminals, and many officers went as mercenaries to the Chinese generals, who were constantly fighting among themselves.

In this situation, it was not difficult for the Japanese to find people among the Russian officers who were ready to serve them. Among them were professional and highly educated military men - generals, colonels and combat youth ready for any risky actions. Some went for money, others were attracted by the idea of "White Russia", but only a small group of people connected with the Japanese residency knew that they all worked for the Japanese, the rest sincerely believed that they were serving the monarchical forces.

The tasks of the formations created by the Japanese included the destabilization of the situation in the Far East, its separation from Russia and, of course, the collection of military and political information.

For the same purposes, the military department of the Harbin Monarchic Center was created, headed by General Kuzmin and a professional counterintelligence officer, a former representative of the imperial headquarters in the international intelligence bureau in Paris, and then the head of the special department of the army of the Supreme Ruler of Russia A.V. Kolchak by Colonel Zhadvoin, whose "sponsor" was the Japanese resident Takayama.

The newly created Soviet intelligence station in Harbin was given the task of carrying out "undercover penetration" into this department in order to obtain secret information about its activities.
value.

We soon became convinced that the military department could not be approached from outside. I had to look for someone who already works there.

With great difficulty, the security officers managed to acquire a reliable assistant - Somov, but he did not have access to the operational plans of the department. To acquire an agent in the leadership seemed to be an impossible task, since all the people there were proven, hardened in battles with the Bolshevik authorities, the Red Army.

And yet the search for a suitable candidate continued. We learned from Somov that there was a certain Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Mikhailovich Filippov in the department. During the Civil War, he served with Kolchak, was considered an experienced, knowledgeable officer, enjoyed authority as a military specialist, and was aware of all operations. And one more detail that I really wanted to grab on to - Filippov had a negative attitude towards the atrocities of the taiga gangs, sometimes restrained their activity,

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for which some of the officers considered him almost an accomplice of the "Reds". We decided to study it deeper and involve it in cooperation.

Recruitment methods during these years were not very ingenious, but often gave the desired effect. First of all, they attracted those who applied for return to their homeland and had to earn this right by their work. And since the times were harsh, sometimes methods were used, as they say, "hard". For example, it was hinted that in case of refusal to cooperate, relatives living in Russia might suffer.

Those who were in need of money and did not intend to return were recruited, as a rule, "in the dark" on behalf of American or Japanese intelligence. The method was good because the information from such agents always came true: no one dared to deceive the Japanese and Americans, they knew that they were quick to reprisal.

Filippov was not going to return, he led a modest lifestyle, he did not feel the need for money. The only clue - his "liberalism" - has so far been too ephemeral.

But soon they learned from Somov that Filippov's wife and daughter lived in Vladivostok, and a dispatch went there asking to find them.

Meanwhile, the enemy did not doze. Once Somov, excited, came to a meeting and, handing the local emigre newspaper to the operative, pointed his finger at one note:

— Read!

The article reported that a refugee from Vladivostok, a former Red Army soldier Mukhortov, spoke about the massacre of the families of officers. The women and children whom the Chekists executed by cutting off their heads were listed, among them were Filippov's wife and daughter.

Do you understand the state he's in now? He swore fierce revenge on the Soviet regime.

The note immediately aroused scouts' doubts. One of the residency workers managed to find Mukhortov, got to know him, and in a skillfully constructed conversation (on behalf of a gang of smugglers who allegedly intended to attract Filippov to cooperation) found out that Mukhortov was not a Red Army soldier, but a fugitive criminal, and the note was signed for money received from a man who, according to the description, was very similar to Colonel Zhadvoin. It became clear that, appreciating Filippov as a specialist and fearing for his loyalty, the Japanese and white counterintelligence decided to keep him in this way.

The scout managed to convince Mukhortov to meet with Filippov and tell him about the falsity of the note, when suddenly Mukhortov pulled out a pistol and shouted: "Oh, you bastard, Chekist, I saw you in the Cheka when they took you for interrogation!" - pounced on him. In the ensuing fight, Mukhortov was killed, and the residency lost an important witness. In addition, discouraging news came from Vladivostok that Filippov's wife and daughter "are not listed as living in the city."

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A few days later, Somov showed up for the meeting with two important messages. Firstly, Filippov shared with him that, wanting to personally avenge the Bolsheviks for the death of his family, he himself went on a raid across the border as part of the detachment of Colonel Shiryaev, and, moreover, Somov managed to find out the time and place of the border crossing by the detachment. Secondly, which meant no less for the Chekists, Filippov, in a conversation with Somov, mentioned that his wife's surname was not Filippova at all, but Baryatinskaya, from which it followed that our previous searches were going in the wrong direction.

On the same night urgent information was sent to Vladivostok.

Shiryaev's detachment was let through the border without hindrance, "led" for several kilometers, and then completely defeated in a short fight. Shiryaev fled, Filippov was captured.

For several days, local Chekists, using materials received from the residency, worked hard and persistently with him, seeking his voluntary transfer to their side, but to no avail. During one of the interrogations, he stated:

"You won't do anything to me. The worst thing that a person can experience, I have already experienced - the violent death of the people closest to me.

"You are mistaken, Sergei Mikhailovich," the officer corrected him, "we do not take revenge on the innocent." people.

"But my wife and daughter have been brutally murdered!" exclaimed Filippov.

Instead of answering, the security officer got up, went to the door and opened it:

- Elena Petrovna, Irochka, come here.

The wife and daughter threw themselves on the chest of the stunned Filippov.

When he became aware of the background of the provocation started by the Japanese and white counterintelligence against him, he did not hesitate to agree to cooperate with Soviet intelligence and swore the honor of an officer to serve her to the end. Taking advantage of the legend of a successful escape from the encirclement and the reverse crossing of the border, Filippov soon returned to Harbin. Now he also had the glory of a "combat partisan".

Soon, fulfilling the task of the Chekists, S.M. Filippov prepared a well-thought-out and substantiated memorandum addressed to the leadership of the military department. In it, referring to the numerous failures and defeats of the White Guard detachments, caused by the lack of timely information, a unified plan of action and proper coordination of work, he proposed to create an information center and allocate a relatively small amount for its successful work. The plan was approved and the money was given.

The military department put several messengers at Filippov's disposal, who systematically made their way across the border, met with the leaders of the detachments in Primorye, received information from them and delivered it to Harbin. Filippov processed it

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and forwarded to the headquarters, but at the same time the residency in Vladivostok began to regularly receive and report to the Center important and timely data about the gangs preparing for the transfer, about the time and routes, about the enemy spies and emissaries.

One day Filippov received serious information that, on the orders of Japanese intelligence, an uprising was being prepared in the Spassky, Nikolsk-Ussuriysky, Yakovlevsky and Anuchinsky districts of Primorye. The calculation was that it would serve as a detonator for the insurgency in other areas.

Through Filippov, it also became known that the cruel and merciless lieutenant Kovalev was sent to the "Taiga Headquarters" to coordinate the insurrectionary activities. This post was one of the last. The residency received information that the counterintelligence of the Whites and the Japanese mission, alarmed by the numerous failures, suspected Filippov of betrayal. The ring tightened around him. It was decided to withdraw the agent from the military department and use the situation to infiltrate the "Taiga Headquarters" in order to defeat him.

Operation was successfully completed. It was possible to stage the abduction of Filippov and his "murder by the Chekists." For the "innocently murdered servant of God Sergius" a memorial service was served at the headquarters. Suspicions were removed from him, and all operations conceived and planned with his participation continued without any changes.

Lieutenant Kovalev was captured by the Chekists after crossing the border, and according to his identity card (for a fictitious person), Filippov went to the "Taiga Headquarters". It was risky - the news of his "death" could reach the "taiga". But the game was worth the candle.

To help Filippov, a group of border guards and former partisans consisting of twelve people was allocated, the commissioner of which was the Vladivostok Chekist I.M. Afanasiev. The group was trained by the future famous Soviet intelligence officer D.G. Fedichkin. This man deserves special mention. His biography includes partisan and underground work in the rear of the Whites and the Japanese, intelligence work in the pre-war years in Latvia and Poland, capture and imprisonment in a Polish prison, then, during the Second World War, work on the territory of Bulgaria, after wars ~ leadership of the residency in Rome and many years devoted to the education of new generations of intelligence officers ... And here we will cite only one episode told by D.G. Fedichkin about the operation he carried out in the early 1920s in the Far East. It became known that in the upper reaches of the Amur, the White Guards were concentrating forces for raids into the Primorsky, Amur and Chita regions. The place and time of the landing were strictly classified. Our

the agent managed to figure out these plans only at the very last moment before the start of the raids. A personal meeting with the agent was excluded, but they managed to tell him

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a request that he briefly outline the necessary information on paper and put the note in a matchbox. On the way to the pier, passing under the bridge that was next to it, the agent had to throw the boxes into the grass. It was assumed that D.G. Fedichkin, sitting on a park bench, will pick up the box.

Everything seemed to be going well. The scout saw how the agent approached the bridge, took out a pack of cigarettes and matches from his pocket, lit a cigarette, but, stepping under the bridge, disappeared from view, and after a minute and a half three policemen ran out from there, chasing the fleeing man. I had such a condition, D.G. later recalled. Fedichkin, as if I were rooted to the bench. Go in search of a matchbox? What if it's a trap? But there was nothing to do: going up to the bridge, he looked down and saw a matchbox in the grass. I walked through the park, there were no people, examined the nearest bushes - nothing suspicious either. Having made a walking circle in the park, I walked under the bridge in the other direction, picked up the box on the go, and pounded in my head: "Is this the box? What if they are watching? But everything ended well. The note gave the names of the landing points, time, names, number of personnel, armament, and a plan of action on Soviet territory. The operation was aborted.

But let's get back to the events around the Taiga Headquarters. The Filippov-Afanasyev detachment successfully reached him. Soon the scouts were aware of all the issues of preparation for the uprising. Under the pretext of "conservation of forces," they managed to persuade the leadership of the "headquarters" to reduce current operations, in other words, bandit raids. However, this aroused suspicion among some leaders. There was also a fear that some of the White Guards who knew about Kovalev's mission and about the "murder" of Filippov would appear in the "headquarters". The massacre of the agent and his comrades could occur at any moment. These circumstances made it necessary to accelerate the liquidation of the "headquarters".

The operation carried out by Filippov and Afanasiev for this purpose is unlikely to have analogues in the history of intelligence. Filippov, a passionate amateur photographer, always carried a camera with him. At his suggestion, the leaders of the "Taiga Headquarters" settled down for group photography. The privates, including the members of his detachment, stood aside: their turn was next. Filippov's detachment froze in anticipation of the commander's prearranged signal. And here comes the magnesium. At the same moment, shots rang out, and the leaders of the "headquarters" were destroyed. The rest, confused, surrendered without resistance. Only one bandit managed to escape, cross the border and get to Harbin, where he reported the incident.

Being the only "representative" of the "Taiga Headquarters", Filippov took urgent measures to prevent an uprising

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and to eliminate the remaining units. The situation in Primorye has stabilized.

In 1925, in Vladivostok, a trial took place over the emissary Kovalev and the leaders of the White Guard underground, who were to lead the planned uprising, identified with the help of Afanasiev Filippov's group. It completely exposed the subversive activities of the White Guard organizations and "centers" in Primorye.

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Red and white

White emigration in the 1920s was the subject of constant attention of Soviet foreign intelligence.

It did not represent any single and homogeneous force. The bulk of it consisted of those who did not accept Soviet power and left Russia after October 1917, or fought against this power with weapons in their hands and, having been defeated in the Civil War, fled abroad. This was the most bitter part of the emigration.

Pre-revolutionary Russia was represented by the Grand Dukes Romanovs, former tsarist ministers, members of the State Council and deputies of the State Duma. Many other politicians of various kinds, landlords, capitalists, merchants and government officials of all ranks, soldiers of the defeated tsarist army, the intelligentsia, and members of their families also turned out to be abroad. Among them were famous people and simply frightened townsfolk.

After the Red Army broke through the fortifications of the Whites in the Crimea in November 1920, the front commander M.V. Frunze turned on the radio to General Wrangel with a proposal to stop the fight and lay down their arms in order to avoid senseless resistance and bloodshed. At the same time, those who laid down their arms were promised an amnesty, and those who did not want to work with the new government were guaranteed the opportunity to travel abroad "provided they refused on parole from any participation in the further struggle against Soviet Russia." Wrangel did not respond to Frunze's proposal and tried to hide him from his troops. A few years later, while in exile, Wrangel recalled these events in his notes: "Our radio station adopted Soviet radio. The Red Command offered me surrender, guaranteeing the life and inviolability of all the senior staff of the army and all those who laid down their arms. I ordered all radio stations closed except for one

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officers." A whole armada of ships - from dreadnoughts to sailboats and longboats - took away the remnants of the defeated white army to the Turkish shores.

On November 18, 1920, against the backdrop of the exotic panorama of Constantinople, a bizarre, like a fantastic mirage, appeared an armada of various ships and boats, crowded with people exhausted by a six-day voyage in inhuman conditions, most of them without bread and water, standing in cramped quarters.

Various reasons for the defeat of the whites in the Civil War were named by the leaders and participants of the white movement, as well as by many foreign historians. Among them are the lack of a common political line, disagreements between individual leaders, between the Cossacks, the "federalists" of the Kuban, Don, Ukraine, Georgia and the "centralists" who advocated a "united and indivisible Russia", between supporters of orientation towards the Entente and to Germany.

In the Volunteer Army, embezzlement, speculation, bribery reached extraordinary proportions, and, as A.I. Denikin in his "Essays on Russian Troubles", the leaders of the white movement were leaders without people, they did not take into account "the power of resistance or assistance of the masses"! The agrarian, social and national policies of the white governments, their support for the landlords and capitalists who tried to take revenge and return the lost property, the preaching of the slogan "one and indivisible Russia", the denial of the right to self-determination in national politics - all this did not arouse enthusiasm among the people, created favorable conditions for the perception of the Bolshevik programs and slogans by the broad masses.

In hindsight, the leaders and participants in the white movement admitted that there were no "positive" slogans in their armies, they did not know how to arrange a rear, they could not curb the spontaneously growing robberies and violence perpetrated not only by bandit formations, but also by troops, and state guards, and counterintelligence. Here is what Colonel V.V. wrote about this. Samborsky, head of the ship unit of the 1st Corps of General Wrangel, in his "Notes on the Causes of the Crimean Catastrophe": "The population of the area occupied by units of the Crimean army was considered as conquered in an enemy country ... The peasants constantly complained

on the officers who illegally requisitioned, i.e., rather, robbed their carts, grain, hay, etc. The village had no protection. It was enough for the army to stay 2-3 weeks in the occupied area, as the population cursed everyone ... In essence, there was no civil administration in the occupied regions, although some regions were occupied by troops for 5-6 months ... General Kutepov spoke bluntly that he needs such judicial figures who could, on his orders, anyone

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to be hanged and sentenced to death for any offense... People were shot and shot. Many more were shot without trial. General Kutepov directly said that there was no need to start a judicial rigmarole, to shoot and that's all ... "?.

But let us return to the situation in Constantinople. For five days in November 1920, 150 thousand people arrived here, of which about 70 thousand officers and soldiers of the Wrangel army. In total, more than 300,000 white emigrants passed through Constantinople. From Turkey, many ended up in the Balkans, Czechoslovakia, France. Another route passed through Poland, from where the emigrants were sent to Germany, Belgium, and France. Up to 200,000 immigrants from Russia settled in Poland, up to 600,000 in Germany, and up to 400,000 in France. Part of the emigration settled in Finland and the Baltic States.

China has become a special area of emigrant dispersion. The remnants of the troops of Admiral Kolchak, detachments of generals Dieterikhs, Kappel, and Ataman Semenov rushed here. In Manchuria, according to various sources, in the 1920s there lived from 150,000 to 300,000 immigrants from Russia. A significant part of them were Russians who settled along the CER before the revolution.

Thus, at the beginning of the 1920s, centers of concentration of Russian emigration were formed in many foreign cities. In Paris, Berlin, Sofia, Bucharest, Belgrade, Warsaw, the remnants of the former military formations of the White Army settled - Kornilov, Drozdov, Markov, etc. Their main coordinator was the headquarters of the "United Russian Army" (ORA) stationed in Serbia, headed by General Wrangel. In September 1924, on the basis of the ORA, Wrangel created the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), whose leadership included generals Kutepov, Shatilov, Turkul, Gershelman, Klimovich, Skoblin.

Members of the White émigré organizations cherished the hope that the Bolsheviks would not stay in power for a long time, and actively established contacts with the counter-revolutionary underground in Russia in order to prepare an uprising. The Kuban and the Don, Moscow, Petrograd and Yaroslavl were in the sphere of their attention. Bloody raids from the adjacent territory of Poland were carried out by the armed gangs of Petliura and Skoropadsky, Bulak-Balakhovich, Tyutyunnik and Pavlovsky. In the southern regions of the country, Ulagay military formations were active, gangs led by the Taiga Headquarters agitated the population of the Far East.

In the territories adjacent to China and Manchuria, the Americans and Japanese did not lose hope for revenge using the remnants of the army of Kolchak, Dieterikhs. Of particular importance at that time was Harbin, where the headquarters of Kolchak, Ataman Semenov, refugees from the Amur region, Siberia and the Far East were located.

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Terrorist activities posed a great danger to the country. In 1923, the White Guards Konradi and Polunin killed the General Secretary of the Soviet delegation at the Lausanne Conference, V.V. Vorovsky. On June 7, 1927, at the main Warsaw railway station, the emigrant-monarchist B. Koverda killed the USSR ambassador to Poland P.L. Voikov. White emigrants attempted to blow up the building of the Soviet embassy in Warsaw: a bomb of great destructive power was found in the chimney.

In March 1927, a meeting of terrorists was held in Terijoki (at the secret point of Finnish intelligence), which was attended by General Kutepov. He stated the need

"immediately start terror", indicating that the British and other foreign governments will give money only if the white emigration proves its viability, will actively fight against the Soviet power?. In this regard, cases were noted of crossing the Soviet border from Poland and Romania by entire military groups with the aim of destroying the Soviet people and ruining the border areas.

On the evening of June 7, 1927, a group of terrorists who crossed over from Finland dropped a bomb during a party club meeting in Leningrad. The explosion injured 30 people. The terrorists - white officers Stroeve, Samoilov, Bolmasov, Solsky and Aderkas - were detained and brought to justice.

The main attention of foreign intelligence and its residencies was directed to the study of the secret activities of the counter-revolutionary White émigré formations, the identification of their plans, the establishment of branches and agents on Soviet territory, the decomposition of organizations from the inside, the disruption of impending sabotage-terrorist and other subversive measures. Overseas intelligence, in close cooperation with counterintelligence units, paid close attention to the so-called "People's Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom" headed by B.V. Savinkov, "Russian All-Military Union", "Brotherhood of Russian Truth", "Brotherhood of the White Cross", etc.

In 1921, the INO obtained the ciphers of anti-Soviet organizations in London and Paris. The intercepted and decoded telegrams from these centers were of great help in identifying and neutralizing the enemies of the young republic.

The methods and scope of the department's activities in the 1920s and early 1930s are evidenced by its participation in the decomposition of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), the most active and aggressive organization of white emigrants, created from officers of the defeated Wrangel army. The ROVS was headed by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, Admiral Wrangel and General Kutepov. The latter from the very beginning became the actual head of the organization, since 1929,

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after the death of Romanov and Wrangel, he became the sole leader, in fact, of the entire White Guard movement abroad. Terror and sabotage were the main weapons of the ROVS in the fight against the Soviet state. In Paris and in all branches of the union (in Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, etc.), terrorist groups of officers were being prepared to be thrown into the Soviet Union. This work was carried out in close contact with the special services of France, Poland, Romania, Finland,

The first blow to the ROVS was the aforementioned operation "Trust", developed and carried out with the direct participation of Dzerzhinsky and completed under the leadership of his successor as chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky. In parallel with the operation "Trust" against the ROVS and its branches in Bulgaria and Romania, a number of other similar operations were carried out: from 1924 to 1929 - operation "D-7" with the participation of the legendary "Military Organization" of former monarchist officers in Leningrad, from 1924 to 1932 - operation "S-4" with the participation of the legendary "Internal Russian National Organization" (VRNO), from 1929 to 1932 - operation "Overseas" with the participation of the legendary anti-Soviet organization "North Caucasian Military Organization" (SKVO), from 1929 to 1934 - Operation Academy. In all of these operations, INO agents were active. Moreover, the Foreign Department on its own carried out one of the most difficult tasks - secretly kidnapped the head of the ROVS Kutepov.

The list of some sources of information eloquently testifies to the possibilities of foreign intelligence in the ROVS. For example, one of the prominent leaders of the union was the former commander of the Kornilov regiment, Major General N.V. Skoblin. He and his wife, the famous Russian singer N.V. Plevitskaya, enjoyed great prestige in the circles of white emigration. Since the late 1920s, both were involved on a patriotic basis in intelligence activities.

S.N. also participated in the work on the ROVS. Tretyakov, At one time he was the chairman of the Moscow Exchange Committee, the chairman of the Economic Council under the Provisional Government, a member of the Kolchak government. In Paris, he became deputy chairman of the "Russian Trade, Industrial and Financial Union" ("Torgprom"), founded in 1920 by more than 600 Russian industrialists, bankers and merchants, one of the active participants in the anti-Soviet actions of white émigré organizations.

The position of these individuals in the white émigré environment spoke for itself, and foreign intelligence cooperated with them for many years.

In the 1930s, foreign intelligence continued to build up its attacks on the ROVS. In 1937, when she kidnapped the new leader of the union, General Miller, who committed atrocities during the Civil War

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we are in Arkhangelsk, the EMRO has practically disappeared from the scene. Even the Gestapo refused to use it in their subversive work against the USSR, suspecting in it, as they said then, "a hoax Chekists".

As for the aforementioned foreign intelligence agents, their fate turned out to be tragic. Skoblin died in Spain during the Civil War in the late 1930s. Plevitskaya was arrested by the French, kept in one of the prisons for especially dangerous criminals in Alsace-Lorraine, where she died during the German occupation in 1941. Tretyakov was arrested by the Germans as a member of the resistance movement and shot.

Foreign intelligence participated in operations to eliminate or capture atamans Dutov, Ungern, Annenkov, capture the Petliura general Tyutyunnik, an active organizer of bandit raids of entire military formations from Poland and Romania.

Yurko Tyutyunnik was considered Petlyura's right hand. Behind the cordon, he headed the so-called partisan-insurgent headquarters with an extensive network of relevant committees on the territory of Ukraine, where numerous gangs of Petliurists were already operating (only in the Kiev province, for example, their number approached a hundred). They managed to infiltrate their like-minded people in some Soviet institutions and units of the Red Army, actively preparing for an uprising throughout Ukraine.

For two years, intelligence and operational activities were carried out against Tyutyunnik with the participation of the legendary anti-Soviet nationalist organization "Higher Military Rada". In the end, Tyutyunnik himself went to the Soviet Union and was recruited. This made it possible to use it in active actions to decompose underground organizations.

A similar action was carried out against one of the prominent organizers of the counter-revolution during the Civil War, a talented military leader, Lieutenant General Ya.S. Slashchov, who fled with the remnants of the defeated White Guard troops to Turkey. Once on the banks of the Bosphorus, Slashchov and a group of officers close to him experienced emigration hard. In February 1921, Slashchov even tried to start negotiations with the Soviet government on the terms of his return to Russia, for which he secretly met with a representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. However, Slashchov did not make a final decision. Then, in the spring of the same year, the INO VChK sent its agent to Istanbul, through which Slashchov was influenced accordingly. Slashchov returned to his homeland and appeared in the press condemning white emigration, which contributed to the return to Russia of many other refugees. Subsequently, Slashchov taught at the Frunze Academy.

Over the years, the situation within the White émigré organizations, and the attitude towards them, the views of the émigrés themselves, to a certain extent

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started. By the end of the 1920s, it became clear to many of them that power in the USSR was firmly held, enjoyed the support of the people, and the struggle against it was aimless and unpromising. Contradictions are growing among the emigrants, and a split is growing. Most of the emigrants return to the USSR, others are trying to find normal conditions for a permanent life abroad and are actively involved in labor activity in those countries where fate has thrown them. Emigration, heterogeneous in its composition, is even more fragmented and falls apart into separate enclaves. But despite this, the Russian population abroad (and among the emigrants from Russia there were about 85% of Russians) is trying to preserve their culture, religion, customs, language. There are Russian educational organizations. The Orthodox Church played an important role. Stable Russian communities formed around her parishes.

With the help of various charitable organizations and donations, Russian schools began to be created along the lines of the old gymnasiums and real schools. In Prague, a Russian law faculty, pedagogical and cooperative institutes were opened at the university. There were unions of farmers, writers, journalists, doctors, engineers and technicians.

Various scientific societies and institutions were created in Paris, Berlin, Belgrade, Sofia, Harbin and other centers of emigration. The Society of Engineers in Paris had over 3,000 members, chemists - more than 200, and the Society of Physicians - several hundred.

Many Russian scientists got jobs in various local educational institutions and scientific institutions. For example, in Paris, several talented Russian scientists worked at the famous Pasteur Institute. The largest of them was S.N. Vinogradsky, member of the French and honorary member of the Russian Academies of Sciences (1923). At the same institute, the physiologist S.I. Metchnikov is a student of I.P. Pavlov.

Despite the difficulties, cultural life also developed. A great contribution to the treasury of Russian and world culture was made by such prominent figures as F.I. Chaliapin, S.V. Rachmaninov, I.F. Stravinsky, A.K. Glazunov, S.P. Diaghilev, S.M. Lifar, A. Pavlova, A. Vertinsky, writers I.A. Bunin, A.M. Remizov and others.

Later, already in the second half of the 1930s, even more significant changes took place in the political views of emigrants. When the fascist rebellion began in Spain, about a thousand of them arrived to defend the republic: V.M. Kargin became the deputy commander of the republican aviation, Lidke became the political commissar of one of the international brigades, the commander of the artillery of the Aragonese front was the former colonel of the tsarist army V.K. Glinoyedsky, who died heroically in battle. The son of Boris Savinkov, Lev Savinkov, who became the captain of the republican army, took part in the battles.

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An even greater number of representatives of the white emigration joined the fight against fascism when Hitler attacked the USSR. Many of them considered it their duty to take part in the armed struggle against fascist Germany and thereby sought to help their homeland.

Among the brave fighters was M.A. Shafrova-Marutayeva is a national heroine of Belgium, posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War [degree. In France, Princess Vera Apollonovna Obolenskaya participated in the resistance movement. On August 4, 1944, fascist executioners cut off her head in the Plötzensee prison in Berlin. She was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, the highest awards of France - the Order of the Legion of Honor, the Military Cross with Palms, and the Medal of Resistance. Emigrants Boris Vladimirovich Vilde and Anatoly Sergeevich Levitsky, former white officers Ivan Ivanovich Troyan and Alexei Petrovich Durakov, Tamara Alekseevna Volkonskaya and poetess Elizaveta Yuryevna Kuzmina-Karavaeva, as well as dozens of other patriots who fought against the Nazis were awarded Soviet orders. outside of our country.

Hundreds of patriots from among the emigrants participated in the resistance movement and partisan detachments.

Years passed. The attitude towards the USSR in the West changed. However, a certain part of the emigrants continued to remain in positions hostile to the USSR. With the beginning of the Patriotic War, they entered the service of Hitler. Even before the start of the war, these people made great efforts to continue subversive activities against the USSR. Fascist organizations were born in their midst in Germany, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Manchuria, the USA and some other countries. In Manchuria, the "Russian Fascist Party" headed by K. Rodzaevsky began to operate, in Germany - the "Russian National Socialist Movement" headed by B. Biskupsky in the USA - the "All-Russian Fascist Organization", its leader was A. Vonsyatsky.

Under these conditions, Soviet intelligence did not stop working among White émigré organizations, which set themselves the goal of participating in a new foreign intervention against the USSR.

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The figure of Y. Slushchov attracted the attention of the writer Mikhail Bulgakov

and served as the basis for creating the image of Khludov in the play "Running".

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The difficult path to Savinkov's "confession"

"Without your arrival, my father will not be able to visit the fair" - such, in general, quite an ordinary phrase was contained in one letter intercepted by the Chekists. Phrase as a phrase. For the uninitiated - just worldly trifle. But those into whose hands the letter fell knew perfectly well that information of extreme importance was encoded in this phrase. The climax of the complex and risky "operational game" that lasted for several years under the name "Syndicate-2", which later became a textbook in the history of domestic special services, was coming. Its purpose is to lure from abroad the cunning, resourceful and most dangerous enemy of Soviet power.

The meaning of the mysterious phrase was hidden behind two key words: "fair" and "father". And the Chekists knew well what these words meant: "fair" is Russia, "father" is Boris Savinkov.

During the operational game, the Chekists were close to success more than once, but at the last moment something went wrong. And now, again, not everything is fine: "Without your arrival ..." Again, the operation turned out to be a hair's breadth from a breakdown. The fact is that quite recently one of Savinkov's closest associates, S.E., who had secretly moved to Russia, had to be arrested. Pavlovsky. He was presented with a long list of bloody crimes committed during bandit raids in the western regions of Russia in 1918-1922. It was absolutely impossible to let Pavlovsky go abroad. This threatened with inevitable failure, and without Pavlovsky, Savinkov did not want to go to Russia. Pavlovsky, of course, was a big "catch" for the Chekists. But the "father" himself is needed ... What to do?

Boris Viktorovich Savinkov was, undoubtedly, one of the largest figures in the Russian political emigration. He was born into a quiet, intelligent family of a provincial Warsaw judge on January 19 (31), 1879. At first, nothing foreshadowed some stormy events, tragic breaks in his biography.

However, already in his youth, Boris made an irrevocable choice for himself: he is a fighter, a revolutionary. In 1902, the gendarmerie authorities sent him into exile in Vologda on the case of the St. Petersburg Social Democratic group. But the political line of the Social Democrats is not entirely to his liking. He breaks with the Social Democratic movement, flees from exile to Geneva and joins the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The "Russian liberation movement" in the person of the Socialist-Revolutionaries was then headed by Azef, who was later exposed as a provocateur and agent of the Okhrana.

In 1903, B. Savinkov became one of the leaders of the so-called militant organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary terrorists. He was personally involved - and was very proud of it - in the murders of the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve and the Moscow Governor-General, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich. In 1906, B. Savinkov was arrested and sentenced to death by the tsarist government. He manages to escape, and since 1911 he has been in exile again. During the First World War, he fought against the Germans as a volunteer in the French army.

After the February Revolution of 1917, he returned to Russia, declared himself an "independent socialist" and entered the government of Kerensky, and after the October Revolution, he embarked on the path of irreconcilable armed struggle against the Bolsheviks.

He takes part in the campaign of General Krasnov against Petrograd, flees to Donk Alekseeva and Denikin, then becomes the organizer of active operations in the rear: in July 1918 he raises armed mutinies in Yaroslavl, Rybinsk and Murom. After their suppression, he runs to the rebellious Czechs, participates in the Civil War in the ranks of the Kappel detachments. At the end of 1918, Savinkov became a representative of the government of Admiral Kolchak, created in Siberia, abroad - he obtained money and weapons. During the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, he was the chairman of the Russian Political Committee in Warsaw, helping to create the so-called Russian People's Army, which fought on the side of the Polish ruler Pilsudski.

In early 1921, from the remnants of the Russian Political Committee, he created a new military organization, the People's Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom (NSZRiS). The armed formations of this organization are led by Colonel S.E. Pavlovsky. In the autumn of the same year, after the Soviet note, the Polish government turned to Savinkov with a demand to leave the country, and he moved to Paris.

In 1921, the security officers identified and arrested about 50 active members of the NSZRiS in Russia. In the course of an open trial over them, Savinkov's connection with the Polish and French special services, the preparation of rebellions and a foreign invasion of the territory of the RSFSR, were revealed.

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In particular, it turned out that back in January 1921, Savinkov sent secret messages to the war ministers of France, Great Britain and Poland, in which he indicated that after the fall of Wrangel he represented the only "real anti-Bolshevik force that had not yet laid down its arms".

During raids on Soviet territory, the Savinkovites brutally cracked down on local authorities and robbed the population. In a report to Savinkov, one of the participants in such a raid, Captain Ovsyannikov, reported:

"I consider it my duty to you for the sake of saving the Union from the accusation of indulging in robberies and robbery to report to you on the following facts that have become known to me from the activities of the detachments working in Soviet Belarus." Further, Ovsyannikov describes how Pavlovsky's detachment attacked a mill near the village of Rakoshichi: the property was looted, the owner's wife was raped. The captured Red Army soldier, "despite the fact that he offered no resistance and turned out to be not a communist at all, was hanged on the orders of Colonel Pavlovsky." Prior to this, six peasant guides were hanged, allegedly "so that they would not report to the Red troops about the advance of the detachment." On the Novo-Kurgalye farm in the Domgan Volost, Igumensky Uyezd, a forester's wife was hanged for refusing to give up her husband's hunting rifle. In the town

Pukhovichi of the same county, Pavlovsky's detachment organized a massacre of Jewish citizens: "18 people were taken to the nearest forest and shot." Reporting on this, Ovsyannikov concludes: "As I was convinced from private conversations with peasants in the Bobruisk, Slutsk and Igumen districts of the Minsk province, the attitude of the peasants towards these detachments became sharply hostile."

To fight the Savinkovites, in 1921, foreign intelligence prepared and sent abroad through the refugee canal a reconnaissance group of seven people, headed by a former participant in the Civil War, Alekseev.

On September 30, 1921, the first message was received from Alekseev: "We have been in Riga for three weeks ... We have established contact with Prague and Vienna. Nobody is in Paris yet... Savinkov has been in Paris for two weeks..."

On December 17, Alekseev reported that two agents of the group, Colonel Pototsky and Captain Pavlov, who had previously worked for B. Savinkov and were well known to him, had left for Prague. The agents were tasked with getting turnouts in Russia.

At the end of 1921, Savinkov's old acquaintance, British intelligence agent Sidney Reilly! organized Savinkov's trip to London and a meeting with W. Churchill. In the course of the conversation, Savinkov outlined in rainbow colors the prospects for the fight against the Bolsheviks by the NZZRiS and, apparently, convinced Churchill so much that he persuaded the Prime Minister of England Lloyd George to receive Savinkov in a country residence

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Checkers. However, instead of fighting, Lloyd George offered to trade with the Bolsheviks.

The life paths of Savinkov and Reilly crossed in the spring of 1918 in Moscow.

Despite the support of the British, French, Poles and Czechs, the "People's Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom" continued to suffer significant losses as a result of the joint efforts of counterintelligence and intelligence of the Cheka. The emissaries and liaisons of Savinkov who were heading to the territory of Russia disappeared. Then he decided to send one of his especially trusted employees, Leonid Sheshenya, to check the activities of the residents in Smolensk and Moscow. The transfer of Shesheni across the border was carried out by the captain of the Polish intelligence Secunda. However, after crossing the border, Sheshenya was detained by border guards and taken to Moscow. During interrogations, Sheshenya admitted his belonging to the NZZRiS and that he was personally sent to Russia by Savinkov, allegedly to study the situation and the mood of the Russians. However, after Sheshenya had a confrontation with a previously arrested participant in the raids of Colonel Pavlovsky's detachments and proved Sheshenya's involvement in atrocities against the population, he, under the weight of the evidence presented, agreed to cooperate with the Chekists and said that he was in touch with the residents - Gerasimov in Smolensk and Zekunov in Moscow.

Staff Captain Gerasimov was arrested, and his underground in Smolensk, Rudnya, Gomel and Dorogobuzh - more than three hundred people - was destroyed. The Smolensk trial of the Savinkovites followed. And behind him are the processes in Petrograd, Samara, Kharkov, Tula, Kyiv, Odessa.

Savinkov's resident in Moscow, Zekunov, has been in the capital for two years. After his arrest and recruitment, it turned out that Sheshenya was supposed to replace Zekunov, organize the work of the underground, and return to Poland a year later.

On the instructions of Dzerzhinsky, it was decided to use this circumstance to start an "operational game". They developed a set of measures that included legendizing on the territory of Russia the counter-revolutionary organization "Liberal Democrats" (LD), which is supposedly ready for decisive action to overthrow the Bolsheviks, but needs an experienced political leader, as Savinkova believes.

The Chekists sent Zekunov to Poland with a letter from Shesheni announcing a successful settlement in Moscow. Zekunov told Captain Sekunda that in Moscow Sheshenya accidentally met his colleague in the tsarist army, Novitsky, who holds a prominent position in the Red Army and is at the same time one of the leaders of the LD. Having learned from Sheshen about the purpose of his arrival in Moscow, Novitsky handed over to him for sending to the Poles the "genuine" order on artillery of the Red Army No. 269 of August 29, 1922 on the results of the survey

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of artillery depots in the Moscow military district, as well as a copy of the memorandum on the creation of a department for the study of the Polish army at the General Staff of the Red Army. Secunda sent these documents to Warsaw.

The "solid community of like-minded people" operating in Moscow was reported to Savinkov.

At the same time, the mention of Novitsky played a positive role, whom Savinkov, being in the military ministry of the Provisional Government in 1917, remembered as an artillery officer.

The "intelligence data" prepared in Moscow was highly appreciated by the Polish intelligence and the representative of the Second Bureau of the French General Staff Gatier. The latter, after reading the documents, congratulated Savinkov on his great success.

B. Savinkov was a very cautious man, a born conspirator. Life has taught him not to take anyone's word for it. In order to verify the information received from the LD, he decided in the summer of 1923 to send a particularly trusted emissary, Pavlovsky, to Moscow. And when visiting Shesheni, Pavlovsky was arrested.

In order to reassure Savinkov and to cover up Pavlovsky's delay for more than three weeks in Russia, G. Syroezhkin, an employee of the counterintelligence department, was sent to Poland, who handed over to Captain Sekunda the intelligence prepared in Moscow and Sheshenya's memorandum on working with LD for transfer to Savinkov.

Upon Syroezhkin's return, Sheshenya himself left for Paris. He brought Pavlovsky's letter to Savinkov with very important news: at the request of the LD, a bilateral leading center had been formed in Moscow, which had elected Savinkov as its chairman in absentia. The leader of the LD himself, Tverdov (pseudonym Artuzova), wrote a letter to Savinkov, emphasizing that he was his deputy in the USSR.

Savinkov replied that he was ready to leave for Russia, but on one condition: Pavlovsky himself must come for him. Although Pavlovsky's letter confirmed the reports of Shesheni and a number of other "trusted" persons, the experienced conspirator was still tormented by doubts. One of Savinkov's deputies handed Sheshena a letter - "S.E. Pavlovsky in his own hands", which, in particular, stated: "Without your arrival, my father will not be able to visit the fair."

The very culminating moment has come, which was mentioned at the beginning of the essay...

To get out of a difficult situation, a combination was developed: Savinkov was informed that Pavlovsky did not return to Paris on time because he had important business in the south of Russia, where his relatives lived. There he intended to carry out "expropriation" to replenish the treasury of the NHS&S. But the train robbery planned by Pavlovsky near Rostov failed. In a shootout with guards, he was seriously wounded, but managed to elude the checks.

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stov and take refuge in Moscow in the apartment of a surgeon, a faithful person who treats him. Savinkov was brought three letters from Pavlovsky, in which he called him to Russia and expressed hope for his speedy recovery.

After much deliberation, Savinkov finally agreed. On May 2, 1924, in a letter to his sister Vera, he wrote: "I would be very upset by what happened if I were not consoled by the latest news from Russia. I am writing briefly. Our Central Committee is working as never before: the Union has grown, strengthened and expanded enormously; Moscow budget (voluntary donations) - 600 chervonets per month; we are talking about the editorial office of Svoboda in Moscow and maintaining it; finally, apparently, in the very last days, the Union became very rich. They sent me \$100. I haven't received them yet, and I don't know when I will. But the very fact is indicative. Thank God!.. If the Union not only does not receive food from abroad, but can even help "abroad", this indicates its normal development, which means that it really has deep roots ... And I am only an honorary chairman of the Central Committee. Now I have the right to say that the Union is the strongest of all existing organizations ... "

Having made a decision, Savinkov, on a July afternoon in 1924, visited one of the leaders of the white emigration, V.L. Burtsev, with whom he had a long-term friendship, to share his thoughts on the upcoming trip to Russia.

In his article "In the networks of the GPU. Savinkov's Confession", published on October 15, 1927 in the magazine "Illustrated Russia", Burtsev describes this meeting as follows. After carefully listening to Savinkov's revelations about the "powerful revolutionary organization" operating in Russia and having supporters in the highest circles of the Bolshevik Party, government, army, and even in the GPU, Burtsev categorically began to object to Savinkov's trip to Russia on the right death, since he will inevitably fall into the nets laid out by the GPU. Ignoring Burtsev's arguments, Savinkov, pale and agitated, declared: "My trip to Russia has been decided. I cannot stay abroad. I have to go... I'm going to Russia to die in the fight against the Bolsheviks. I know that if I get arrested, I will be shot. I will show Chernov, Lebedev, Zenzinov and others sitting here abroad how to die for Russia! During tsarist times they preached terror. And now, not only terror, but even in general they have renounced the revolutionary struggle against the Bolsheviks. By my trial and my death I will protest against the Bolsheviks. Everyone will hear my protest!"

Having made the final decision to go to Russia, Savinkov invited Sidney Reilly from New York to help him plan his secret mission.

After a three-week discussion with Reilly of all the details of the upcoming trip and the forms of organization of subversive work on the territory

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Russia in early August 1924, Savinkov and a number of his closest associates left Paris. After illegally crossing the Soviet border, they were arrested and taken to Moscow to the Lubyanka.

On August 27, 1924, at a show trial, Savinkov made the following statement, which hardly seemed sincere to anyone at the time: "I unconditionally recognize Soviet power and no other. To every Russian who loves his country, I, who went all the way through this bloody hard struggle against you, I, who proved your failure like no one else, I tell him - if you are Russian, if you love your people, you will bow low to the workers' and peasants' power and recognize it unconditionally.

On August 29, 1924, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, at an open meeting, sentenced Savinkov to death. But, taking into account Savinkov's admission of his guilt and "complete renunciation of the goals and methods of the counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet movement", the court decided to petition the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee for a commutation of the sentence. On the same day, after Savinkov's statement about his "readiness to serve the working people under the leadership of the authorities established by the October Revolution", the death penalty was commuted to ten years' imprisonment.

Being in prison after the trial, Savinkov sent a message abroad to his like-minded people urging them to lay down their arms and stop fighting against their own people. In a letter to close associates, Savinkov urged them to follow his example and return to Russia. He sent a similar letter to Sydney Reilly.

Later, while serving his sentence in prison, Savinkov, despite the rather free regime created for him, increasingly fell into a depressive state (by the way, characteristic of his older brother during the Siberian penal servitude, and to some extent their father, whose psyche also turned out to be traumatized after the difficult experiences associated with the arrest of her sons). Apparently, this mental instability hung in their family... B. Savinkov petitioned for a full pardon, but his request was rejected. Having learned about this in the office of the investigator on Lubyanka, he jumped out of the window of the fifth floor and fell to his death. This happened in May 1925.

! Sidney Reilly (1874-1925), real name Sigmund Georgievich Rosenblum, was born in the south of Russia, near Odessa. Thirst for adventure in his youth threw him to South America, where he met Major Fochergil of the British Secret Service and began working for British intelligence. Youthful passion for adventure develops into adventurism. Reilly becomes a paid agent for a number of intelligence agencies. During Russo-Japanese

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During the war, he was in the Far East, where he collaborated with the Japanese special services. Later, after returning to Russia, he offered his services to the tsarist intelligence, continuing to work for the British. Since 1906, he has been living in a luxurious apartment in St. Petersburg, in his free time from "work" he is fond of collecting paintings. But "work" always comes first for him.

place.

Before the First World War, he takes a job as a welder at the Krupp military factory and, after killing two guards, steals secret documents. Later he "works" at a German shipyard, stealing secret blueprints for submarines and selling them to the British and Russians at the same time. Soon Americans appeared among Reilly's "clients". In April 1918, he reappeared in Russia and, together with Savinkov, prepared a military coup, and in 1922, an attempt on the life of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin.

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Grigory Syroezhkin

The news that Grigory Syroezhkin was awarded the Order of Lenin for special services in the fight against fascism in Republican Spain found him in a cozy room in a hotel in the center of Moscow. Late in the evening, an old comrade in the Foreign Department of the Cheka called him and told him "confidentially" that a closed Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was signed and announced to "who needs it", in which Grigory's name was mentioned among those awarded the highest Soviet award.

Grigory quickly went downstairs to the duty night buffet and bought a bottle of selected Georgian cognac from a sleepy waiter. "Let's have a drink together with the one who comes to congratulate me first..." – decided Syroezhkin. Grigory went up to his floor and saw three strangers at the door of his room.

- Syroezhkin Grigory Sergeevich? came the voice.

"Yes, it's me," Grigory answered with a wide smile. "Wait a minute, I'm just..."

He opened the door for strangers.

In the hallway, one of them handed Grigory a sheet of paper folded in four and, looking somewhere to the side, said gloomily:

— This is a warrant for your arrest and search of the premises, citizen... Read it and sign it!

As if after a terrible blow, Grigory mechanically unfolded the paper and brought it to the unseeing eyes.

With incredible difficulty, he spelled out the terrible word "a-re-sto-vat" ...

Grigory Syroezhkin was born in 1900 in the Saratov province. From early childhood, he was brought up in a military environment. His father, who came from a peasant family, served as a junior captain in the Tiflis garrison, and little Grisha decided to become a military man from childhood. He liked to watch drills; with delight

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clambered onto a saddled horse, planted by cavalrymen; spent long hours at the local gun shop. When the boy was fourteen years old, he was captured by another hobby - the circus. Possessing remarkable health, strong and agile, Grigory became a student of famous wrestlers - two Ivans - Poddubny and Zaikin, who were touring in Georgia at that time. Syroezhkin was not even sixteen when he first put on a wrestling leotard and began to go out to the arena to measure strength with the audience. In the circus, he learned the art of a magician, horse riding and other tricks that were very useful to him in life. But in one of the fights, the enemy broke his right arm. This injury remained for life, the arm became shorter, and I had to part with the idea of a circus career.

After the revolution of 1917, my father and his family returned to their native village to "divide the land". But Gregory did not become a farmer. He could not sit in his parents' house and at the first opportunity he volunteered for the Red Army.

Once, together with a group of Red Army soldiers, Grigory was sent to a neighboring region for fodder. The documents were not properly executed, and the envoys were seized as marauders, disarmed and brought to the Workers' and Peasants' Tribunal. Severe punishment awaited them. However, to the credit of the guardians of revolutionary legality, they figured everything out and released the captives in peace. Gregory was doubly lucky: the tribunal needed a competent clerk, and he was invited to this position. Here Syroezhkin received the basics of legal knowledge.

From the tribunal, Grigory got to the investigative, and then to the operational KGB work in Moscow. He was sent on his first business trip to the Tambov region to suppress the Antonov rebellion. There, commanding a KGB detachment, Syroezhkin met and carried out a joint successful operation with a squadron commanded by the future Marshal Georgy Zhukov.

However, meetings with much more ordinary people played a decisive role in the fate of Gregory. Life brought him into contact with a certain Strzhelkovsky, who at the same time worked in the tribunal and diligently conducted business "in the fight against counter-revolutionary sabotage." Strzhelkovsky knew no pity for the defendants. He recognized only one measure of punishment in relation to both the right and the guilty - execution. And when Grigory had already become a scout, this man crossed his life path like a black ominous shadow. It happened like this. Syroezhkin received a task from Menzhinsky and Artuzov: under the name of Serebryakov, cross the Polish border, get in touch with Polish intelligence and, on behalf of the Liberal Democrats organization, legendary by the Chekists, to the opposition authorities, hand over to the special services of the Commonwealth a number of documents confirming the existence of

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Soviet Russia by an influential group of political conspirators, ready at the first request and with support from abroad to overthrow the Soviet government and seize power. Syroezhkin crossed the border without much difficulty through a reliable crossing point and safely reached Vilna.

However, there, on a busy street in the city center, a man ran up to Grigory.

- Grisha, friend! he shouted and rushed to hug Syroezhkin.

Grigory hardly recognized him: Strzhelkovsky, the same one who in 1919 administered an unjust trial in the Revolutionary Tribunal, where Grigory also served. But then Strzhelkovsky had a dashing cavalry look, and now an old man stood in front of Grigory - overgrown, drooping, with a wasted face, in a shabby, greasy coat from someone else's shoulder.

- Grisha, - Strzhelkovsky began to cry. - And you're here! The whole old guard has gone beyond the cordon, all friends!

Syroezhkin never considered himself a friend of Strzhelkovsky, and now especially. Grigory's brain worked feverishly: "To push away, to pretend that Strzhelkovsky is mistaken? It won't work, he's got too much hold on me. Run? But it means to fail the whole operation, so carefully thought out.

Meanwhile, Strzhelkovsky dragged him to a bar and asked him to treat his old friend, who today, as a sin, did not have any money at all. I had to go.

Strzhelkovsky said that after the Civil War, taking advantage of his Polish origin, he moved to Poland, but even here he had a hard time: they were driven from everywhere, there was no work. Grigory, in turn, told him a hastily invented story that he had long been disillusioned with the Soviet regime, broke with it, and decided to leave "wherever one's eyes look."

They seemed to part on good terms, even agreed on a new meeting, but Syroezhkin vaguely guessed that this incident would not end so easily.

Indeed, soon Gregory was detained and taken to the police. Strzhelkovsky was already there. Gregory expected this and thought out a line of conduct. He played "insulted innocence", began to shout that Strzhelkovsky was a drunkard and cocaine addict, he said that they had a fight while serving in the Red Army, which is why Strzhelkovsky

him personal accounts.

Knowing Strzhelkovsky from the most negative side, the policemen believed Syroezhkin, released him and even apologized to him. Of course, it also mattered here that he represented a solid "underground" organization in the USSR that supplied "valuable intelligence information" to the intelligence of Pan Poland.

The meeting between Syroezhkin-Serebryakov and the captain of the Polish intelligence Sekunda went off without a hitch. Sekunda expressed his satisfaction

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information (it was handed over to him immediately upon Syroezhkin's arrival) and apologized on behalf of the Polish authorities for the "misunderstanding with the police."

Returning to Moscow, Syroezhkin reported in detail about everything that had happened. Of course, his message caused concern in the INO, but there was no other way out - the operation should have continued.

Soon Syroezhkin-Serebryakov was again sent to Poland. The Chekists took a risk by sending him a second time: after all, he could be under the suspicion of the Polish counterintelligence and risked his life. But, on the other hand, it was also an excellent test - if everything goes well, then the Poles believe Syroezhkin.

This time Syroezhkin-Serebryakov delivered two packages across the border. One of them contained a letter from Colonel Pavlovsky to Boris Savinkov with an invitation to visit Russia (this was mentioned in the essay "The Difficult Path Toward Savinkov's "Confession"), in the other —

photocopy of the secret order of the people's commissar for military and naval affairs on conducting maneuvers near the Polish border. This "order", at the request of the leadership of the OGPU, was specially prepared in a single copy in the People's Commissariat for Military Seas, and all official notes and indexes that should be on a genuine document were affixed to it. But in Vilna, Grigory was in for an unpleasant surprise. Instead of Captain Secunda, he was met by another officer, Captain Mayer. Outwardly phlegmatic and taciturn, he was a tenacious and exceptionally meticulous scout. He received Syroezhkin-Serebryakov just as politely as Captain Secunda, perhaps a little more formally. Syroezhkin gave him the brought materials. When Mayer read the order, his eyes lit up with joy. He immediately appreciated the significance of the brought document. Therefore, when Grigory hinted at the payment for the information received, the captain did not hesitate to place a thick bundle of banknotes in front of him.

"Just sign, please, right here, Pan Syroezhkin," Mayer said with a courteous smile.

"How does he know my real name? ~ Grigory shuddered inwardly, - after all, I am Serebryakov for him! Then he immediately realized: "This is all Strzhelkovsky! Well, nothing, I did not hide from them that I once worked in the tribunal, and then went underground. Is he provoking or just showing his awareness? If it's the first, then it's over now - I'll shoot and break through." Grigory coughed, reached into his pocket with his left hand, as if for a handkerchief, felt

there is the steel of the gun.

"I already forgot the time when I was Syroezhkin," Grigory said calmly. - And to call me that is a great sin, sir, I gave up that life long ago.

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"Daya just didn't think, Pan Serebryakov! Excuse me. It was so written here, here I am

And...

"You offend me, pan captain," Grigory sighed, "where can I sign here?"

And he neatly signed: "Serebryakov."

Mayer did not object and graciously agreed to forward to Boris Savinkov a packet with Pavlovsky's message.

On the same day, Gregory went home. In Moscow, Syroezhkin reported on the results of his trip to Artuzov, and then to Menzhinsky. As a result, an official report of the leadership of the OGPU appeared, which, in particular, said: "Comrade. Syroezhkin Grigory Sergeevich... took an active part in working out the case of the enemy of the Soviet government, terrorist Boris Savinkov, repeatedly risking his life.

He was an official employee of the OGPU, was sent repeatedly to Poland. During the trips he showed great resourcefulness and courage. Only thanks to this, he managed to avoid the almost inevitable arrest, which entailed execution and the failure of the development of the case.

We petition for the awarding of Grigory Syroezhkin with the Order of the Red Banner."

The next decade was especially disturbing and dangerous for Gregory. In 1925, he was placed at the disposal of the authorized representative office of the OGPU in the North Caucasus region. Banditry was widespread in this region at that time. The suburbs of Grozny, oil fields and trains were subjected to frequent armed attacks, numerous murders of Soviet workers, teachers, and women were committed. The people are tired of the bandits, in whose hands a huge amount of weapons has accumulated. However, banditry in this region was particularly survivable. It was difficult to cope with it by the armed forces alone. Other measures were required.

Syroezhkin was sent to the operational-intelligence detachment, whose tasks included the identification and liquidation of the largest formations of criminals and their active accomplices, who terrorized the entire district.

Among the local population there were many who, on the basis of tribal, religious or property principles, and sometimes as a result of direct threats and intimidation, assisted the bandits. But there were also those who suffered from them and treated them with hatred and contempt, especially among the poorest population of mountain villages.

Skillfully relying on the help of the local population, the Chekist detachment, which included Syroezhkin, was able to successfully carry out an operation to disarm a number of bandit formations.

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Syroezhkin completed another important task in Yakutia, where in 1928 Japanese agents from among the former White Guards were preparing an armed uprising with the aim of creating a puppet government and separating Yakutia from Russia.

The names of the conspirators were known, but they lived in fortified and well-guarded trading posts. Syroezhkin had to divide his already small detachment into several groups. He himself, with one assistant and a Yakut guide, went to the trading post, where the former staff captain Schmidt, who was at the head of the conspiracy, was located. Posing as the auditor of the Consumer Union and presenting the relevant documents, Grigory got acquainted with the affairs of the trading post, and in the evenings he drank and walked with the owner. On the third day, having asked Schmidt to escort him to the outskirts, Syroezhkin arrested the dangerous conspirator without firing a shot.

A large amount of weapons, ammunition, prepared appeals and appeals to the American authorities to recognize the independence of Yakutia, as well as a lot of gold and furs, were confiscated from those arrested in this case.

Now it is difficult to say whether the conspirators had really serious political goals. Most likely, they just wanted to get rich, and then flee to America and live there for their own pleasure.

After Yakutia, Syroezhkin had to visit Mongolia and walk around the rear of the Chinese troops during the conflict on the CER. Then he began to travel frequently on business trips to Norway, Germany, Finland and Sweden to hold meetings with agents. In Finland, for example, he secretly met with Stepan Petrichenko, one of the former leaders of the Kronstadt rebellion, who informed the operative in detail about military preparations on the Soviet-Finnish border.

In 1936, a fascist rebellion broke out in Spain. Volunteers rushed from all over the world to help the Spanish Republicans. Among them were Soviet representatives, many of whom later became outstanding commanders of the Great Patriotic War, and others became famous partisan commanders, among them Heroes of the Soviet Union S. Vaupshasov, K. Orlovsky, N. Prokopyuk, A. Rabtsevich .

Syroezhkin wrote three reports in those days before he received the go-ahead.

The Spaniards warmly welcomed the Russian comrades, although the situation in the camp of the Republicans was not easy and not everyone approved of the invitation to the country of "Bolshevik commissars". Under their banners were not only communists, but also socialists, anarchists and even Trotskyists, not counting many representatives of various petty-bourgeois parties.

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Soviet intelligence officers, having extensive experience of the Civil War, brought to Spain the methods of guerrilla military operations. Grigory Syroezhkin was one of the

guerrilla organizers. On his initiative, partisan groups, battalions, brigades were created, which successfully operated in the rear of the Francoist troops, having their bases on republican territory.

In the autumn of 1937, the command of the republican army decided to unite all forces for joint operations behind enemy lines. This is how the famous 14th Special Corps was born, which carried out military operations on all fronts until the very end of the war, in Andalusia, Castile and Catalonia even after the fall of the Republic. G.S. Syroezhkin became a senior military adviser to the corps commander Domingo Ungrii.

Grigory Sergeevich managed, in particular, with a small group of fighters to prevent the flight of an entire anarchist division from combat positions. This bold and risky operation was of great importance: it prevented the advance of the Nazis on the central sector of the Madrid Front.

They say the world is small. In Spain, Syroezhkin met his son Boris Savinkov. Lev Savinkov grew up outside of Russia. In the early 1930s, he worked in France as a driver on fuel trucks, then drove rich French entrepreneurs.

With the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain, Lev Savinkov went there as a volunteer and bravely fought against the Nazis as part of the International Brigade.

Appreciating the personal qualities of Savinkov's son, Syroezhkin contributed to Lev Savinkov's promotion. Since 1937, Leo became the captain of the Republican army. In the autumn of 1938, shortly before the end of the war in Spain, Syroezhkin sent Lev Savinkov from Spain to France. After the occupation of France by the Nazis, Lev Savinkov joined the Resistance and fought heroically against the Nazis for the liberation of Paris. In August 1944, Lev Savinkov, as part of a group from the "Union of Russian Patriots" detachment, which were part of the Resistance militant organization, hoisted a red flag in Paris over the building of the Soviet embassy on Grenelle Street.

So the biographies of fathers and children, the first and subsequent waves of Russian emigration, hundreds of representatives of which distinguished themselves this time in the anti-fascist struggle, dispersed.

Syroezhkin in Spain was nicknamed Grigory Grande - Grigory the Great. He was a universal favorite: he was valued for his courage, honesty, professional skills, kind, humane attitude towards people. He always knew how to cheer up, cheer up the fighters, was rich in invention, loved to show tricks, because he himself once performed in a circus ...

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In the summer of 1938, Grigory Syroezhkin was recalled to Moscow. Although earlier he had repeatedly avoided failures on foreign territory, here it was impossible for him to escape from illegal arrest. He was accused of spying for Poland. The reason for the arrest was the same case with the detention of Syroezhkin by the Vilna police on the denunciation of Strzhelevsky.

"It can't be that you were released from a Polish prison - we just like that!" - said the investigator from the Lubyanka. – Yes, and the materials that you handed over to the Poles contained state secrets.

"But after all, my leadership specifically sent me to Poland to transfer this information to the Poles," objected G.S. Syroezhkin.

- Your leaders also turned out to be Polish spies! was the answer.

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A sharp weapon of disinformation

From the first days of Soviet power, the countries of the Entente and Germany, which was defeated in the First World War, sought to destabilize its position. Acting in a roundabout way, they put pressure on the governments of many countries, trying to prevent the recognition of the USSR, to isolate revolutionary Russia politically and economically. This was supposed to cause tension in international affairs, undermine the confidence of the people in the new regime in Russia, discredit the Bolsheviks, or at least weaken their positions. Russia's opponents created a distorted view of reality, misinforming the world community about the intentions of the Soviet government, and misrepresenting the situation in Russia itself.

There were two types of "active measures" used against the USSR: open actions, used in official anti-Soviet propaganda and in ordinary diplomatic relations, and secret actions, when it came to covert propaganda, written, documentary or verbal disinformation, about the activities of agents of special services in mass public organizations and the press, etc. Soviet intelligence did not remain in debt and defended the gains of the new government with the methods and means available to it, using a rich arsenal of world and domestic experience in this matter.

History is rich in examples of the most diverse "tricks" and far from harmless "pranks" of this kind. Let us recall the Trojans, who, so to speak, out of the simplicity of their souls, brought into their besieged city a huge wooden horse built by inventive Greeks, not suspecting that armed enemy soldiers were hiding in its belly. Or a case from the Second World War, which is considered a classic among professional professionals: the story of the so-called "Major Martin". British intelligence agencies took one of the corpses in the London mortuary, put on him the uniform of an officer of the Royal Air Force and on a submarine until

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placed on the coast of Portugal. The calculation was simple: the corpse would definitely be discovered, and with it... they would also find plans for the "upcoming landing" of the allies on the coast of continental Europe. For greater persuasiveness, in the pockets of "Major Martin" were, as it were, accidentally inserted tickets for the London Underground, receipts for the delivery of linen for washing, and at the same time a "secret" letter, from which, by the way, it was clear that the Allies intended to invade Southern Europe via Sardinia and Greece. An active event using "Major Martin" played a role. Hitler sent an additional panzer division to Greece, and the Italian garrison in Sicily was left without reinforcements.

There are many types of active events. These are lines in a newspaper publication, and an "accidentally" dropped word in a room where a listening device is installed, and a special "document" planted at the "right" person at the "right" time, and exposing materials about the unsightly activities of that person. or otherwise

politician...

The history of Russian foreign intelligence is also rich in interesting and major active measures that have brought our country a great economic, military and political effect. The reader has already familiarized himself with some of them in the first volume of essays.

Acquaintance with the materials of the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation, where are stored sent at different times in the name of I.V. Stalin's highly secret documents made it possible to make a number of interesting discoveries that shed additional light on the history of Soviet disinformation campaigns, primarily in organizational terms. These documents include, first of all, the previously mentioned resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) dated January 11, 1923 on the creation of a special interdepartmental Bureau for disinformation under the Cheka-GPU. The Disinfburo (as stated in the document), in addition to the GPU, included representatives from the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR), the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters.

Attention is drawn to the range of tasks that the country's leadership set for the Bureau of Disinformation in order of operational necessity.

We list them as recorded in the document:

- taking into account information received both by the GPU and the Intelligence Agency and other institutions about the degree of awareness of foreign intelligence services about Russia;
- accounting and characterization of information of interest to the enemy;
- revealing the degree of awareness of the enemy about us;
- compiling and technical production of a whole series of false information and documents that give the enemy a wrong idea about the internal situation in Russia, about the organization and
consisting

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research institutes of the Red Army, on the political work of the leading party and Soviet bodies, on the work of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, etc.;

- to supply the enemy with the above materials and documents through the relevant bodies of the GPU and the Intelligence Directorate;
- development of a number of articles and notes for the periodical press; prepare the ground for the release into circulation of various kinds of fictitious materials and submit them in each individual case for consideration by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee.

As is clear from the above document, the leadership set two main tasks for the departments that had permanent service access abroad: to monitor the hostile actions of unfriendly special services against the USSR and to prepare retaliatory disinformation actions designed to "confuse the cards" of the enemy and to protect Soviet citizens from the military-political danger threatening them.

In the early 1920s, groups of militant Russian emigrants were actively used by foreign intelligence services to prepare and carry out various disinformation actions against the USSR. These explosive forgeries, varying in quality of execution and the nature of word creation, often misled and embarrassed diplomats and other government officials of those countries in whose territory the fakes were put into circulation. In September 1921, for example, the British Foreign Office found itself in such a position when, in an official note of protest to the Russian government, it quoted word for word a number of "Soviet" documents prepared by the White Guards in Germany and on the shores of the "foggy Albion" itself. ". Such an embarrassment, in the opinion of British politicians, was "an intolerable disgrace", since it allowed the Russians to shout "Fake!" every time when even a genuine Soviet document obtained through undercover means appeared in the world.

Foreign intelligence agencies used fake tactics not only to compromise Soviet foreign and domestic policy, but also to solve their own political problems. One of the most famous examples of this kind, sensational throughout the world, was the "Zinoviev letter", dated September 15, 1924. This letter, allegedly intercepted by British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) agents, contained a number of recommendations from the British to the Communists to exert appropriate pressure on "their" supporters in the Labor Party, as well as "useful" instructions for "strengthening agitation and propaganda work" in the British armed forces. The document was clearly timed to coincide with the height of the election campaign. He influenced the mood of the British

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voters, and not least because of this, the Labor government then in power was swept away by the Conservatives. "Document" did its job and, of course, had to disappear. This is how it actually happened. The original "Zinoviev's letter", handed over to the SIS for publication in the British press, "has not been found" to this day.

The effectiveness of Soviet disinformation work was quite high. It brought not only tangible political, but sometimes material success. There is a well-known case when Soviet intelligence officers managed to get one million two hundred thousand gold rubles from the Secret Intelligence Service agent Sydney Reilly to organize the work of a non-existent anti-Soviet center in Russia and at the same time lead the leadership of the British intelligence services to the idea of the need to encourage the British state awards to the most active members of the "anti-Soviet organizations", which by that time consisted entirely of career Chekists and their reliable agents.

Operations "Trust" and "Syndicate", known to the reader, played a special role in the disinformation of the Western intelligence services. And not only...

In the early 1930s, an employee of the INO OGPU, let's call him Martovets, was brought to Romania under the guise of a fugitive from the persecution of the Soviet authorities to participate in an operational game with the Romanian special services. He told the Romanian authorities that he was an active member of an underground group allegedly existing in Odessa from among engineering and technical workers opposed to the Soviet regime. Martovets told the Romanian investigators that the Cheka was on the trail of this group and the arrests were to begin any day now. The Romanians interrogated Martovets for a long time and with prejudice, because they did not trust him and were looking for confirmation of his testimony. And they found them. Odessa newspapers reported that the OGPU had arrested a large group of "vile wreckers and saboteurs" who had "made their nests" at some industrial enterprises in Odessa. This note cleared Martovets of suspicion, and he turned from a potential enemy into a friend.

A fresh man from Bolshevik Russia immediately attracted the attention of the Western intelligence services that were active in post-war Romania. The resident of British intelligence in Bucharest, Muller, invited the Soviet intelligence officer for a friendly private conversation in one of the best restaurants in the city. Having found out some formal information about Martovets (it was quite obvious that he was familiar with the protocols of interrogations of the Romanian police), Muller got down to business. Hinting that the experience and knowledge of the Odessa engineer could be very useful to His Majesty's government, Muller "took the bull by the horns." Already at the second meeting, Martovets, who had not yet had time to say yes or no, received a task from the British resident to collect

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information of interest to the inquisitive "Government of His Majesty". Here is its content:

- what is the deployment of Soviet warships in the area of the Sevastopol Bay and in the outer roads;
- the number and types of Soviet submarines in the Black Sea basin;
- how many submarines have been built at the shipyards of the Nikolaevsky plant over the past three years;
- what is the scheme of defensive structures built recently in the area of Odessa.

No sooner had Martovets compiled his report to the British intelligence officer with the help of the Center than the Russian White Guards, who had received shelter in Rumania, entered the business. On the instructions of the Romanian security service "Sigurants", they handed over to Martovets their list of questions of interest, which in some way echoed the task of Muller.

The sphere of interests of the special services seemed to have no limits. An avalanche of the most unexpected questions literally fell on Martovets, the answers to which were prepared carefully, dosed, with varying degrees of "reliability", according to the growing appetite of the "clientele" ...

Paradoxical as it may sound, but the Disinformation Bureau, created on January 11, 1923 under the VChK-GPU, despite many very successful and less successful operations, not only left almost no traces with descriptions of events in the intelligence archives, but even indirect references to those who, to one degree or another, were involved in their development. Perhaps the Bureau, keeping its secrets, timely got rid of "explosive" documents with the help of a fire-breathing stove? Nearly a quarter of a century passed before a new specialized intelligence unit called the "D" department arose.

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Operation "Trust"

Along with carrying out measures to uncover and suppress the subversive activities of B. Savinkov and his underground, the Chekists had to seriously deal with other foreign White émigré organizations that hatched plans for the restoration of autocracy in Russia.

At the end of May 1921, a monarchist congress opened in Germany, which was attended by delegates from different countries who elected the Supreme Monarchist Council (Navy) headed by a former member of the State Duma N.E. Markov II.

Monarchists grouped around the pretenders to the Russian throne - the former Grand Dukes Nikolai Nikolayevich and Kirill Vladimirovich Romanov. The most numerous part of the monarchists, including the Supreme Monarchist Council headed by Markov and military units under the command of Wrangel, supported Nikolai Nikolayevich, the cousin of Nikolai P.

The leaders of the monarchists understood that without an organization of like-minded people on the territory of Soviet Russia, they would not be able to overthrow the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the presence of such an organization would enable them to raise their prestige in the leading circles of the capitalist states and count on their material and military support.

In November 1921, foreign intelligence of the Cheka intercepted a letter from the White Guard Artamonov, who at that time worked as an interpreter in the English passport office in Reval (Estonia), addressed to Berlin to a member of the Supreme Monarchist Council, Prince Shirinsky-Shikhmatov. Artamonov reported on his meeting with the former State Councilor, and now a responsible worker of the People's Commissariat of Communications, A.A. Yakushev, who was going on a business trip to Sweden via Revel. Yakushev supposedly informed him that disparate groups of adherents of the monarchy continued to operate underground in Moscow and Petrograd, and he was taking steps to unite them. He also expressed

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Xia for establishing contacts with the monarchist council in order to unite efforts to overthrow the Soviet regime.

About the impression that Yakushev made on Artamonov, his former student at the Imperial Alexander Lyceum, excerpts from the same letter speak eloquently:

"Yakushev is a major specialist. Smart Knows everyone and everything. Our associate. He is what we need. He claims that his opinion is the opinion of the best people in Russia... After the fall of the Bolsheviks, the specialists will come to power. The government will not be created from emigrants, but from those who are in Russia. Yakushev said that the best people in Russia not only see each other, there is a counter-revolutionary organization in the country. At the same time, his impression of emigrants

terrible. "In the future, you are welcome to Russia, but it is impossible for the government to import from abroad. Emigrants do not know Russia. They need to live, adapt to new conditions.

Artamonov's letter about the meeting with Yakushev was the subject of a special discussion with the chairman of the Cheka, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, during which Artuzov reported to the VChK information about Yakushev.

Yakushev Alexander Alexandrovich, born in 1876, a hereditary nobleman from the family of a teacher of the cadet corps, graduated from the Imperial Alexander Lyceum in 1907. He remained to work as an educator at the time when Yuri Artamonov entered the lyceum to study. Then Yakushev served as a department manager in the Ministry of Railways with the rank of a real state councilor. In 1919, when General Yudenich was advancing on Petrograd, General Miller was advancing on Vologda, the Poles occupied Minsk, and Kutepov's corps captured Kursk and Orel, Yakushev, who was part of an underground organization in Petrograd, maintained contact with the National Center in Moscow and participated in the preparation of the mutiny in Petrograd simultaneously with the mutiny in Moscow. After the defeat of the counter-revolutionary underground in Petrograd, Yakushev and his family moved to Moscow and got a job at the People's Commissariat of Railways as a consultant on water management. On duty, he periodically went on business trips in Russia and abroad. In Moscow, he occasionally met with some former aristocrats and tsarist dignitaries who did not lose hope for the restoration of the monarchy.

After listening to Artuzov's report, Dzerzhinsky instructed to carefully study Yakushev's personality and suggested thinking about creating a legendary monarchist organization in Russia under the control of the Cheka in order to quickly play with the Supreme Monarchist Council. It was suggested that the strategic political line of the legendary organization be based on Yakushev's position: "... the government will be created not from emigrants, but from those who are in Russia." Supporting this idea, Deputy Chairman

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The Cheka Menzhinsky and Artuzov drew Dzerzhinsky's attention to the content of the second part of Artamonov's letter about Yakushev, which should be used in the future as a tactic to disrupt the terrorist and military sabotage aspirations of white emigration against Soviet Russia.

It was about the following excerpt from Artamonov's letter cited above: "Yakushev went on to say: 'The monarchist organization from Moscow will give directives to organizations in the West, and not vice versa.' There was talk of terrorist attacks. Yakushev said: "They are not needed, we need the legal return of emigrants to Russia as much as possible. Wait for officers and those involved in politics. Foreign and voluntary intervention is undesirable. Intervention will not meet with sympathy." Yakushev is definitely with us. Good girl. A man with a global outlook. In passing, he dropped the idea of a "Soviet" monarchy. In his opinion, Bolshevism is winding down. One can climb into Yakushev like into a dictionary. Gives accurate answers to everything. Offers a real connection between us and Muscovites. I did not name names, but, apparently, these are people with authority even there, abroad ... "

"This is another useful idea," Dzerzhinsky remarked, "suggesting whom we should include in the legendary organization besides the Chekists. In general, Yakushev is a very interesting person, and we need to learn as much as possible about him, how deep his monarchist convictions are and what are his practical activities against the Soviet regime. Is it possible to convince him and make him our ally... In the latter case, Yakushev would have turned out to be a good leader of a monarchist, but legendary by us organization. Think about it," Dzerzhinsky finished, addressing Artuzov directly.

When A.A. Yakushev returned to Moscow, he was arrested right at the station and taken to the Lubyanka.

At the very first interrogations, he confirmed the content of his conversations with Artamonov and said that they had agreed on further communication and coordination of the activities of the monarchists abroad with the monarchists in Soviet Russia. Yakushev recognized the futility of the struggle against the Soviet regime and made the head of the counterintelligence department (CRO) of the Cheka Artuzov and his closest assistants Pilyar and Styrne the impression of a sincere patriot of Russia, an intelligent, reasonable and honest person. Many hours of conversations between Artuzov and Yakushev on various issues of the international situation, the role and place of Soviet Russia, the ways of developing its statehood, the need to resist the subversive activities of foreign monarchist organizations found understanding in Yakushev.

At one of the interrogations, Yakushev said: "I confirm that I am ready to move away from any political struggle if I am released.

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den. I consider myself a completely loyal citizen of my country and I am ready to work for its good, not out of fear, but out of conscience..."

Chairman of the Cheka Dzerzhinsky and his deputy Menzhinsky closely followed Artuzov's work with Yakushev and approved his proposal to make Yakushev the head of the legendary monarchist organization in Soviet Russia.

Before Yakushev was released from prison, Dzerzhinsky and Artuzov had a final conversation with him, during which they shared their plans:

– How do you look, Alexander Alexandrovich, at our proposal to head an organization that does not yet exist, but is being created by us under the conditional name, say, "Monarchist Organization of Central Russia" (MOCR)? You will have deputies for military and political affairs, headquarters will be organized for you in St. Petersburg and in Moscow, you will travel to Europe for contacts with "like-minded people" ... True, as you probably guess, all this will be a game - ours with your participation ~ under the code name "Trust". I don't expect an immediate answer from you, Alexander Alexandrovich,' said Dzerzhinsky at the end of the conversation. - Go home, think carefully and let me know about your decision through Comrade Artuzov.

After obtaining the consent of A.A. Yakusheva Artuzov, together with him, took up the recruitment of the political council of the Monarchist Organization of Central Russia. At the suggestion of Yakushev, the Chernigov landowner Chamberlain Rtishchev, the Baltic Baron Osten-Saken, the oilman Mirzoev, and the Privy Councilor Putilov were included in the political council. It was decided to consider the lieutenant-general of the tsarist army Zaionchkovsky, professor of the Soviet military academy, as the nominal head of the MOCR, and Yakushev was assigned the role of chairman of the political council. Subsequently, Lieutenant General Nikolai Mikhailovich Potapov, a former military attache in Montenegro, head of a department of the quartermaster general service, which was in charge of foreign intelligence of tsarist Russia, was included in the political council. After the revolution, Potapov, who was well known in the circles of the old generals, was a member of the high command of the Red Army.

It was decided to make Yakushev's deputy for financial affairs an agent of the Cheka ~ the former tsarist officer Opperput, under the name Staunitz. This appointment turned out to be a serious miscalculation by Artuzov, who did not take into account the adventurism and instability of Opperput's character.

Simultaneously with the solution of organizational issues, Artuzov took the necessary measures to encrypt Yakushev's stay under arrest and restore communication with the Supreme Monarchist Council. For this, a counterintelligence officer was sent to Revel

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Kiyakovsky's department, who established contact with Artamonov using a password, spoke about Yakushev's illness with typhus during a regular business trip to Irkutsk, which caused a break in communication, handed over information prepared in Moscow about the activities of the IOC, and agreed to maintain reliable communication between the IOC and the Navy, including through the Estonian mission in Moscow.

On November 14, 1922, Yakushev, on the instructions of Dzerzhinsky and Artuzov, went on a business trip to Berlin to establish direct contact with the leaders of the Navy. In Riga, Yakushev was joined by Artamonov and Wrangel's nephew P.S. Arapov, who organized meetings for Yakushev with the main leaders of the Navy Talberg, Shirinsky-Shikhmatov, Gerschelman and Baumgarten, and later with Markov, who returned from Paris.

Operational game called "Trust" began.

The line of conduct developed for Yakushev, his personal qualities made it possible to convince the leadership of the Navy that they were dealing with a serious and capable organization.

At Yakushev's meetings with the leaders of the Naval Forces, practical issues of relations and communications between the Naval Forces and the IOCR, assistance from the IORM, as well as questions of the program and tactics of the IOCR in Soviet Russia, were discussed. It was decided to keep in touch with the representatives of the ICR and the Navy through personal meetings and correspondence, using the diplomatic mail of the Estonian mission in Moscow for this.

After the successful completion of the negotiations, Yakushev returned to Moscow, where he was also given a parallel task - access to a number of foreign intelligence services.

In the letters of the ICR to the Navy, transmitted through the Estonian mission, "materials" about the Red Army began to be placed, since there was complete confidence that the Estonian intelligence, reading these letters, would show interest and desire to establish contact with the ICR in order to receive intelligence information from her directly. And so it happened, and from that moment the transfer of disinformation materials to Estonian intelligence began through Roman Birk, the press attache of the Estonian mission in Moscow, an agent of the OGPU. Later, the IOCR came to the leadership of Polish intelligence.

Meanwhile, in Europe, the strengthening of the White military emigration continued. Vigorous activity in this direction was developed by General Wrangel, who understood that it was not enough to lead only the army, it was necessary that he be supported by a sufficiently influential political organization. However, the Navy, led by Markov, himself sought to subjugate Wrangel and his troops. Therefore, such a positive reaction of the general was caused by the information he received about the existence and activities of the MOCR. Wrangel immediately decided to establish contact with this organization.

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The leadership of the OGPU came to the conclusion that the time had come to establish personal contacts between Yakushev and representatives of Wrangel and conclude an agreement with them that all their actions on the territory of the USSR should be carried out only with the consent of the ICR. In 1923, Yakushev was organized a business trip to Berlin, where he met with representatives of Wrangel.

But the meeting was not painless. Having learned about it, the leaders of the Navy regarded it as a desire of the IOCR to weaken ties with them and further focus only on the "Organization of the Russian Army" (ORA). Then a personal meeting between Yakushev and Markov took place, which reduced the tension. Markov even supplied Yakushev, who was leaving for Paris, with letters of recommendation to persons from the inner circle of Nikolai Nikolayevich.

In Paris, negotiations were planned between Yakushev and the leaders of the ORA: General Miller, Holsman and Mankiewicz. During the negotiations, the issues of the program and tactics of the ICR were discussed, with which the leaders of the ORA agreed, and as a result, an agreement was signed in which

It was stipulated that all the activities of the ORA on the territory of the USSR must first be coordinated with the IOCR. The same agreement regulated the issues of mutual fulfillment of various instructions and the exchange of information.

Yakushev took advantage of the conversation by showing Miller and Holsman the letters provided by Markov, which contained information about the intrigues of the Navy against Wrangel and Miller. These letters served as a new impetus, intensifying the hostility between the OPA and the Navy.

On the recommendation of Miller and Holsman, Yakushev was received by Nikolai Nikolaevich. The pretender to the Russian throne had a discussion of cases in various organizations of white emigration, plans for the future were considered. After negotiations with the Grand Duke, Yakushev returned to Moscow.

During all these contacts, Yakushev behaved impeccably. However, by the autumn of 1923, some leaders of the ORA nevertheless decided to double-check on the spot whether the MOCR was such an effective monarchist organization, as was clear from the words of Yakushev.

The leaders of Operation Trust foresaw this possibility. When General Holsman sent Colonel Zhukovsky to Petrograd, he contacted two of his former acquaintances - former officers, naturally not knowing (by chance) that they were agents of the OGPU. As a result, Zhukovsky reported to Holsman not only about the capacity of the ICR, but also about the possibility of creating monarchist cells in the Red Army units in Petrograd. Subsequently, a legendary military organization was created in Petrograd, and for several years this operational game was carried out simultaneously with the "Trust" operation.

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General Kutepov also sent his especially devoted representatives to Moscow – Maria Zakharchenko-Schultz and her husband Georgy Radkovich ("nephews"). In order to give Zakharchenko the impression that she was involved in active work in the IOC, she was entrusted with the role of a transmission link on the IOC's communication line with representatives of the Estonian and Polish intelligence services. Zakharchenko and Radkovich reported to Kutepov that the ICR was a serious organization and that he needed to personally get to know its leaders.

General Wrangel, in turn, sent his representative Burkhanovsky to the USSR without the consent of the IOC. In order to show Wrangel that any action without prior agreement with the IOCR could lead to failure, Burkhanovsky was stovan.

The arrival in Moscow of representatives of foreign monarchist organizations greatly complicated the conduct of the Trust game. At the same time, it became obvious that there should be a military specialist in the leadership of the MOCR, since it was difficult for Yakushev to conduct "negotiations" on military issues, namely, the leaders of foreign monarchist organizations showed great interest in them. Therefore, it was decided to create a headquarters in charge of military affairs. The military leader of the organization was already known to the reader, Lieutenant General of the tsarist army Potapov, who worked in a responsible position in the high command of the Red Army. Together with this major military specialist, Yakushev had previously visited Warsaw, where they negotiated with representatives of Polish intelligence.

In 1924, tensions began in the leadership of the military unit of the White emigration abroad - between Wrangel and his deputy, General Kutepov. Having learned that Kutepov had secretly established contacts with the MOCR, Wrangel went to Paris to Nikolai Nikolayevich to receive support on strengthening his one-man command not only in the leadership of the army, but also in political activities. However, the trip did not help. Kutepov was a man of strong will, great organizational skills, purposeful and cruel. He won the behind-the-scenes struggle among the white emigration, and Wrangel was removed from political affairs. Kutepov essentially became the head of the EMRO.

The disagreements that arose weakened Wrangel's influence in the monarchist movement as a whole, and in such conditions the need to use him in the development of Operation Trust disappeared. It was decided to stop the connection of the IOC with Wrangel, which further undermined his authority among the monarchists as a political figure. |

In the same period, the Eurasian movement began to spread more and more among the young monarchists, which tactically took the form of opposition to the leadership of the monarchist

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organizations. The ideologists of Eurasianism were Russian philosophers P. Savitsky, G. Suvchinsky, G. Florovsky and Prince N. Trubetskoy.

Under the influence of the famous Russian philosopher N.A. Berdyaev, the Eurasianists believed that Russia would follow the path of development, which should be based on common elements of the economy, politics and culture of Europe and Asia. This path would be based on the ideas of monarchism, nationalism and the Orthodox Church.

The leaders of the operation "Trust" decided to establish contact with the Eurasians, taking into account mainly their originality and contradictions with the leadership of the monarchist movement abroad. For reliability, it was necessary to do it in such a way that the initiative came from the youth of the ICR, as if bypassing the leadership. For this, a new person was introduced into the development - a soldier of the Red Army N.A. Langovoy, who acted under the legend of the Assistant Chief of Staff of the ICR.

Langovoy entered Poland through a "window" created in accordance with an agreement signed with Polish intelligence, and held talks with the head of the Eurasians, Arapov, who had specially arrived in Poland, during which they agreed to create a Eurasian party and develop its program document. In order to strengthen the leadership of the Eurasianists in the ICR, an assistant to the head of the counterintelligence department, Styne, was introduced into its composition as an active participant.

Arapov's representative Mukalov, who arrived in Moscow through the ICR channel, was "demonstrated" the "active" work of the ICR, after which Arapov himself arrived in the USSR. In connection with his arrival, a meeting of the ICR leadership was convened, which was attended by Yakushev, Oppertut, Langovoy, Styne and a number of other persons who played the role of leaders of the ICR.

In order to demonstrate to Arapov the "active activity" of the IOC, in the presence of Yakushev, a meeting was organized with one of the "leaders" of the IOC, involved by the CRO in the operational game, a former tsarist general, an experienced general staff officer A.M. Zaionchkovsky. The impressive appearance and refined speech of the general, well-known in monarchist circles, made a proper impression on Arapov.

After Arapov's return from Moscow, an intensive correspondence began between him and the IOCR, in which he informed in some detail about the situation in monarchist circles abroad.

The growing influence of General Kutepov on the monarchist movement made it necessary for the Chekists to focus maximum attention on him. Earlier, by correspondence, an agreement in principle was reached on a personal meeting between Yakushev and Kutepov. This meeting took place in Danzig on June 6, 1924. After they met, both went to the residence of Nikolai Nikolaevich, where

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questions of the situation in the army and among the clergy, the mood of the people, the organization of a coup in the USSR

Taking advantage of the situation, Yakushev brought to the attention of Nikolai Nikolaevich information about Markov's desire, on behalf of the Grand Duke, to conclude a separate agreement with Poland, as well as with Romania, promising the latter Bessarabia. Feeling that the Grand Duke was dissatisfied with the actions of Markov, Yakushev proposed to call the leaders of the Navy and show them his attitude to their policy. Nikolai Nikolaevich took advantage of Yakushev's advice, which led to a significant cooling of relations between the Navy and the Grand Duke.

On June 11, 1924, Yakushev returned to Moscow, and after his report on the work done, it was decided to deepen the split in the monarchist movement.

Meanwhile, the ICR was expanding its ties. By the middle of 1924, through R. Birka, who by that time had transferred to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia as a diplomatic courier, relations were established with Finnish intelligence, as well as with an agent of British intelligence, a representative of Nikolai Nikolaevich in Finland. .N. Bunakov.

The disinformation material transmitted by the IOCR interested the Finns and, accordingly, the British, and they went to expand contacts with the IOCR, for which they opened a "window" on the Soviet-Finnish border. On the Soviet side, the commander of one of the units of the border detachment, Toivo Vyakha, was used to transfer people and mail abroad, playing the role of a man "recruited" by the ICR.

By that time, a number of problems had arisen in the relations of the IOC with the Estonian and Polish intelligence services. In this regard, Yakushev "illegally" crossed the Soviet-Estonian border and met in Revel with the chief of staff of the Estonian army and intelligence. In addition, Yakushev met with an assistant to the British resident in Estonia and received from him information about the intentions of the British to conduct terrorist activities in Soviet Russia.

It is difficult to overestimate the contribution that the former staunch monarchist Yakushev made to the defense of the new government. During his trips to the capitals of European states, he learned a lot about the plans and intentions of the monarchists, about the political and moral character of their leaders, about discord and squabbles in the ranks of the White Guard emigration. But the most important information obtained by Alexander Alexandrovich concerned plans for carrying out terrorist acts and sabotage on the territory of Soviet Russia, methods for preparing specific individuals to carry out these actions, special combat centers and agents of foreign special services sent to the territory

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USSR Operation "Trust" attracted, like sweetened adhesive paper - insects, the most dangerous and active part of the white emigration, revealed the state of affairs in the anti-Bolshevik military-political opposition both within the country and abroad, in order to ultimately compromise its leaders by direct participation in the KGB operational game.

It happened that the life of Alexander Alexandrovich Yakushev hung in the balance. However, high-willed qualities, natural intelligence and thorough preparation with the help of Artuzov for each trip abroad or meeting with the envoys of the White Guards on Soviet soil helped him to play his role perfectly and never make a single mistake. Yakushev's prestige and, to a certain extent, his backing was facilitated by the involvement of Lieutenant General Potapov, experienced in intelligence affairs, who was distinguished by professional resourcefulness, the ability to quickly assess the situation and show due restraint in dangerous situations. Like Yakushev, every time he traveled abroad, he not only perfectly coped with the tasks assigned to him, but also skillfully dispelled the enemy's suspicions about the Trust.

In the "Trust" case, located in the SVR Archive, there is no dry statistical reporting on the number of identified enemy agents, arrested or re-recruited. But the "assistance" that the "Trust" provided to Western intelligence services in obtaining "secret military-political information about the USSR and its armed forces" is documented in various forms. The thing is

that in the course of the "Trust" operation, at the suggestion of the GPU-OGPU and with the consent of the Republican Revolutionary Military Council, a special bureau was created to prepare disinformation for military intelligence of the West. At the same time, it was taken into account that often the information transmitted by the "Trust" to the Poles was sold to the latest French or British intelligence services. Estonian and Finnish intelligence did the same.

And the requests were very diverse. For some reason, the British were then interested in the device and equipment of a gas mask for horses, while the Romanians were interested in the state of the military port facilities of Odessa and Sevastopol, and the Germans were interested in plans for laying ships at the Baltic Shipyard, etc. The intelligence officers from the Polish General Staff, perhaps, went furthest of all. Contacting in 1925 through his resident in Moscow personally with A.A. Yakushev, they, on the direct instructions of Marshal Pilsudski, offered the MOCR to get a Soviet mobilization plan for 10 thousand US dollars (at that time a very large sum). Yakushev denied, referring to the fact that their organization was not intelligence, but political, but nevertheless he "conceded" and handed over to the Polish resident material specially prepared by the disinformation bureau of the OGPU. One

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temporarily, it was decided to transfer such information to Estonian intelligence. The transmission of disinformation, especially on military issues, was of particular importance, since the INO OGPU had information about the preparation of a new intervention against the Soviet country.

Through various channels, the OGPU began to receive reports that the British intelligence officer Sidney Reilly, who was in the United States, was showing great interest in the situation in Russia. This was reported, in particular, by Andrei Pavlovich Fedorov, an employee of the OGPU, who traveled to Paris in 1924 to meet with B. Savinkov, who spent the evening in the company of Sidney Reilly and his wife Pepita Bobadilla. Reilly, probing the "courier from Moscow," as if inadvertently spoke of Savinkov's forthcoming trip to Russia and mentioned that he himself would not mind going there. Around the same time, information about Reilly's intention to go to the Soviet Union also came from N.N. Kroshko. F.E. Dzerzhinsky set the task, after the completion of the operation against B. Savinkov, to develop an operational combination to withdraw Sidney Reilly to the territory of the USSR. Artuzov and his colleagues spent many sleepless nights studying the available materials on Reilly in order to find a solution to this problem.

Ultimately, they settled on the option of using the "in the dark" Maria Zakharchenko Schultz, whom Yakushev advised to invite Reilly to Finland to discuss the possibility of his participation in the affairs of the ICR

This idea was supported by Bunakov and the resident of British intelligence in the Baltic countries, Boyce, who sent an encrypted letter to the USA for Reilly. In his letter, Beuys informed Reilly about the IOCR as a very solid monarchist organization on the territory of the USSR, in the activation of which both British and French intelligence services were interested.

Reilly immediately responded to this invitation, especially since he knew Beuys well from their joint work in Russia in 1918. On the way to Finland on September 3, 1925, Reilly met Kutepov in Paris and found out in detail everything that he knew about the ICR. Beuys, who had arrived in Paris, also took part in this meeting, and he finally persuaded Reilly to go to Finland.

Yakushev met Reilly in Finland on September 24, 1925. In a conversation with Reilly, Reilly outlined his views on the general situation in Europe and America, as well as on questions of the political and economic situation in Russia. Turning to the issue of funds to support the activities of the ICR, Reilly proposed two ways: the acquisition and theft of art treasures to sell them abroad, as well as cooperation with British intelligence on the basis of supplying it with information about the activities and plans of the Comintern. Yakushev, referring to the fact that he cannot alone

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take a decision on Reilly's proposal, invited him to come to Moscow to discuss these issues at the political council of the IOCR

After much hesitation, Reilly agreed, and on September 25, 1925, he crossed the Finnish border in the Sestroretsk area. He was escorted to the border by Radkovich and the Finnish captain Rozenstrem. On the Soviet coast, Reilly was met by the head of the outpost, Toivo Vyakha, who took him to the Pargolovo station in a gig. On the way to Pargolovo, the fog that descended to the ground covered everything around. Reilly listened attentively to any sound, but heard only the lulling creak of the wheels of the gig, and the champing of damp earth under the hooves of the horse. This calmed Reilly and reminded him of a similar situation in 1918, when, fleeing the Cheka, he left the Petrograd-Mo Squa train in Klina in advance and traveled further to Moscow on passing carts. Then he managed to escape from persecution, and he believed that fate would again favor him. In Pargolovo, Reilly boarded a train bound for Leningrad. In the car, Yakushev and Chekist Shchukin were waiting for him. Reilly was given a passport in Steinberg's name.

On the morning of September 26, Reilly was already in Leningrad. He spent the day at Shchukin's apartment, and in the evening Reilly, Yakushev, and the Eurasianist Mukalov left for Moscow in the international carriage. At the railway station in Moscow they were met by Chekists Starov, Dorozhinsky and Shatkovsky.

On September 27, at a dacha in Malakhovka, at a meeting of the political council of the ICR, which was attended by Potapov, Oppenput, Styne, Langovoi and others, Reilly outlined his proposals, which he spoke about to Yakushev in Finland. From here he went to the railway station, where he was arrested and on November 3, 1925, shot in accordance with the sentence of the Revolutionary Tribunal in 1918.

On the night of September 28, a skirmish, screams, noise, the arrest of Vahya and the "murder" of three people were staged at the border. On the morning of September 29, a truck drove up to the border and the "corpses" were loaded into it. All this was done in such a way that the Finnish side got the impression that Reilly and the two "employees" of the IOCBR accompanying him, having approached the border, accidentally stumbled upon the border guards, as a result of which a shootout ensued and all three were killed. The Leningrad Krasnaya Gazeta reported that on the night of September 28-29, a group of unknown persons tried to cross illegally to Finland. In the ensuing skirmish with the border guards, three bandits were killed.

The emigration was very concerned about Reilly's failure. Maria Zakharchenko-Schultz Radkovich, the husband of Maria Zakharchenko-Schulz Radkovich, arrived in Moscow from Finland, who was throwing Reilly across the border, and demanded an explanation from Oppenput for what had happened. The results of the ICR investigation conducted in Leningrad were sent abroad, confirming that Reilly was killed by accident.

clash

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Mukalov, a representative of the Eurasianists at the ICR, who took part in the investigation, went abroad.

There was a rumor that Toivo Vähä had been shot as a traitor. In fact, under a different name, he went to a new place of service, having received the Order of the Red Banner for the operation to withdraw Reilly.

But, despite all the measures taken, Reilly's failure still raised doubts about the IOC among the governments of some states. In such conditions, it was decided to give the opportunity to freely enter and leave the USSR V.V. Shulgin, who had long wanted to visit the country illegally. V.V. Shulgin, a large landowner, a convinced monarchist, a prominent political figure in tsarist Russia, a former member of the State Duma, was well known in white emigration circles.

On the night of December 22-23, 1925, Shulgin took advantage of the "window" on the Soviet-Polish border. In the movement through the Soviet territory, Shulgin was accompanied by agent D.

Shulgin visited Kyiv, Leningrad and Moscow. Cut off in exile from the real life of Soviet Russia, Shulgin was surprised by what he happened to see, and by what he was shown.

In Moscow, he met with the leaders of the IOCR, and even the very atmosphere of the secret meeting made a huge impression on him. He was very pleased with the trip.

During his stay in the USSR, Shulgin was suggested the idea of writing a book about his visit to Soviet Russia, carefully concealing the way he got there. Returning behind the cordon, he did just that. The book "Three Capitals" was published in 1926 and contained many attacks against the Soviet government, but at the same time the author objectively asserted that the people of the former Russian Empire did not perish in ruin and did not degrade, did not think about the restoration of tsarism and in their the majority supports the Soviet government.

Worried that the publication of the book would not damage the MOCR, Shulgin camouflaged all the names and other realities in it, although the power of some anti-Soviet organization was quite visible. It is interesting that the first readers of the manuscripts of Shulgin's book, which he previously sent to the ICR for approval, were Dzerzhinsky, Menzhinsky and Artuzov.

In early 1926, the leaders of Operation Trust directed the activities of the ICR to further eliminate the difficulties caused by the capture of Sidney Reilly. The work carried out in this direction made it possible, to a certain extent, to restore faith in the existence of the IOC, but the monarchist organizations abroad began to demand more persistently from the IOC the implementation of active subversive actions.

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In the IOCR itself, Zakharchenko began to show particular activity in this direction, whose position was supported and encouraged by Kutepov.

After a detailed analysis of the course of the operation "Trust", it was decided to deprive Zakharchenko of independence. To do this, the IOCR specifically created an opposition that allegedly advocates the use of terror, and put Opperput and Zakharchenko at its head. Now Zakharchenko could not make decisions without the approval of the Opperput.

Soon Zakharchenko, with the "consent" of Opperput, went to Paris for negotiations with Kutepov, who introduced her to the active supporter of terror, the monarchist A.I. Guchkov, formerly a major capitalist and leader of the Octobrist Party. He was the military and naval minister in the first composition of the Provisional Government. While in exile, he took an active part in the struggle against the Soviet regime.

At a meeting with Zakharchenko, Guchkov declared that he had the opportunity to purchase poison gas in Germany in unlimited quantities, using which it was possible to carry out a major terrorist act.

Kutepov, Zakharchenko and Guchkov worked out the following action plan: mass poisoning of delegates to the Congress of Soviets during a meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre; prepare a detachment of up to 200 people abroad from former officers especially devoted to the monarchists and, gradually transferring it across the border, concentrate in Moscow, entrusting it with the task of seizing the Kremlin immediately after the terrorist act. To implement this plan, it was decided to immediately start testing the gas, creating a special commission with the obligatory participation of representatives of Kutepov and the IOC.

The leaders of the operation "Trust" instructed to agree and take part in the test to find out what was at stake. For this purpose, a student of the military academy of chemical protection was selected as an expert. Leaving for Paris in October 1926, the expert studied a number of issues related to gas, but he could not examine the gas itself, because it had not yet arrived from Germany. From an expert

there was an opinion that such a substance either does not exist, or it is one of the species known in the last war.

Arriving in Moscow, Zakharchenko learned that Yakushev did not approve of the terrorist act at the Bolshoi Theater. Potapov took the same position. This aroused Zakharchenko's suspicions of Yakushev's unreliability, and she tried to highlight Oppenput, who, in her opinion, should have completely taken over the leadership of the preparation and implementation of terror.

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istic acts. To organize a meeting between Oppenput and Kutepov, Zakharchenko went abroad.

After discussing the situation and coming to the conclusion that Zakharchenko's report might arouse serious suspicions among the leaders of the monarchists abroad regarding Yakushev and Potapov, it was decided to send Yakushev to Paris and prevent Oppenput's meeting with Kutepov.

At the end of November 1926, Yakushev crossed the border with Estonia and arrived in Revel, and then, having received an Estonian passport, left for Paris, where Kutepov met him at the station.

Negotiations with Kutepov took place in a tense atmosphere. However, Yakushev chose an offensive line of behavior, focusing on the difficulties with money. This, he says, is what slows him down. As for Zakharchenko, Yakushev accused her of intrigue. He said that he could not get carried away with all sorts of fantasies, the work should be built on a real basis. Yakushev managed to convince Kutepov of the correctness of his position.

At the end of the conversation, Kutepov stated that he considered it necessary to meet on neutral territory and discuss with the leadership the general state of affairs in the USSR, as well as develop a plan of joint action. Yakushev agreed with this proposal.

Yakushev used a similar offensive tactic at the reception with Nikolai Nikolaevich, who, obviously, under the influence of information received from Zakharchenko, began the conversation in an arrogant tone. The Grand Duke demanded to begin to act actively and immediately within the next few months.

Thus, a situation began to take shape in which the IOCR could no longer restrain the growing desire of the monarchists to organize and carry out terrorist and other subversive actions. In addition, the further stubborn unwillingness to engage in subversive activities began to arouse serious suspicions among foreign monarchists whether the IOCR is really the organization that it claims to be.

In February 1927, a decision was made to end Operation Trust. But in order to make sure it was correct, another meeting was organized with Kutepov, to which Potapov and an employee of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Zinoviev were sent in March 1927 - he was supposed to play the role of a naval representative of the IOC This meeting was to find out fully the intentions and, most importantly, the possibilities of Kutepov in organizing terrorist acts in the USSR.

At the talks, Kutepov categorically insisted on setting a specific date for the start of subversive activities. Representatives

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The IOCR, as before, raised the issue of the funds needed to start active operations, and also insisted that they should save their forces "to achieve the ultimate goal - the overthrow of Soviet power and the establishment of a monarchy in Russia." Then Kutepov suggested sending a group of terrorists (20-30 people) to the USSR, who, being under strict

the control of the ICR will prepare and carry out terrorist acts, and the forces of the ICR intended for decisive action will remain. It was difficult to object to Kutepov without risking deciphering, so Potapov proposed to refer this issue for discussion.

political council.

The results of Potapov's negotiations with Kutepov in Finland confirmed that Operation Trust should be completed. The task set before its creators was completed. The completion of the operation was accelerated by the following circumstance. In early April 1927, Radkovich, while in a Moscow pub, made a scandal and ended up in the police, from where he was taken to the OGPU. After his release, he appeared to Oppenput, who at that time had Zakharchenko, who had just returned from abroad. Outraged and frightened by what had happened, she insisted on Radkovich's immediate departure abroad and on April 10 went to Leningrad to help him cross the Finnish "window".

However, on April 11, a telegram was received from Zakharchenko, from which it followed that Radkovich had disappeared. Then Oppenput asked to be allowed to go to Leningrad in search of Radkovich. On the same day, Zakharchenko decided to go to Finland - also to look for Radkovich. The agent went to escort her to the border. Having reached the border, Zakharchenko and Oppenput quickly, almost running, headed to the Finnish side, from where Oppenput did not return. As it turned out later, Radkovich was already in Finland at that time.

A letter from Oppenput was found in a secret apartment in Leningrad, in which he announced that he had left the USSR forever, and demanded 125 thousand rubles as a reward for not disclosing everything that he knew.

After crossing the border, Oppenput informed the Finnish and British intelligence services that the MOCR was an organization specially created by the state security agencies. But the Finnish and other intelligence agencies did not fully believe this and even suspected Oppenput of belonging to the Soviet agents. The opinion was expressed that Zakharchenko could also be a Soviet agent, specially abandoned abroad to compromise the ICR.

To prove the sincerity of Oppenput, the monarchists decided to transfer him and Zakharchenko with the Kutepovite terrorist Peters to the territory of the USSR for them to commit a number of sabotage and terror

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static acts. First of all, it was planned to kill senior officials of the Soviet state security agencies, the leaders of the operation "Trust" and blow up the building itself, which housed the state security agencies.

Oppenput, Zakharchenko and Peters failed to complete this task. During the arrest, they all shot themselves.

Oppenput's confessions and an unsuccessful attempt to commit terrorist and sabotage acts on the territory of the USSR forced Kutepov in 1927-1928 to do a great job of forming and transferring new terrorist groups to the USSR.

From the message of INO OGPU No. 32700 of 07/19/28:

"In 1927 Kutepov was in Finland before the terrorist acts of Balmasov, Peters, Selsky, Zakharchenko-Schultz and others. He actually supervised their exit to the territory of the USSR and gave the last instructions at the very border. Upon his return to Paris, Kutepov developed a network of terrorist acts in the USSR and submitted his plan for consideration by the headquarters, which accepted this plan with some changes. The main plan was:

a) the assassination of Stalin;

- 6) explosion of military factories;
- c) the assassination of the leaders of the OGPU in Moscow;
- d) simultaneous assassination of commanders of military districts in the south, east, north and west of the USSR

This plan, adopted in 1927 at the Shuanyi meeting, remains in force.

Thus, Kutepov's point of view on terrorist actions in the USSR has not changed.

According to available information, Kutepov is hotly recruiting voluntary agents who are ready to go to the USSR for terrorist work.

Kutepov allegedly completely eliminated the turnouts. Each person acts independently in the area indicated to him. Each agent receives a passport and money from the spot."

But by this time, intelligence already had reliable undercover capabilities in the ROVS, and therefore most of the members of these groups were detained.

Thus, the monarchists began to carry out terrorist acts only after it became known that the MOCR was an organization created by the Chekists. Consequently, the operation "Trust" successfully completed its task: to keep foreign monarchist organizations from active subversive activities on the territory of the USSR and, first of all, from committing terrorist acts. The leaders of the monarchists abroad had to reckon with the fact that the ICR was categorically opposed to such actions.

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Such valuable time was won, which foreign intelligence used to infiltrate the ROVS, create its own agent network in it in order to counter terrorist assets.
ness.

June 9, 1927 Wrangel in a personal letter to the representative of the EMRO in Yugoslavia, Lieutenant General I.G. Barbovich wrote: "The defeat of a number of organizations in Russia and the revelations of the well-known provocateur Oppenput-Staunitz-Kasatkin that appeared on the pages of the foreign Russian press fully reveal the entire collapse of the three-year work of A.P. Kutepova. What I repeatedly told both the Grand Duke and Alexander Pavlovich himself turned out, unfortunately, to be true. A.P. fell entirely into the hands of the Soviet Azefs, being an unwitting accomplice in catching the enemies of Soviet power inside Russia in the name of the Grand Duke.

On this occasion, Wrangel wrote to Barbovich even more sharply on June 21, 1927: "<... with A.P. Kutepov, I spoke quite frankly, expressing my opinion to him that he exaggerated his strength, took up a business for which he was not prepared, and pointed out that his moral duty, after the collapse of his three years of work, was revealed, to move away from this business. However, he is unlikely to do so. After all, it would be an open admission of its insolvency. In order to decide on this, one must be a man of exceptional honesty and civic courage."

Operation "Trust" took place in difficult conditions. Great difficulties were created by the visits to the USSR of representatives of foreign monarchist organizations, who closely observed the actions of the IOC. Therefore, it was necessary to periodically carry out special operational combinations to create the appearance of the active work of the IOC and the difficult conditions in which this activity takes place.

A certain positive role was played by the disinformation work carried out through the IOCR. The information received by Soviet intelligence confirmed the effectiveness of disinformation, which was transmitted to the Polish, Estonian and Finnish intelligence services, and they, in turn, supplied it to the intelligence services of France, England, Japan, Italy and partly the USA. It's safe to say

that disinformation was perceived by them as real information and served as the basis for the corresponding calculations in the headquarters of these states. This led the enemy to an exaggerated idea of the combat power of the Red Army and ultimately led to the rejection of intervention against the USSR.

Yakushev Alexander Alexandrovich after the completion of the operation "Trust" continued to work in the People's Commissariat of Railways, constantly fearing revenge from the militants of the ROVS. However, the danger came from the other side. In 1934 he was sentenced to 10 years and

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He died in the camp in 1937. However, such a fate befell those with whom he worked so successfully. Artuzov Arthur Khristianovich and Pilyar Roman Alexandrovich became victims of repression in 1937.

The fate of some other participants in the "Trust" operation was more successful: on May 9, 1938, Lieutenant General Potapov Nikolai Mikhailovich was transferred to the reserve due to age. He died in Moscow in 1946.

Langovoy Alexander Alexandrovich died in Moscow on February 26, 1964.

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Roman Birk

In 1921, a certain Roman Birk arrived at the Estonian mission in Moscow as an attaché. The Cheka found that Birk was born in 1894 in Russia, in 1916 he graduated from the officer school in Irkutsk, a participant in the First World War, which he graduated with the rank of captain. After Estonia was granted independence, he served in the Estonian army in 1918-1920, worked in the General Staff. It was with the assignment from the headquarters that he was sent to Moscow.

The Cheka, which at that time was organizing illegal correspondence channels for the Trust organization, drew attention to Birk's candidacy. In November 1921, members of this organization, Kolesnikov and Oppertut, established contact with him and agreed to send letters to the representative of the "Trust" in Tallinn, Shchelkachev, by mail of the mission.

Since that time, they have become regular visitors to the mission. Birk received letters from them once or twice a month to be forwarded to Tallinn. Correspondence at first was of a private nature, and from January 1922 various military and economic information began to appear. The same information came in response letters, mainly from Paris. Kolesnikov opened individual packages in the presence of Birk, and he saw their contents: orders for the Red Army, other military documents.

At the same time, an in-depth study of Birk was carried out in order to attract cooperation. In the end, Kolesnikov was convinced that Birka could be trusted. Shortly after the relevant checks that proved this, Kolesnikov revealed to Birka that he was an employee of the Cheka, Viktor Stanislavovich Kiyakovsky. Since then, Birk's cooperation with the Russian security agencies began, lasting 15 years.

Birk connected Kiyakovsky with representatives of the Polish and British intelligence services in Moscow, who were supplied with specially prepared "information".

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Birk also handed over for opening the mail of the Polish military attache in Tallinn, Drimmer, which was sent through the Estonian legation. According to Kiyakovsky, he received such a volume of intelligence information from representatives of the "Trust" abroad and Birk that safes burst from it. With the help of Birk, the Finnish and Estonian borders were illegally crossed

the head of the "Trust" Yakushev and his couriers. Birka hosted A.Kh. Artuzov, other heads of Russian special services. For Operation Trust, he was awarded a gold watch.

In connection with the betrayal of Staunitz-Opperput, a participant in this operation, further work with Birk was temporarily stopped, and in 1927 he left for Vienna, where he entered the Consular Academy to study.

Because of Opperput's revelations, Birk was trailed by a "trust" trail. A secret memorandum from the Vienna Police Directorate dated December 7, 1927, noted that Birk had been under surveillance since mid-November, but his connections with Soviet circles had not been established. Further in this document, the following words of Birk were quoted: "In 1922-1924. was an attaché of the Estonian mission in Moscow. He served in the General Staff and in recent years traveled as a courier. He had connections with the Soviet General Staff in the interests of Estonia, which was facilitated by his former service in the tsarist army. He did not cooperate with the Soviet government."

Opperput's statement that Birk was an OGPU agent, picked up by newspapers in Estonia, was not recognized by the Estonian court as sufficient evidence in Birk's suit, and the court demanded an apology from the newspapers.

Abroad, until the beginning of 1930, Birka continued to patronize the INO. In 1929, in Vienna, Birk, together with Patzel, a professor at the Consular Academy, and one of his friends, Thaler, opened a representative office of the American-European Information Agency (AMEIA). It received through New York access to the intelligence department of the US State Department. At the suggestion of Kiyakovsky, the former tsarist diplomat Lavrentiev was appointed as AMEIA correspondent in Moscow.

Birk left at the beginning of 1930 under the roof of AMEIA for Hamburg. However, the Americans soon lost interest in this representation.

Then Birk got a job as a correspondent in the representative office of the Hearst Agency in Berlin and in this capacity could speak on behalf of the Americans. He also made it clear to his contacts and connections that he unofficially represented the general staffs of Estonia and Finland.

In Berlin, he resumed intelligence activities in favor of Soviet Russia under the leadership of the local residency in the line of foreign intelligence. On April 13, 1930, he wrote to the Center about his first meeting with the Berlin resident: "He

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He wants me to urgently arrange here to receive secret information from the headquarters, the Foreign Minister and the diplomatic corps.

The Trust school gave Birk a lot as a scout. He knew how to win the trust and favor of very sophisticated professionals. Birk did not "pull" information from the source, but patiently waited for the source to begin to give it himself. He never responded immediately to the proposals of representatives of the Western intelligence services for cooperation, he said that he had to think, referred to difficulties, asked to consider himself only a "reservist in case of war."

He refused cash and other advances, saying he was not sure if he could get the material he needed.

Birk firmly adhered to the rule that in order to succeed in business, one must stand morally above his counterparties. They saw him as a reliable partner and trusted him. Participating in their "feasts and amusements", Birk did not lose his head. The wives of his sources also had confidence in Birk. One of them, for example, going to his mistress, said to his wife: "I will sit in a restaurant with Birk," and this was a weighty alibi.

Birk quickly becomes one of the most active assistants of the Berlin residency. In particular, he manages to establish a business contact with the old Abwehr agent Egon

Gessling.

Goessling, immediately after the meeting, suggested that Birk contact the Abwehr directly through him. Birk declined this offer, saying that he did not wish to be involved in intelligence, as he had already "suffered in this business due to the provocation of others", but that he would be glad to serve Germany as his second homeland. Birk continued to adhere to this legend, declaring that he "still manages to prove his loyalty to Germany by becoming an active intelligence officer in case of war."

In June 1931, the Center wrote to Berlin that it approved of Birk's line of conduct, "which is calculated on the fact that Gessling and German military intelligence will consider Birk as their reservist and constantly strive to bring him closer to them, which will make it possible to be among them "one of our own" and use this circumstance to identify persons who should be taken care of and could be recruited in this area of our work, moreover, in essence, ONE OF THE MAIN.

The Center noted that "Birk's acquaintance with Goessling is very valuable, and Birk should use it to further expand his contacts in military intelligence circles."

In the early 1930s, in search of sources of information on the Nazi Party, Birk firmly entered the circle of "national revolutionaries" who then joined the left wing of the Nazi movement in Austria and Germany. In this environment, Birk managed to find and acquire two necessary sources of information. One of them was personal

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Birk's friend from studies at the Consular Academy in Vienna, Thaler, who managed to penetrate into such an important Nazi lair as the party, and after the Nazis came to power, state intelligence. Another source was Heimzot, a doctor close to the top of the Nazis, who provided extensive information about the situation in the Hitlerite leadership and other important issues. Many of Birk's acquaintances, mostly former officers, were characterized by the spirit of front-line fraternity. And they considered Birka "a reliable comrade, a good landsknecht", he was trusted with secret secrets.

The Berlin residency reported to the Center on October 10, 1932: "With all Birk's caution, he is to a certain extent dependent on Gessling, and if we do not want Birk to fail, then he must maintain friendly relations with Gessling, abstaining from as much as possible from talking about political topics." At that time, the residency offered Birka to move to another country, but he refused. His wife played a certain role: the family had just settled in Berlin after a number of years of nomadic life, the son studied at the gymnasium, and less than a year ago, the daughter of Birkov was buried here.

By leaving Birk in Berlin, the residency was taking on a huge risk. Birk, in spite of everything, managed to hold out until July 1934 in Germany, thanks in part to Gessling. The latter's wife, theater and film actress Kevt, wrote to Birk after his departure: "You are absolutely devoted to my husband. He is your most trusted friend."

However, the situation in Germany after the Nazis came to power quickly escalated, and in 1934 Birk was still forced to leave Germany and move to another European country, where he continued to cooperate with Soviet foreign intelligence until 1937. He did it very professionally and honestly. In the surviving ten-volume archival file on Birka, there is no data on its deciphering...

The further fate of Roman Gustavovich Birk was tragic. In 1938 he was recalled to Moscow and sentenced to capital punishment. In 1963 he was rehabilitated.

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Illusions of General Shteyfon

In the early morning of October 14, 1929, the fast train "Bucharest Chisinau" departed from the station of the Romanian capital. The first class compartment comfortably accommodated two passengers. While waiting for the ordered breakfast, a leisurely conversation ensued. They recalled acquaintances, the events of the Civil War, individual details of emigration in Turkey, in Gallipoli.

Soon the conversation died down, and the passengers plunged into their thoughts. The steady clatter of the wheels caused drowsiness. Harvested fields, yellowed gardens and copses flickered outside the train window.

But behind the apparent calm of the passengers, internal tension was hidden, their thoughts constantly returned to the upcoming dangerous business - the illegal crossing of the Romanian-Soviet border.

For several years of connection with white emigration, Captain Petritsky crossed this border more than once. His companion, Major General Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon, participated in this case for the first time and, admitting this to himself with difficulty, was nervous. Again and again he was overcome by doubts about the correctness of the decision made - to make a trip to the south of Russia himself and get acquainted with the state of affairs in the underground organization, headed by Captain Petritsky.

Shteifon recalled his repeated conversations with the representative of the "Russian All-Military Union" in Romania, General Gerua, at his apartment in Bucharest, and found serious arguments in favor of the step taken. He also recalled the encouraging words spoken at the station by a member of the Romanian intelligence service that ensured their passage across the Soviet border.

Deciding on the trip, Shteifon had the intention of showing that he trusted the underground organization and was fulfilling his "moral duty" as the initiator of sending two groups of officers at its disposal.

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In Chisinau, which at that time belonged to Romania, they were met by a representative of the Romanian intelligence, Captain Roman, who was directly responsible for the transfer across the border.

On the night of October 15, 1929, the full moon was shining, and upon arrival at the border, Shteifon became agitated and began to persuade his fellow travelers to postpone the crossing. Captain Roman reassured him, saying that the moon would soon set and everything was ready for a safe passage. Petritsky supported him.

Around midnight, Petritsky and Shteifon crossed the border. After crossing over to the Soviet side, they had to make their way through ravines, up the mountain, and Shteifon was exhausted after walking about two kilometers. Shteifon was left in a securely hidden place, and Petritsky went out to an agreed meeting with a guide, a member of his underground organization, who was waiting for him. Together they went to the place where Shteifon was hidden. And here the unexpected happened. Shteifon, seeing from afar the figures of people approaching him, was frightened and, leaving his things, fled. Petritsky expected anything but this. The fact is that he controlled Shteifon on behalf of ... the OGPU, and the situation that had arisen was in no way part of his plans.

After a thorough search, it was not possible to find the general, and Petritsky and his guide went to the Birzulu station in the expectation that Shteifon would get there on his own, as was agreed earlier when developing the plan for crossing the border. Shteifon was provided with a real Soviet passport, money, knew the turnout. He had a pistol with him.

The next day at 2 o'clock in the morning, Petritsky breathed a sigh of relief - Shteifon appeared at the Birzulu station. He said that, being in a sheltered place, he was very worried and it seemed to him that three people were walking instead of two, as had been agreed. Shteifon was ready to open fire with a pistol at those approaching, but then he decided to just run and get to the station on his own. Accompanied by one of the members of the underground organization, he was sent by rail to appear in the city of Yeysk.

From archival documents:

Major General B.A. Shteyfon was born in 1883 in the Kharkov province. In 1903 he graduated from the Chuguev cadet school. Member of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In 1912 he graduated from the course of the Academy of the General Staff. He served in the Moscow and Turkestan military districts. During the First World War, he was on the Caucasian front. From the war he returned to Kharkov with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He went to the Volunteer Army to Alekseev. At the beginning of 1919, he was appointed chief of staff of General Witkowski's division. At the end of 1919 he commanded the Belozersky regiment, colonel. At the beginning of 1920, he was the chief of staff of the group of troops of General Bredov, with whom

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tory and retreated to Poland. In July 1920, already in the rank of major general, he ended up in the Crimea, retreated with Wrangel. In Gallipoli he was commandant, later chief of staff of Kutepov's corps. After leaving Gallipoli, he lived in Yugoslavia, worked as a clerk in a mine, worked as a laborer. Energetic, persistent, confident in his actions, ambitious, religious. Conspiratorial and cautious. Convinced monarchist.

The episode with the crossing of the Romanian-Soviet border was preceded by a long and painstaking operational work of the Rostov Chekists. It was about creating the legendary "Organization of Resistance to Soviet Power" and establishing links between it and foreign emigration. This organization is much less known than its counterpart, Trust, but it was also formed with the aim of revealing the plans of the Russian emigration, especially "in the hinterland", in particular on the Don, and neutralizing them.

In 1922, White emigrants Ureniuk and Captain Petritsky were transferred from Romania to the Crimea with the task of launching subversive work against the Soviet regime and creating underground organizations for this. In 1926, Urenyuk was arrested and put on trial for subversive activities, while Petritsky was in for a different fate: he was recruited by the staff of the office of the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU of the North Caucasus Territory. He was instructed to create the "Organization of Resistance". Already in a new capacity, he was transferred "back across the border" - to Constantinople, and from there - to Romania. Legend: managed to escape.

Petritsky met with the former general of the tsarist army Gerua, who settled in Bucharest, and reported on the "work done." On the recommendation of the general, Petritsky was sent to Paris to meet with the head of the Russian All-Military Union, General Kutepov, and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Petritsky made an excellent impression on both of them. As a result, he received instructions that testified to high confidence in the performer, to organize a struggle against Soviet power on the territory of the USSR.

From archival documents:

"Top secret

Letter from Gen. A.P. Kutepov gene. A.V. Gerua Paris, July 31, 1926, No. 154

Dear Alexander Vladimirovich, I have received your letters Nos. 59 and 60. The first of them will be presented by me to the VKNI! in a timely manner.

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B.F. Petritsky arrived and made the best impression. It will be presented by me to the WKNN. His report is very interesting and breathes truthfulness. I am now waiting for a visa for him, which we ask you by telegram to send him back.

Regarding the exchange of Ureniuk, despite all the desire to help wrest him out, I, unfortunately, am powerless to do anything in the direction you suggest. Despite some connections, I am sure in advance that no government will now raise the question of exchanging a citizen for him. Maybe you can still do something for him with you.

I beg you to take all the most effective precautions regarding B.F. Petritsky to save him.

Accept the assurance of perfect reverence and devotion,

Sincerely yours

A. Kutepov.

From the archival file No. ... OGPU:

B.F. Petritsky was born in 1896. He received a secondary education, and in August 1915 he volunteered for the army. In March 1916 he graduated from the 3rd Kyiv school of ensigns and was sent to the 42nd reserve regiment in Tiraspol, and then to the 65th Moscow regiment. In the summer of 1917 he was seconded to the headquarters of the 5th Army, where he served until October 1917. He joined Denikin's Volunteer Army, in 1918 he met Urenyuk and later served under him as a commander of fifty in the counterintelligence detachment of the headquarters of the Feodosiya defensive region. After the defeat of Wrangel, he was evacuated with a detachment to Turkey, Gallipoli, and from there, together with Urenyuk, he moved to Romania.

Since 1928, the legend of a counter-revolutionary insurgent organization in the North Caucasus begins, on behalf of which "couriers" are regularly sent to Romania with disinformation materials for Romanian intelligence and to receive funds and instructions from the white émigré organizations "Russian All-Military Union" and "Patriotic Squads" (Yugoslavia). In addition to "couriers", in order to resolve the organizational issues that arose, captain Petritsky was repeatedly sent to Romania by the Rostov Chekists, speaking according to legend as the head of an underground organization in the North Caucasus.

Romanian intelligence also fully trusted him, believing that they were using Petritsky as a
your agent.

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From archival documents:

"Top secret

MISSION OF THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE B.F. PETRITSKY 9.UP1.1929

Questions for urgent clarification:

A. Aviation:

1. The staff of one of the fleets you indicated (exact description of positions). The property of the air fleet - for sure.
2. Numbers of all devices and motors of squadrons and otd. units in which you have a resident.
3. Flight training programs for aviation units (for the period of 1929).
4. Get books: Lanchinsky - "Aviation Tactics", S. Pokrovsky - "Combat Aviation Service", Wegener - "Air Communications", Wegener - "Airfields".

B. Cavalry:

1. It is urgent to establish what the 5th cavalry division is - purely personnel, territorial or mixed.

2. Do you have any information about whether Ter. kav. divisions 11 and 12 to reduce and turn into 4 regiments. If there is information, then for sure - where and how did you receive the information.

3. States Ter. kav. divisions.

B. Tanks and armored parts:

1. We need the following information on tanks and armored vehicles: a) name; b) chassis type (number of wheels); c) motor type, horsepower, etc.; d) maximum speed on bad roads; e) weight; f) type of carrosserie (body); g) team size; 3) whether it has a radio; i) armor; j) weapons.

G. Artillery:

1. Have there been any changes in the organization art. heavy shelves with p.cases (such as [X]), and accurately collect fresh information about the organization of those at a given moment.

2. Please check the information about individual artillery battalions in the North Caucasus Military District. Their numbers, organization and armament.

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To accomplish the task set by the Soviet intelligence, it was necessary to provide a permanent line of transfer of couriers across the border. Some of them, like Petritsky himself, were employees or agents of Soviet intelligence, others were let in to preserve the legend of the "white organization".

As a rule, representatives of the Romanian intelligence service met the returning couriers at the border, among them captains Roman and Ishmael. Immediately upon arrival on the Romanian side, the courier handed over to these persons specially prepared materials intended for Romanian intelligence, which were sealed in a special package and sent to their destination. These materials, along with truthful but insignificant information, mainly about units of the Red Army, also contained carefully prepared disinformation.

In Bucharest, the courier was met by an employee of the intelligence section of the Romanian General Staff, Major Morozov, who placed him in a safe house, handed over intelligence assignments, weapons and money. Sometimes the couriers were met by the head of the intelligence section of the Romanian General Staff, Colonel Glyase, the head of the Russian department of this section, Colonel Florescu, and Captain Ionescu. It is absolutely clear that all these meetings, as well as the intelligence assignments that the courier received from the Romanian intelligence service, helped the leadership of the OGPU to keep abreast of the practical activities of the opponents of our state.

In addition to general information about the political and economic situation in the Soviet state, Romanians were especially interested in information about the 4th Cavalry Corps of the Red Army, which included the 11th and 12th Cavalry Divisions. They believed that this corps, in the event of hostilities, should have deployed its units against Romania.

Naturally, in addition to the Romanians, work with couriers was also carried out by General Gerua.

From archival documents:

Major General of the tsarist army Alexander Vladimirovich Gerua, born in 1870. In 1917 he was chief of staff of the Romanian Front, whose headquarters was in Iasi. The initiator of the creation of five volunteer national corps: Russian, Muslim, two Polish and Ukrainian, which, as planned, were to take part in the campaign against the Bolsheviks. The campaign failed, and in the end, these formations were created from a number of Colonel Drozdovsky, who in 1918 made his way from Romania to the Volunteer

Denikin's army. Gerua remained in Romania, being the representative of General Denikin under the Romanian rule.

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agency, through him negotiations were conducted with the British and French for assistance to the Volunteer Army. Twice, in 1918 and 1920, Gerua traveled from Romania to Denikin's headquarters in Rostov, together with representatives of the Entente. Subsequently, General Gerua acted as a representative of the monarchist emigrant organizations, as well as the "Russian Military Union" in Romania.

He corresponded regularly with the Grand Dukes Nikolai Nikolaevich and Andrei Vladimirovich, the head of the EMRO, General Kutepov, and then with Miller and many other leaders of the Russian emigration. The general spoke in favor of uniting all forces in the fight against the Bolsheviks, deploying a broad underground movement with the aim of raising an uprising in southern Russia. He argued on this issue with General Kutepov, speaking out against the tactics of individual terror, believing that this did not give the desired results. He developed the system of state structure in Russia after the expulsion of the Bolsheviks, wrote works on the history of the First World War.

In 1936-1937, Gerua established contact with the leaders of the Russian fascist movement Vonsyatsky (USA) and Rodzaevsky (Manchuria) and carried out propaganda work in favor of this movement.

It was not by chance that Petritsky relied on General Gerua. This gave special significance to his "underground organization". The general developed plans and directions for its activities, sought funds, selected the people needed for the cause from among the Russian emigration, mostly former officers. And, most importantly, information about the activity of General Gerua and, consequently, about the viability of Petritsky's "underground organization" was widely disseminated among the top Russian emigration.

But it was necessary not to get carried away with the operational game, not to go, as they say, beyond its scope. After all, General Gerua demanded that the leaders of the "organization" spread its activities to the territory of the Crimea and Ukraine and create underground groups there. Raised the question of preparing an armed uprising in the south of Russia by the spring of 1930. And he didn't just talk about abstract, general tasks. In order to cause economic damage to the Soviet Republic and deprive it of foreign exchange earnings, the general insisted on blowing up the Baku-Batumi oil pipeline. He also most seriously raised the issue of the attempt on the life of the German ambassador in Moscow, Count Brockdorf Rantzau.

In letter No. 134 dated September 3, 1928, Gerua writes to Petritsky:

"..this issue is so serious that the real dictator of Moscow gr. Brockdorff-Rantzau should be removed in the same way as it was removed

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his predecessor c. Mirbach. You have directions and instructions for such a case, think about it and tell me your thoughts, and in the meantime I hope to find funds for this. For what follows, in our correspondence, we agree to denote Brockdorf-Rantzau by the letters BRA. If we remove this BRA, there will be no one in Germany to support the Soviets, and without this support they must fall.

But let's get back to General Shteifon, whose transfer across the border was skillfully used by Soviet intelligence officers to provide "particularly important reliable evidence" that the "underground organization" lived a "full-blooded life." He safely reached the safe house in Yeysk. He was given the opportunity to visit Krasnodar, Pyatigorsk, meet with members of the "underground organization" and the "leaders" of its "district headquarters".

General Shteifon was satisfied with his trip to the south of Russia and communication with the members of the "underground organization" – in total he was shown about 20 members of the organization.

In a farewell conversation with Petritsky, Steifon promised to carry out all the necessary work abroad in order to obtain funds, weapons, and to select an additional number of officers to be sent to Russia, including the transfer of "strategists" in the person of Generals Drotsenko or Volkhovsky. Shteifon also asked to find a place on the Black Sea coast for the unloading of weapons by the spring of next year.

On October 27, 1929, accompanied by two "couriers", Shteifon left for the border and crossed to the Romanian side. Upon arrival in Bucharest, he made a detailed report to General Gerua on the results of the trip, praising the activities of the "underground organization" and Petritsky.

General Gerua, judging by the materials of the archival file, summed up the following results:

— the organization is going through a transitional period from organizational to mobilization;

— an alliance with Kutepov should not be abandoned, provided that the independence of the organization is preserved;

- foreign personnel are pouring in to raise the spirit of the organization and create conditions for the bond between Russia and abroad;

- groups of officers go to permanent work in full subordination to Petritsky, despite the fact that he is younger in years and in rank (captain).

To financially support the activities of the "organization" and supply it with weapons, Steifon, at the direction of Gerua, is sent

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to Paris via Poland, where he makes contacts to create new lines of communication with the "organization".

In Paris Shteifon developed a vigorous activity. He meets with General Kutepov, Grand Duke Andrei Vladimirovich, industrialists Guchkov and Gukasov, financier, former mayor of Kiev Demchenko, former Prime Minister of Russia Kokovtsov.

Shteifon tells them about his trip to the Union, the activities of the "underground organization", and asks for financial and other assistance. He stayed in Paris for more than a year, but did not achieve results. I met with understanding, sympathy, but did not receive money.

In the meantime, Romanian intelligence put forward more and more new demands each time, expressing obvious dissatisfaction with the materials received through "couriers". According to some individual details of their behavior, it could be assumed that they were beginning to guess who they are dealing with.

In September 1933, the new representative of the ROVS in Romania, Jolondkovsky, summoned two couriers of the "organization" to Bucharest, ostensibly to resolve issues of receiving and escorting a schooner with weapons and explosives. The Rostov security officers, taking into account the analysis and assessment of the course of development of the operational game, had doubts about the expediency of sending these "couriers". But in the end they decided to take a chance, and two couriers appeared in Bucharest. Soon one of them returned with the task of preparing the reception of the schooner on the coast near Gelendzhik. The second "courier", according to Jolondkovsky and the representative of the Romanian intelligence, Major Morozov, was supposed to go on a schooner. However, the schooner never arrived, and there was a rumor in Bucharest that she sank along with her crew...

This was the end of the work on the Zamorskoe case - under such a conditional name it was listed in operational documents for eight long years. It became too risky to continue this long operational game.

How did the further fate of the main actors involved in this case develop? General Shteifon did not give up his convictions and continued to fight against the Soviet authorities, already in alliance with the Germans. In 1941, in Yugoslavia, General Skorodumov formed the "Russian Security Corps" (ROC) by agreement with the Germans. Shteifon was Skorodumov's deputy. However, Skorodumov, with his nationalist views, became objectionable to the Germans, and he was replaced by Shteifon as head of the ROK, conferring on him the rank of lieutenant general.

General Gerua received Romanian citizenship and, although he retired from active anti-Soviet activities, assisted General Shteifon in recruiting people for the ROK.

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Initially, the Germans intended to send the "corps" to the Eastern Front to fight the Red Army, but subsequently used it against the Yugoslav partisans.

After the collapse of Nazi Germany, the "corps" was interned in Austria in the summer of 1945, General Shteifon soon died there of a heart attack. Lost illusions he could not survive ...

! VKNN - Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.

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Murder on the Western Express

Public interest in Soviet Russia in the case of the murder of diplomatic courier Nette and the wounding of his comrade was slowly fading. Gradually, as if gradually, the theme of the "villainous assassination attempt" on two Soviet citizens with diplomatic passports in their pocket first disappeared from the front pages of newspapers, from radio broadcasts, and then completely sunk into oblivion, remaining only in the artistic word of the famous poet. "Do you remember, Nette, when you were human, you drank tea with me in a deep cup?" Vladimir Mayakovsky asked in those days.

In the early morning of February 5, 1926, when the passengers of the Moscow-Riga express train were still sleeping peacefully, two unknown men in masks approached the compartment where the Soviet diplomatic couriers were carrying diplomatic mail to Latvia. Swiftly opening the door, locked with a chain, they started firing point-blank at the passengers sitting on their bunks. One of them, the diplomatic courier Theodor Nette, was hit by the assassins' bullets on the spot, the other, Johann Makhmastal, was seriously wounded. Overcoming the pain, Johann discharged his pistol at the attackers, and when the train crew ran to the shots, they saw a terrible picture: in pools of blood they saw three dead. The name of one was established immediately according to the diplomatic passport. The identity of the attackers - a little later. They turned out to be the sons of the manager of one of the landlord estates near Riga, the brothers Gabrilovich.

About the brothers-murderers of Theodor Nette - a little later. They were only executors of a terrorist act. And its organizers...

A few days before the tragic events on the Moscow-Riga express train, an urgent telegram from Berlin landed on the desk of the operational duty officer of the INO OGPU: enhanced security to the border. Take appropriate measures for diplomatic mail from Moscow."

In Moscow, at the Lubyanka, the "signal of danger" was taken very seriously. To the capitals of a number of European states through foreign

intelligence sent the relevant directives: "From today, we are not sending regular diplomatic mail and we ask you not to send regular mail to Moscow until further notice."

This telegram-instruction was the first document that has survived to this day, which opened the "Case of Operational Correspondence" of Russia's foreign intelligence, code-named "Post". Days and weeks passed, and the Post Office file gradually turned from a thin pamphlet into a solid volume. Diplomatic courier Nette was publicly buried, his comrade was paid tribute, the organizers of the assassination from the imperialist camp were branded, and, it would seem, the matter was closed. But it wasn't. Foreign intelligence came to grips with the investigation of the crime.

At an emergency operational meeting on the day of the attack on diplomatic couriers, the head of the INO, M. Trilisser, read out the text of a telegram already known to the reader from Berlin and asked to find out, through agents and trusted ties, details about the organizers of the murder. At the same time, he pointed out that the Gabrilovich brothers, careless offspring of wealthy parents, could hardly imagine who they were shooting at. They were apparently simply ordered to get by any means necessary leather bags, which were allegedly stuffed with money. "As for the organizers of the assassination attempt, the matter is much more complicated," said the head of the INO. "Let's wait for answers from the residencies," M. Trilisser concluded the meeting.

And the answers were not long in coming.

From Berlin on February 7, 1926: "When the first information was received in Berlin about the attack on Soviet diplomatic couriers, two excited naval officers came to the naval department of the War Ministry. We suspect the Marine Department's connection to the attack."

From Berlin on February 9, 1926: "The Naval Department knew about the attack in advance. English embassy helped."

From Berlin on February 11, 1926: "A source from the War Office reports that the British military attache in Riga, Lloyd, together with the German naval officer Haase! for three months they prepared a plan of attack on Russian diplomatic couriers. The operation is funded by Lloyd."

From Berlin on February 12, 1926: "The Ministry of the Interior is convinced that British interests are behind the attack on Soviet couriers. For a long time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had information that certain circles of the Reichswehr and the naval department were in touch with British representatives on this issue ... "

Telegrams from residencies in the Baltics indirectly confirmed the contacts of the Gabrilovich brothers with foreign intelligence services, but nothing more.

From Kaunas: "According to a reliable source in the leadership of the Lithuanian political police, there is convincing evidence that the attack on Soviet diplomatic couriers was not of a criminal nature, as investigators of the Latvian criminal police tried to present. The Gabrilovich brothers, being avid hunters, constantly spent time in the company of the leaders of the Latvian police, where they were going to enter the service. There were also many foreigners among the hunters, with whom the brothers had close friendships.

relationship".

It seemed that there would be no end to the flow of reports about the organization of an assassination attempt on Soviet diplomatic couriers, and all of them, to one degree or another, repeated or blocked the intelligence information already available in the INO, which came immediately after the tragedy on the Moscow-Riga express train. There was only one thing missing in this stream - one hundred percent proof of participation in a conspiracy

British and German intelligence agencies. The head of the INO made one last attempt to clarify the situation. He sent a letter to the resident in Berlin and asked him to "dig into" this matter as meticulously as possible. And suddenly - an unexpected success. The Berlin residency got hold of a personal letter from one of the conspirators (Lloyd) to another (Haase) dated January 14, 1926, that is, dated three weeks before the attack on Soviet diplomatic couriers. Here is an excerpt from this letter, which, perhaps, puts everything in its place:

"The two hunters you recommended made a very good impression on me," Lloyd writes to his companion Haase. "I don't see fit to let these people in on my plans and have so far instructed them to recruit someone else to help me in my hunting match?" I seriously hope that my high hopes invested in this expedition will justify themselves.

fully".

The Anglo-German "expedition", however, ended in failure. Johann Mahmastal did not hand over the diplomatic bags. In Riga at the station, bleeding, he refused hospitalization, guarding the Soviet diplomatic post. He did not give the mail to the representative of the Soviet embassy who arrived at the station, declaring that he would guard it until one of the Soviet diplomats whom he personally knew appeared. Soon, the consul general, who was familiar to Johann, arrived, received the mail, and only then did Mahmastal allow doctors to see him.

The head of the INO was well aware that the crime committed against the diplomatic couriers had a clearly political connotation and that the government in Moscow was waiting for a qualified assessment of the incident by intelligence. And such an assessment was given. After analyzing all the information received, M. Trilisser reported to the government: "We can consider the initiative and organizing role of British intelligence (Lloyd) in the attack on Soviet couriers

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firmly established. Preparations were carried out simultaneously both in Germany and in the Baltic States..."

Days passed, and, alas, no government decisions were received at the highest level. The Soviet side was more interested in normalizing its economic and political relations with Western states than in increasing tension. And that is why the Post Office file moved from the desk of the head of intelligence to the archives.

Lieutenant Commander of the German Navy Haase is one of the active members of the far-right German organization "Consul", which has been conducting intelligence work against the USSR since its formation, and then merged into the German military intelligence Abwehr.

2 So in the original text.

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Kronstadt rebel

Among the motley mass of white emigrants, there were truly outstanding personalities for whom the fate of their homeland was inseparable from their own fate.

In a series of essays, the reader will get acquainted with some of them - voluntary assistants of the foreign intelligence service, who played a significant role in its history.

After the October Revolution in Russia, there were a number of armed uprisings against the new government. The people who then took up arms were called differently: "rebels", "rebels", "bandits", "freedom fighters" - depending on their personal attitude to the power of the Soviets. It also happened that "bandit" and "fighter" were often combined in one and the same person. Stepan Petrichenko, one of the leaders of the Kronstadt rebellion that broke out on March 1, 1921, was also among the most controversial figures.

Stepan Maksimovich was born in 1892 in the family of a small-land peasant in the Zhizdrinsky district of the Kaluga province. When he was two years old, his father and his family moved to Zaporizhzhya and started working at a metallurgical plant. After graduating from a two-class city school, at the age of fourteen, Stepan also entered the same factory. He worked as a metal worker, and in 1913 he went to the naval service. "During the war," he later recalled, "he shouted "Hurrah!" from the bottom of his heart. at all sorts of reviews and parades in honor of the victories of Russian weapons and was very sick of the soul with defeats. He was not a member of any parties, although after the victory of October, he supported the strengthening of the Soviet system with all his might.

The first doubts about the correctness of the Bolshevik policy arose from Stepan Petrichenko in 1918. Regarding the Brest Peace, he spoke negatively. He opposed the withdrawal of Russia from Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, was indignant at the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to Germany. Command of the battleship "Petropavlovsk"

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hastened to get rid of Petrichenko and demobilized the "oppositionist". Then Stepan, of his own free will and understanding, went to Ukraine to fight against the German hetman, Hetman Skoropadsky. But he was arrested on the way, spent three months in prison and returned to the battleship with repentance. In order to somehow justify himself and gain confidence, he signed up as a communist sympathizer and remained in this capacity until the very beginning of the Kronstadt uprising ...

Six years have passed. On a warm August day in 1927, a stout middle-aged man walked for a long time in front of the Soviet consulate in Riga, deep in thought. The policeman at the entrance to the building began to pay attention to him. Finally, as if casting aside doubts, the stranger walked resolutely towards the entrance.

"Hello," he said as he entered the consul's office. - I'm Stepan Petrichenko. I ask the Soviet government to allow me to become a Soviet citizen again and return to my homeland. Here is my application addressed to Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin. He held out several sheets of paper.

The consul took the statement and began to read: "The Kronstadt uprising fell on my head against my good will or desire. I was neither soul nor body in the preparation of this uprising. (It was unexpected even for myself.) And again I took part in the uprising because I too sensitively took to heart all the needs of the working people and was always ready to lay down my life for the interests of the working people.

But my trouble was that I was a politically naive baby. This naivete led me, besides the Kronstadt uprising, to even greater and gravest crimes already on Finnish territory - a complete and involuntary attempt to fight against the USSR. To do this, I had to communicate with all the enemies of the Soviet government who wanted it, for example, with Savinkov, Tchaikovsky, Wrangel ... "

At the request of Consul Petrichenko, in addition to his statement, he compiled a report on the Kronstadt uprising and his role in it, spoke about the activities in Finland of the former Kronstadters and various organizations that opposed the USSR.

After the uprising, about eight thousand participants in the Kronstadt rebellion ended up in Finland. Their leaders were several white officers. But the chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee, Stepan Petrichenko, set the tone for everything. Not a single issue could be resolved without him. Eyewitnesses of the events said that most of the former participants in the rebellion listened to the instructions and orders only of Petrichenko himself.

And these instructions were not always liked by the White Guard officers and the Finnish authorities, who supported the Russian counter-revolution. For example, the decision to send Kronstadt "volunteers"

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to organize an uprising in Soviet Karelia, or the order to merge a detachment of former Kronstadters with the army of Baron Wrangel was canceled at the direction of Petrichenko.

By this time, an increasing number of Kronstadters were fleeing the Finnish camps and returning to their homeland. By August 1921, only about three thousand of them remained in Finland.

At that time, the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the complete forgiveness of all ordinary participants in the Kronstadt rebellion and permission for them to return to their homeland had a great influence on the mindset of the Kronstadt emigrants. Ordinary, but not leaders! For Stepan Petrichenko, the leaders of the Russian emigration planned a completely different route. He had to go to the USA to speak publicly about the atrocities of the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution. Everything seemed to be ready for departure overseas, but at the last moment the organizers of the trip decided to consult with the Ambassador of the Provisional Government to the USA, B.A. Bakhmetiev. His verdict was unequivocal: "The bright figure of the Kronstadt leader will be amusing to the Americans, but they will not give money for him." The question of Petrichenko's trip to the United States fell away by itself.

Despite the fact that the amnesty did not affect the leader of the Kronstadt rebellion, Stepan Petrichenko nevertheless decided to ask for his homeland, which he shared with some friends - former members of the Revolutionary Committee. The result turned out to be sad: a denunciation was written in the name of the police chief of the city of Vyborg about the "vile intention" of Petrichenko. On May 21, 1922, he was thrown into prison, where he spent several months.

Once free, Petrichenko ceased to engage in active political activity. He got a job at a sawmill and became a skilled carpenter. However, his name continued to be widely known, and connections were maintained among the white emigration, which still pinned hopes on him. But Stepan Petrichenko himself thought differently. And this led him to the Soviet consulate in Riga.

...While the consul was discussing with Petrichenko the possibility of his return to the USSR, an urgent telegram was sent to Moscow from the resident of foreign intelligence: "I ask for instructions on the line of conduct in relation to the former leader of the Kronstadt rebellion, Stepan Petrichenko, who requested to return to homeland."

The chairman of the OGPU, Yagoda, personally reported to Stalin about Petrichenko's request. How to proceed? What to do?

"It is possible to serve one's homeland usefully, even being outside its borders," was the answer.

The following instructions were sent to the residency:

"Establish, if possible, covert contact with P. known to you, give a verification task and, if it is successfully completed

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to secure permanent intelligence work at the place of residence in Finland. Discuss the conditions for secret appearances and meetings.

So Stepan Maksimovich Petrichenko became an active assistant to Soviet foreign intelligence. Through him, she received information about the anti-Soviet plans and intentions of the White émigré organizations that settled in Finland, their contacts with like-minded people in other European countries, information about Finnish intelligence and counterintelligence itself.

"He always remained a personality," this is how the well-known Soviet intelligence officer Zoya Ivanovna Rybkina (Voskresenskaya) characterized Petrichenko, with whom he was on a secret mission.

connections.

"In 1937, when the trials of "enemies of the people" began in Moscow, he appeared furious at one of the meetings," Z.I. Rybkin. – He said that he would kill me now and bury me in a snowdrift. To my bewildered question, what was the matter, he replied that he was terribly indignant that in Moscow they were judging not enemies of the people, but true fighters for his own ideals, poisoning people who made the revolution and remained faithful to it. "In any case," he declared, "I refuse to work with you!" With great difficulty, I then managed to calm Petrichenko and convince him to continue cooperating with the Soviet foreign intelligence," Z.I. Rybkin.

The situation in Europe was heating up, and the German threat became more and more tangible. Like other Soviet intelligence agents, Petrichenko was focused on working against Nazi Germany.

At the beginning of 1941, several messages were received from him about the joint preparation of the German and Finnish military for a war with the USSR.

On January 19, 1941, he reported specific facts about the military preparations of Finland, about the arrival and deployment of German officers in the country, about the concentration of German divisions in Poland.

In March 1941, he informed the Center about the arrival of a German division in the Petsamo area, and some time later, about the reservists receiving military uniforms, which meant that they were practically brought to full mobilization readiness.

This was Stepan Maksimovich's last message.

What happened to him next?

After the attack of Nazi Germany and its ally Finland on the Soviet Union, Petrichenko was interned and then arrested by the Finnish authorities and kept in prison until 1944, until the signing of an armistice agreement with the Soviet Union by Finland. On September 25, 1944, on the basis of the Soviet-Finnish agreement, he was released, and already on April 21, 1945, he was again arrested by the Finns and transferred to the counterintelligence agencies of the Red Army.

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On April 24, 1945, on the basis of an arrest warrant approved by the head of the Smersh Main Directorate of Counterintelligence, Petrichenko was arrested and searched because, as the decree stated, "being the leader of the Kronstadt rebellion in 1921, he fled abroad, lived in Finland, joined the anti-Soviet organization ROVS, was engaged in the transfer of members of the ROVS to the territory of the USSR for subversive anti-Soviet activities.

An investigation has begun. On May 15, 1945, Stepan Maksimovich was charged, each of which could be followed by a death sentence. Formally, the investigative norms were observed. Witnesses have even been questioned.

September 6, 1945 Stepan Maksimovich Petrichenko was charged with an indictment. Petrichenko stated that he had no petitions or additions.

Criminal case against Petrichenko S.M. had the following accompanying note: "Introduce to the Special Meeting. The measure of punishment Petrichenko S.M. define 10 years of forced labor camps.

Military Prosecutor Lozinsky.

Without a public hearing of his case, Stepan Maksimovich was convicted. He died in the Solikamsk camp in July 1947, leaving sincere lines:

"In my skull, everything turned upside down. But I assure you that everything I did I did sincerely, honestly: I gave my strength, energy and life, being convinced that I was serving the interests of the workers and peasants with calloused hands. I am not a careerist or an ambitious person. I did not pursue any, absolutely no personal goals ... "

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Two letters of the tsarist general

The daily reception of visitors at the Soviet embassy on rue Grenelle in Paris was coming to an end when a medium-sized, thin gentleman, dressed in an expensive dark gray three-piece, entered the lobby. Tost called himself a Russian political émigré. After waiting for the commandant on duty to finish talking on the internal telephone, he asked:

- Your Majesty! I would definitely like to meet with Mr. Ambassador on a matter that brooks no delay. We are talking about a military conspiracy against the republic of Soviets. I am one of the direct participants in this conspiracy. My name is Pavel Pavlovich Dyakonov.

The word "conspiracy" had a magical effect, and the guest was immediately taken to a separate room. Pavel Pavlovich settled himself comfortably in a leather chair and asked for a piece of paper. Putting on his pince-nez, he leisurely took an autopen out of his side pocket and began to write:

"I hereby declare that, being in the past a person hostile to the Soviet power, at the present time I have decisively changed my attitude towards it. I undertake to protect, defend and serve the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its government.

P. Dyakonov, Paris, March 1924

The name of Major General Pavel Pavlovich Dyakonov, the former Russian military attache in Great Britain, was quite well known in Soviet military-diplomatic circles. During unofficial meetings with Soviet representatives, he repeatedly expressed a desire to return to his homeland, offered himself for any job that would be useful to the Soviet diplomatic service. But Moscow was in no hurry to respond. Like all his other civilian and military colleagues from the "former", Dyakonov was under great suspicion, and the more often he spoke of his intention to help but

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the howl of Russia, the more cautiously they responded to his proposals. Moreover, there was information about the close connection of Pavel Pavlovich with the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), which united over one hundred thousand officers of the White Army.

So this time, the letter of General Dyakonov, delivered by diplomatic courier to Moscow, seemed to be left without any attention. But by this time the situation in Soviet Russia had changed somewhat: the troops of foreign interventionists were defeated and expelled from the country, the internal opposition to the new regime, having lost international support, hid and subsided, and only various émigré military and paramilitary organizations in Germany, France and England posed, in the opinion of the Soviet government, a real threat. It was against these organizations and groups that chose terror as the method of struggle that the uncompromising struggle of the OGPU was concentrated.

"General Dyakonov reminded me of himself just in time," said the head of the INO, having read the message of the former military attache to the end. – As for his information about the program of total terror abroad against Soviet citizens and institutions, it is undoubtedly reliable. It is covered by other information from reliable sources. However, before trusting Dyakonov, we should thoroughly study him, trace the general's entire life path ...

The next day, on the table of the head of the INO Trilisser, a certificate-objective on Major General of His Imperial Majesty of the General Staff of the Russian Army Pavel Pavlovich Dyakonov lay down:

Born in Moscow in 1878 in the family of a military man. In 1905 he graduated from the Academy of the General Staff and was sent to the active army in the Russo-Japanese War. An impeccable knowledge of English, German and French allowed Dyakonov to achieve a transfer to the military-diplomatic service. In July 1914, he was appointed to London to the post of assistant military attaché. After the outbreak of the First World War, Dyakonov submits a personal petition to the Chief of the General Staff with a proposal to send him to the German front as part of the Russian expeditionary corps in France. In January 1916 P.P. Dyakonov was appointed commander of the 2nd Special Regiment of the Russian Expeditionary Corps and took an active part in the battles against the Germans. For military merit in the battle of the Marne, he received the distinction of an officer of the Legion of Honor, was awarded an officer's cross of the Legion of Honor and two French military crosses. On the recommendation of the Chief of the General Staff, he was promoted to general by Nikolai P. In September 1917, he was seconded to London to perform the duties of a military attache in Great Britain, where he remained until May.

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1920. After the closure of the Russian military mission in London, he moved permanently to Paris.

General Dyakonov met the revolution while abroad. He did not take part in the white movement on Russian territory. According to people close to General Dyakonov, neither he nor members of his family ever expressed hostile intentions against the new government in Russia.

The head of the INO underlined the last three phrases with a bold line. In the resolution in the left corner of the reference lens, he wrote: "Have a confidential conversation with General Dyakonov and find out his further intentions."

During the conversation, Dyakonov handed over the plan of the general work of the EMRO. "Terror, exclusively abroad, against Soviet officials," the document said, "as well as those who are working to disrupt emigration."

In Paris, Warsaw, Sofia, Prague, Berlin and other capitals of European countries, it was recommended to train "troikas", "fives" and individual militants of the ROVS to kill Soviet diplomats, as well as to send sabotage groups into the territory of the USSR in order to organize armed uprisings against Soviet power.

The conversation with the operative was coming to an end when Pavel Pavlovich, slyly narrowing his eyes, suddenly asked his interlocutor:

- Do you think that only the Bolsheviks are interested in the affairs and plans of the ROVS? Not at all, Dyakonov replied to himself. And he continued: "Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich himself asked me to constantly supply him with news about the activities of the ROVS. He told me so at a personal meeting: "I want to know everything that Kutepov and his militants are plotting against the Russian monarchists." So the objects of interest, - Dyakonov laughed, - both the Bolsheviks and the monarchists, you WALK, ALONE ...

The voluntary, and most importantly, thoroughly thought-out and disinterested transition of P.P. Dyakonov to the service of the Soviet government opened a completely new stage full of surprises in the life of the former tsarist general. Pavel Pavlovich, as it were, regained the meaning of life, got an exciting job that brings joy to creativity, close in nature to the operational intelligence activities that he was engaged in as a military agent of the tsarist General Staff.

The beginning of Pavel Pavlovich Dyakonov's cooperation with Soviet intelligence coincided with the first steps of Adolf Hitler, the leader of the National Socialist Workers' Party, little known in Europe, who sought to seize power in Germany. Despite the danger of a revival of German militarism, some

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Many political and military leaders of the West saw Hitler not so much as a possible dictator and tyrant, but as a figure capable of throwing down the "red danger" gauntlet. Among such people in France belonged to an influential military group of former Russian generals, who largely determined the mood and political sympathies of the then top leadership of the French armed forces.

Realizing the danger of a rapprochement between Germany and France on an anti-Bolshevik basis, Soviet intelligence in those years took all measures to prevent this alliance. And here the role of General Dyakonov turned out to be decisive in many respects. It was he, the Chevalier of the Order of the Legion of Honor, who was instructed by Soviet intelligence to bring to the attention of the Second Bureau of the General Staff of the French Army information about the "fifth column" - pro-fascist officers and generals. Shortly before the start of World War II, the French authorities, to whom General Dyakonov presented the relevant documents (partially received from Moscow), declared persona non grata and expelled from the country a large group of the pro-German wing of the Russian emigration, headed by General Turkul. And Pavel Pavlovich himself received a letter of thanks from the leadership of French intelligence: "Your information about the Russians, who are known for their German sympathies, is extremely valuable for France. We highly appreciate our cooperation."

Pavel Pavlovich's life in France was difficult and restless. After the death of his wife, he was left alone with his daughter Masha, who needed constant care and attention. In addition, dark clouds were gathering over the former general. The influential emigre newspaper Vozrozhdenie published an article in which it called Dyakonov a "Chekist agent" and a direct participant in the impudent kidnapping of the head of the ROVS, General A.P. Kutepova. Although many of Kutepov's entourage knew the fact that Dyakonov was not even personally acquainted with the head of the ROVS and had never seen him, a shadow of suspicion was cast, and a lot of time and effort had to be spent to refute the slander in court. The French court, having considered the materials of the investigation in the case "General Dyakonov against the newspaper Vozrozhdeniye", found the newspaper's allegations unfounded and forced it to apologize accordingly...

The Second World War began. In 1940, the Nazis occupied Paris. In the very first days of the occupation, the Gestapo began to arrest anti-fascists and people who sympathized with the French National Front. Among those arrested was General Dyakonov. Forty-three days he spent in a fascist dungeon, hoping for help from the Soviet embassy, to which the general once offered his services. And this help came. Pavel Pavlovich and Maria were

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Soviet citizenship was delivered, and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics immediately demanded that the German authorities release the Soviet citizens P.P. Dyakonova and his daughter M.P. Dyakonov. The German military command in Paris had no choice but to comply with this demand. It was necessary to observe in those days the rules of relations between the USSR and Germany.

At the end of May 1941, a month before the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, Pavel Pavlovich and Masha returned to their homeland.

This is the happiest day of our lives! – said the touched old general to the operational worker who met them at the railway station in Moscow. I hope that our life

will now be devoid of all worries and wanderings...

Dyakonov, unfortunately, was mistaken. Five weeks after returning home, he and his daughter were arrested "on suspicion of maintaining contact with foreign intelligence services and spying against the USSR." Detention center, prison again. This time - Soviet. After the first interrogations, Pavel Pavlovich again, as once in Paris, asked for a piece of paper. In a letter to the head of the Lubyanka, he wrote:

"For 17 years of work abroad, I had to perform many responsible tasks. For this work, I received only gratitude. It doesn't fit in my head how they could seriously suspect me of criminal activity against the motherland. Needless to say, what a moral pain this suspicion caused me.

The investigator who was in charge of the Dyakonovs' case handed over the letter to the authorities, and, contrary to the logic of those first war days, it was not lost and was not thrown into the waste paper basket. The message from the prison cell found the addressee. It turned out to be the head of foreign intelligence of the NKVD. And his resolution "I ask you to sort it out" had an unexpected effect: the report sent to the investigating authorities said: "Dyakonov and his daughter are known to the 1st Directorate of the NKVD. The department deems it necessary to release them."

The Dyakonovs were released. This happened in October 1941. Unfortunately, no materials have been preserved about their further fate.

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"King of the Kremlin Spies"

In early 1929, the United States was shocked by the news that the sensation that Soviet intelligence had decided to bribe the American senators Bohr and Norris turned out to be a fake, fabricated by a White émigré center working for a number of Western European intelligence agencies. On his "combat account" were "documents" that caused a cooling, and in some cases a break in diplomatic relations between Western countries and the Soviet Union.

The attempt to spread such actions to the United States, which at that time did not even have diplomatic relations with the USSR, made a great impression not only on the American public, but also on the government. Having received convincing information about how and by whom the fake was made, Washington demanded a trial of its authors. The Soviet side joined this demand. And the trial took place. Perhaps this was the first joint Soviet-American initiative in history.

In the second half of the 1920s, "documentary materials" began to appear in the foreign press about the "sinister plans" of the OGPU and the Comintern, allegedly aimed at shaking the economic and political foundations of the Western world. Outwardly, the authenticity of the documents was not in doubt: their style, vocabulary, requisites, signatures of officials - everything was like the real thing. The publications provoked a storm of indignation in the Western public and led in some cases to grave, tragic consequences - the executions of Bulgarian communists who allegedly prepared the blowing up of the cathedral in Sofia on the instructions of the Comintern, German police raids on the Soviet trade mission in Berlin and the British - on the representation of the Russian cooperative society "Arkos" and the subsequent rupture of diplomatic relations between the USSR and England. The prestige and interests of our country, which had just begun to emerge from international isolation, were significantly damaged.

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The documents allegedly originated in Moscow, but the Soviet leadership knew that they were fakes, although they were expertly and expertly made. But by whom? Where? Intelligence received the task - to answer these questions.

One of the scouts who showed himself brilliantly in this work was Nikolai Nikolayevich Kroshko, a former émigré and Socialist-Revolutionary Savinkovite. He played a decisive role in the case in question.

After a thorough search, we managed to find the original source - an organization that called itself the "Brotherhood of Russian Truth" (BRP). Painstakingly collected information about her and her leader. He turned out to be a highly experienced and dangerous enemy, in tsarist times an investigator for especially important cases, and then the head of the Wrangel intelligence and counterintelligence, a real state adviser Vladimir Grigorievich Orlov, who settled in Berlin.

Naturally, a very limited circle of people knew about his true activities. Only a very clever person, moreover, with suitable personal data, could penetrate Orlov's entourage. The choice at INO fell on N.N. Kroshko. But a long and difficult path led him to Orlov.

Like N.N. Kroshko appeared in intelligence? In 1920, one of our Baltic residencies became aware that the White émigré, Socialist-Revolutionary Savinkovite, lieutenant Nikolai Kroshko was disappointed in the Socialist-Revolutionary ideals, in emigre life in general, and dreams of returning to his homeland. The operational worker met with Nikolai - at that time he was a 22-year-old handsome man, tall, athletic, in an elegant suit.

"Hello, Mr. Consul..." he began.

"We call each other comrades," the consul remarked gently.

- Yes, but I...

— Nothing, if you are going to return to your homeland with a pure heart and serve it, you are our comrade!

Kroshko told about himself: he was born in the Tambov region, grew up and was brought up in poverty. His parents made every sacrifice to give him an education. Graduated from the gymnasium with a silver medal. In 1918, from Kyiv occupied by the Germans, he left for the Don, Denikin's army. Further - flight abroad, to Poland, work with Savinkov, close ties with emigrants, especially from among the officers.

And here he is in front of the Soviet representative, ready to do anything to earn his return to his native land, where his mother and sister are waiting for him. He accepted the offer of cooperation with the intelligence service without hesitation - for a long time already, with an invisible line, he separated himself from his former colleagues in the White Army and emigration, and they were no longer his friends. The only thing that upset him was the need to stay abroad for an indefinite period when he was so eager to go home. But he understood that service is service.

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The first tasks were easy. It was necessary to infiltrate several émigré groups and determine whether they were a bunch of nostalgic babblers, perhaps malicious but essentially harmless, or dangerous intelligence-related organizations. The tasks in which he himself was subjected to verification, he completed so successfully that he was enlisted in the staff of foreign intelligence, which happened extremely rarely, and became its personnel officer under the pseudonym Kate.

An interesting, full of adventure and danger work began. Although Keith had to travel to other countries more than once, he mainly worked as part of the Berlin residency. During this period, the "Brotherhood of the White Cross" (BBK) operated in Berlin, led by the former lieutenant of the tsarist fleet, Pavlov. Young officers were grouped around him, disillusioned with the old leaders - Denikin, Wrangel and right-wing monarchist organizations. Pavlov found material and political support from figures from extremely reactionary German circles, who later became active members of the Nazi party. Among them, among other things, was

and Cuba - the future Gauleiter of Belarus, the executioner and murderer, who was killed in 1943 by the verdict of a partisan court by Soviet intelligence officers.

Keith was tasked with infiltrating the LBC, gaining Pavlov's trust and establishing what they were doing and how dangerous this organization was.

Keith significantly "overfulfilled" this task - he not only penetrated the LBC, but soon became Pavlov's closest assistant, figured out the "kitchen" of the LBC, managed to establish opposition to his work: the agents thrown into the USSR were recruited and used as a channel of disinformation, and the entire circulation of anti-Soviet pamphlets and leaflets, which Keith was instructed to transfer to the Union, was actually destroyed. Soon the failures of the LBC so bothered the Germans that they refused him material support, and the "Brotherhood" essentially curtailed its activities. Pavlov himself was forced to "requalify" as a driver, although he remained at the head of the LBC.

Keith used his stay at the BBK to great advantage. He made extensive connections among the Germans, was present in 1923 at the congress of the National Socialist Party and the Steel Helmet organization, at friendly drinking parties of delegates, where he further strengthened these ties.

The young, elegant lieutenant turned out to be well-connected to the leaders of the ROVS, and to the monarchist leaders, to almost the entire top of the white emigration in many countries.

In the early 1920s, our residencies were by no means located in all states from which subversive work was carried out, but information about it was required.

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"Nikolai," Kate heard the resident's voice more than once, "get ready." You will go to Yugoslavia (or Bulgaria, France). There is evidence that a provocation against our representative office is being prepared there. We need to understand and try to stop.

He rode, understood and stopped.

One of these episodes was connected with the Russian monarchists. Their headquarters at that time was in Munich. Arriving there, Keith spent a lot of effort to get to know and get closer to the secretaries of Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich, Baron Medem and Prince Kazem-bek. Of course, in addition to personal charm, I had to use the money of the residency - impoverished aristocrats were not averse to drinking at someone else's expense. Keith not only managed to take part in the meeting of the Kirillites with Field Marshal Ludendorff and the nascent Nazi Party, but after Kirill Vladimirovich moved to Paris, with the help of the secretaries of the Grand Duke, he entered his office and photographed about a hundred documents that were in the safes.

In Paris, he collected information about the connections of émigré organizations with French government circles and intelligence, and identified some of its agents in the Soviet Union.

Returning to Berlin, one evening Keith took two suitcases with documents from the Denikin-Wrangel military mission to the residency, and after re-photographing in the early morning returned them in place.

But the main goal of N. Kroshko was Orlov and his BRP. Fulfilling the task of penetrating the Brotherhood of Russian Truth, he met Colonel Kolberg, a friend and like-minded person of Orlov. Kolberg introduced his new acquaintance personally to Orlov. A real state councilor, a bilious and suspicious man, was in no hurry to approach Nikolai, although the young lieutenant made a favorable impression. He made inquiries with Pavlov, who gave the best description of his assistant. But this was not enough. It was necessary to demonstrate some possibilities that would arouse Orlov's interest in cooperation and melt the ice of distrust. Once Keith reported to Pavlov, and then, on his advice,

Orlov about the information received from "their own people" in the USSR that they allegedly stepped up their work and they need a direct connection. Pavlov seized on this and, wanting to raise his prestige, began to persuade Orlov to send Keith as an emissary, using his connections in Finland for this.

"You have your own corridor through Poland," Orlov remarked displeasedly.

"But for reasons of secrecy, we cannot use it now," Pavlov objected and confirmed this with the arguments prompted by Keith.

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Orlov reluctantly gave Keith letters of recommendation addressed to the head of the Finnish political police and his representative in Vyborg. In turn, Pavlov asked to visit his aunt in Sevastopol.

On a dark November night in 1925, agents of the Finnish political police took a tall young man in a warm coat to the Soviet border, providing him with reliable documents and weapons. We discussed the day and hour of the return.

The border crossing went smoothly - our border guards were waiting for the "violinist" and freed him a "window" in advance.

Keith arrived in Moscow without incident and reported in detail that he had become aware of the connections of the emigrant groups in Helsinki and Vyborg with the Finnish police and of who and how prepared and carried out his transfer across the border. Then - a touching meeting in Kiev with his mother and sister. I went to Sevastopol, where I gave Pavlov's letter to his aunt and received a reply. Another important event - Kate received a Soviet passport.

Before being sent back, he was provided with "information materials" that were supposed to be of interest to the white emigration and their friends from Western intelligence agencies. On his return to Finland, Keith handed over some of these "materials" to the head of the political police as a "payment" for help. They made such an impression on the Finnish intelligence services that they began to seek Keith to give them the appearances of "his people" in Leningrad and Moscow, but he refused under the pretext that they allegedly occupy prominent positions in the state apparatus and are connected with them for reasons of their safety. can only be supported through it.

When Keith returned to Berlin, Pavlov, in his own interests, began to advertise his successes, and soon Orlov, having familiarized himself with the information he had brought and warmed up by the positive feedback from the Finns about Keith, suggested that he completely switch to work in the BRP. Keith did not immediately agree, he had to be "persuaded".

Soon he became Orlov's special confidant. He managed to find out that, in addition to Finnish intelligence, Orlov cooperates with British, French and German intelligence, with the political police of Berlin. Keith identified Orlov's representatives in Latvia and Lithuania, who were closely connected with the local secret police and intelligence, established that, on the instructions of the German police, Orlov, through his agents, was developing employees of the Soviet representative office in Berlin, and found a list of these agents in the form of a statement on receiving rewards.

All this was good and necessary, but it still did not lead to the fulfillment of the main task - the disclosure of a fake factory. So last

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for over a year. The fakes continued to appear, and Keith still did not know anything about their origin. "Perhaps this is not the work of Orlov?" he thought sometimes.

In the summer of 1927, Orlov himself, at the request of the Finnish secret services, suggested that Keith make a new sortie in the USSR. He initially refused, citing recent failures, but under pressure from Orlov, he agreed. The sortie turned out to be "very successful" both for Orlov and for the Finnish special services - they received "information" from Keith, "appearances" in Leningrad, but first of all for Keith, the pleased chief of the Finnish police told a lot about the activities of emigration in Finland, about her connections with Western intelligence agencies, including British intelligence. And most importantly, Orlov finally completely trusted Keith.

Once he invited him for a serious conversation.

— Everything we do — border crossings, turnouts, information — is not bad, but not the main thing. If we want to cause real harm to the Soviets, we must quarrel them with the whole world. I have funds for this, and I do something.

Orlov told Keith about the fakes we already know about and other "projects" directed against Soviet missions abroad and discrediting individuals. And then he showed Keith his "factory".

He looked with surprise at his extensive file cabinet, stamps, seals, duplicates of the most malicious forgeries, signature samples, photo and chemical laboratories, a set of typewriters with different fonts and other devices.

"As an intelligent and decisive person, I invite you to take part in our cause. It is not only necessary, but also bread. Speaking between us, I bought my estate in Mecklenburg with the proceeds from it. Intelligence agencies pay well and, by the way, do not particularly check the authenticity of the documents that I offer them, the main thing for them is the quality of execution and the relevance of the content.

With some reservations, Keith agreed, and soon Orlov introduced him to his main assistant, a former employee of the Cheka-OGPU Yashin-Sumarokov, who lived in Berlin on the basis of documents issued to him by the Germans in the name of Pavlunovsky.

He treated Keith with confidence, told about the ups and downs of his fate: he fell in love with a German woman, a certain Dumler, and she turned out to be a police agent, persuaded him to betray. Having planned his escape, he took with him a number of residency documents, gave some to the Germans as a payment for asylum, and handed some to Orlov, from which he copied forms, stamps, signatures and seals, which is why everything that came out of the "factory", and looked like the real thing. He also advised Orlov on issues of Chekist and party terminology, on the realities of

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veterinary life, on the details of the relationship between employees of missions and residencies, etc. In general, Yashin-Sumarokov revealed all the secrets of the Oryol "factory".

So, in the hands of our intelligence was the necessary information about the activities of Orlov. It's time to take countermeasures. Some hotheads suggested simply destroying and burning his "factory". But this would only stop his work for a while, besides, all past fakes would remain unrevealed, and the Soviet secret services could be accused of attacking emigrants.

Keith suggested another solution. He made casts of the keys to the apartment, laboratory, safes and cabinets with documents. They made duplicate keys. I waited a few weeks for the right opportunity. Finally, when Orlov left for Mecklenburg, Keith entered his apartment and seized copies, drafts and blanks of false documents, samples of stamps and seals. Among those seized were the preparations of two fakes, which Keith was especially keen on - about the alleged bribery of the American senators Bohr and Norris by the Soviet government.

Soviet intelligence, through its own channels, brought this document to the attention of the US government.

On February 27, 1929, Orlov and his henchmen - Yashin-Sumarokov-Pavlunovsky, his mistress - police agent Dyumler and Colonel Kolberg - were arrested and put on trial. They were accused of trying to sell a false letter to the correspondent of the American newspaper The New York Evening Post, Arthur Nikker Boker, about the receipt of money from the Soviet government by Senators Bohr and Norris for advocating the recognition by the United States of the USSR and the establishment of diplomatic relations with it. Other forgeries were also exposed at the trial.

Orlov was sentenced to a 4-month imprisonment and, after serving his sentence, was expelled from Germany.

Keith also had to urgently leave Germany, because due to a gross violation of the secrecy by one of the residents of the residency, the threat of failure hung over him. On the steamer "Herzen" he sailed to his homeland. He was still at sea when telegrams appeared in all the newspapers about the "Mysteriously Disappeared Lieutenant" and the documents missing from the safe.

For various reasons, his role in exposing Orlov and other actions became known in the West and at the end of the 20s served as the basis for sensational publications with catchy headlines: "King of the Kremlin Spies", "The Owner of Tsar Kirill's Secret Safes", "The Collector of Rotozees", "The Man Who Walks Through the Wall" He became famous all over the world, except ... his country,

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where his deeds were kept silent for many years. It is also fortunate that he, like many other intelligence officers, was not dealt with during the years of the Yezhov-Berievshchina.

Keith lived to a ripe old age, for many years he raised young scouts; in 1967, already being seriously ill, he wrote a memoir about his intelligence work.

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Isolation front broken

After the end of the First World War, the balance of power in the world changed. Germany was defeated, but from the very beginning there was a clear tendency to revive revanchist sentiments in the country.

Even before the end of the war, there was talk in the political circles of the Entente that without German militarism it would be difficult to put an end to Soviet Russia. It is no coincidence that in the Compiègne armistice agreement with Germany of November 11, 1918, the victorious powers stated that Germany must maintain its troops in the Ukraine and the Baltic states as long as the Entente countries and the United States consider it necessary. This provision was preserved in the Treaty of Versailles. As Winston Churchill testified, expressing the general opinion at the closed Anglo-French-American meeting in London in December 1918, Russia can only be conquered with the help of Germany.

The post-Versailles peace was more like a shaky, temporary truce. The victorious states tried to consolidate the fruits of their victory and extract the maximum benefit from them, strengthen their positions in the world, and extend their influence to new countries.

Germany, in turn, longed to free itself from the restrictive provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, restore its military and economic potential and continue the struggle for the redivision of the world. The rivalry between world powers was complicated by the impending economic crisis.

Under these conditions, intelligence obtained information not only about the hostile plans and interventionist intentions of foreign states in relation to Soviet Russia, but also revealed the forces that advocated the establishment of normal political and economic relations with it.

economic relations. Russia sought to withdraw from the international isolation.

In other words, a two-pronged task was solved: obtaining reliable information about the anti-Soviet plans and intentions of the foundations

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capitalist states and the provision of intelligence forces and means of assistance in breaking through the isolation of Soviet Russia, in developing political and trade relations beneficial for the country with the outside world.

There was also difficult work to be done to strengthen the positions of our country in neighboring states, where the special services were preparing subversive actions, trying to turn the border territories into a springboard for anti-Soviet activities.

One of the first serious tests for the Soviet foreign policy intelligence, which it successfully withstood, was the Genoa International Conference. In a number of Western European countries it was possible to obtain secret information about the preparations for the conference. It revealed the plans developed by these countries to isolate Soviet Russia diplomatically and impose solutions on it that would allow them to interfere in its internal affairs and dictate their terms.

At the same time, intelligence information also pointed to deep contradictions in the relations of the victorious powers with Germany, as well as between England and France. Intelligence reports regularly received by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs allowed the Soviet delegation to take a flexible position at the conference and, using contradictions in the enemy camp, sign an agreement with [Germany on the restoration of diplomatic relations. This treaty, signed on April 16, 1922 in Rapallo, a suburb of Genoa, testified to the failure of the plans to create a united front of the capitalist states against Soviet Russia.

During the period of the Genoa Conference, foreign intelligence also managed to obtain information about the preparation of terrorist acts against members of the Soviet delegation, to identify the perpetrators of these acts, to intercept, in particular, the correspondence of S. Petliura and V. Shulgin? about this question. All this made it possible to prevent the impending assassination attempts.

In 1924, already 13 states recognized the USSR. Foreign intelligence also had a certain merit in this.

It can be said without exaggeration that the signing of the Rapallo Treaty dramatically changed the situation throughout Europe. For Germany, it meant a way out of foreign policy isolation, in which she found herself as a result of the Versailles system imposed on her by the Entente. For Soviet Russia, the Treaty of Rapallo meant the first official recognition by a major Western power.

By the time the Rapallo Treaty was concluded, an exchange of official representatives between Moscow and Berlin had already taken place on the basis of an agreement concluded on May 6, 1921. Now it was about the establishment of full diplomatic relations and the exchange of plenipotentiaries (ambassadors). The first step, which had opre

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divided demonstrative character, was the signing on June 7, 1922 of the Protocol on the transfer of the building of the Russian embassy in Berlin on Unter den Linden to the government of Soviet Russia.

The favorable internal political situation and the opening of an official diplomatic mission in Berlin allowed the Foreign Department of the GPU to establish a "legal" residency in Germany in 1922. It was originally formed jointly with

Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, but already in 1923 INO allocated an independent residency. It was not numerous: only 4-5 operational employees. We started in difficult conditions: there was not enough, as usual at that time, well-trained workers, the forms and methods of foreign intelligence were just beginning to take shape, and the technical equipment was weak. However, this did not prevent the Berlin residency in a very short time from getting on its feet and becoming a stronghold of the GPU's overseas intelligence in Europe.

In 1922, the first "legal" residency of the GPU and the Red Army in Berlin was headed by an employee of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Stashevsky. However, he did not stay in this post for long: in the same year, one of the employees involved in the work of the residency committed a betrayal - he appeared in the press with a publication that revealed Stashevsky as an intelligence officer. This led to an urgent recall of the chief resident to Moscow.

In February 1922, an employee of the INO GPU, Bronislav Bronislavovich Bortnovsky, headed the residency. He was an experienced worker who went through many trials and was selflessly devoted to the cause for which he fought.

Bortnovsky was born in Warsaw in 1894 in the family of an official. Back in 1910, he joined the Union of Socialist Youth of Poland, and in 1912, the Russian Social Democratic Party. Soon he was arrested and spent 1914-1915 in prison, first in Warsaw and then in Saratov. After his release, he remained in Saratov, where the revolution caught him. After working for some time in the Saratov Soviet and in party work, Bortnovsky went to Petrograd, and then to Moscow, entered the Cheka. In August 1918, he participated in the exposure of the head of the British mission, Lockhart, as the organizer of the anti-Soviet conspiracy. Lockhart was wounded during his arrest. After treatment, Bortnovsky was appointed head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front. In 1921 he was recalled to Moscow at the disposal of the deputy chairman of the Cheka, I.S. Unshlikht.

In 1924, Bortnovsky returned from Berlin to Moscow, worked in the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters under the command of Ya.K. Berzin, and soon became his deputy. The last period of his life is associated with party work.

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The wave of repressions of 1937 did not bypass Bronislav Bronislavovich. He was arrested and on November 3, 1937, was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Like many others who shared his bitter fate in those years, Bortnovsky was fully rehabilitated in 1955.

Bortnovsky was replaced as a resident of the Berlin Point by Aleksei Vasilyevich Loginov-Bustrem (second name - for illegal party work). It was also a truly colorful personality. A detailed story about him is also important in order to imagine who was appointed as residents at the time when the "legal" INO residencies were created.

Life of A.V. Loginov is best conveyed in the words of an autobiography written in 1925:

"I was born in the family of a forester in the city of Kem, Arkhangelsk province. My father died, I was 2 years old. There were 6 children and a mother left. The source of the family's livelihood is a pension of 29 rubles and kopecks and the mother's labor. He studied at the gymnasium at public expense. From the age of 15, he began to earn money by giving lessons and correspondence with a lawyer... He studied at the gymnasium until the 8th grade, from which he was expelled for political unreliability. In parallel with his studies at the gymnasium, he worked in circles of political education (then also illegal). He passed the exams as an external student and entered the Tomsk Technological Institute, at the beginning of the second year of which he was expelled for the same thing and ended up in the soldiers. I stayed in the service for 6 months and fled after it was discovered that I was one of the organizers of the Social-Democrats. circle among artillerymen and the organizer of the May Day meeting, in which soldiers participated for the first time. From that moment on, he worked as a professional in the military combat organizations of the RSDLP (French Bolsheviks). He was a participant in one of the South Russian conferences, the Tammerfors

conference (military, Bolshevik), London Congress. He worked in St. Petersburg, Helsingfors, Sevastopol, Libau and Riga..."

In 1922, Alexei Vasilyevich was sent to work at the INO GPU. One of those who recommended him for this job was the head of INO M. Trilisser. He wrote about Loginov: "I know from joint work since 1906 in the military organization of the party in St. Petersburg, from a joint indenture in hard labor from 1909 to 1910, in exile in Siberia from the 14th to the 17th year" .

When Busstrem arrived in Berlin at the end of 1922, M. Trilisser was secretly there. "The residency premises," one of the employees recalled, "was isolated from the premises of the embassy and had its own courtyard, where employees sometimes rested. M.A. often appeared among the employees in that courtyard. Trilisser and Loginov-Bustrem, where they communicated in a comradely manner with the residency workers.

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At that time, the tasks set before the Berlin residency were far beyond the borders of Germany. In this respect, the point in Berlin had a "global" significance. The Center asked the Berlin residency about subversive activities against Soviet Russia on the part of the White Guard and other emigrant organizations abroad, foreign intelligence services and their agents, demanded that they receive documents that were important for ensuring the security of the state.

On April 5, 1922, the Center wrote to the residency: "Now all our interests are concentrated mainly on the possibility of intervention. In this regard, almost all of your latest reports are extremely valuable, since they allow, from a wide variety of sources, checking one piece of information with another, to approximately reveal the true state of things ... The most significant points for us are: 1) the true combat strength of the Wrangel army, 2) its support by France as the main base of intervention, 3) the attitude of neighboring states towards it, in particular Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland."

And in May of the same year, the Center already gave an assessment: "We note with satisfaction the very significant value of the materials sent by the last mail, in particular about Wrangel and the Socialist-Revolutionaries." In April-May, the residency sent 406 information materials to the Center, of which 301 were recognized as valuable or very valuable by the Center.

In May 1922, the Center sent a new task: "In connection with the end of the Genoa Conference and the likelihood of a new one in The Hague, you are instructed to immediately begin preparatory steps for the possibility of covering The Hague no less intensively than it was done in [enue].

The range of tasks and activities of the Berlin residency in the field of political intelligence was determined by the fact that it had very valuable sources at its disposal, which made it possible to obtain information on Germany and other countries. The Center received, for example, monthly reports from the German Ministry of State Economy to the president on the economic situation in the country, reports from the Berlin police presidium on the domestic political situation and the labor movement in Germany. Very valuable information was obtained about Poland: about preparations for military operations against Soviet Russia, about political groupings in Poland. In 1921-1922, a large amount of information was received on military issues, as well as economic ones, in particular, on the state of the markets, the import and export of capital in Germany, England, France and Czechoslovakia.

In 1922, the residency was able to obtain important information about the position of France and individual French industrialists in relation to Soviet Russia. One of the residency materials indicated that French President Poincaré was changing his mind

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towards our country in a positive direction, and the prominent French businessman Kolrad, who is close to Poincaré, and his group are interested in resuming diplomatic relations with Russia.

In January 1923, the Center reported to the residency: "Relations between the states that are part of the Entente are a very important issue for us in connection with the events developing in Europe; serious attention should be paid to the coverage of these relationships. Soon, materials about the Franco-Polish rapprochement, about the policy of England towards Poland and the Baltic states, information from the Polish General Staff about three options for a possible future offensive were sent to the Center.

In May 1923, a copy of a personal letter from the French military attaché in Romania to the French Minister of War was sent to Moscow. The letter contained information about the state of the Romanian army, about the Polish-Romanian military plans. Sending this document, the residency concluded: "The interventionist plans will not find practical implementation now, and attention will be directed to improving the military forces of the Little Entente."

Moscow highly appreciated the efforts of the Berlin residency: "Materials of a diplomatic nature are very interesting, for the most part quite deserving of attention"; "IN. secret message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Poland addressed to Poincaré: the document certainly deserves credibility and is confirmed by similar documents received from Poland" (letter dated July 5, 23); "Definitely good material about the work of nat. men. Poland... Comrade Chicherin is extremely interested in this material" (letter dated 12/11/23).

In 1924, the Center set a task for the residency to strengthen the work of political intelligence (or diplomatic intelligence, as it was then called). "The latter," the Center wrote, "suggests the presence of reputable informants in the undercover periphery, the recruitment of which should make up all 90% of your work to expand and deepen diplomatic intelligence... In necessary cases, you can not skimp on funds. If you need reinforcements with workers, let me know ... "

Back in the first half of the 1920s, foreign intelligence received secret information about the foreign policy intentions of the ruling circles of Germany, France, England and other countries, about Britain's plans to supply military materials to Poland, about the Greco-Turkish conflict, German-Polish relations, the conclusion of a military conventions between Romania, Greece and Yugoslavia, on the positions of the government of Czechoslovakia on the issue of recognition of the USSR.

In 1924-1925, the work of the political intelligence residency noticeably intensified. New sources of information have emerged, including the German Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and the
military

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Affairs of France, at the French Embassy in Berlin, at the Polish Legation in Berlin. Opportunities were acquired to obtain documentary information from the Romanian Foreign Ministry and the Romanian embassy in one of the Balkan countries.

Of particular interest were sources of information in the German Foreign Ministry. "In addition to a very valuable source known to you from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," the residency reported to the Center, "we have now established relations with another referent. It is expensive, but it is still more profitable than using sources that do not have access to documents."

Thanks to the presence of such sources, the residency was able to obtain valuable documentary information on various issues of foreign policy of the German government. Thus, copies of letters from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to their embassies in Warsaw, London and Constantinople were obtained, in which it was about the intention of England to supply military materials to Poland, information about German-Polish relations.

A lot of documentary classified materials were obtained from the French Foreign Ministry, French embassies in Berlin, London, Warsaw.

In the period 1921-1925, great importance was attached to intelligence in Poland, the ruling circles of which, including the military, incited by England and France, systematically staged armed provocations on the Soviet-Polish border. Particularly distinguished was the source number 19%, who regularly supplied the residency with important information from the Polish government. The residency explained the scheme for obtaining this information in the following way: "After each meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in Poland, the secretariat sends a report on the meeting to the President of the Polish Republic. There is one Pilsudski there who unofficially prints an extra copy for Pilsudski. Pilsudski's adjutant often comes for these copies, from whom our source receives a copy.

Another valuable source received secret information telegrams from the Polish Foreign Ministry from the Polish Mission in Berlin. These are the information bulletins of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were sent three to five times a week to all embassies. The report came to Berlin in only one copy and was multiplied on the spot according to the number of members of the mission. One of these copies fell into the residency.

One of the archival documents preserved a list of issues that were regularly covered by the residency until 1926. Here he is:

- German policy in the East (USSR Poland and other border states);
- foreign policy of the Balkan countries;
- "foreign policy" of the U.N.R. (Petlyura Ukrainian People's Republic);

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- Poland's foreign policy;
- foreign policy of Czechoslovakia;
- Correspondence of the American consulate in Germany;
- Germany's relations with France, England and Turkey. The work of the Berlin residency gradually improved.

: SwigsY U. Tye Moga yggyyy. - UJ. 5. - Gopdop, 1930. - R. 24-25.

2 Petliura S.V. (1879-1926), one of the organizers of the Central Rada (1917) and the Directory (1918) in Ukraine, leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. He relied on the kulaks, the bourgeoisie, and the nationalist part of the intelligentsia. In the Soviet-Polish war, he took the side of Poland. In 1920 he emigrated. Shulgin V.V. (1878-1976), Russian politician, monarchist. One of the leaders of the right wing of the PTU of the State Duma. He was among the organizers of the struggle against the Soviet regime. For many years he was in exile. In 1944-1956 he was serving a sentence in the prison of Vladimir for past counter-revolutionary activities. After his release, he lived in Vladimir. Author of the memoirs "Days" and "1920", a number of other works. Source number 19. For the purposes of secrecy, it was customary to designate residency sources with numbers. Later pseudonyms were introduced into practice.

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The clouds are gathering

Starting from the second half of the 1920s and until the beginning of the 1930s, alarming information increasingly began to arrive in Moscow through intelligence channels, which indicated that the ruling circles of England and

France is trying to put together an anti-Soviet bloc of Eastern European states with the participation of Germany.

In October 1925, a conference was held in Locarno, which was attended by England, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The outcome of the conference was the Rhine Pact, which was intended to insure the Western powers against the revanchist aspirations of Germany and direct its expansion to the East.

The year 1926 was a kind of turning point in the work of the Berlin residency. By this time, the situation in Germany had undergone significant changes. If at the first stage of the Rapalle decade, Germany was still in the grip of the Versailles system and in many cases, despite political antipathies, was forced to reckon with the Soviet Union, then in 1926-1930 it was increasing its economic potential more and more and putting forward one of the most influential countries in the Western world. Right-wing forces are growing stronger in the internal life of Germany, the Nazis are becoming more active. The conditions for reconnaissance work began to gradually become more difficult. I had to make the necessary adjustments to it on the go, strengthen the conspiracy, and acquire new sources of information.

By the beginning of 1926, the residency in Berlin had at its disposal several sources from the Berlin main police department - the police presidium, which made it possible to regularly receive materials on the domestic political situation in Germany and the situation in various political parties. The survey of the right movement for 1925 received from this institution was highly appreciated by the Center. In one of the letters to the residency in January 1926, the Center wrote: "The internal situation of Germany is illuminated by the Berlin residence

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tour is better and more complete than all other areas, moreover, with the largest percentage of documentary material.

In 1926-1928, the possibilities for covering the situation in a number of Balkan countries were significantly expanded. The residency received valuable, including documentary, information from the Romanian Foreign Ministry and the Romanian embassies in Belgrade and Paris, as well as the Yugoslav embassy in Paris. Thus, in 1928, a copy of the agreement between the Chiefs of General Staff of France and Yugoslavia, a copy of the secret convention between France and Romania, as well as the agreement between Romania and Poland, and a report on the state of the Romanian army were received. In November 1928, the residency wrote to the Center: "In the first place, we are now setting up the collection of documents on the main key political issues of Central Europe and Poland and Romania. The picture in the Balkans is clear, and in the presence of documents sent to you in the spring and summer of this year. and sent by current mail, it is possible to predetermine the entire situation on the peninsula.

As before, serious attention was paid to the extraction of information about the policy of Poland. The channel through which the residency received materials on the meetings of the Council of Ministers of Poland continued to operate.

The archives preserved a document on the work of the residency as of January 1, 1928, which gives an idea of the scale of its activities at that time. The personnel of the residency - 8 people, the number of sources in Berlin - 39, in Paris - 7. In 1927, 4947 information materials were received from Berlin to Moscow, 15% of which were documentary. Out of the total number of 2009 materials, they dealt with economic problems, 1507 - with foreign and domestic policy issues of the explored countries, and 626 - with emigration. Over a thousand of the most important information messages of the residency were sent to the country's leadership, of which 147 were sent personally to Stalin.

At the end of 1928, Stalin received from Berlin secret documentary materials on reparations prepared by the German Foreign Ministry for the Reichstag Foreign Affairs Commission.

In December 1928, the Berlin residency reported to the Center on the acquisition of a new source that would provide incoming and outgoing correspondence of the Italian Foreign Ministry, including cipher telegrams. "This," the residency wrote, "will be the largest investment in our information on Southeast Europe and the Middle East."

In addition to the European residency, they obtained and sent information to the Center on Egypt, India, Afghanistan, and the pan-Islamist movement. A channel was established for receiving documents on the foreign policy of Persia, in particular on the position of Persia in the League of Nations - the correspondence of the Persian Foreign Ministry with its embassy in Berlin.

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Of particular interest was information about secret meetings of the general staffs of countries bordering the USSR: Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Romania with the active assistance of the French General Staff. At these meetings, the development of military plans for the USSR was carried out.

A great contribution to the work of political intelligence in Germany in 1926-1929 was made by I.K. Lebedinsky, D.M. Smirnov, P.I. Kornel, spouses Karl Adamovich and Irma Genrikhovna Dunts.

In November 1929, a new resident arrived in Berlin - Nikolai Grigorievich Samsonov. His archival track record, completed in 1925, says: he was born in 1896 in Nizhny Novgorod in the family of an employee, in 1916 he graduated from the gymnasium, speaks German and French. In December 1916 he was a student at Moscow University.

To work in the Cheka N.G. Samsonov was recommended by the first head of INO Ya.Kh. Davtyan, who described him as a dedicated and conscientious worker.

With the arrival in Berlin in 1929 of the resident N.G. Samson's work in the area of political intelligence has noticeably intensified. Here is a far from complete list of materials, mostly documentary, obtained by the residency in 1929:

- "The Anglo-Chinese Treaty and Its Application" - a document of the French embassy in London;
- "French-Chinese treaty and the unresolved issue of loans" - a document of the French embassy in Berlin;
- a top secret letter from the Romanian Foreign Ministry to its ambassador in Paris about joint military maneuvers with Poland in northern Moldova;
- Report of the Prime Minister of Romania, Maniu, on the work of the government, sent to the Romanian embassies abroad;
- Report of the German Embassy in Sofia on the economic situation in Bulgaria;
- information on Poland from the French military mission in Warsaw, including a document on the nature of the future war and Polish tactics, as well as a report of the Polish General Staff "The current situation of the Polish army";
- materials covering the activities of German intelligence in France;
- material "On the solidarity attitude of the states of the Little Entente and Poland towards the USSR" (in connection with the forthcoming conference of the Little Entente in Belgrade);
- information on the German economy, including the military industry.

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A whole volume was made up of materials obtained by the residency in 1929, mostly documentary, about the policy of the leadership of the so-called Ukrainian People's Republic, aimed at preparing insurrectionary actions in the rear of the Red Army and an uprising in Ukraine, about the participation in this preparation of Poland, France, England and a number of other countries.

Before coming to Berlin, Samsonov gained experience in intelligence work abroad: in Estonia, Latvia, Germany, Turkey and Czechoslovakia. He worked as a resident of the INO in Germany until 1931, upon his return he was appointed head of one of the departments of the INO, and in February 1937, he became a resident in Harbin.

Wherever Nikolai Grigorievich worked, he always enjoyed authority, and his work was highly appreciated: he was awarded the Badge of Chekist, an honorary weapon and a diploma. His description noted: "An old security officer with great operational and organizational experience. Works with the consciousness of full responsibility and the importance of the tasks entrusted to him. Disciplined, energetic, persistent. He knows how to select good assistants and create a business apparatus..." However, neither awards nor high marks of service saved N.G. Samsonov from the wave of unjustified repressions that took place in 1937.

At the same time, the residency continued to regularly obtain information about the internal political situation in Germany. It was in 1929 that she acquired a valuable source - Breitenbach. For a long time he handed over original documents and reports prepared by him personally about the structure, personnel and activities of the political police (later the Gestapo). Breitenbach had strong connections in related services, including military intelligence and counterintelligence, as well as in military-industrial circles. Working later on in leading positions in the Gestapo, Breitenbach rendered invaluable services to the residency. He was one of the sources who warned in 1941 about the impending attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union.

In the early 1930s, the internal political situation in Germany, where the fascists were rushing to power, began to deteriorate rapidly. The tendency towards revenge became more and more clear, the militarization of the country took place. From the second half of 1931 until the end of 1932, Germany's course towards a complete rejection of the Rapallo policy was already clear.

Analyzing this stage of relations between Germany and the USSR, the German historian Karl-Heinz Ruffman noted that they "were marked not by a crisis, but by a gradual cooling of the political climate and the uncertainty of the future behavior of both partners." Ruffman cites the opinion of an authoritative German diplomat, who stated: "Actually... Germany was then trying to get away from Rapallo under an outwardly harmless façade!"

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LETTER TO THE OLD CHEKISTS

Dear comrades!

And standing VCHI-OGPU as an organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat is of great importance for

only in the study of the October Revolution and the subsequent struggle to preserve and strengthen the power of the proletariat in its struggle against capitalism.

In the future, historians will turn to our archives, but the materials available in them are, frankly, completely insufficient, since all errors are reduced in the vast majority to the testimony of persons who have been held accountable, and therefore often very one-sidedly shed light on both individual strokes of the activities of the Cheka - OGPU, and events related to the history of the revolution. At the same time, the cadres of the old Chekists are becoming more and more dispersed, and they take with them the richest material of memories of individual moments, which often do not have their own written reflection.

Therefore, we, taking into account the need for a collection of materials that would fully and from all sides illuminate the multifaceted work of all its bodies, appeal to all the old checkists with a request to start compiling memoirs, covering in them not only the work of the bodies of the Cheka in its various directions, but also the political and economic work that accompanies the described events, as well as the characteristics of individual comrades who took an active part in that or other work, both in terms of the number of Chekists and local party members in general.

Chairman of the OGPU

Moscow, 7 eat 43 Marga "bolu 4925.

IE RAKA Z

All-Russian Extraordinary Commission No. 169.

Moscow December 20, 1920

\$ 1 1 Foreign Department of the Special Department of the Cheka to disband and organize the Foreign Department of the Cheka

2 Transfer all employees, inventory and files to the Foreign Department of the OOVChK at the disposal of the newly organized Foreign Department of the VChK

5. Subordinate the Foreign Department of the Cheka to the Head of the Special Departments Comrade Menzhinsky.

4 Vrid Comrade Davydov is appointed Head of the Foreign Department of the Cheka, who will submit the staff of the Foreign Department for approval by the Presidium within a week.

5 With the publication of this order, all communications with abroad, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, the Tsentreva and the Bureau of the Comintern, to all Departments of the Cheka, should be carried out only through the Foreign Department

Chairman of the Cheka DZERZHINSKY Sov. Secret. 47

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POSITION 0 OF THE CORDONAL PART OF INOSOUGPU,

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Foreign work. _ u i.

1.0 of the provisions, s 1 / The foreign part of INOGLU is the IR aa center, concentrating all the management and control of foreign work of intelligence and counter-intelligence nature, carried out y G.2.7, 111, System of organization,

certain points according to the scheme, is it possible to work out? Zanordon Cha

INO G.P.U.

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NACHEMOGPU: r g 4

Documents on the creation of the Foreign Department of the Cheka

Chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky

STRUCTURE OF INO VChK

DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT (HEAD
AND TWO ASSISTANTS)
VISA BUREAU
FOREIGN

OFFICE OFFICE (ORGANIZED
AS REQUIRED DIVISION) MILITARY

t e

„63. _ Certificate of the employee of the Cheka | A.F. Filippova

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"Adjutant of His Excellency" - Pavel Makarov

Lieutenant General Vladimir Makarov V.3. May-Maevsky

To connect with the masses and lead them along, there are 3 ways:

I). The proclamation of ideals dear to them.

<) Organization..

3) Practical approaches.

Let's analyze each of them:

I) Shdezly. In a vast country with a motley population, this is not a simple or easy task. Moreover, the peaceful coexistence of dispersed ideals causes such a system of them that, while satisfying the general needs, they would not exclude each other.

Let us take an example: national-provincial aspirations and the unity of the whole country. This was a stumbling block for Denikin. How to get out of this situation? It seems that the remembrance of the dozuvge "FREE

Mi" should satisfy

steal all wishes.

Really, what does that mean? This means: freedom of religion, language, local budgets, native press, literature, autonomy of the administration, and so on. The affairs of the Center to harmonize these

freedom with the unity of the State.

The technique of proclaiming ideals requires skillful handling of dosungs, which alone can carry them to the masses. They don't read the latest books, they read newspapers by chance, they need to hammer in the most important truths.

slogans of this afmissary yen yahzoretura, The slogan must be red

From the archives of the Cheka - Instructions for the work of underground White Guard organizations in Russia

Alexey Nikolaevich Lutsky

A.N. Lutsky with his wife

E. Yakovleva, Irkutsk, 1916

A.N. Lutsky, Moscow, 1904 (to the essay "Barometer for a Storm")

A.N. Lutsky with his family in Japan, Tibe, 1913

b e A © | A G. no. Lroletarians of all fear, unite! ? `` Uasevskiy Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Central Momitet. 4, th y: BRET ralaet teat.

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Moscow, Guy Choyabrya 1920

Extracts from the protocol of the Orgburo of the Ts.p. dated 15/X1-20 No.

to second Comrade Davtyan at his disposal.

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Secretary PAN. 1. EE

\$ 3l. Comrade Dzazhinsky's request \$ 31

Please refer to your No. and date

The first head of INO Ya.Kh. Davtyan (1888-1938)

Head of INO M.A. Trilisser (1883-1940)

Head of INO A.Kh. Artuzov (1891-1937)

PROLETARIANS

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Certificate of awarding A.Kh. Artuzov with an honorary military weapon

OH. Artuzov with his son

General N.V. Skoblin

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The obligation of General N.V. Skoblin on cooperation with intelligence, January 21, 1931, Berlin

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Obligation N.V. Plevitskaya on cooperation with intelligence, January 21, 1931, Berlin

Anatoly Levitsky, member of the anti-fascist resistance in France

Princess Tamara Volkonskaya at the headquarters of the detachment of French patriots, where Russian emigrants fought against the Nazis, as well as Soviet soldiers who escaped from captivity

E.Yu. Kuzmina-Karavaeva (mother Maria) is a member of the French Resistance. Died in a concentration camp

yy 1st K: 7

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Boris Vilde, member of the anti-fascist resistance in France

Princess Vera Obolenskaya, member of the French Resistance. executed

fascists

K.N. Tretyakov, participant in the operation "Trust"

re: PP Anna T R ÿ DOELAT D.K. VENTS TO THE PARIS TITLE.

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re 30 and spinning from there in Invaoe 31g.

1Keizom ›chnoe message is based on the basis of a personal observation

December 10, warming travels at the end of 19.3) and the beginning of 19531, through Transcaucasia, Dagestan, Chechnya Terskaya, RubanskoR and Doneko \ ÿ areas near Vor ›nezhskoy Ryazanskaya, Moscow Penaenskaya and Sazlosko! provinces, Orenburg region "Kyrgyz steppe of Turkestan and Transcaspian ridge,

The economic situation of the border zone of Zakazka Zya and the Zlkaspiisky Krai is incomparably better than that of central Russia. except for Moscow. 06° I understand this by the fact that the Soviet government, fearing to provoke a discontent among the local population on the borders in the border areas; The strip, first of all, if possible, seeks to satisfy the interests of the local population at the expense of the central provinces, which are far from the border. But without denying all the efforts of the Soviet power, especially the awakening mood is strongly developed - precisely in these gravitational otos, thanks to their gzographical position, which gives an easier opportunity; departure to the territory of the Soviet state and from there in the form of various partisan detachments. near the border of the region with the position of the peasants of the central provinces of Russia, you will be surprised at such tolerance of the latter, despite

on their much worse weeding, According to the "elrvleni" of the peasants of Povothya, by the beginning of 1931, their bread will be rolled out katoto

Vlau is more surreal and in a very limited number, and 10 New Ur

From the intelligence archives

Boris Savinkov

. Syroezhkin (1900-1939)

HS

A.A. Yakushev, participant in the operation "Trust"

General N.P. Potapov, participant in the operation "Trust"

R. Birk

B.B. Bortnovsky

_ N.N. Kroshko - "the king of the Kremlin spies"

At a meeting of the White Guard organization in Berlin. Second from the left - N.N. Kroshko, standing - Orlov, fake maker (rare photo)

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N.N. Kroshko (in recent years)

P.P. Dyakonov, major general of the tsarist army, military attaché

Russian embassy in London (1878-1942).

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Commitment P.P. Dyakonov on cooperation with Soviet intelligence, May 26, 1924, London

Baron von Possaner

German press report on von Possaner's assassination

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A.V. Loginov (Bustrem)

N.G. Samsonov (Semyon)

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT O. Y ... d and A 1937 a Service note

Tel komyut. OGPU No. 1-54,

A. Artuzov's instruction to stop Dobrov's installation in Prague

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No. K | m @luzhednoy note

I personally. 4 PAS.INO OGPU

comrade ARTUZOV.

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POM. VAC, 5-return: IVEVAKOVI

Intelligence service memo on Dobrov's fulfillment of the task of establishing contact with the leading circles of the Nazi Party in Germany dated July 14, 1932.

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I.N. Kaminsky

Direction of the Center to residency on work on Wrangel dated April 5, 1922, no. R D7, A STA 4 ... lbelella, rer "4, Se, at the PATH Fadl. ali. Yes in 4. 4% raa Ele 2nd 44.4 Su SADA 2/3 27710.44. to Cherie me. — 62 Sweat May.

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Emar of Jukhar MAMED TAGI, son of KShBEI, was represented by Enrlagsky as consul and military attache, a closed agor, / Yeyede.

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From the intelligence archives. Translation of the text of the agreement between the representative of the Emir of Bukhara and the British

F.Ya. Karin | IN AND. Pudín

I.A. Chichaev

At the beginning of 1931, Boris Davydovich Berman replaced Samsonov as a resident. According to his personal file: he was born in 1901. The father owned a steam mill, which apparently served as the basis for the exclusion of B.D. Berman from the party in 1923 as "a native of the bourgeois environment", but he was soon reinstated.

In the period from 1921 to 1925, B.D. Berman was alternately in party work and in the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU, and from 1925 he became a staff member of the OGPU and held a number of senior positions until he left for overseas work in Germany in January 1931.

The award list preserved in the archives speaks about Boris Davydovich's work as a resident. "The experience gained at the previous job," it says, "is now successfully applied abroad, carrying out a successful restructuring of work in accordance with the changed situation abroad and our immediate tasks. Directly manages all intelligence and operational work of a large residency. Thanks to his correct leadership, a number of recruitments were carried out, which provided valuable agents. Persistent and courageous Chekist. So B.D. Berman was presented with an honorary weapon.

In 1931, the Center set the task for the residency to infiltrate and obtain information in all political parties in Germany, in financial and industrial circles, in military organizations and groups, in various cultural associations, scientific organizations for the study of the East (USSR) , in intelligence and other special services.

Fulfilling this task, in 1931-1932 the residency doubled and qualitatively strengthened the network of information sources.

Assessing the work of the Berlin residency in 1932, the Center noted: "We have a very valuable agent and documentary coverage of the foreign policy of the German government ... In addition to political information, we regularly receive information about the activities of German intelligence conducted through the Foreign Ministry, from the - the occupation of specific persons conducting this work.

Sources numbered A/239 and A/301 made a great contribution to documentary information. A/239 was an employee of the main telegraph, through which there was a cipher correspondence between Berlin and a number of capitals of European countries. A/301 was a typist at the main telegraph office and also had access to classified information. The center reported to the residency: "All cipher telegrams passing through the Berlin telegraph office ... are of great value to us. It is essential that this material be mined in the greatest possible quantity."

According to the archives of the SVR, at the beginning of 1931, foreign intelligence, citing its sources in Paris, Berlin and Warsaw, reported to the country's leadership that the French government was ready to provide Germany with a loan of 2-3 billion gold

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francs in order to put pressure on her in matters of Soviet-German relations and the revision of the terms of the Rapallo Treaty. In the middle of 1931, intelligence reported on the difficult economic situation prevailing in Germany, and on the readiness of the head of the German government, Brüning, to go to Paris and accept help on the terms offered by France.

Sources in the United States reported that President Hoover did not intend to change his position towards the USSR and approved of the measures taken by England and France against him. At the same time, Hoover emphasized that these measures could be effective only if they were supported by Germany.

From Berlin in early June 1932, a message was received that the new German government, headed by von Papen and German Foreign Minister von Neurath, was taking anti-Soviet positions and was a supporter of Western plans to fight Soviet power and communism. In June of the same year, foreign intelligence received information from a source from von Papen's immediate circle about his negotiations in Paris on the establishment of a military alliance between France, Germany and Poland, directed against the USSR. the first goal of this union. At the same time, its participants expressed the hope that England would not remain indifferent and, under the guise of liberating Georgia, would seize the oil sources of the Caucasus.

In the middle of 1932, information was received from Berlin that in the circles of von Papen, Hitler, von Neurath, they were coming to the conclusion that, due to severe food difficulties in the USSR, the present moment was the most successful for an attack on it. To this end, von Papen went to Lausanne in the hope of persuading England and European countries to launch a campaign against the USSR. Thus, already a few months before Hitler came to power, intelligence reported on the readiness of German militaristic circles to join a bloc of European states directed against Soviet Russia.

Before us is archival work for 1931-1932. Title: "Different materials on Germany. Top secret". Almost every second document in the file is information obtained by intelligence about the brewing of a new war. An important role in the preparation of this war was played in 1932 by the government of von Papen, a well-known supporter of the struggle against Soviet power and communism. In June 1932, intelligence reported to the Center: "Papen believes that "the softness of the German government in relation to Eastern Europe must be drastically changed..." von Gleichen, who stated: "Papen has long believed that the era of expanding relations between the USSR and the capital

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ended with the static world. Now comes a period of intense preparation for the struggle between the two systems, and the German government must be prepared for such work ... "

The information received from the prominent German entrepreneur Flick-Stteger, who was personally well acquainted with von Papen, spoke even more frankly about preparations for a war against the USSR: "How quickly further events will develop and whether an attack on USSR, it is difficult to say, everything depends on the possibility of an agreement in this respect between France and Germany. In any case, the front in this direction is already leveling out. Japanese troops have already reached the Soviet border in Manchuria, and tanks, artillery and other military equipment are being intensively sent to Poland from France.

On July 1, 1932, Flick-Stteger told a source: <... Reich Chancellor Papen is now in Lausanne conducting secret negotiations, the ultimate goal of which is to unite European countries and England for a campaign against the USSR in order to overthrow Soviet power... Papen insists in Lausanne that Europe urgently needs to forget its differences and claims and unite against the common communist enemy - the USSR. Although now the immediate danger of an attack on the USSR is not noticeable, but, as Flik-Stegger concluded, the war against the USSR will not be long in coming ... "

Before the fascists came to power in Germany, there were still a few months left, and the real threat of war against the USSR was already outlined.

Intelligence paid more and more attention to the processes taking place in Germany. And the events there developed rapidly and most directly affected the issues of the external security of our country.

Intelligence timely reported on the growing influence of fascist ideology among the political circles of the country, eager for revenge, and foresaw the rise of Hitler and his party to power. Thus, in the message of the Berlin residency to the Center dated May 9, 1931, on the internal political situation in Germany, there are the following lines: "The intentions of the National Socialists are absolutely obvious. They are officially striving for legal entry into the Brüning government... This autumn, the National Socialists will be able to enter the government."

Among the main objects of development, the National Socialist Party of Germany is mentioned for the first time independently in a document of the Center sent to Berlin towards the end of 1932. This does not mean that the residency did not deal with the Nazis before, but the information obtained on this issue was episodic. Only by the beginning of the 1930s, when the possibility of the Nazis coming to power became real, did the residency begin to take measures to find stable sources of information on this party. First

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two serious sources, which were able to provide valuable information, were acquired in 1931. In the correspondence they were listed under the numbers A/270 and A/331. Both were Nazis belonging to the internal party opposition to Hitler, which served as the basis for their cooperation with Soviet intelligence. Shortly after they came to power, the leadership of the Nazi Party severely cracked down on them.

Nevertheless, during the two years of cooperation between A/270 and A/331, they managed to obtain and transfer to the residency secret information covering the structure of the Nazi party apparatus, the characteristics of its leading figures, and materials on internal differences in the party.

In the materials of operational correspondence between the Berlin residency and the Center in 1930, a source appeared under the number A / 229, which in a number of documents was given such, at first glance, not very clear, intriguing characteristic: "It establishes a very close connection in the national socialist circles of Goebbels.

Olga Ivanovna Farster-Shkarina was hiding under this number, judging by one of the letters, she was an emigrant. More detailed information about her in the archives, unfortunately, has not been preserved.

The operation to infiltrate the leading circles of the Nazi Party, which was planned by the residency through A/229, was very interesting and, if successfully completed, could have yielded a significant result. In a letter to the Center dated November 22, 1930, the residency reported: "Some time ago, A/229 met the writer Arnold Bronnen, who proposed to her to marry him. We recommended to A/229 that the proposal be accepted, and the marriage will be formalized within the month of December. Bronnen is a personal friend of Goebbels and is considered a National Socialist theorist. Bronnen had already introduced A/229 to all his acquaintances, including Goebbels. Goebbels turned to her with a request to install a provocateur who is among the top, i.e. among 32 people ... Goebbels had A / 229, and he promised to give all the data on those whom he suspects, and asked her not to tell anyone about this, also to Bronnen. During A/229's visit to Goebbels, it became clear that he, too, wanted to look after her and that, with the right behavior, A/229 could become a very close and trusted person to Goebbels... In order for her to participate in Goebbels' meetings, we - they told her to study typewriting, and then she would be able to record protocols. In a separate envelope we are sending the first message A / 229 and Bronnen's characterization.

Moscow reacted quickly and positively to the announcement of such a promising opportunity. In a letter dated November 27, 1930, they wrote from the Center: "Give the task to source A/229 to cultivate a connection with Goebbels so that she gains his full confidence and has the opportunity to take part in their active work. Until she

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will enter into their full confidence, do not give her any tasks. Completely with your plan agree."

Everything went fine at first. On December 4, the residency informed that the wedding of number A/229 with Bronnen was scheduled for December 17, and sent a message to the Center about her relationship with Goebbels. And on December 24 she reported to the Center: "We are sending newspaper clippings about the wedding ist. A/229. The fact that the newspaper considers her the culprit of the "mouse terror" at the Mozartsal cinema while watching the film "All Quiet on the Western Front" by Remarque, and the fact that she is scolded, brought her great benefit. According to Goebbels, she is the heroine of the National Socialist Party. Relations with Goebbels are very good, and he does everything he can to have her around him more often.

From the foregoing, one can only assume that Olga Ivanovna was an attractive woman and, apparently, was related to the world of art. However, unfortunately, there are no materials in the archives about the further development of this operation.

Successes in work in the field of political intelligence in the late 1920s and early 1930s were facilitated by the presence among the staff of the residency of such experienced intelligence officers as K.V. Gursky, K.I. Seeley, V.P. Roshchin.

In 1932, Germany found itself on the verge of the Nazis coming to power, putting an end not only to the "spirit", but also to the "letter" of the Rapallo Treaty. Relations between Germany and the Soviet Union took on a new character, which forced the intelligence leadership to urgently restructure the entire system of work in Germany. Its circular dated November 3, 1932, prescribed: "In connection with the ever-increasing danger of war and intervention against the USSR, your foreign apparatuses are faced with the task of drawing up a mobilization plan in advance: the organization, composition and activities of our our zakordonnye devices in full combat readiness ... "

Intelligence signaled the danger that Hitler might pose to the Soviet Union. She closely followed the growth of revanchist sentiments in political circles and among the population of Germany, the attempts of the ruling circles of Germany to free themselves from

restrictive articles of the Treaty of Versailles for it, to begin the revival of the German Wehrmacht and the militarization of the country's economy. The policy of England and France, which did not hide their desire to use the resurgent German militarism to fight the Soviet Union, as well as the foreign policy doctrines of the German fascists striving for power, who openly declared the need to acquire "living space" in Eastern Europe, gave serious grounds for such fears. Subsequent developments confirmed these predictions:

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German fascism became the main source of danger for the Soviet Union.

Hitler, after assuming the post of Reich Chancellor, at the first meeting with the high command of the German armed forces on February 3, 1933, proclaimed as the most important goals of his policy "the capture of a new living space in the East and its merciless Germanization"!, about which the external intelligence informed the country's leadership.

To what extent did the Soviet leadership realize the importance of these reports? According to the German historian Ruffman, "Moscow... fatally underestimated the danger that threatened Germany from the strengthening of right-wing radical forces, especially the National Socialists..." Ruffman refers, in particular, to the directive of the Comintern (and the Communist Party of Germany) fight primarily against the Social Democrats as "the main enemy of the working class", the "social fascists"?

The bias in assessments was also facilitated by internal factors, in particular, the internal party struggle in the USSR. Without delving into the analysis of the reasons that gave rise to some underestimation of the threats that the Nazis came to power in Germany concealed for the Soviet Union, we only note that the inertia of previous views also affected the underestimation of information about the impending Nazi aggression against the USSR and in the aftermath. - blowing years. But more on that ahead.

'
Cit. Quoted from: Russia and Germany during the years of war and peace. - M., 1995. - S. 17. 2 Ibid.

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Baron von Possaner and Dr. Heimzot

In mid-March 1933, a report appeared in German newspapers: "Austrian citizen Kurt Possaner, who lived for several years in Berlin, was arrested a week ago in Berlin on suspicion of undesirable political activity, was shot dead yesterday while being transported from Berlin to an Austrian citizen. nice." So the Nazis who came to power dealt with one of the valuable sources of the Berlin residency under the number A / 270.

The staff of the residency met him on November 16, 1931, when a visitor came to the Permanent Mission of the USSR in Berlin. He was very excited and declared that he could report on a case of direct interest to the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, he added that he was in very cramped financial circumstances and would like to receive a certain amount for his services.

During the conversation, it turned out that the visitor was Baron Kurt von Possaner, an Austrian citizen, descended from an old aristocratic family, the nephew of the leader of the Austrian fascists, Prince Staremborg, a member of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (NSDAP) and until recently - head of one of the intelligence departments in the "Brown House" - the headquarters of the party leadership in Munich.

He recently learned that he was included by the leaders of the party in the list of persons subject to liquidation in connection with major disagreements between the leaders of National Socialism and heads of assault squads. This information was confirmed by the fact that Possaner was suddenly dismissed and he was not even paid a salary.

The Berlin residency immediately tried to organize an operational verification of the information provided by the visitor to the permanent mission. It so happened that suddenly help came from... the local press. On November 28, 1931, one of the newspapers opposed to the fascists decided to expose their inner-party intrigues and published a sensational report about the existence of

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"Brown House" lists of NSDAP members scheduled for murder. Among the persons included in these lists, the name of Possaner also appeared. From the publication it followed that he worked in the second branch of the secret department of the leadership of the National Socialist Party. It was a secret stormtrooper reconnaissance, led by Prince Waldeck von Pymont.

At the next conversation, Possaner spoke about some episodes from his life. They characterized him as a courageous and resolute person with a certain penchant for adventurism.

At the age of fifteen, Possaner was assigned to the cadet corps, where he received a comprehensive military education. During the First World War, he served in the Austrian Navy, and after its completion and the collapse of the fleet, he worked at a gunpowder factory. By this time, the beginning of the participation of the baron in organizations of the National Socialist persuasion belongs. At the same time, apparently due to his origin, he remained devoted to the idea of monarchism and participated in the activities of a secret monarchist organization that received directives from Switzerland from the exiled former Austrian Emperor Charles [.

One day, the building where this organization met secretly was suddenly searched by the Austrian police. Several conspirators were arrested, and correspondence, including the personal directives of the former emperor, was confiscated. At the time of this operation, Possaner was in the building and decided to save the documents compromising the emperor. He managed to play the role of a random stranger before the police, and he was not sent along with others to the police, but left in the premises in the care of the police commissioner who guarded the confiscated documents. Taking advantage of the moment when the commissar went out briefly into the next room, Possaner quickly hid the documents under his clothes and, after waiting a few, asked the returning commissar for permission to go to the toilet. The commissioner gave permission, and Possaner managed to run out of the house. The commissar, who noticed this, opened fire from the window, but Possaner managed to escape. He reached the Dominican monastery, where he hid for three days in an underground room among the tombs.

The act of the baron did not go unnoticed. The emperor warmly received him in Switzerland, removed the Order of the Iron Crown from his uniform and, in gratitude, attached it to Possaner's chest. This episode is an illustration of the assessment that Possaner gave himself in a conversation with a residency officer. "I," he declared, "is a very active person by nature, I have always been a devoted soldier and unconditionally put my life on the line."

In a conversation held in December 1931, Possaner explained the motives that prompted him to apply to the Soviet permanent mission.

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After World War I, while working in a factory, he believed for a long time that Hitler was sincerely fighting for socialism and that his party was anti-capitalist. An active character and personal data allowed him to advance in the party and take the post of head of one of the departments of party intelligence. This work revealed to him many behind-the-scenes secrets of the party. He became aware of the financing of the Nazis with big capital, and when the leadership of the party began to receive huge salaries, their own cars and luxurious mansions, he had his first deep doubts. Possaner did not hide his dissatisfaction from others. At first, he got away with it. However, when he began to resent aloud the behavior of Goering, who had homosexual relations, everyone turned away from him out of fear of Goering.

Rumors began to circulate that he allegedly gave out party secrets to state organizations. Was fired without pay. Not wanting to aggravate the conflict, the leadership of the party, however, offered Possaner a compromise: he renounces all claims against the party, and the party will rehabilitate him, as issued by an official document. Such a document was indeed issued to him. Not only that, he was unexpectedly offered the post of intelligence chief of the Austrian Heimwehr! in Vienna.

On our part, Possaner was promised a monthly reward and the word was given that in case of failure or any other undesirable situations, we would not leave him to his fate and give him the opportunity to find refuge in the USSR. Possaner agreed to these terms and asked to be tested to make sure that he was indeed 100 percent in service.
us.

Since December 1931, active work began with Possaner as a source of information. The list of connections he presented made a strong impression. It included the entire Nazi elite of that time: Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, Rosenberg, Rem, Strasser, their adjutants, confidants and friends, leaders of the SA and SS detachments, as well as some foreign diplomats and leading intelligence officers from different European countries. Sending materials to the Center on Possaner, a resident from Berlin wrote: "There is no need to talk much about the actual and potential value that A/270 represents. This is our first really serious source on the National Socialists, i.e. the same party that today plays one of the largest roles and which in recent years, having won a number of victories, is preparing for power. A/270 is valuable to us not only as the former head of intelligence of the Nazis, but also as a person who now remains in the party and has really large

connections".

At first, Possaner fully justified the hopes of the residency. In writing, he conveyed information that

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thought about the activities of the National Socialist Party, its leaders, the work of party intelligence, and on a number of other issues of the internal political situation in the country.

However, the question arose before the residency: what next? By this time, the source no longer occupied leading positions in the party, and the leadership of the Austrian Heimwehr offered to him significantly narrowed his information opportunities. In this situation, given that the passions around Possaner in Nazi circles had somewhat subsided, the residency recommended that he find ways to regain the confidence of the Nazi leaders and again take a leading position in the party intelligence.

Possaner took up this recommendation with enthusiasm. He returned to Munich and, using his connections, managed to interest Motz, head of the Nazi foreign intelligence service, who offered him to head the eastern department of foreign intelligence. Along the way, in a conversation with Motz, Possaner received interesting information that the National Socialists, confident in their imminent coming to power, already have a ready-made "skeleton" of the future government. In particular, the affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are handled by Rosenberg, and the future foreign intelligence is handled by Motz.

To consolidate his position, Possaner tried to intensify his contacts in the Brown House: in addition to Motz, he met with Rosenberg, Comte de Moulin, Hilmar von Decken and other influential Nazis. In March 1932, on the instructions of the residency, he prepared and handed over a carefully worked out plan of the "Brown House".

But not everything went smoothly. As early as January 1932, the residency wrote to the Center: "The enemies of the A/270, who have succeeded in compromising it and thereby removing it from active work, will continue to conduct careful surveillance of the A/270." These fears were justified. Enemies of Possaner began to spread various rumors in the "Brown House", trying to denigrate him. Motz's proposal to move into intelligence was up in the air.

When, on April 9, 1932, Possaner left Munich for Berlin to meet with a residency officer, upon arrival at the Anhalt station, on the instructions of Deluge, the head of the SS in Berlin, who was also here, he was detained by a police post. During a search of the police presidium, a revolver was found in Possaner's suitcase, as well as a piece of photographic film with a plan of the "Brown House" filmed on it. At first, he was told that he was detained on suspicion of spying for England. However, the accusation was so absurd and lacking evidence that it was immediately dismissed, but it was stated that the case was sent to court for the illegal transport of weapons. On April 22, 1932, the court fined Possaner 100 marks. He was released from pre-trial detention in Berlin's Moabit prison and on April 24 he went to a meeting.

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It should be noted that the vicissitudes about which Possaner reported to the residency, the leadership of the residency tried to double-check, and each time the sincerity of the source was confirmed. So in this case, through the possibilities of the residency, copies of the investigation materials in the Possaner case were obtained, which confirmed that he was telling the truth.

Possaner reported, in particular, that in Munich he met an old acquaintance from the youth organization of the Austrian "Heimwehr" Robert Levine and resumed communication with him. The SS officers conducting surveillance of Possaner immediately established this and, since Robert Levine was in the SA, they demanded that he conduct surveillance of Possaner. At the same time, they referred to the fact that Possaner was supposedly ... a French spy. Robert Levine immediately told Possaner about this.

It became clear to the residency that as a source of valuable information on the Nazi party, A/270 was practically lost. However, to save face of the source, he was advised to send official letters to Motz and Hitler asking them to stop persecuting him, that Possaner and did.

It did not help. On May 19, 1932, members of the criminal police burst into the room in Munich, where he lived with his wife at that time, and both were arrested after a search. This time he was charged with nothing less than "organizing a conspiracy to assassinate Hitler." The accusation was built on sand, and on May 25 he was released as unexpectedly as he had been arrested, but as an "unwanted foreigner" he was expelled from Bavaria. The same decision was taken by the police presidium of Prussia.

Possaner was forced to leave again for Vienna. The residency understood that after all these events, Possaner no longer had the opportunity to obtain information on the NSDAP, but did not want to lose him as an assistant with great intelligence skills. Therefore, he was recommended to restore ties in the monarchical circles of Austria and strengthen his position there. For the safety of the source, contact with him was cut off for several months.

As always, Possaner actively took on a new assignment, rather quickly restored and strengthened his ties with the monarchists in Austria, including Archduke Albrecht. In July, on behalf of the monarchists, he came to Berlin. However, at the end of October, at a meeting, he said that it makes no sense to work in monarchist organizations. They are mired in petty intrigues, collecting gossip and marking time in one place. When asked by an employee of the residency how he imagines his future work, he answered: "I expected this question, since I myself understand that I have no moral right to receive a salary and do nothing; Now

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I see that as a result of the conflict with the Nazis, I am deeply compromised and will hardly be able to join any other organization that interests you."

"He spread his hands," the letter to the Center reported, and said: "I see, I can only put a bullet in my forehead. Coming to you, I told you everything I knew, and now that I can do nothing

I don't want to burden you any more." He was already thinking about whether he should start learning Russian and leave for the Union as at least a laborer. In general, the A/270 has a gloomy mood."

These sentiments were somewhat dispelled by an employee of the residency, who advised him to consider whether he could do recruiting work while staying away from the Nazis and other political parties. Possaner perked up. Soon he brought a list of his connections, consisting of 51 people, which included politicians, industrialists, journalists, military men, foreign diplomats and other persons from Germany, Austria, Holland, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia. According to this list, it was possible to select objects for recruitment work.

At the end of 1932, Possaner acquired a valuable source for Soviet intelligence under the pseudonym "Surprise". "Surprise" was an employee of the intelligence department of the German War Ministry, had solid connections, and in six months - from September 1932 to February 1933 - handed over 34 valuable information materials to Possaner. They contained information about the structure and leadership of the intelligence of the Ministry of War, about the work of this intelligence in Poland, Yugoslavia and Austria, about the agents of the ministry from the White Guard figures.

The information received from Surprise covered some international issues, in particular the situation in the Balkans, the situation in the leadership of the Nazi Party, including the relationship between Goebbels and Himmler. Also of interest was information about what information the German military intelligence had about the situation in the USSR.

In early February 1933, when the Nazis were already in power, the Center again expressed its fears for the fate of Possaner. "The events of recent days," the letter to the residency said, "as you understand, may adversely affect the position of A/270, and work with Surprise is also dependent on this. The danger of A/270's position is so great that we are inclined to have him immediately go back to his homeland. One case, when a film of the "Brown House" plan was found with A/270 during his arrest at the station, is enough to deal with him in the most decisive way, and, as you know, A/270 has more than enough sins against the party".

Why Possaner did not leave for Austria is not clear from archival materials. But it's safe to assume that the Nazis found

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would have him there. On March 8, 1933, the Center received an urgent report from a resident from Berlin: "A/270 was arrested on the night of 6 to 7... Measures were taken to establish the reasons for the arrest."

On March 20, 1933, a new urgent report to the Center follows: "On March 16, A/210 was released for lack of corpus delicti. On the same day he returned home, from where he went carelessly into the city. Didn't come home again. The wife took steps to search. His corpse was found in a forest near Potsdam. A/270 is killed by his "old friends". Since the corpse was severely disfigured (several stab and gunshot wounds), they did not let her body in... On March 18, his wife was at his funeral."

Rechecking the events connected with the murder of Possaner, the residency received the following message from one of the reliable sources: "Possaner was in a police prison and on March 15 was extradited from there at the request of the SA, allegedly in order to take him to Munich, where he is wanted for some business. On March 15, he was taken out of Potsdam and, outside the town of Michendorf, was shot in the forest, as if he was trying to escape.

Among the information received by the residency about the circumstances of Possaner's death was the following: "His corpse was found at Michendorf. The first report from the local police was that there had been a suicide. Now he is considered "killed while trying to escape." The source of this information, listed in the residency under number A/331, of course, could not even imagine that a similar fate awaited him.

At the beginning of 1932, one of the agents of the Berlin residency met the neuropathologist Dr. Karl Heimzot, a former member of the National Socialist Party. By that time, Haimzot was not a member of the party and was opposed to it, since he believed that Hitler had changed the "revolutionary" course. The doctor attracted the attention of the agent by the fact that he retained strong personal ties in the leading circles of the Nazi Party, in particular, he was a close friend of Hitler's chief of staff, Captain Röhm.

In the course of studying Himesot, the agent got closer and closer to him. Upon learning that the agent was a journalist by profession, Haimzot himself offered to supply him with information about the Nazis for a fee. From the agent's reports and subsequent personal conversations with Haimzot, the station formed a detailed picture of the man.

In the past, an artillery officer with the rank of lieutenant, at the end of the First World War, was dismissed from the German army. After demobilization, he joined the Oberland military organization in Munich, at the same time he began to study medicine, receiving a doctorate from the University of Rostock.

In 1922, he left as a contract doctor for the island of Java, where he fell ill with malaria. Soon he moved to China. His health continued to deteriorate and he returned to Europe.

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In Java, Haimzot wrote a scientific work on the effect of malaria on the human psyche, which attracted the attention of a well-known Austrian professor. The professor invited him to Vienna and then to Paris, where Haimzot took the position of a police medical expert in the fight against drug smuggling. In this capacity, he was given the opportunity to attend the officers' school at Saint-Cyr and other military institutions in France. He sent the information collected during these visits to Rem, who then headed the Munich organization "Oberland", and he passed it on to an Abwehr officer. Thus began the intelligence activities of Dr. Heimzot. Upon returning to Germany, he began to practice as a neuropathologist.

Like many of Heimzot's colleagues from the Oberland, he joined the Nazi Party. It happened shortly after graduating from the university. However, being "revolutionary radical" minded, after some time he moved away from the Nazis, nevertheless maintaining close friendly relations with Rem, who repeatedly suggested that Haimzot return to the Nazis and take a prominent position in the party.

After analyzing the information received about Heimzot, the residency decided to continue contact with him as a source of information on the Nazi Party. The residency agent, having loaned the doctor money, suggested that he prepare two materials: on the activities and plans of the Nazi leadership, and on the characteristics of the leading figures of the party. The first materials prepared by Heimzot were sent to Moscow in April 1932. Handing over the materials, the agent reported to the residency: "In my personal conviction, Dr. Haimzot will be a completely reliable informant for me about the National Socialists, I hope in the future to receive documentary data on the activities of the Nazis from him or through him."

The materials were highly appreciated in the residency and at the Center. The source was assigned a number - A / 331 and a personal file was opened under the pseudonym "Doctor Hitler". During 1932, "Dr. Hitler" handed over to the residency a significant number of materials on the situation and disagreements in the leadership of the Nazi Party, on Hitler's plans against Hindenburg. He also provided information on domestic political issues in Germany, in particular on the reasons for the resignation of Chancellor Brüning, on the activities of the War Ministry. In October, solid material was received from a source on Franco-German relations and Germany's foreign policy isolation. Sending this information to the Center, the resident wrote: "The report is very interesting and, apparently, compiled on the basis of information obtained from well-informed sources."

Even earlier, in May, the residency received instructions from the Center about the need to study the leadership of the opposition to Hitler on

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the National Revolutionary Movement and, in connection with this, raised the question of establishing direct contact with "Doctor Hitler" without the mediation of an agent. For some time, "Doctor Hitler" did not want to get acquainted with anyone other than an agent whom he trusted. But in the end, on February 25, 1933, the Center received a report: "Doctor Hitler has been recruited." We agreed on our direct work. The doctor accepts, on our instructions, Himmler's invitation to work in the SS headquarters.

During the recruiting conversation, "Doctor Hitler" said that through his friends he had repeatedly received offers to return to the party and, in particular, to join the SS headquarters. However, he refused for ideological and political reasons. The residency succeeded in persuading him to return to the Nazi Party and attempt to enter the service of Himmler's apparatus. He even managed to pass the interview, but then the case stalled. In April, he tried to contact Himmler personally, using his old close acquaintance with one of his closest collaborators, Breithaupt. Nothing succeeded. The Nazis, who had already come to power, did not allow former internal oppositionists to enter it. Clouds were gathering over Dr. Heimzot, although he still felt safe.

On the evening of May 4, Heimzot stayed late at a Nazi party meeting. At this time, three intelligence officers came to his doctor's office on Nuremberg Strasse, demanded the keys from the porter, and carried out a thorough search until two in the morning. They took away all correspondence and various records, among which were notes about the party leadership and the organization of assault detachments. Haimzot found out about the search in the morning when he came to his doctor's office. He immediately went to Breithaupt and asked for his advice and support. Speaking later about this visit, Haimzot said: "The latter expressed his concern that it was an illegal event; so I have to be very careful. I could just as easily be taken away and shot. The incident with the murder of von Possaner and other similar facts prove that all this is within the realm of possibility. Breithaupt advised him not to spend the night at home. Heimzot spent that night at a boarding house next door to Breithaupt's house.

On the same day, Haimzot raised a fuss in his local Nazi party organization and sent telegrams to Röhm and Himmler. He also visited the local police station and reported the search. At the police station, he was told that the search had been carried out by the Gestapo, allegedly following a denunciation from neighbors that Haimzot had a machine at home for reproducing leaflets of the anti-Hitler opposition. But neither leaflets nor the device were found.

The next day, Haimzot managed to find out through his contacts that stormtroopers had taken part in the search, and to identify them.

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names. He immediately informed Breithaupt of this, who promised that he would take further steps. In the evening of the same day, Breithaupt reassured Heimzot, assuring him that everything was in order and that he could spend the night at home again. However, at half past five in the morning, Haimzot was roused from his bed. The house and yard were cordoned off by stormtroopers. Heimzot was arrested.

About what happened next, Haimzot told the station officer after his release. First, he was escorted to the police station, and then, under an escort of 7 people, he was taken to Hedemannstrasse 5. This house was notorious in Berlin as a place of torture. Outwardly, it was a typical Berlin building, on the ground floor of which there was a small boarding house "Stadt Dresden". It seems that this sign was a disguise, since, when Chaimzot was taken to the prisoner's quarters, he noticed that the walls at human height were stained with dried blood. Without announcing the reasons for the arrest and without interrogations, Haimzot spent 14 days in custody. They were treated cruelly, beaten, mocked.

Heimzoth wrote letters to Breithaupt, Himmler, and several other prominent National Socialists, and also turned to Major Stephanie of the Steel Helmet for help. All in vain - there were no answers. He later learned that none of his letters from prison had been sent. The letters received addressed to him were also not handed over to him. It was at this time that Chaimzot's father fell mortally ill from grief over his son's arrest. This, too, was concealed from him and was only introduced to his mother's telegram about his father's death.

Fourteen days after the arrest, Haimzot was finally summoned for interrogation. All the questions of the investigator for especially important cases concerned the participation of Heimzot in the opposition to Hitler. Having received a negative answer to all questions, the investigator chuckled and said: "Be glad that you are being released." What he was accused of, the investigator did not say.

It remains unknown which springs worked, but after spending a few more days in the general cell after interrogation, Heimzot was released on May 25, and on May 26 he went to Dortmund for his father's funeral and decided to stay there for security reasons for several months. There was a break in work with the source, but the station maintained contact with him again through an intermediary agent. Archival materials show that the residency tried once again to send him to restore "friendship with the National Socialist elite" ...

On February 27, 1934, Gestapo officials came to Haimzot's house and interrogated him about his connections with the opposition to Hitler. At the end of the interrogation, they demanded that Haimzot appear at the Gestapo in the evening of the same day to talk with the chief. Himzot hesitated, he wasn't sure if he should go.

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However, he did not come to the meeting scheduled for the next day with a member of our intelligence, and he did not come to the control either. From that day on, "Doctor Hitler" disappeared. The residency tried twice to call him on the phone. Each time, a so-called service bureau was connected to the network and tried to find out who and on what business was calling Himzot. The suspense continued for half a month. In mid-March, a certain Hans Braumann, the son of a Berlin pastor, came to the station officer and introduced himself as a close friend of Heimzot.

G. Brauman said that on the evening of February 27, Haimzot went to the Gestapo and never returned. Even before this, Haimzot had warned Hans that if something ever happened to him, he should go to such and such an address and inform him of what had happened, which the latter did. He also said that Chaimzot's mother had commissioned a Berlin lawyer to defend her son's interests. The lawyer visited the Gestapo and established that Chaimzot was indeed
stovan.

On March 20, Hans again visited the station officer and said that the lawyer had once again been to the Gestapo, where he was told that Dr. Heimzot had been released. Since that time, Haimzot's trail has been lost. His mother came to Berlin and made a statement to the police department for the search for missing persons. On March 22, the newspapers published information about his disappearance. The police told the mother that they believed her son had been killed by the communists. Reporting all this to the Center, the residency expressed its firm conviction that "Doctor Hitler" had been destroyed.
by the Gestapo.

This was confirmed by the "White Book" published on June 30, 1934 in Berlin. On page 124 of this document it was stated: "Dr. Carl Heimzoth, a well-known writer and physician ... At the trials that were conducted in 1931 and 1932 in the case of Röhm, he appeared several times as a witness ... Heimzoth had a large number of letters from the national -Socialist leaders who revealed their homosexual inclinations... Repeatedly demanded that he publish these letters. Since he was promised protection by Rem, Chaimzot rejected these demands. It cost him his life. Officially, his murder is not disputed."

On the photocopy of this extract from the White Paper sent to the Center, the residency added: "It is known that Dr. Chaimzot was killed approximately March 20-22, 1934. The body of Dr. , it was badly mutilated ... What scoundrels and bastards

- they killed a man and still mock the poor mother. I hope the hour of reckoning for these murderers will come!"

The fates of von Possaner and Dr. Heimzot are deplorable. The archives preserved a certificate on the results of the work of the Berlin residency, compiled in 1933. "Given the possibility of coming

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to the power of the National Socialists and the colossal activity shown by this party over the past two years, - the note says, - we have taken decisive measures to obtain information within the party. Agent A/270 was the first to be thrown into this job, but failed, failing to strengthen his position in the party. The reasons for this were both the character of the agent and his past sins against the party. Nevertheless, thanks to his connections, he managed to obtain materials elucidating the structure of the party and the characteristics of its individual leading employees ... "Source A / 331" gave a number of extremely valuable materials on the work of the party apparatus and characteristics of individuals. These two sources also revealed the party's intelligence apparatus and its cover."

Heimwehr is an armed organization in Austria in 1919-1938, created to fight against the revolutionary movement. Since 1930, it has been openly fascist in nature.

"Oberland" is the name of a paramilitary nationalist organization created in Germany after the First World War from former German officers.

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Business trip to Berlin

On May 17, 1939, Alexander Matveyevich Dobrov, manager of the Burobin trust (Bureau for servicing foreign missions), was arrested in Moscow. He was charged with espionage for the benefit of German and British intelligence services. The investigation lasted a year and ended on June 19, 1940, with a sentence to death. This is how one of the talented secret employees of the Foreign Department of the OGPU died:

The investigation based the accusation on two facts that had taken place: Dobrov's unofficial meeting in Berlin in 1931 with the leadership of the National Socialist Party and his establishment in the same year of connection with British intelligence. Around these facts, the investigators fabricated an outwardly rather coherent story of the "fall" of a Soviet citizen. It was not difficult to compose it, bearing in mind that Alexander Matveyevich studied in Switzerland, worked there, then in Germany, and had extensive connections in German business circles.

At a closed meeting of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, held on June 19, 1940, under the chairmanship of the military lawyer Ulrich, Dobrov pleaded not guilty and showed that he did not conduct espionage activities against the USSR, but was an honest Soviet intelligence officer. True, during the preliminary investigation, they managed to get a "confession" from him as a result of beatings.

At the trial, he stated that since 1929 he had been a secret employee of the INO OGPU and, while fulfilling the tasks of Soviet intelligence, in 1931 in Berlin he really established contact with the leading figures of the National Socialist Party, Rosenberg and Sievert, and also "enlisted" in British intelligence. However, this statement was ignored by both investigators and judges. The verdict was predetermined.

Who was A.M. Dobrov and what happened in reality? Finding answers to these questions is not easy today. In the archives

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Our state security agencies do not have his personal and work files. Apparently, they were destroyed to cover up the traces of false accusations. Nevertheless, after careful searches in the archives, it was possible to find separate documents, according to which it is possible to restore the real face of Dobrov and the benefit that he brought to the foreign intelligence of his country.

Alexander Matveevich was born in 1879. After graduating from the Moscow Higher Technical School in 1906, he left for Mülhausen (Switzerland) to continue his studies, and received a diploma as an engineer in the chemical processing of textile products. In 1907 he moved to Basel and worked there for some time in a dye factory. In the same year he returned to Russia, worked at various enterprises of the textile industry. By the nature of his work, he was associated with representatives of the German company Farbwerke, which had its own interests in Russia. was good specialist.

During the period when Dobrov attracted the attention of foreign intelligence agencies, he worked as a senior engineer of the textile directorate of the Supreme Economic Council of the RSFSR. His knowledge, life experience and connections in Germany, apparently, served as the basis for the INO OGPU to recruit him in 1929 to secret cooperation. The lack of archival materials makes it impossible to get an idea of how it was used by foreign intelligence in the initial period. But, apparently, he cooperated honestly and showed himself to be a capable intelligence officer, since in 1931 he was chosen to carry out a particularly secret mission, which intelligence could entrust only to a very reliable, capable and proven person.

In June 1931, intelligence organized Dobrov's departure for "treatment" to one of the resorts of Czechoslovakia, from where he was supposed to visit Berlin unofficially to perform three very risky tasks:

- go to the top of the Nazi party and establish constant contact with its representatives in order to obtain information;
- establish contact with British intelligence and "substitute" yourself for recruitment;
- establish contact with representatives of the white emigration in Berlin and obtain their presence in the USSR.

In Moscow, a legend was worked out for Dobrov. He had to act, posing as one of the leaders of a counter-revolutionary organization allegedly existing in the USSR, which is seeking support and financial assistance in anti-Soviet circles abroad. This role, judging by the surviving documents, he succeeded well.

Dobrov's path to the Czechoslovak resort lay through Berlin. Here he got in touch with a friend he knew from before, including pre-revolutionary

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Noah, work as a representative of the company "Farbenindustri". Lived with him for several days, talked about life in the "Soviet hell", made it clear that he represented some kind of "counter-revolutionary organization", and hinted at a desire to get to know Hitler as the leader of the most pronounced anti-Bolshevik party in Germany. With that, he left for the resort.

However, after 15 days, Dobrov again comes to Berlin from Czechoslovakia, and an acquaintance from Farbenindustry introduces him to professional intelligence officer Harald Sievert, who is closely associated with the Nazis. Sievert, a Baltic German, served in the Abwehr and was close to the Nazis, and later, after Hitler came to power, he became the head of the Russian branch of the Foreign Department of the NSDAP. Sievert was friends with one of the leaders of the Nazis, Alfred Rosenberg, with whom he studied together in Riga and was in the same student union.

Sievert offers Dobrov to live with him for the duration of his stay in Berlin. Talking to him, Dobrov makes it clear about his "anti-Soviet sentiments", talks about the "counter-revolutionary organization" and leads the owner to the idea of the desirability of meeting with any of the leading

leaders of the NSDAP. What happened next is evidenced by a curious document preserved in the archival file of agent A/270 (Kurt von Possaner).

When Possaner appeared on November 16, 1931, at the Permanent Mission of the USSR in Berlin and offered his cooperation, as the main proof of the sincerity of his intentions, he handed over information about the Soviet citizen written by himself. "About June 20-25, 1931," wrote von Possaner, "a member of the Supreme Council of the National Economy came to see Harald Sievert. Sievert told me that this gentleman wanted at all costs to have a meeting with Hitler, the leader of the National Socialist Party of Germany.

For reasons of secrecy, I was not given his last name. At dinner at Sievert's (where he stayed without a residence permit) I got to know him personally. He apologized that he could not tell me his last name, but he would prove his identity to Hitler (I set him such a condition, otherwise I refused to organize a meeting).

After that, I learned that he was the head of a counter-revolutionary organization in the Soviet Union, the top of which was in the Soviet service. He himself received an engineering degree in Switzerland, is a Russian assistant professor and a member of the Council of the National Economy.

In June, he was undergoing treatment at a Czechoslovak resort (Karlsbad or Franzensbad) and his treatment, or rather vacation, was

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used to travel to Berlin to get in touch with Hitler. He was advised to contact Harald Sievert."

Possaner further reported that he arranged for the Russian stranger to meet with Hitler, for which the latter thanked him. Perhaps this is the only thing in which Possaner sinned against the truth. Hitler indeed agreed to a meeting with Dobrov in Munich, but then avoided it, instructing Rosenberg to speak with Dobrov.

Dobrov's acquaintance with Rosenberg took place in a Berlin restaurant at a hotel opposite the Anhalterbahnhof station. Sievert was also present at the meeting. The conversation, which lasted two hours, was about the creation of a fascist party in the USSR. Rosenberg gave detailed advice. The technique of further linking Dobrov to the Nazi leadership through Sievert was also discussed.

Having received such a message from von Possaner, the Berlin resident immediately informed the Center and asked to be informed "whether the data on the 'member of the Supreme Council of National Economy' is sufficient to disclose this person." At the same time, the resident reported that he had sent a telegram to Prague with a request to urgently check whether in June 1931 a person with signs reported by von Possaner was being treated in Karlsbad or Franzensbad.

This is where information about Dobrov ends in the von Possaner case. Only a short handwritten note was found on the letterhead of the INO OGPU dated November 26, 1931: "Reference. Artur suggested that Peter immediately stop working out the assignment from Berlin to install a person from the Supreme Council of National Economy, who was allegedly being treated in Franzensbad or Karlsbad. True (signature illegible)." Artur - head of INO A.Kh. Artuzov, Petr - INO resident in Prague. Already in another archival file, a message was found from Prague that the residency received a telegram from Berlin and began searching for a person from the Supreme Economic Council, but upon receipt of telegram No. 1404 from Moscow, this work was stopped.

Everything indicated that we were talking about an extremely secret person who was carrying out the task of the INO OGPU. What happened next? In his statement to the court, Dobrov said that upon his return from the resort to Moscow, he reported his meeting with Rosenberg and Sievert to an INO employee named Dmitriev. He also handed over the program of the NSDAP party received from Sievert to him. Was there such an employee? Yes, there was. In Sievert's archives, there is a memorandum addressed to Artuzov, signed by the assistant to the head of the economic department of the OGPU, Dmitriev, which refers to Dobrov. "When our source was abroad," writes Dmitriev, "

The source managed to get in touch with Sievert and with a person known to you, also a member of the National Fascist Party."

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Further, the note contains a request to check through the possibilities of the INO in Berlin how the source (meaning Dobrov) was treated by Sievert and his entourage. "All our development activities at this stage rest solely on the question of the degree of confidence in our source on the part of Sievert and other members of the National Fascist Party." The note is dated July 14, 1932. This means that work on creating a channel through Dobrov to receive information from the Nazi leadership continued in 1932.

To carry out the task of reaching out to British intelligence, Dobrov used the Russian actress Olga Tanina, who was familiar to him, who lived in Riga. Apparently, the INO knew that Tanina was the cousin of the English intelligence officer Eduard Karu, who was operating in Riga.

In the expectation that Tanina would inform Kar about this, Dobrov sent her a letter from Berlin, which began with the words: "Finally, I escaped from the "Soviet Paradise" and breathe rotten capitalism." This phrase alone was enough for Tanina to hand over the letter to Kar, saying that its author was "an engineer, in very good standing in the Union and a good friend." Having received a letter of recommendation from Tanina, Karu immediately went to Berlin to meet with Dobrov.

At this meeting, Dobrov described his "moods" and "sabotage plans" in the USSR in such a way that the British intelligence officer immediately agreed to help him and arranged for a connection through one of the foreign embassies in Moscow.

No less convincing in presenting his legend of the "counter-revolutionary" was Dobrov in conversations with Alexander Kolberg, the leader of the Brotherhood of Russian Truth. Having arranged a meeting with this representative of the white emigration in Berlin, Dobrov said that he was not acting personally on his own behalf, but represented a group previously associated with the Industrial Party and engaged in sabotage and sabotage in the industry of the USSR. He asked Kolberg to shed light on the situation in white émigré circles and to supply his group with anti-Soviet literature.

Kolberg took everything at face value and agreed with Dobrov on the conditions for further communication and methods for transporting emigre literature to Moscow. For this credulity, Kolberg was subsequently reprimanded in a letter by one of the leaders of the white emigration, reminding him of the successful operation "Trust" by the Chekists.

Such diverse tasks made their implementation very risky and difficult. But they were united by a common legend: the "counter-revolutionary" was seeking support for his organization in various anti-Soviet circles abroad. Dobrov was the best suited for this role and played it excellently.

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The archives contain fragmentary information about only one business trip to Berlin, but it was intense and productive. A.M. Dobrov honestly and at a high professional level carried out the tasks of the foreign intelligence of his country.

The good name of this tragically deceased person, listed in the files of the INO as "Gutman", was restored in 1958. According to the decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of January 21, 1958, the verdict of 1940 against A.M. Dobrova was canceled for lack of corpus delicti.

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Own among the Nazis

In the autumn of 1930, the Berlin residency recruited an Austrian citizen, Doctor of Law Franz Thaler, to secret cooperation. At that time, he headed a private information bureau in Vienna, and he had good opportunities to obtain information of interest to intelligence from the state apparatus and influential political circles in Austria.

Our intelligence agent, posing as an American, quickly gained Thaler's confidence and asked him to provide him with up-to-date political information for a moderate fee. Thaler agreed, and began his cooperation with the Soviet intelligence, as it is called in the professional language, under a "foreign flag".

Thaler had very solid connections in the nationalist circles of Austria. In 1928 he joined the volunteer corps "Oberland" and also acquired contacts among the German leaders of the corps. The political views of Thaler himself were rather confused. As he himself noted, at that time he had an interest in both the Nazi worldview and Marxist ideology.

Soon he became a prominent member of the semi-military Austrian fascist organization Heimwehr and became close to its leader, Prince Staremborg, who in the early 1930s took up the post of Minister of the Interior of Austria. In 1930, Staremborg took him on as his personal assistant, entrusting him with the leadership of the Heimwehr press a year later, and a few months later he appointed him secretary of the political bureau of this organization. Such a high position and proximity to Staremborg allowed Thaler to receive information through his contacts in the Austrian Foreign Ministry, military intelligence and nationalist circles. He personally kept all the minutes of the meetings of the Heimwehr political bureau, as well as Staremborg's correspondence with his political friends in Hungary, Italy and Germany.

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In April 1931, an illegal agent who kept in touch with Thaler reported on his next trip to Vienna: "On Saturday evening and Sunday morning, when there was no one at the Heimwehr headquarters, I went there with Thaler and rummaged through all the correspondence. .. Thaler conscientiously gives us and informs us of everything that he has there."

Information from Thaler was flowing to the Center. In assessing it, the Center reported to Berlin in June 1931: "Materials, both undercover and documentary, about the activities of the Heimwehr in Austria give us the opportunity to get a complete picture of the development of this movement." The Berlin residency called him "one of the most valuable sources", noted his "initiative, good acquaintances and a good nose."

But this was not enough. In connection with the impending threat of the coming to power of the Nazis, Austria became important as a springboard for undercover coverage of the domestic and foreign policy of the National Socialist Party of Germany.

To carry out such a task, Thaler was presented as an exceptionally promising agent. But this required a restructuring of the entire work. Firstly, it was necessary that Thaler had a clear idea for whom and in the name of what he was working. Second, they needed more concrete and day-to-day leadership. The latter was especially important, given that Thaler was noticeably fond of leftist ideas, composed leaflets, and made presentations. He began to be called in the press "a paid communist". In the interests of the cause, it was necessary that Thaler stop such activities and enter into the confidence of the Nazis.

All this led to the decision to transfer him directly to the Berlin station for communications. To organize a meeting with him, his appeal to the Soviet embassy in Berlin for a tourist visa to the USSR was used.

An employee of the Berlin residency was sent to Vienna, who, as a representative of the embassy, appeared at Thaler's apartment and conveyed an invitation to come personally to Berlin in connection with his request for a visa. Sharing his impressions of Thaler, the residency officer

wrote to the Center: "He is an unconditional supporter of Soviet Russia and, although he seemed to work for some mythical American group, in essence (I was sure of this), if he did not know, then at least he suspected that his materials end up with the Bolsheviks."

The conversation with Thaler in Berlin went well. He showed no hesitation and willingly cooperated. In August 1931, he was transferred to the Vienna station for communication.

The results were not long in coming. On the recommendation of the residency, Thaler withdrew from political work, began to look for ways to get closer to his former friends among the Nazis, and in June 1933

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joined the Vienna organization of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. He made new contacts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Austria, as well as in the General Directorate for the Protection of Public Order of the Office of the Federal Chancellor of Austria. Thaler began to receive solid materials on the internal political situation.

At the same time, Thaler established contacts at the headquarters of the German Nazis - the "Brown House" in Munich, transmitted all orders from Munich to the Vienna "Brown House" to the residence. Gradually, Thaler managed to win the trust of the German Nazis.

Such an active behavior attracted the attention of the Austrian authorities to him. In September 1933, while Thaler was on holiday in Yugoslavia, his apartment in Vienna was searched, and on his return to Vienna he was arrested and charged with "illegal nationalist activities".

The report about Thaler's arrest to the Center said: Thaler "is being persecuted because two months ago, on our assignment, he contacted the local Nazis, who offered him to work for the SS."

The German Nazis provided Thaler with all possible support in this situation, including providing him with a free lawyer. However, the court sentenced him to 6 weeks in prison.
conclusions.

Despite the unpleasant aspects of this event, it objectively strengthened the confidence in Thaler on the part of local and German Nazis and played a positive role in his further work for Soviet intelligence.

After serving 6 weeks on his sentence, Thaler actively continues to strengthen his position with the Nazis. He establishes a correspondence with an old acquaintance from joint work in the Heimwehr, the former Austrian Police Commissioner Dr. Begus, who, being persecuted for Nazi activities, fled to Munich and headed intelligence in the Austrian direction in the Brown House ".

At the request of Begus, Thaler selects the right people in Austria for the German Nazis and practically creates a network of agents there, which includes mainly persons who held responsible positions in Austrian state institutions, including in the office of the Federal Chancellor, the Main Directorate of Public Security, the Ministry foreign affairs. To maintain the legend, Thaler passed part of the information obtained through this network to the intelligence of the Nazi party, but at first all the materials went to the Soviet intelligence.

In May 1934, Thaler went to Prague for a secret meeting of representatives of the National Socialist terrorist organizations in Germany and Austria. This became known to the Austrian police, and on his return from Prague he was arrested. Thaler categorically denied his participation in this meeting, declaring that he had traveled to Prague on his personal business affairs, but when I realized that

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he could not avoid arrest and investigation, asked permission to go to the apartment to put his personal affairs in order. The police commissioner did not object and let him go, accompanied by a policeman. By a happy coincidence, the policeman turned out to be an old acquaintance of Thaler and allowed him to "escape".

On May 15, 1934, Thaler was already in Salzburg, from where he was illegally transported to Munich. This is where his old friendship with Dr. Begus came in handy, who met him with open arms and immediately offered him to become his deputy in charge of the Nazi intelligence bureau in the Austrian direction. A few months later, Thaler was already heading this bureau. In one of the Soviet intelligence reports, he wrote: after two arrests and an escape to Munich, "I was dressed in the halo of a 'martyr', and thus my political past was to some extent forgotten."

In the autumn of 1934, the unit in which Thaler worked was disbanded, and he was transferred to the Forschungsamt, the so-called research service of the German Air Ministry. Behind this harmless name was Goering's intelligence service. Thaler moved to Berlin. This greatly facilitated communication and obtaining information. At first everything went fine. Thaler's position in the Forschungsamt was secure. Intelligence capabilities have expanded. By that time, he was in charge of about 20 Nazi agents in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Our residency reported to the Center: Thaler "gives us a lot of documents, including those that expose Nazi and other agents."

In connection with the flight to Germany, Thaler entrusted the leadership of the intelligence network he created in Austria to his assistant, nicknamed "Meisner". The latter did not know at first that the materials obtained by his agents were going not only to Munich, but also to Moscow. But soon he was informed of this. He was taken into contact by the Vienna residency, and the work of the group went more intensively. It seemed that the near future did not bode well.

But in June 1935, a message came from Thaler in which he wrote about intrigues against him coming from the Brown House. Rumors spread about his former left-wing activities in Austria, including that in 1932 he received a suitcase of money from Moscow for his services; reports were made to the police. "But the work, good connections and excessive exaggeration of rumors about me," Thaler wrote, "did not cause doubts in the Forschungsamt about my sincerity ... Nevertheless, the Gestapo is extremely hostile to me and can clean me up together with other suspicious elements during the next "cleansing" ... At the moment, I am not in danger, since I am under the protection of the Forschungsamt. However, the position of the Forschungsamt is not so strong that it

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could provide me with absolute protection ... I feel as if I am sitting in a steam boiler heated to the last limit, the valves of which are still working, but they will just refuse to serve, and then the boiler will explode.

But the "cauldron" did not have time to explode, and the danger that interrupted Thaler's cooperation with Soviet intelligence came from a completely different direction. In the autumn of 1935, Thaler announced that the division in which he worked at the Forschungsamt was to be liquidated and he might be left without a job. In order to discuss the situation that had arisen, he suggested organizing a meeting in Prague between him, "Meisner" and an employee of the Berlin residency, with whom he was in contact. The center approved the proposal. To disguise the purpose of the trip, Thaler's passion for football was chosen: he went to Prague under the pretext of attending an international football match between Czechoslovakia and Austria. He also legalized his trip in front of the Forschungsamt, having received a number of official assignments from the leadership, including to find in Prague a Nazi intelligence liaison, the Sudeten German Le Grosse. This task became fatal for Thaler.

No one knew that Le Grosse was also an informant for the Czech counterintelligence. On the day of arrival in Prague, October 25, 1935, Thaler sought out Le Grosse and held a meeting with him, and the next morning, Thaler, Meisner, and an employee of the Berlin residency, who had gathered for a meeting in a cafe, were arrested by the Czechoslovak police. The Czech police were extremely surprised by the participation of a Soviet citizen in a meeting with active Nazis, but he was released.

Communication with Thaler has since been cut off. However, the agent network he created in Austria continued to operate successfully.

What happened to Thaler later became known only after the war from captured Gestapo documents in Germany, among which Thaler's court case dated 1940 was discovered. It turned out that after the capture of Czechoslovakia in 1938, the Gestapo stumbled upon the investigation of Thaler, which was conducted by the Czechs in connection with his arrest in Prague in 1935. From it, they learned that Thaler, as a result of torture, and also in the face of evidence - a notebook with notes found in his possession indicating his involvement in German intelligence agencies - was forced to testify. However, he categorically denied his connection with Soviet intelligence, stating that the Soviet citizen arrested with him was his agent, that is, an agent of German intelligence.

The Czechs, apparently, believed him, but put him in a dilemma: either a 15-year sentence in prison, or agreeing to work for them against Germany. Thaler chose the latter and in mid-February 1936 was "expelled" to Germany. He was given a conditional address for establishing a connection, which he used only once in order to evade communication under a plausible pretext.

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cooperation with Czechoslovak intelligence. Until 1938, he worked in various judicial bodies in Germany, and then left for Austria.

After Thaler's Czech investigation fell into the hands of the Gestapo, he was arrested in March 1939 on charges of treason and in September 1940 sentenced to 9 months in prison. The unusually lenient punishment was explained by the fact that the court took into account a number of mitigating circumstances in the verdict: "impeccability in the past, membership in the NSDAP, and also the fact that he suffered greatly from the cruel treatment of the Czechs." Not the last role was played by the fact that, being a lawyer himself, Thaler skillfully defended himself in court. As a result, he was convicted only for being negligent in taking with him to Prague a notebook with secret official information.
notes.

A document has been preserved in the foreign intelligence archive, which analyzes the entire period of Thaler's cooperation. This analysis emphasizes his honest cooperation with Soviet intelligence. Neither during the investigation in Prague in 1935, nor then in Berlin in 1939, did he reveal his connection with Soviet intelligence. When comparing the materials of the Gestapo court case with the materials of the archival file on Thaler, it is concluded that he skillfully and deftly combined work in the Forschungsamt with work for us. His main work was cooperation with us.

In June 1945, the head of the Soviet foreign intelligence, Lieutenant General P.M. Fitin received a memo from the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence SMERSH: "Austrian Thaler Franz, born in Kuvstein, lived in the city of Kuvstein, appeared at the SMERSH Directorate of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Vene, who stated that from 1932 to 1935 he was in contact with the workers of the Soviet trade mission of Gardin and Masing, he had the password "Miner" to communicate with them. Please check and let us know if these data correspond to reality."

It immediately became clear - they correspond! This is Thaler. Work with him was resumed and continued for many more years.

"Grangle of Beer"

On September 18, 1927, the German steamer "Praeusen", which arrived from Leningrad, moored at the passenger pier in Hamburg. On board was a group of Russian emigrants and about twenty foreigners: businessmen, two journalists and a small orchestra from Bavaria.

Foreign passengers were released first. The emigration authorities and customs officials briefly checked the documents and luggage. No questions arose.

Together with this group, a young man of about thirty came out, according to his passport - an Austrian businessman Max Weiner. Except for the youngest person, no one in the group, of course, knew that his name and profession indicated in the passport were not real. His clothes, manners and language did not distinguish him from other foreigners. On the boat, he did not communicate with anyone and therefore did not linger with his fellow travelers, took a taxi and headed to the railway station.

In the station building, Weiner suddenly ran into a man: a square, crimson face, a deep scar running from his left eye to his earlobe. The imaginary businessman quickly turned away and went to the side. But it was too late.

- I recognized you! He heard a familiar hoarse voice behind him.

I had to stop.

"Ah, Mr. Kaufman, glad to see you!" - the "merchant" said with mock goodwill in his voice.

"Have you come to Germany again to stir up the workers?"

"You are mistaken, mister policeman, I have already passed that age. Came on company business. I am returning home to Vienna.

"That's commendable, though hard to believe," Kaufman said.

The conversation didn't stick. The young man was most afraid that Kaufman would demand his passport. Everything would be revealed right away: after all

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The real name of the "merchant" was well known to the policeman. If he had exposed him, it would not have been possible to escape the arrest.

But Kaufman was benevolent, he boasted that he had been transferred with a promotion to Hamburg and that soon all the Reds would be "kaput". Nodding casually, he went to the buffet, where beer and sausages were briskly traded...

Kaufman had a good professional memory. He remembered very well how in 1921 in Bremen he arrested this guy, Bertolt Ilck, who organized the strike. The guy also did not forget the iron fists of the law enforcement officer, which he set in motion when a group of arrested people were being taken to prison. But the most unpleasant and annoying thing was that Kaufman could inform his superiors about the appearance of B. Ilk in Germany, and then the search would begin even before the scout began to carry out the task.

In the morning the train arrived in Berlin. B. Ilk chose a modest but quite respectable hotel and registered under the name of David Fuchs, a businessman from Copenhagen. He destroyed his old passport. After assessing the situation, he came to the conclusion that there was no direct danger for him, and with a new passport in his pocket, he could act boldly, not forgetting, of course, the need to observe certain security measures. Who was this man really and with what task did he come to Germany?

Berthold Karlovich Ilk was born in Austria-Hungary in 1896. A lawyer by training, he graduated from the gymnasium and foreign trade academy in Vienna. He spoke German, Polish, English and Russian. In 1921 he was arrested in Germany as a Bolshevik, but was soon released, in 1925 he was again imprisoned in Hungary, a year later he fled and moved to the USSR. Soon he was hired by intelligence under the pseudonym Beer.

When deciding to send Beer to Germany to organize intelligence work, the leadership of the INO OGPU took into account the presence of negative factors in terms of security, but at the same time they took into account the professional and personal qualities of the future leader of an illegal organization: experience in underground work, good knowledge of the situation in Germany and neighboring countries, remarkable organizational skills.

Just such a person was needed to solve the tasks: Beer was to create the first illegal residency in the history of Soviet foreign intelligence - an underground organization capable of conducting intelligence work in several countries, in a kind of "triangle": the Balkans (Belgrade, Sofia, Bucharest) - the Baltic direction (Warsaw, the Baltic States, Helsinki) - the western direction (Paris, London and some adjacent

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countries). Berlin was supposed to become the center of this invisible "triangle".

The choice of Germany for this purpose was explained, first of all, by the fact that the country is located in the center of Europe, surrounded by states where the largest anti-Soviet formations are concentrated. From the territory of Germany it was possible to get to any of these countries literally in a matter of hours. In addition, Germany itself had numerous emigrant organizations on its territory. It was also taken into account that the German administrative and police regime in those years was not very strict and allowed people of various nationalities to freely visit the country.

In order to start active intelligence work, Beer had to gain a foothold in the country. And above all - get a job suitable for these purposes. Skillfully using his former connections, he came into contact with a German - the owner of a toy factory. After some time, he contributed his share and became a co-owner of the business. Officially, he held the position of the company's business manager, in fact, his companion did all the main work, while Beer got the opportunity to actively engage in the creation of a residency.

According to the plan, the arrival of assistants to Beer was planned, who were to be responsible for the work of individual areas. The Center did not always have the capacity to provide the seconded employees with the relevant documents. Therefore, the resident devoted a lot of time to searching for people through whom it was possible to obtain the necessary passports.

Beer devoted a lot of effort to acquiring sources of information. Already in June 1928, he sent the first secret information to Moscow about the economic situation of some Baltic countries and other information, including a list of officials from the security services.

By the end of 1929, Beer's residency already had up to forty agents. Of these, ten people were sources of particularly important information.

In terms of its organizational structure, the residency consisted of operational groups independent of each other, which were led by assistants to the resident or senior groups. Beer himself, in one of his letters to the Center, gives the following description of residency: "In building my organization, I laid the basic principle that individual groups are absolutely not connected with each other, which completely excludes the possibility of one group failing through another. This strict secrecy was carried out by me consistently and within the framework of each group. So, for example, in the "Hoffmann" group, nothing is known about the existence of another group. In the same way, in the central apparatus of the residency, the courier, the safekeeping and address points are absolutely concealed from each other.

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Moreover, for each of my groups there are separate couriers, different addresses and safe houses.

Beer's deputy resident was "Julius" — Weinstein (Guchkov) Morits Iosifovich, born in 1901, a native of Latvia. In 1924 he graduated from the legal department of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Moscow State University. In addition to the functions of a deputy resident, he had a group of agents in Germany in touch, led the agents operating in England, and was responsible for work along the "Jewish line" (purchasing sources, auxiliary agents, etc. from among persons of Jewish nationality).

Resident's assistant Bart was based in Riga and worked with sources working in Latvia and other Baltic countries. He was a native of Latvia, had a doctorate in economics.

The work in Poland was headed by a German citizen, a relative of Beer's companion, nicknamed "Malts". In Danzig, the work was carried out by "Ios", an English citizen, a student at the Danzig Polytechnic. The work on the Ukrainian nationalists was headed by an assistant to the resident, who had the pseudonym "Igor". The Balkan line closed directly on the resident.

In addition to the above directions, there were separate sources that worked in France, the USA and some other countries.

The English group included the head of a department of one of the ministries of England. He received classified information, including information related to the Soviet Union. The group also included the personal secretary of the chairman and an employee of the secretariat of the vice-chairman of one of the political parties in England. From these two sources, a large amount of political information was received, which was related not only to the activities of the party, but also to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet of Ministers itself.

A former Polish intelligence officer successfully worked on Polish issues. Through his connections in the Polish secret services, he obtained very useful information about the most active anti-Soviet part of the emigration from Russia and Ukraine, connected with the Polish intelligence agencies.

Serious information came from an AA/30 source who was an employee of the Polish embassy in Berlin. From him came documents on the development of Polish-German relations, minutes of negotiations, information concerning contacts with England, France and other countries, as well as instructions from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to their embassies in Europe.

A large and important work was carried out by the source AA/36, who worked in the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland. He was involved in the preparation of top secret documents for the government of his country. Copies of these documents are regularly received

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whether in residency and sent to Moscow. Among them were materials relating to relations with the USSR and the activities of extremist white émigré formations.

AA/29 source, a German journalist who had connections in the highest circles of German society, was very active in Germany. He managed to obtain secret information about the internal political situation of the country, the dangerous forms of manifestation of the National Socialist movement and the connections of its leaders with the leadership of large German banks and concerns.

An active source was AA/8, who was connected with the pacifist movement in Germany and had the opportunity to visit other countries regularly. Through his friends, newspapermen and writers, he obtained noteworthy information related to the development of political processes on the European continent.

A valuable source was also AA /31, an employee of one of the most influential magazines in Riga. Using his connections in government circles, he obtained information about the activities of Western intelligence services in Latvia, Estonia and Finland, the purpose of which was to use these countries as a springboard for subversive work against the USSR.

The residency also had agents among the Russian White émigré organizations.

Each group had several secret apartments, points of contact, one or two couriers or messengers. The source, as a rule, closed to one of the apartments or transmitted materials through a specific point of contact. Couriers and messengers kept in touch only with the head of the group and did not know other members of the residency. However, the rules of conspiracy were sometimes violated, which subsequently led to the failure of several agents.

The Center closely followed the activities of the residency and commented on the information it sent. Some material, especially from newly acquired and insufficiently verified sources, has been subjected to serious criticism. Assessing the latest information received from Beer's residency, the head of the INO OGPU A.Kh. Artuzov emphasized that its main shortcomings are "correspondent character" and "passion for economic issues that are not the main ones for us."

"Try," the letter pointed out, "to firmly turn this work towards covering the activities of the imperialist countries ... directly or indirectly directed against us."

The assessment of information at the Center and the criticisms expressed were taken into account by Beer in his work, and he took measures to improve

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improving its quality, obtaining information that Moscow needed.

Over time, the weak points of the residency became more and more contrasting - for example, providing employees with reliable documents. The desire to acquire these documents as soon as possible led to the establishment of contacts with insufficiently verified, and sometimes even random persons. This, in turn, led to a simplified execution of documents, and as a result, to the impossibility of their more or less long-term use. At the same time, the nature of the activities of the members of the residency required frequent trips not only within the country, but also across borders. Police and border officials could draw attention to inconsistencies that were often found in passports, for example, between the appearance of the passport holder and the data entered in the document, as well as sometimes not knowing the language of the country of which the intelligence agent pretended to be a citizen.

A study of residency archival materials shows that in a number of cases the work of acquiring sources and assistants was carried out without a sufficiently deep and patient study and verification of candidates. In addition, at that time there was a practice when the leaders of groups and individual intelligence officers independently decided the issue of acquiring sources and auxiliary personnel. They reported to the leadership of the residency only on the results of their work. This led to lack of control and errors. As a result, people who did not meet the requirements for them fell into the existing working network.

A big brake on improving the activities of the residency was its cumbersomeness. It was simply impossible to effectively manage such a large illegal organization operating in 15 countries and numbering about 50 employees.

In the middle of 1930, the Center came to the conclusion that it was necessary to break down the residency. It was decided to separate the Polish-Baltic side of the "triangle" into an independent illegal organization, putting at the head of it a staff member of the INO, an illegal intelligence officer named Mond. The main task of Beer's residency was to work in Germany, England and France.

In 1931-1932, several failures of agents occurred in the residency of Beer. In February 1933, the Center decided to disband it, and Beer was recalled to Moscow.

Bertold Karlovich Ilk worked abroad for five and a half years, devoted a lot of energy to solving the tasks assigned to him. In the future, his work experience was very useful in organizing new illegal residencies.

Just before leaving for Moscow, he again had to face Kaufman, which he had been afraid of all these years. Square, fleshy

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the scarred face was looking at him again, but this time... from a newspaper page. The article spoke about the dispersal of a demonstration of workers in Hamburg by stormtroopers. The "heroes" of the Hamburg massacre were filmed against the backdrop of the city hall. The caption under the photo said that the stormtroopers were led by Sturmführer Kaufman.

Ilk once again looked with dislike at the face of this man and said to his comrade:

- Things are bad for the Germans if people like Kaufman come to the fore. They can crucify Germany and push her into the abyss...

He crumpled up the newspaper and threw it into the wastebasket.

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The feat of the scout Kaminsky

On July 4, 1936, Carl Peter Nordmann, arrested on May 23 of the same year, was brought from the Saint-Antoine prison to the Geneva prosecutor's office on charges of espionage. There was a lawyer in the prosecutor's office. The prosecutor told the detainee:

- Mr. Nordman - or how are you? The Commission of Inquiry has decided to release you pending trial on bail of 10,000 Swiss francs. You are required to report to the police station weekly and report your whereabouts. You are not allowed to leave the city. Come and sign here.

Nordman put his signature.

- You have questions? the prosecutor asked.

— I would like to get my passport.

- The passport will remain with us, especially since it is fake.

- Mr. Prosecutor, I protest! I received this passport from the Danish Embassy in Rome on legal grounds.

"During the investigation, you played silent, and now you started talking ... Look, the prosecutor took some paper from the table and began to read: "In response to your inquiry about Danish citizen Carl Peter Nordman, we inform you that such is in the books of those born and residents of the city does not mean. The Danish embassy in Rome replied that the passport number ... was not issued."

"The investigator has already told me about this," Nordman replied calmly. "But there is some mistake here.

- No mistake! retorted the prosecutor. — We checked twice.

"Wait for me in the waiting room," the lawyer asked as Nordman went to the door.

— Mr. Prosecutor, maybe you would still give him the document? After all, without a passport, you can't even get into a hotel.

- What are you worried about, lawyer? This guy can find a way to get where he wants to go without this passport. We would have it

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so simply not released, if the press did not inflate the whole campaign. Here, look at what they write in today's newspapers: "There is a clear absurdity in relation to Nordman. He, a man who sought to prevent a terrorist act, is being kept in prison, and a terrorist, Colonel Konovalov, who has more than one "wet case" behind him, freely roams the streets of Geneva.

The lawyer went to the waiting room, where his client was waiting for him. They went outside together. The lawyer gave him his business card and told him to come to his office tomorrow.

Nordman was left alone in the street, went up to a small square, sat down on a bench and for about ten minutes admired the work of two gardeners who were watering a flower bed with beautiful flowers. After prison, this square seemed to him a piece of paradise.

Then he got up, walked quickly down the street and into the first cafe he came across.

The prosecutor was not mistaken: the passport was indeed fake, and this man was not Nordman at all, but a resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence, Ivan Nikolaevich Kaminsky (pseudonym Mond).

Born in 1896 in the village. Kornin, Skvirsky district, Kyiv province, Ukrainian, from a peasant family. Until the age of 14, he lived in the countryside, went to school in the winter, and on holidays from the age of 10 worked for the landowner in the field.

Then his father brought him to Moscow and gave him as an "errand boy" to the book publishing house "Agronomist". Later, Ivan worked in a loan office and studied at the same time. Graduated from high school without interruption from work. In 1915 he was called up for military service, graduated from the ensign school, was sent to the Romanian front, rose to the rank of second lieutenant.

After the October Revolution, he returned to his homeland, where the Germans ruled. Together with his comrades, he organized the 1st Volyn insurrectionary revolutionary division in the rear of the Petliura troops, after it was reorganized into the regular 1st Volyn rifle regiment, he was appointed commander of the regiment. He was seriously wounded in the battles and was being treated in Moscow. Upon discharge from the hospital, he was sent to work in the Special Department of the IBSC. In 1922 he was transferred to work in the INO GPU. Since that time, his work in intelligence began. The first five trips abroad were on a legal basis. In 1922-1924 he worked as an assistant to the resident in Poland, in 1924-1925 he worked as an assistant to the resident in Czechoslovakia. From 1925 to 1927 - a resident in Latvia, in 1927 - a resident in Italy, in 1929-1930 - a resident in Finland.

During eight years of business trips abroad in senior positions, Ivan Nikolaevich gained extensive experience in intelligence work, studied the host countries well, and mastered several foreign languages. In a description written in 1931,

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it was noted that "Kaminsky is a good organizer, he fully justified himself in independent work, he worked successfully abroad, he is honest in all respects."

When the question arose about dividing Beer's residency, the leadership of the INO suggested that Kaminsky head the illegal residency, which he was supposed to form from the eastern

sides of the Beer triangle. The intelligence officer took this for granted, despite the fact that he was known as a Soviet diplomat in all countries where he now had to work from illegal positions.

Since there were already failures in Beer's residency, Mond was instructed to carefully deal with the personnel, weed out agents that arouse suspicion, get rid of unhelpful connections, make the organization more compact structurally, strengthen control over the work of employees, strictly demand observance of the rules of secrecy and security.

The most active group was Weber - I.I. Brochis. This wonderful man needs to be told in more detail. He was a native of Russia, from the family of a large manufacturer of a millionaire of Polish origin. Brochis connected his fate with intelligence in somewhat unusual conditions. In 1917, having left for the Far East in order to help out his father's goods stuck there, he "stuck" himself until the establishment of Soviet power. In the Far East, he met a Chekist-intelligence officer, whom he assisted during the occupation of the region by the Japanese. Brochis was recommended for work in intelligence. When Brochis returned to Poland, he entered the residence of Beer, and then Kaminsky.

As a big businessman, he had extensive connections in government circles and could obtain secret information from the leadership of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Interior and from the Minister of War. He acquired several very valuable sources from among the officials of these departments. Obtained documentary information about the plans and practical actions of the Polish authorities directed against the USSR

He also received information about impending provocations by Russian and Ukrainian terrorist groups operating under the auspices of the Polish special services on the Polish-Soviet border.

Brochis was assisted in intelligence work by his sister, who maintained a safe house for meetings with some sources. Brochis had a branch of his firm in Berlin and therefore often visited Germany, brought intelligence materials and passed them on to Mond at secret meetings.

Kaminsky liked Brochis: solid, calm, and exceptionally brave. Deep down, the resident worried about him.

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His former work in the residency of Beer inspired fear. In case of suspicion, he had to immediately leave for Berlin.

But the tragedy that later unfolded in Warsaw, paradoxically, began precisely in Berlin. On one of his visits, Brochis noticed that he was under surveillance. Then the German police searched his office and Berlin apartment. The police department where he was brought tried to accuse him of spying for Poland. But a few days later he was released due to lack of evidence.

Nevertheless, Kaminsky instructed him to leave for Switzerland. He was not supposed to appear in Poland under any circumstances. Kaminsky was sure that such a disciplined worker as Brochis would unquestioningly carry out his instructions.

But the unexpected happened. Together with Brochis, his wife was in Berlin, and their young son remained in Poland. The couple agreed that the husband would go to Switzerland, the wife to Warsaw, and after some time she and her son would arrive in Zurich.

Then the plan was changed a little. Brochis decided to accompany his wife to the border with Poland, change trains there and head to Switzerland. At the entrance to the transfer point

German territory Brochis suddenly decided to follow to Warsaw. And in a couple of days he intended to quietly leave for Switzerland.

A few days later, he was arrested by Polish counterintelligence at the train station while trying to travel abroad. The Warsaw District Court, after a two-day trial, sentenced Brochis and one of his assistants to death by hanging. The execution took place in the presence of officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - as if to edify them, since the intelligence assistant was from this department.

During the investigation and at the trial, Brochis held firm and did not betray anyone. Courageously accepted death and his assistant.

Brochis' wife was allowed two visits with him: one at the trial during a break, and the other two hours before the execution. The scout could not tell her much, since security was present during the meetings. However, he managed to whisper that she turned to Soviet intelligence officers for help. The wife and son of Brochis managed to be illegally taken to the USSR, where, at the request of the leadership of foreign intelligence, they were granted Soviet citizenship.

The failure led to new arrests of members of the group, among whom was the sister of Brochis. Emergency measures were taken to withdraw from Poland employees and agents whose connection with the Brochis group could be established by Polish counterintelligence. In connection with the failure of the Brochis group, the Center instructed Kaminsky to take out to his homeland or transfer to other countries the members of the residency,

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which could attract the attention of the Polish and German counterintelligence.

After the work on localizing the failure was completed, Ivan Nikolaevich was offered to leave for Moscow. But he did not stay long at home. Already in the spring of 1934, he was sent to Paris as a resident of an illegal residency to work on emigrant terrorist organizations in France, Belgium and Switzerland. In addition, it was planned to solve individual tasks along this line in Germany and Poland.

The residency had to be created almost from scratch. In addition to two or three sources and a messenger named "Zhanna", there was no one at Kaminsky's disposal. Painstaking work began to acquire sources, and after a year and a half Kaminsky had his people in the most important objects of intelligence interest.

There were also many difficulties. Particularly difficult was the work of introducing the right people into the entourage of Colonel Konoalets, who led the OUN terrorist group and was known for his fierce hatred not only for the USSR, but also for Poland. He was born in Eastern Galicia, which then belonged to Austria, and after the war passed to Poland. As an Austrian officer, he was captured by the Russians. A year and a half later, he escaped from captivity and joined the struggle for the separation of Ukraine from Poland and Russia. Then he moved to Vienna, from 1923 to 1930 he lived in Berlin, and after that he moved to Geneva and began to engage in journalistic activities.

After the assassination of the Polish Minister Peracki in the summer of 1934, the press reported on the statement of the Polish Minister of Justice, who blamed the OUN and Colonel Konoalets for the murder. The OUN was also credited with the murder of several more Polish citizens, among whom were high-ranking officials of the state bodies of Poland.

But it was Konoalets who headed the military wing of the OUN. After the USSR joined the League of Nations, he began preparing a terrorist act against the Soviet delegation. The main target in this operation was to be People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov.

The Center instructed Kaminsky to intensify the study of Konovalets and his entourage, to create an opportunity to monitor the actions of terrorists. Kaminsky moved to Switzerland and, on the recommendation of the Paris "legal" residency, established contact with a relative of a trusted source, a young girl Teresa. She was characterized as a completely reliable person and could help Ivan Nikolaevich in the selection of people to organize surveillance of Konovalets and his group. Time was short, the terrorists could begin to act at any moment, and we had to hurry. You

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boron fell on Teresa also because her fiancé worked in the police and he had access to a file cabinet on persons under suspicion. Kaminsky was sure that Konovalets should go through the police file, and interesting materials were probably kept there.

In the process of contact with the girl, Kaminsky tried to establish an acquaintance with her fiancé. However, he soon became convinced that it is best to act through it. And the groom needed money in connection with the upcoming wedding, and therefore, Teresa's proposal to transfer the materials agreed. The fiancé completed the first task for Konovalets quickly and accurately, giving a detailed police instruction: biographical data, past work, current occupation, a number of contacts, address.

Then Teresa's brother was involved in the development of Konovalets. Kaminsky needed to organize direct observation of the terrorist leader's group. The brother was instructed to conduct covert surveillance of Konovalets himself, some members of his group, and, if possible, to reveal their intentions.

Unfortunately, further work on Konovalets had to be stopped due to the intervention of the Swiss police. As it turned out later, Teresa's fiancé lost his temper and reported to his superiors about the proposal made to him. The police arrested Teresa's brother, and then Kaminsky himself. During interrogation, the brother confessed to everything. Teresa was detained, but not arrested. During interrogations, she behaved more cautiously, admitted the fact of acquaintance with the intelligence officer, but reduced everything to a purely personal relationship.

An analysis of the circumstances of the failure and the prevailing situation gave the Center reason to believe that the Swiss authorities were not interested in inflating the hype around this case. Therefore, it was decided to hire an experienced lawyer and build Kaminsky's defense on the fact that he had no intentions to inflict any damage on Switzerland, and he dealt exclusively with issues of ensuring the security of the Soviet delegation in the League of Nations. This version was prepared in case of a trial and the presentation of irrefutable evidence that Kaminsky was a Soviet citizen. It corresponded to reality, and the Swiss police knew what was going on. In addition, the version would be understandable to the public if they knew about the trial.

However, things took a different, more favorable turn. During the investigation, Kaminsky behaved in an exceptionally dignified and professional manner. He did not deviate from the "legend", stubbornly asserted that he was not connected with the USSR, did not give any evidence, and even went on a hunger strike in protest against his mistreatment.

To find out the identity of the arrested person, the police authorities sent a request to the place of his birth indicated in the passport.

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But that didn't clear anything up either. The scout stubbornly stood his ground and argued that the local bureaucrats had mixed everything up.

The investigators who conducted the interrogation found themselves in a very difficult situation: they not only could not prove that the arrested person was engaged in espionage, in which he was charged

charge, but they were not even able to establish his identity. This was seen by the higher authorities as a serious failure in their work. In order to achieve the desired results, various forms of physical and mental influence began to be applied to the scout. He was placed in a strict regime solitary cell, food - bread and water - only twice a day, deprivation of walks and other measures that, according to the investigators, were supposed to weaken the will and undermine the physical condition of the arrested person. In such conditions, Ivan Nikolaevich spent two weeks.

The firmness of Kaminsky led to the fact that police officials began to have doubts about his guilt. In addition, the press began to exert a certain influence on this matter. Some newspapers came to the defense of the arrested person and criticized the authorities for taking the side of the terrorist Konovalts and hiding the victim in prison.

In the end, the prosecutor's office informed the lawyer that she was ready to release the arrested person. So Kaminsky was free. But this freedom was still far from real. He remained under police surveillance, who could arrest him at any time. In addition, he did not have any documents in his hands.

For an illegal departure from Switzerland, Kaminsky decided to use the data he received at one time from a Geneva taxi driver. On the territory of France, not far from the Swiss border, there was one place of entertainment, which was visited by the Swiss and employees of the League of Nations. It was possible to go there without presenting documents when crossing the border. The scout, convinced of the safety of the route, calmly proceeded across the border, and then transferred to the train and a few hours later was in Paris.

The operation according to the planned scenario against Konovalts did not take place. However, although at a cost, the actions taken have served their purpose. The Swiss authorities, concerned that the man's personality had begun to attract too much public attention, banned him from Swiss territory. The plans developed against the Soviet delegation were frustrated.

Ivan Nikolaevich could no longer continue to work in France, for sure the Swiss police warned the French about his possible appearance in the country. Therefore, Kaminsky took the necessary security measures - he changed his appearance somewhat, appeared on the street mainly in the evening, did not maintain contacts with the old

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our acquaintances. Soon he was transferred to Moscow and after a short rest he began to work in the central office of the INO as the head of the department. At that time, it was quite a high position. INO consisted of several departments, their chiefs were part of the leading core of intelligence.

The memorandum of the head of the INO Slutsky addressed to the Commissar of Internal Affairs noted the positive work of Kaminsky in fulfilling the task assigned to him, his courageous behavior during imprisonment, and contained a petition for awarding him a second badge "Honorary Chekist".

The further fate of Ivan Nikolaevich was tragic. In 1938, he was arrested on a false denunciation and sentenced to a long prison term. However, in 1944 he was unexpectedly released from prison and returned to work in the central office.

At this time, operations began to neutralize Bandera. Ivan Nikolayevich had extensive experience in working against Ukrainian nationalist formations abroad. Many of their participants during the war served in fascist punitive or security detachments. At the end of the war, the Bandera leaders launched sabotage work in the rear of the Red Army. The fight against Bandera was complicated by the lack of personnel who knew their methods of action. It was then that they remembered Kaminsky. His case was reviewed, and he was back in the ranks.

The scout went headlong into work, as if there were no six years in prison. However, fate was again harsh on him. During a business trip to Western Ukraine, he died from the bullets of Bandera. Thus, the path of this courageous man ended at a military post.

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What was hidden under the designations X and XY?

Revanchist aspirations and political processes that seized Germany in the 1930s demanded that foreign intelligence pay attention not only to the political and military spheres, but also to scientific and technical ones.

In July 1925, the INO OGPU received a request from the Economic Department of the Supreme Council of National Economy: "It would be desirable to receive reviews not of a general order, but for individual industries, giving a detailed economic analysis of the situation. Such material would be of great interest to us, since a lot of data is hidden by firms and governments."

October 26, 1925 from F.E. Dzerzhinsky, who at that time was the Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, the INO OGPU received a proposal: "I think we need to create an information body at the INO about the achievements of foreign technology." The date of this note is considered the beginning of the formation of technical intelligence as one of the activities of the country's foreign intelligence.

On March 5, 1926, the Military-Industrial Directorate of the Supreme Council of National Economy compiled for the INO a "List of Questions for Foreign Information" and instructed "... to send it through your agency in a completely confidential way... directly abroad." The task of the USSR government consisted of the following three sections:

— protection of defense industry enterprises from the means of attack by the enemy, the subtleties of the production of various types of military equipment and the requirements for materials used for their manufacture;

— production of various types of explosives, incendiary and lighting compositions, the latest poisonous substances and means of protection against their effects, information on the location of the respective enterprises;

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— information on the organization, planning, material and personnel support of the work of defense industry enterprises in the prewar and war periods, as well as on the mobilization of civilian industry enterprises to carry out military orders.

The intelligence leadership was faced with the question of organizing intelligence activities abroad along the technical line, or, as it was also called, line X. In particular, in these years it was a question of combining work from legal and illegal positions. First, separate illegal intelligence groups were created, which were reduced to residencies with the arrival of illegal intelligence officers. Such groups of various sizes existed in 1927-1930 in the USA, Great Britain, and Germany. Along with obtaining political information, they obtained information of a military-technical nature. Agents were acquired from among politicians, informed engineers of large industrial corporations associated with military production.

For example, Dietrich Ernest Preuer, born in 1877, a German, member of the Reichstag and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Union of German Industrialists, professor at the University of Königsberg, came to the attention of illegal intelligence in Germany. It follows from the available archival materials that he was involved in cooperation in 1929 together with his secretary Gertrud Lorenz, and each knew about the cooperation of the other with the USSR.

intelligence work was received during their visit to the Soviet Union. Having connections in the industrial circles of Germany, Preyer, until 1932, provided extensive information about the position of German industrialists in relation to the USSR, descriptions of patents, and technological processes. Preyer and Lorentz worked on a material basis.

A variety of information was received through intelligence channels, in particular, about testing aircraft equipment, artillery systems, new poisonous substances, oil refining and the use of its by-products, about a plant for the hydrogenation of brown coal, and radio equipment for military use.

One of the most active foreign intelligence officers in the scientific and technical field was Abram Osipovich Eingorn. He was born in Odessa in 1899, a security officer since 1919, a participant in the Civil War. Traveled illegally to Turkey, Greece, Palestine, France, Germany. Eingorn began working at INO OSHU in 1925. From 1926 to 1927 he was with his wife Claudia Ivanovna Mazalova in Italy as part of a legal residency. After returning, he began training for work in the United States, but from an illegal position.

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In the United States, the intelligence officer acted as a businessman engaged in market research, the possibility of purchasing machinery and equipment, allegedly with the aim of opening his representative office in Iran or the Middle East. Communication with him was carried out without interruptions and interference by mail and through couriers, the results of the work were highly appreciated by the intelligence leadership. On line X, the group of A.O. Eingorn received and sent to the Center a complete set of drawings of one of Sikorsky's military aircraft.

In 1931, one of the reports addressed to the deputy chairman of the OGPU Messing said: "Recently, work on technical intelligence in America has greatly revived. The work had to be re-started, and given that until last year the results were low, now these successes must be recognized as enormous. We received materials on the chemical industry (according to an estimate, the savings amounted to 1 million dollars), comprehensive materials on the Packard diesel engine. Regular communication has been established with America (live, illegal). This is a great merit of Comrade Eingorn A.O., who under difficult conditions did a great deal of operational work, having fully completed the tasks entrusted to him. Eingorn has been an employee of the Cheka-OGPU since 1919, most of which worked from illegal positions that require exceptional devotion, personal courage and risk. I petition for the awarding of Eingorn with the badge "Honorary Chekist".

One of Eingorn's sources was the agent "Pop" - a Russian, an adviser to a number of American firms on the Russian market. He had extensive connections, including in the US government. Eingorn and his group did a lot to obtain American and Canadian document forms (sometimes even with Austrian and German visas) for our illegal intelligence.

Continuing to work in the USA, Eingorn traveled to China and Japan to fulfill the tasks of the Center. The purpose of the trips was to organize the import of American military goods to Japan and then deliver them to the Union. For these purposes, a special company was created in the USA, the president of which was an American businessman.

In the early 1930s, the decision-making bodies of the country made a decision to switch to military technical intelligence (XI). The reasons for this were the emergence of a military danger from fascist Germany and the openly hostile attitude of Japan towards the USSR. The Center informed the residencies about "the reorganization of the system of work on technical intelligence, hereinafter referred to as XU, which is now being given very serious importance and it ... is organizationally separated into an independent area of work."

Military-technical intelligence knew where to direct its efforts, what methods and means to use to effectively solve the tasks facing it. A reliable, although

German

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numerous intelligence apparatus. For example, in England, in parallel with the "legal" in the early 1930s, an illegal residency was operating, supplying extensive documentary, including secret, information about many new types of weapons for the army and navy. In one of the special reports of foreign intelligence to the Council of People's Commissars, more than 50 information of interest was indicated on aviation, radio engineering, chemistry, bacteriology, and military shipbuilding.

Valentin Petrovich Notaryev, born in 1903, from Yaroslavl, was one of the intelligence workers on the XU line in the 1930s. He worked in the state security organs since 1919, since 1931 - in the INO OGPU. In 1931-1932 he was on a business trip in Germany. While working in the trade mission, he received confidentially materials on oil, rolling mills, and issues of military equipment. In 1932 he was transferred to France (also through XY), worked with agents, received materials necessary for industry and of defense importance. In the late 1930s, he was in the USA (Los Angeles and San Francisco) under consular cover, working with the recruiting agent Blériot.

In the course of the military preparations of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the tendency to saturate the armies mainly with new aircraft, tanks, and more advanced artillery, mortar, and automatic small arms became evident. Although during this period the forces of XU were small and the necessary experience for active work was only just accumulating, the direction of the information activity of intelligence indicated that priority was given to obtaining information for industries of military importance.

In 1930-1932, the intelligence of the state security agencies managed to obtain, on the instructions of various branches of the defense industry, a large amount of secret information, which was of considerable interest to our country and was used in the development of many domestic projects.

For example, the technical documentation on the electric motors of the German company AEG, used for submarines, was of great practical importance. According to the conclusion of the design bureau of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, these materials (drawings, descriptions) were of great value and were used by factories that manufactured similar motors.

The documentation on the jet engine received special appreciation from the domestic industry. According to the conclusion of the Scientific Research Automotive Tractor Institute, "the aforementioned jet engine is the invention that scientists around the world have been working on for many years. Industrial development of this

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inventions brings an uncountable revolution in aviation ... and especially in military affairs. The use of this invention in the mine and torpedo business creates such forms of technical attacks against which modern technology cannot oppose anything. On the basis of the materials received, it is possible to start manufacturing the engine in the Soviet Union."

One of the most active workers in the XU line of foreign intelligence was Karl Adamovich Dunts. He was born in 1890 in Riga in the family of a Latvian worker. He began his working life at the age of 15 as a turner at a machine-building plant in Yekaterinoslav; In 1918, together with his father, he joined the Red Guard detachment, which operated under the leadership of the Yekaterinoslav Revolutionary Committee. In 1918 he was enrolled in the Sveaborgtsy detachment under the collegium of the Cheka, took part in a number of KGB operations, including in the Lockhart case. For more than a year he was a unit guarding V.I. Lenin in Gorki, and since 1922 - in the Economic Department of the GPU.

In Germany, K.A. Duntz stayed from 1926 to 1933, acted from the position of a "legal" residency in Hamburg, acquired a number of sources through the XU line. Subsequently, from 1936 to 1938, he successfully worked in New York. In 1939 he retired. With the beginning of the Great

During the Patriotic War, he went to the front as a volunteer, participated in military operations and was seriously wounded, received a disability of the 1st group (leg amputation). For fruitful work in the Cheka of the NKVD, he was awarded personalized weapons, had government awards.

Among other distinguished scouts of the XY line, one can name Gayk Badalovich Hovakimyan. He went from an ordinary worker to the deputy chief of intelligence. G.B. Hovakimyan was born in 1898 in Nakhichevan. After graduating from Moscow State Technical University. N.E. Bauman and postgraduate study of the Chemical Technological Institute named after A.I. DI. Mendeleev, defended his Ph.D. thesis in one of the areas of chemical sciences, and in 1931 was hired by the INO. Almost immediately he was sent to the trade mission in Berlin and already 8 months later he recruited his first agent - "Rotman" - a major German specialist in chemical apparatus engineering, from whom he regularly began to receive documentary information about the construction of new military facilities, about the most modern technologies for the production of synthetic benzene and saltpeter. These documentary materials were highly appreciated by the General Staff of the Red Army.

Then Hovakimyan recruited several more agents: "Strong" - the leading engineer of the "Auer" company; "Ludwig" - researcher at the firm "Zeiss"; "Filter" ~ chemical engineer. The documentary information received from these sources on optical instruments, echo sounders, and means of chemical protection received

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la a positive assessment and was used by domestic research institutes and design bureaus. In 1933, Hovakimyan was sent to the United States, where he continued to work successfully in the pre-war period.

The experience of the first years of technical and then scientific and technical intelligence in 1917-1932 made it possible in subsequent years to step up efforts to obtain information so necessary for the country, mainly on military topics, to expand geo

reconnaissance schedule, improve the forms and methods of its activity.

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Everyday life of illegal immigrants

In the 1920s, when there were many displaced persons in Europe, the passport regime in many countries was not too strict. Sometimes people were let in without any documents. Soviet illegal intelligence agents took advantage of this and in some cases acted under the guise of refugees.

But in the early 1930s, the documentary regime began to tighten. To travel abroad, a passport was required, and in some countries an entry visa was also required. The success of the assignment largely depended on what document the illegal was provided with. For short-term assignments, a fictitious passport, made at a good technical level, was also suitable. But for a long stay in the country, this document was needed, which would be issued officially and would contain all the necessary marks.

At the same time, such a factor as the citizenship of the passport holder was taken into account. Successful foreign work required not just a real passport, but a passport of a country whose citizens in the host country had a loyal attitude, or a local document that generally removed all issues related to the formalities introduced for foreigners.

Here it is necessary to say a few words about the need that forced Soviet intelligence to resort to illegal forms of work, which involved many serious difficulties and, in particular, great efforts to document intelligence officers.

This was due to the fact that in the 1920s and early 1930s, Soviet Russia still had not established diplomatic relations with a number of countries, and the need to obtain a secret

information became more and more acute. Then the question arose of organizing intelligence work from illegal positions.

It was also necessary to resort to the use of illegal forms in a number of countries where "legal" residencies already operated, but the difficult operational situation prevented their effective work.

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Intelligence work from illegal positions during these years was carried out not only in Europe, but also in China, the USA, Turkey, Iran and some other countries.

Intelligence carefully approached the choice of national affiliation, the social status of illegal intelligence agents, and especially documents proving their identity. All these factors, as a rule, were strictly coordinated with the tasks that the intelligence officer had to solve. In practice, however, there were cases when a scout was given the task to conduct work on obtaining political information, but he was sent to some Western country under the guise of a White Guard officer who fled from Russia. As a result, the scout ended up in a military unit, where the disciplinary regime deprived him of mobility, chained him to one place and made it impossible to carry out full-fledged work on a given problem. There was very little benefit from such an employee.

It also happened that a scout arrived in a particular country with a passport of a state whose citizens were treated with distrust there. As a result, he had problems with employment and, as a result, complications in intelligence activities. Therefore, in the process of training an illegal intelligence agent, they primarily sought to ensure that the documents met the requirements necessary for successful work in a particular country and on the identified issues.

The preparation and withdrawal of an illegal intelligence agent abroad demanded both from the performer himself and from the Center serious and great creative efforts.

How this process was carried out and what difficulties were encountered along the way can be clearly seen in the example of an employee of the illegal apparatus, Nikolai.

To work on scientific and technical issues in Germany, either a German by nationality or a foreigner from a friendly country was required, who had the opportunity to open his own business or mastered such a specialty that would allow him to get a prestigious job. The choice fell on Nicholas. His father was a Pole, his mother was a Latvian. He was fluent in Latvian and German, could act as both a Latvian and a German. It was decided to obtain a Latvian passport for him – Latvia was then considered a friendly country to Germany. By his mother, he had the right to receive such a document.

However, in the process of elaborating the issue, it turned out that Nikolai's father was known in Latvia as a revolutionary who had emigrated to Russia, and complications could arise when applying for a passport. It was not at all possible to obtain a German passport, since there was not even the slightest reason for this. The use of a fictitious document was excluded because the task

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which stood before Nicholas, demanded a firm settlement in the country, which did not cause the slightest doubt from the German authorities. For such purposes, a real passport was required, carried out according to all records and registrations.

Further work on this option led to the idea of using Nikolai's maternal uncle, who lived in Riga and was a big businessman, to obtain a Latvian passport. He had a son from his first marriage, about the same age as Nikolai,

but the marriage was unsuccessful, and after the divorce, the wife went abroad with the child, their trace was lost, and it was only known that the boy died shortly after leaving.

Nikolai wrote a letter to his uncle and asked to meet him in one of the neighboring countries. Meeting took place.

The uncle agreed without hesitation to help his nephew get a passport. In the course of the discussion, Nikolay expressed the idea that because of his father, complications could arise and the whole undertaking would be useless. He carefully hinted to his uncle about the possibility of using the document of his dead son. He readily seized on this option, since he was even ready to buy a Latvian passport for his nephew. In this case, he believed, the document can be obtained at legal grounds.

Taking the photographs and the petition, my uncle left for Riga, and two months later he informed me that the passport had been received. We again agreed to meet in a neighboring country, where the nephew received from his uncle a passport and letters of recommendation to Germany to his friends. The most difficult issue, over which the employees at the Center puzzled for a long time, was resolved.

On a legal basis, Nikolai managed to arrive in Berlin, register at the Latvian embassy and begin to resolve the issue of employment. According to the plan, he was to open either a small shop or a pharmacy. This made it possible, under the guise of goods or medicines for sale, to receive intelligence materials, including drawings, samples, and forward them to the Union.

Having studied the situation on the spot, they settled on the purchase of a small store selling medicines and sanitary and hygiene goods, which could serve as a point for sending the extracted materials and at the same time legend to the surrounding people the source of the livelihood of its owner. The store was purchased, and Nikolai began practical intelligence work.

Everything was going well. But suddenly, as often happens with scouts, unforeseen circumstances arose. Nikolai was summoned to the embassy and handed a summons: "Come to Latvia for military service." It was absolutely unacceptable, all the work done went down the drain. I had to look for some kind of you

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move out of position. The center instructed to go to Riga and, with the help of my uncle, obtain a deferment from the service. Upon arrival in Latvia, Nikolai immediately set about clarifying the issue of the postponement. He had to act cautiously - in Latvia he graduated from a gymnasium at one time, and many people knew him here.

It was possible to establish that the maximum that he could count on was to receive a delay of six months. This option, of course, did not suit Nicholas. In the meantime, my uncle found out that it was possible to release his nephew from military service with the help of one of the top leaders of the state or the army under the pretext of, say, studying in Germany.

Uncle turned to one of his good friends, a former minister. He went forward and advised to organize dinner in a fashionable restaurant, expressing his readiness to invite "the right people" there. And so they did. Dinner was ordered at one of the most prestigious restaurants in Riga and continued until morning. They spared no money for food. At the end of the dinner, Nikolai drank brotherhood with his patrons and received a promise to fulfill his request. Literally the next day, he was released from military service and enrolled in the reserve of the sanitary department with the rank of lieutenant. For the service rendered and in accordance with the set condition, Nikolai contributed 1,000 lats to the Freedom Monument fund. After that, he calmly left for Berlin.

Intelligence work continued in Berlin. Technical documentation and samples of products began to arrive, which were of a closed nature. Documentation was photographed, and samples

were appropriately packaged and transported to Moscow through available channels. Things were going well, the work at the Center was SATISFIED.

But the danger arose again, whence it was least expected. There was a bank branch not far from his store, and a police patrol appeared from time to time next to it at night. This was also beneficial for Nikolai, since the store, where the extracted materials and samples were sometimes left for storage, was supervised at night. There were no police in the area during the day.

One day, Nikolai stayed late in his shop. Suddenly, revolver shots were heard. He ran out into the street and saw a Mercedes driving away from the bank. Young guys jumped into the car on the move, a policeman ran after them, firing a revolver. There was no doubt it was a bank robbery. Without hesitation, Nikolai jumped into his old car, drove up to the policeman, and together they chased the robbers. Other police officers then joined in the chase, and Nikolai returned, locked the store and headed home. In the morning he found that all the newspapers were full of reports of the robbery, descriptions of the courageous actions of the police and the heroic

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the mortar of Nikolai - "a true patriot". The newspapers listed his last name, said that he was the owner of the store, and gave his address. When he approached his establishment, reporters were already spinning there and a large group of buyers were waiting, who wanted to personally testify to their respect for the brave man. The reporters did their job, took pictures, asked the owner about the details of the incident, interviewed, etc.

This case did not descend from the pages of newspapers for several days. The description of Nikolai's deed, his photographs occupied a prominent place on them. Literally overnight, a modest businessman turned almost into a national German hero. Customers poured into the store, many of them coming from other districts to shake hands with the "patriot" and buy goods in his establishment.

Even the head of the police department personally visited the store and offered Nikolai to get a revolver. Weapons, he noted, are issued only to the most trustworthy citizens of the city. The scout thanked and refused the weapon. The police chief also informed him that, as a token of gratitude, the police would monitor the store and thus protect it from possible robbers. "Rejoice," he patted Nikolai on the shoulder, "now we will not leave you in trouble."

But Nikolai already on the first day realized that there was nothing to rejoice at. The cover base created with such difficulty was collapsing. Now it was impossible to use the store to store and transfer intelligence materials. Systematic observation of the situation around the store could lead professionals to the idea that the owner's lifestyle was not quite usual, and this would lead to failure.

After receiving information about the incident, the Center forbade the use of the store as a transfer point, and Nikolai was instructed to temporarily stop intelligence work. There was a fear that photographs of an illegal immigrant published in newspapers could also play a negative role. However, a careful study of them showed that, due to the fuzziness of the images, it would be difficult to identify him in them.

In the future, the store still had to be closed, and Nikolai, for security reasons, was transferred to work in another country.

From the beginning of the 1930s, the military industry developed rapidly in Germany, and the corresponding Soviet departments showed interest in obtaining data on the latest achievements of the Germans in the field of electrical engineering, radio industry, instrument making, aviation, chemistry, etc.

To work in the scientific and technical direction, an illegal intelligence agent Leo Gelfot arrived in Kaminsky's residency in 1931. The dossier of the archives of the Vienna police contained the following data: "Born (Telfot) on the territory of Bukovina, before the First World War he studied at the medical faculty in Vienna, then he was drafted into the army.

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In 1914 he was captured by the Russians, in Russia he continued his medical education, apparently, he sympathizes with the Communist Party."

All this was true. From the archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service, one can add to this: he was married to a Soviet citizen, worked in the system of the Ministry of Health, and was the head of a polyclinic. From this position he was invited to work in the INO OGPU and sent to work illegally in Germany.

Gelfot worked in illegal intelligence from 1931 to 1938. In Berlin, he got a job as an assistant in the clinic of a famous German professor. He was a radiologist by profession. Work in the clinic gave me the opportunity to get acquainted with materials related to military medicine, to collect information about new methods of treating the wounded in the field. However, his main sources of information were three German agents who worked in military-industrial concerns and were transferred to him for communication.

Gelfot managed to obtain through them a significant amount of materials and samples related to military aviation, electrical engineering, instrument making and chemistry for military purposes.

At the end of 1933, in connection with the complicated situation around the residency, Gelfot was transferred to Paris, where he was entrusted with the work of maintaining contact with active sources. However, his foreign passport did not allow him to stay in France for a long time, and therefore the intelligence officer began to look for ways to consolidate in another European country, to create the necessary base there to continue working with his sources.

For this purpose, he traveled to the Scandinavian countries, but he failed to settle there for permanent residence. Foreigners who had a temporary residence permit were under the control of the police, and this, of course, left its mark on the conditions of operational work. It was extremely difficult to work in such conditions.

After four years in Europe, when his situation with getting a job and obtaining a residence permit became more and more hopeless, Gelfot sent a request to the Center to allow him to return to Moscow. In his letter, he wrote, in particular: "I am so worn out and nervous that I cannot work. Nerves are shattered to the point of impossibility. Didn't take vacation for four years".

Leo Gelfot returned to the Union, rested, received medical treatment and was again sent beyond the cordon. This time his path lay in the USA. The task remained the same – scientific and technical intelligence.

First of all, he was recommended to pay attention to obtaining data concerning protective agents developed in the United States against chemical warfare agents. In Germany, at that time, intensive work was carried out to create a modern chemical

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weapons and equipping them for the army. This caused great concern to the Soviet leadership, and it demanded from intelligence not only information on the types and volumes of production of chemical warfare agents, but also data on the means of protection against them.

Gelfot, in particular, was instructed to find opportunities for obtaining the following samples and materials:

- a secret paste for the treatment of lesions from mustard gas;
- technologies for the synthesis of artificial hemoglobin;
- an individual anti-chemical package used by the US Army;
- a technical installation for washing people in the field after being hit by mustard gas;
- Antidotes for chemical warfare agents.

Before starting the assignment, he had to work hard to create a reliable base, which then allowed him to legally obtain a residence permit in the United States and the right to practice professional activities.

Already the first results were encouraging. He managed to get a sample of a portable device for blood transfusion, unique for those times, in combat conditions. The device was classified and was of particular value to our military doctors. However, the successfully started work was not further developed. Leo fell ill with lobar pneumonia and "burned out" in just a few days. Together with him on a business trip was his wife Maria Mitrofanovna, who was his faithful assistant throughout all eight years of work abroad. In a roundabout way, they managed to take her to the Union. At her request, an urn with the ashes of her husband was also delivered to Moscow ...

! In the archival materials of the SVR, he appears only under this pseudonym.

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On the western outskirts of the former empire

In 1921, there were about 200,000 Russian emigrants in Poland and approximately 85,000 Russian emigrants in the Baltic states, many of whom were members of the monarchist and other military political organizations. In particular, the headquarters of the People's Union for the Defense of Motherland and Freedom, headed by B. Savinkov, settled in Warsaw. In the Baltics, the White Guard leaders were preparing for the proclamation of the "Russian Government in Exile" with a temporary deployment in Tallinn.

The first residency in Warsaw was established in April 1921. For more than two years it was headed by Mechislav Antonovich Loganovsky!, who, although he was a novice in intelligence, made a significant contribution to the creation of the INO foreign apparatus. He was a Pole, born in Kielce. Participated in the struggle against tsarism, for which he served a prison sentence. A good knowledge of the situation in Poland and the experience of underground work helped him to quickly organize the receipt of the necessary intelligence information. The residence managed to obtain important documentary information about the activities of emigrant groups. It was established that the camps of the interned White Guard units of the army of General Yudenich, the detachments of Peremykin and Bulak-Balakhovich were transferred by the Polish authorities to the disposal of B. Savinkov. In 1921, he created a special group to form an "invading army". Its detachments were pulled up by the Polish authorities to the border under the guise of being sent to work. As it was rightly noted in the note of the Ukrainian government to the leadership of Poland dated October 30, 1921, "the episodic raids on the territory of Ukraine until that time by gangs that are formed and maintained on the territory of Poland are now acquiring a mass coordinated character"? .

These gangs were created and sent to Soviet territory with the knowledge of Polish intelligence and the General Staff, as well as the French military mission headed by General Nissel (according to agreement

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powers of the Entente in December 1917, Poland fell under French influence, the Baltic States - under English), who were aware of the atrocities committed by these gangs on Soviet soil. The Warsaw residency confirmed that the Polish special services proper focused on intelligence work in Ukraine and Belarus, where they sought to create a massive spy network. This, judging by the documents of B. Savinkov's organization, which concluded a secret agreement with the Polish authorities on interaction, was connected with plans to form an "independent Belarus" under the protectorate of Poland and transfer the latter the western counties of Volyn and Podolsk provinces, providing Polish military and entrepreneurs access to the port of Odessa. On the part of Warsaw, this meant a slight decrease in its "appetite" compared to May 1920, when the Polish government prepared an essentially colonial agreement with the leadership of the so-called Ukrainian National Republic?.

Throughout the 1920s, the INO carefully monitored Warsaw's persistent attempts to forge an anti-Soviet bloc in the region. Thus, on the initiative of the Poles, representatives of the general staffs and special services of Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland and Romania repeatedly exchanged views on the prospects for creating a Polish-Baltic union in a confidential manner. It was determined which country would conduct reconnaissance in a particular region of the USSR. Taking into account the wide scope of this kind of activity of the ruling circles of Poland, a branch of the Warsaw residency in Gdansk was created to strengthen intelligence.

One of the tasks of the Warsaw residency was to assist in resolving the issue of the return of Russian prisoners of war in the 1920 war with Poland. With regard to them, the Polish authorities violated the generally accepted norms of treatment, which caused the death of several tens of thousands of prisoners. In a note of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR dated September 9, 1921, the Polish side was held responsible for the fact that "out of 130,000 Russian prisoners of war in Poland, 60,000 died". Even if we accept the Polish data, which determines the total number of prisoners of war at 100 thousand people, and compare them with the results of repatriation (51,216 prisoners left for their homeland in August 1921, about 24 thousand remained), then in this case, mortality remains very significant - 25 thousand people.

Despite the fact that, thanks to the timely receipt of information, intelligence contributed to some normalization of the situation in the regions bordering Poland, as well as the search for ways to improve Soviet-Polish relations, not everything went well in its work.

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smooth. Thus, in the mid-1920s, it became clear that a significant part of the information obtained by the Warsaw residency belongs to the category of disinformation. This was the unfortunate result of neglect to check the integrity of sources of information. Among them were provocateurs, using whom the Polish authorities organized noisy anti-Soviet

campaigns.

These failures were partially compensated for by the effective work of other INO intelligence points. For example, the residency in Paris obtained secret information about the activities of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic and military missions of Poland in France. Actively worked in Poland and residency in Berlin. In addition, the illegal Beer and Mond groups created in Germany at the end of the 1920s began to specialize in Polish problems.

In the Baltic states, INO had residencies in Kovno, Riga, Tallinn and Libau in the 1920s. Intelligence information on these countries also came from Stockholm, Copenhagen and Helsingfors. Here, especially at the initial stage, tasks were solved that were in many respects similar to the work on Poland - the disruption of subversive actions, attempts at armed uprisings against Russia, etc. One of the employees of the INO, who observed on the spot the activities of foreign intelligence services in the Baltic states, wrote in his report: "Estonia, the first to make peace with the Bolshevik government, attracted the attention of not only directly interested England, France, America, but also other states, all the way to Japan... Allied military missions are not

were disbanded, turned into centers of espionage against Russia, using the services of the Estonian General Staff for this and creating in parallel their own agents through Russian emigrants.

Another place where the US leadership received information about the situation in Russia was Riga. In the 1920s, the staff of the State Department on "Russian Affairs" went through a "school" in Latvia: R. Kelly, E. Young, C. Bohlen, J. Kennan and others, who subsequently left a noticeable mark on American-Soviet relations .

Unfortunately, the scarce archival materials do not allow us to fully present the participants in the secret work in the Baltics. To some extent, information about the INO residency in the capital of Lithuania, Kovno, will help shed light on this. The residency there was established in 1921. Its head of cover was an employee of the military attache's apparatus and therefore represented at the same time the intelligence department of the Red Army. Conventional names were used in correspondence with the Center. Sometimes the addresses were confused. Then the head of the INO, Mogilevsky, wrote to the head of military intelligence Berzin: "The package that should be sent to you, for some reason came to me ... I'm very sorry and I'm sending it by courier."

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Here are excerpts from the first reporting letters to the Center: "Now we are busy looking for the informer Zhvalgiba (Lithuanian counterintelligence) and finding out the local Russian White Guard organization. Two informants were identified in our mission: the political department of the police department and the French mission. True, they are small fry, but still they gave something to their owners."

At the beginning of 1924, the fourth resident arrived in Kovno, Igor Konstantinovich Lebedinsky, who, staying there for two years, showed himself to be one of the most effective intelligence officers (later he worked in Austria and Germany). A few months after the start of work, he wrote to the Center: "In order to study the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry and foreign missions, I have quite ample opportunities. I have connections with the French, Estonian and Latvian missions. In terms of domestic policy, things are getting better. There is no doubt that we will know more about Zhvalgiba's activities. There is a connection with the Ministry of Internal Affairs."

Lebedinsky acquired valuable new sources of information. One of them, who received the pseudonym "Vasily", worked as a courier in the office of the military attaché of France. Through him, intelligence received drafts of secret correspondence with Paris, which helped in the disclosure of French ciphers. The connection with two valuable sources was continued by residency until the early 1940s.

One of the most valuable sources of information for residency in Lithuania turned out to be Konstantin Karlovich Kleshchinsky.

Kleshchinsky was born in Transcaucasia, graduated from the Moscow Military School in 1901, and in 1910 from the Nikolaev Academy. Participated in the Russo-Japanese and World War I, was awarded three times for military distinction. In 1915, during the defense of the fortress, Novogeorgievsk was taken prisoner, ended up in Lithuania, where in May 1919 he was mobilized into the Lithuanian army, participated in battles with the Poles and the White Guard formations of Bermond-Avalov, who acted on the side of the Germans. He was awarded the Lithuanian Cross of the first degree with swords. In 1920-1921 he served as Chief of the General Staff of the Lithuanian Army. In 1923, he was dismissed from the post of commander of the 1st Infantry Division with the rank of lieutenant general due to disagreements with the new army leadership.

Kleshchinsky was on friendly terms with many prominent figures of Lithuania. This largely ensured the success of his intelligence work. However, in February 1927, at a friendly meeting, Minister of War Merkis told him: "Having nothing against you as a specialist, it is believed that with the current narrowly chauvinistic direction of politics, your appointment

would be dissonant. Your articles in the newspapers unequivocally testify to your sympathy for Russia, with which you allegedly want to connect the future

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Lithuania. Once, in 1920, you were already accused of the same thing, but due to the lack of another specialist, then this issue died out.

In response to the message about this, the Center indicated in its response letter that "it is necessary to seriously and urgently deal with the question of how well known K. is and where he could be sent in case of impossibility of further use in Lithuania. For our part, we will negotiate on the fundamental use of him as a military specialist in the USSR."

Given the threat of failure, measures were taken to curtail his intelligence work. Kleshchinsky himself, in a letter to the Center, said that he "would prefer to return to the "penates" and use them in the area where he could bring the greatest benefit." However, on May 19, 1927, at the time when N.O. Sokolov, representatives of the police broke in there. After his arrest, Kleshchinsky was handed over to a military field court and shot according to his sentence, although the examination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War did not confirm the transfer of information of a secret nature to them.

The example of Kleshchinsky first of all explains the participation of Russians who found themselves in a foreign land in intelligence work by the desire to contribute to the formation of the new Russia as a great power.

At the end of the 1920s, intelligence in the region faced such factors as the gradual increase in the influence of Germany, the formation of a pro-German lobby, and the tightening of internal regimes, bordering on fascism. The ruling circles of Poland and the Baltic countries sought to strengthen their positions with the help of anti-Soviet and chauvinist campaigns. In the foreign policy field, attempts continued to create a coalition hostile to the USSR, which, however, turned out to be ineffective due to the rivalry between England, Germany and France in the region and the contradictions between potential participants in the Baltic-Polish union.

As can be seen from the letters of the residencies to the Center, the intelligence officers had sympathy for the peoples of Poland and the Baltic countries, they understood the ambiguity of the internal situation in them. Concentrating their efforts on identifying the true aspirations of the ruling circles of these states, INO staff were aware that the main task was to promote the establishment of good neighborly relations between the USSR and the young republics on the western outskirts of the former empire. In this regard, we can confidently say that intelligence has made an important contribution to the preparation for the conclusion of such agreements as the Joint Protocol of the governments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Romania on the non-use of force in international relations (Moscow, February 1929 d.), which was joined

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later Lithuania, Türkiye and Iran. Thus, to a large extent, peaceful conditions were guaranteed for the beginning of the revival of the national economy of the USSR.

Loganovsky M.A. in 1925 he was transferred to diplomatic work.

Unreasonably repressed in the late 30s. Rehabilitated by mortal.

Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations. —

M.: "Nauka", 1973. - T. 4. - S. 453.

3 Mihutina I.V. Polish-Soviet War 1919-1920 - M., 1994. - S. 133-139.

* Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. - M., 1957. - T. 1. - S. 319.

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The southern neighbors

Relations between the RSFSR and its southern neighbors developed quite dramatically at first. The first Soviet diplomatic mission was sent to Tehran in July 1918, headed by I.O. Kolomiitsev. The pro-British government of Iran, which came to power in August, did not recognize Kolomiitsev's powers. On the night of November 3 of the same year, the Russian mission was attacked, and the members of the mission were arrested. They were shot or tortured in prisons. Only I.O. managed to escape. Kolomiitsev. In the summer of 1919, he again arrived in Tehran as the head of an emergency mission with the task of delivering the "Appeal of the Government of the RSFSR to the Government and People of Persia," but was arrested and killed.

In 1921, the INO VChK opened the first "legal" residencies in Afghanistan and Turkey under the guise of diplomatic and trade missions. Somewhat later, a "legal" residency was established in Iran. The activities of the residencies in Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey (except Istanbul) were led by the Eastern Sector of the INO. At the same time, he carried out work on sending agents to Turkey and Iran from the territory of Transcaucasia, as well as to Afghanistan from the territory of Central Asia.

The Istanbul residency was supervised by the sector of the South European and Balkan countries. Through Istanbul, intelligence work was carried out in Egypt, Syria, Algeria and the Balkan countries.

In 1920-1932, the main direction of intelligence activity in the countries of the Middle East was to expose and neutralize the subversive actions of England and other Western powers against the young republic, to frustrate attempts to use counter-revolutionary military formations and white emigration for these purposes.

In the mid-1920s, there were about two dozen residencies in Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey. They were very few in number. In the main of them, 3-4 employees worked, and in the peripheral ones -

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1-2 people. Arriving in the country, operational officers established contacts, recruited agents, restored contacts with previously recruited sources or sent from our territory. In many cases, employees of different residencies in the same country did not know each other.

In addition to the tasks common to all residencies, each of them had its own specific ones related to its location and capabilities. Thus, the Istanbul residency, starting from 1924-1926, carried out intelligence work in Syria, Egypt and Bulgaria. The Tehran residency operated through the Kermanshah point in Mesopotamia. The Kabul station had a solid agent on the border with British India and in India itself.

The tasks of the Resht residency in Iran included the development of the Armenian organization Dashnaktsutyun, Azerbaijani Musavatists and the British residency. British intelligence from Rasht directed subversive activities against the Transcaucasian republics. The Kermanshah residency was charged with the duty to work against the White Guards and the English colony in Mesopotamia. The Ardabil residency, as the resident in Tehran noted in 1925, worked against the White Guards and Musavatists. The Bender-Bushere residency concentrated its efforts on the tribes of southern Iran, which were actively used by the British in order to put pressure on the Persian government, and also monitored the situation in the southern ports of Iran. The residence in Urmia followed the activities of the British in the region. The main task

residency in Mashhad also included work against British intelligence agents and their agents from among local citizens, revealing the links of the British with the Basmachi organizations in Central Asia.

Employees of residencies in the countries of the Middle East worked in difficult intelligence and living conditions. In the 1920s, most cities in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan were plagued by epidemics, dirt, and lacked amenities and familiar foodstuffs. Severe climatic conditions caused diseases of the staff of the residencies, many returned to their homeland with poor health.

Difficulties of an objective nature were complicated by insufficient financial, transport and technical equipment of the residencies and their employees. Residents regularly sent complaints to the Center about the lack of funds to finance operational activities. The salaries of the staff of the residencies were very modest, sometimes the scouts went on business trips, not knowing what means they would live and work on. Thus, in July 1924, a resident in Kabul asked the Center in one of his letters: "... I will not be paid a salary here, so I ask you to indicate the amount that I can spend on myself."

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The residences were poorly equipped with vehicles. The Tehran station conducted a lengthy correspondence with the Center regarding the purchase of a used Chevrolet on the local market for operational needs. In the 1920s, for example, a riding horse was kept in the Kabul residency for "operational purposes", and in the early 1930s bicycles were used to go to meetings. There was one bicycle for two operatives. Often, while riding bicycles, the employees of the residencies were attacked by stray dogs, which were in great abundance on the streets of Kabul.

There was no regular communication with the Center. In March 1926, a resident in Istanbul wrote to the head of the INO M. Trilisser: "Among the major shortcomings of the conditions of work here, one must also rank the almost complete lack of communication with you. Diplomatic mail that arrives and departs once every five or six weeks cannot be considered a connection. Under such conditions, even when we have serious material, it runs the risk of getting to you outdated.

The resident in Kabul, in a letter to M. Trilisser in May 1927, noted: "The question of relations between Moscow and Kabul is terribly bad. After all, we have not received a single mail since December."

From 1926-1927, a telegraph connection was established between the Center and the main residencies, but it was rarely used due to the high cost of telegrams and insufficient reliability of ciphers. Telegrams were sent on specific issues and were formulated briefly. Operational letters remained the main form of correspondence with the Center. They were compiled personally by residents in the name of the head of intelligence. In operational correspondence, for the purpose of secrecy, secret writing was used on key points. Since the end of the 1920s, in order to ensure greater security, photographic equipment has been used when sending secret documents.

Residents' letters, as a rule, contained analysis, assessment and forecasts of the domestic political situation and foreign policy plans of the country's leadership, information about its relations with representatives of foreign states. Considering that the establishment of economic relations with the countries of the Near and Middle East at that time was given great importance, in the letters of the residents serious attention was paid to economic information. The residents made proposals on political and operational activities, reported on the work plans of the residencies, as well as on the economic, financial and personal requests of employees.

Until 1928, issues related to the recruitment of agents were resolved by the residents on their own, without the participation of the Center. Candidates for recruitment were not checked against the Center's file cabinets. Characteristics of the studied individuals were sent to the Center irregularly, sanctions on recruitment

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ki was not requested. Some agents were recruited to perform any one, one-time task. Rewards were usually given out in the form of a monthly allowance, that is, regardless of the specific contribution to intelligence work.

In 1926, in order to streamline work with agents and improve the quality of the agent network, the recruitment of agents without the prior approval of the Center was prohibited. More attention began to be paid to the study of recruited persons, their verification, and then their education.

The situation in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan at that time remained quite difficult. Despite the fact that the governments of these countries maintained friendly relations with the USSR and avoided rude actions against Soviet representatives, the local secret services sought to take control of the activities of Soviet representatives and limit their contacts with the population. In 1927, there was a major failure of military intelligence in Tehran. Three cryptographers of the Iranian Army General Staff were shot, and one was sentenced to 15 years in prison. The Tehran resident of the INO GPU wrote to the Center about this: "The news of the execution made a stunning impression on the population of Tehran. This incident hurt us tremendously. Firstly, almost all sources, frightened, temporarily cut off contact with us. Secondly, during this time we have identified several necessary people for recruitment, who, in connection with the execution, sharply recoiled from us!

! FSB archive, case No. 2959.

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Mashhad ball

At the end of the 1920s, several local citizens suspected of espionage in favor of the British were arrested in Tashkent by state security agencies. At that time, the British secret services intensified their subversive work in the Central Asian republics, creating an extensive network of agents there, mainly along the line of the Transcaspian railway. On both sides of the Soviet-Iranian border, more than 300,000 unsettled Yomut Turkmen tribe roamed. Numerous Basmachi gangs associated with British intelligence operated in this area. The activities of British agents were directed from Mashhad, from the territory of Iran.

At the end of the 1920s, a significant number of emigrants lived in this city - Russians, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Tatars. Mashhad became the base of various emigrant organizations. Branches of the Russian General Military Union, the Turkestan Insurrectionary Committee, and the Uzbek Nationalist Movement were located here, which carried out subversive work in close contact with the British special services.

Based on the current situation in this region, the state security agencies decided to infiltrate the British intelligence headquarters in Mashhad, intercept the channels of agents infiltrating our territory and ultimately paralyze its hostile activity.

At the beginning of 1930, the representative office of the OGPU in Tashkent legitimized the creation of an organization of "Russian counter-revolutionaries" in order to send several people to Iran on its behalf in order to infiltrate foreign emigre organizations.

The expectation was that the British, who were actively using Russian emigrants, would definitely find out about the arrival of new "representatives", become interested in them and try to use them in their purposes.

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To confirm the existence of such an "organization", a dozen anti-Soviet leaflets were printed in its name and "secretly" distributed in Tashkent. The flyers hung for only a few hours, but they did their job: they immediately became known in the city. Then the Chekists spread a rumor that the "counter-revolutionary organization" had been uncovered. Many of its members were arrested, but some still managed to escape.

Some time later, information was received that the events in Tashkent became known to emigrant groups and to the British resident in Mashhad. Soon one of the members of the legendary organization, Semyonov, appeared there. He allegedly crossed the cordon on his own, having agreed for money with one of the ferrymen who worked for the British, who in fact was under the constant control of the Chekists.

In Mashhad, Semyonov got in touch with a prominent figure in emigration, Khaidar-Khoja Mirbadalev.

From archival documents:

Mirbadalev Khaidar-Khoja, a former colonel of the tsarist army, served as a dragoman in the political agency of the tsarist government at the court of the Emir of Bukhara, emigrated to Iran in the 1920s, settled in Mashhad, and carried out active subversive work against the USSR. He was a representative of the "Russian General Military Union" and the "Turkestan Insurgent Committee" in Mashhad, was associated with the British.

As expected, through Mirbadalev, the British resident Steveni became aware of Semyonov's arrival, and he established contact with him. According to reliable data, Steveni believed Semyonov's legend and offered him to work for British intelligence. The operational game started in this way with British intelligence continued until 1935. As a result, it was possible to accurately establish the tasks of British intelligence and the main directions of its activities in the Central Asian republics.

Our legal residency in Mashhad, where the Soviet consulate was located, also made a great contribution to this operation. The residency staff recruited a number of agents from the inner circle of the English resident Humber, who replaced Steveni, and thus were able to take control of the subversive work against the USSR, in which he actively used members of the Russian and Central Asian emigration.

It should be noted that Humber, a wealthy man, like many of his compatriots abroad, lived in a big way, had

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a large staff of servants from Persians and Indians. When selecting them, he paid main attention to the fact that they were absolutely illiterate, did not understand a single foreign language, but accurately and unquestioningly carried out his orders. The extremely low standard of living of the local population made it possible for them to hire such people for next to nothing. They waited on the Humber, cleaned the rooms, the office. In their presence, he was engaged in compiling intelligence documents, instructing them to destroy drafts.

The foreign intelligence station made great efforts to acquire assistants among the Humber staff, and two of his servants were recruited by our intelligence. Each of them was worked on separately. They regularly informed the station about the visitors of the English resident, brought rough drafts of intelligence reports compiled by him, and sometimes delivered documents that were photographed in the station.

Information was received from the agency that the British were actively working with representatives of the Yomut Turkmen tribe, who had arrived in Mashhad and raised an uprising in the territory of Turkestan. The Yomuts agreed with British intelligence on the acquisition and supply of weapons, on the provision of financial and other assistance. Thanks to the timely information received, the authorities

security forces took the necessary measures to seize weapons that were delivered to the Yomut Turkmens from Iran.

Realizing that help with weapons was ineffective, the uprising was localized and could be defeated, the British decided to try to save the situation and send two of their agents - military specialists - as assistants to the leaders of the Yomut uprising.

From Humber's servants, it became known that two unknown people appeared in his house. Humber spends almost all days with them, bringing them food himself, not allowing any of the servants to enter the room. Sometimes all three talk in the locked office of the Englishman.

It must be said that the residency oriented its agents from among the servants in such a way that they transferred not only the draft materials of the Humber, but also everything that they take out like garbage: scraps of papers, newspapers, even cigarette butts. All this has been carefully analyzed and studied. Once, among the garbage, cigarette butts "Rose" were found, which were produced in Russia even before the revolution. To meet them in the 30s was a rarity. Since later on cigarette butts of this sort were often found among the brought garbage, the residency assumed that only Russians could smoke them. After a long search, a store was found, at

host co

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long-standing stocks of cigarettes "Rose" have been preserved. It turned out that they were bought by several Russian emigrants living in the city. The owner of the store knew them only by sight. He said that just recently he bought several packs of Russian, which he saw for the first time. Speculation that there are Russians at the Humber has solidified.

To find out their identity, the residency decided to use their agent from the Russian emigration environment. Soon the agent reported that emigrants Kozhevnikov and Pooh had recently disappeared from the Russian colony. It became clear that most likely they are those unknown personalities that Humber hides. Since the English resident surrounded their stay in his house with deep secrecy, the residency concluded that the British intelligence was up to something important, and decided

watch them carefully.

Soon one of Humber's servants reported that, on behalf of his master, he ordered two bus tickets to the city of Serakhs on the Iranian-Soviet border, where, as it was known, British intelligence had one of the bases for transferring its agent - ry. On the instructions of the Soviet residency, an agent from local residents boarded the same bus. He got acquainted with all the passengers, including two Russian men, and according to the conditions of communication worked out in advance, he urgently handed over their verbal portrait and names - Kozhevnikov and Pooh.

A few days later, while crossing the border, these British agents were arrested.

There were other cases when the residency, using its capabilities, identified the agents of the British resident and localized its subversive activities.

The frequent failures of British agents thrown into the Central Asian republics forced British intelligence in the mid-1930s to look for new forms of work. At the end of 1934, Humber tried to establish contact with his agents operating in the Central Asian republics with the help of a light signaling device installed in the mountainous border region. Information using Morse code was transmitted at a speed of 2-3 words per minute.

Humber recruited a group of three people, whom he began to train to work on the light signal device. In addition, it was assumed that these persons would confiscate the collected materials from caches in the vicinity of Ashgabat; to lay information in caches, which, in turn, will be received by British intelligence agents on the territory of Central Asia.

Soviet intelligence managed to obtain information about the new Humber plan. It began with a message from his servant that the Englishman was cooking

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to drop into our territory a group of three people. Members of this group were soon identified, and their study began. One of them, an emigrant from Central Asia, was recruited. Subsequently, during meetings at a safe house, he told everything he knew about the use of a light-signaling device and the details of preparing the group for being thrown into the territory of the Central Asian republics.

From that moment on, the OGPU relentlessly followed the progress of the British intelligence operation, and, naturally, it ended in failure.

Emigrants from Central Asia were widely used by the British in their subversive work. Representatives of the Emir of Bukhara, hiding behind national interests, were ready to make any concessions in order to enlist the support of the British and, with their help, return to power in Bukhara.

In the last period of the existence of the Emirate of Bukhara, there were several palace parties at the emir's palace that fought for influence, including the Tagi-bek group, which was secretly supported by the British and Iranians.

After fleeing from Bukhara, Tagi-bek was elevated by the emir Seyd Alim-khan to the rank of a minister with the right to conclude agreements and treaties with other states on his behalf.

Tagi-bek contacted the British consulate in Mashhad and, on behalf of Seyd Alim Khan, began to negotiate for the British to provide armed assistance to the emir in his struggle against the USSR. He offered the British to expel the Bolsheviks from the territory of the Emirate of Bukhara by force of arms and help the emir restore his power.

As a price for such assistance from the British, the emir agreed to give them the right to bring their armed forces into Bukhara and keep them until "order and calm" were established; to invite only the British as military instructors in the Bukhara army; to invite English advisers to all ministries; foreign trade preferably with England; give the British the right to demand the cession of any part of the territory of Bukhara to them; give them the exclusive right to develop and exploit subsoil.

After a preliminary inquiry sent to the emir himself and receiving from him confirmation of the validity of Taghabek's powers, the British concluded a temporary agreement with Taghabek in 1923, a copy of which was obtained by our intelligence.

After the conclusion of the mentioned agreement, Tagi-bek continued active anti-Soviet work in contact with the British and, in essence, turned into a major British agent.

He illegally sent his agents to the territory of the USSR for intelligence purposes in the interests of British intelligence and

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Iranian authorities. Of the agents abandoned on the territory of the USSR until 1938, 12 people were detained and convicted in Bukhara.

In 1925, Tagi-bek moved to live in the city of Tehran. The Iranian authorities regarded Taghi bek as a figure whose activities corresponded to the interests of Iran, and not only did not interfere with his anti-Soviet work, but also provided him with appropriate assistance.

From the first days of Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, most of the active members of Taghi-bek's group, who lived in Mashhad, carried out pro-fascist propaganda among the emigrants.

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Tanaka Memorandum

In 1929, a document appeared in the Chinese magazine *China Critic*, the publication of which caused the widest resonance in diplomatic circles and had a great impact on the development of international relations at that time and for many years to come, both in Asia and in other regions of the world. . It was the "Memorandum on the Foundations of a Positive Policy in Manchuria and Mongolia". The publication stated that on July 25, 1927, the document was presented to the Emperor of Japan by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country, General Tanaka!.

Why did Tanaka's memo make so much noise?

The memorandum revealed for the first time the true plans of Japan to conquer the world. The stages of the implementation of this task were outlined: first, the subjugation of Manchuria and Mongolia, then China. After mastering the resources of China, Japan was to move on to the conquest of India, the countries of the Pacific Ocean, Asia Minor and Central Asia, and, finally, Europe. At the same time, the memorandum put forward "the need to cross swords with Russia again" as a "program for Japan's national development".

It is no wonder that the publicity of expansionist aspirations of this kind increased distrust in Japan's foreign policy not only in the USSR and China, but also in Great Britain, which then owned, along with India, many other colonies in Asia and had its own, long-established views of China, as well as in France, which dominated French Indochina and many territories in the Pacific region, in Holland - the owner of the Netherlands Indies, in Portugal - with its colonial territories, and, of course, not least - in the United States of America . From all sides, Japan then felt powerful diplomatic pressure, and it had no choice but to assert that in fact there was no such memorandum and allegedly could not be ...

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But the document existed and was obtained by our intelligence officers in two residencies: in Seoul and in Harbin. The receipt of the Tanaka memorandum was the largest achievement in the work of Soviet foreign intelligence against the militaristic aspirations of Japan in the period of the 1920s and early 1930s. years.

The leadership of Soviet foreign intelligence, mindful of Japan's intervention in the Far East in the first post-revolutionary years, set before its cordon apparatus in Japan and a number of neighboring countries, first of all, the task of uncovering the military plans of the Tokyo ruling circles directed against the USSR and the friendly Mongolian People's Republic, obtaining information about the domestic political and economic situation in Japan, about the expansionist plans of the Japanese government in general and its actions against China in particular. Great importance was attached to revealing secret ties between Japanese special services and Russian emigrant organizations abroad and plans to use them in espionage, sabotage and terrorist activities against the USSR.

However, there were considerable difficulties in organizing intelligence work in Japan at that time. The domestic political situation was characterized by extreme escalation of chauvinism, especially under Tanaka, the struggle against democratic organizations, mass arrests, and the dissolution of left-wing trade unions. The Dangerous Thoughts Act and its additional amendments provided for the death penalty for opposition activities. No one wanted to meet with representatives of the "northern neighbor", it was very dangerous for the local residents: the police established a thorough surveillance of our institutions.

Despite the fact that the Japanese special services carried out their work mainly at a high professional level, they also had weaknesses. Feeling like masters in Manchuria, they did not pay enough attention to the peculiarities of the local operational situation and underestimated the capabilities of foreign intelligence services. In particular, they were rather frivolous about forwarding their official and diplomatic mail.

These weak points were exploited by Soviet intelligence. The residency carefully studied the most important Japanese facilities in Manchuria, their work schedule, postal channels. At the main points through which the Japanese secret mail followed, agents were acquired or introduced.

Over time, the residency had great difficulties associated with the processing (opening, photographing, viewing, sealing) of all that huge mail that was obtained through agents. There was a lack of operational equipment, many of the workers did not know either Japanese or Chinese well. Most interesting

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documents of 10-15 pages had to be shot on glass negatives with a very antediluvian camera.

With the help of the Center, these difficulties were eliminated to a certain extent. At the request of the residency, two major Soviet Japanese scientists arrived in Harbin from Moscow, and the latest German film photographic equipment for that time arrived. In addition, having gained experience in working with mail, employees began to process only those documents in which, in their opinion, there was valuable information. The opened mail was immediately looked through by Japanese employees. All the most important was photographed, then the packages were carefully sealed and returned to the agents.

One of the most active assistants of the Harbin residence was Ivan Trofimovich Ivanov-Perekrest, who had extensive connections among the Japanese military personnel, gendarmerie employees, and Chinese who served in Japanese institutions. The famous Soviet intelligence officer, Major General V.M. Zarubin, who in the 1920s was a deputy resident in Harbin, wrote: "Perekrest was a group leader, engaged in recruiting agents. I got very valuable materials about the activities of the Japanese military mission in Manchuria.

The Tanaka memorandum was also obtained through Perekrest.

Tanaka wrote (translation of the time): "The Japanese-Soviet war, taking into account the state of the armed forces of the USSR and its relations with foreign states, should be carried out by us as soon as possible. I consider it necessary that the imperial government pursue a policy with the expectation of starting a war with the USSR as soon as possible.

Of course, we need to advance to Lake Baikal. As for the further offensive to the West, this must be decided depending on the situation that will have developed by that time. Japan will have to include the occupied Far Eastern Territory completely into the possessions of Japan ... Japan, in order to achieve its goals, must apply the policy of "blood and iron". Japan must conquer the world, and for this it must conquer Europe and Asia, and first of all, China and the USSR."

Obtaining a document of this kind was the "finest hour" of the Harbin residency.

But there were moments in her work when everything literally hung in the balance. The Chinese authorities, with obvious instigation from the Japanese, often resorted to various kinds of provocations. One of them almost led to a failure in the work of the Harbin residency.

The essence of the provocation was that the Chinese were trying to take control of the access roads to the CER. The Consulate General in Harbin was surrounded by police, in connection with which it was impossible to exclude

raid.

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On that day, very important and large Japanese mail was being processed in the residency building, located on the 3rd floor of the Consulate General building. The time was coming when it was necessary to return this mail to the agent, and all exits from the building were tightly blocked by the police. It was necessary at all costs to take out the mail from the Consulate General before the search and hand it over to the agent in time.

Here is how an eyewitness of those events, one of the employees of the Harbin residency, spoke about this case:

What are we going to do, comrades? asked Resident Karin. From the window on the 3rd floor, one could clearly see how fussily the Chinese police were running and how their number was increasing. It was impossible to leave the Consulate General unnoticed and pass through the police cordon. We did not know what to do, although we were aware that the only way to save the situation was to carry the mail outside the police cordon. But how to do that?

"Fyodor Yakovlevich, may I try to carry out the mail?" - Sosnovskaya, an employee of the residency, turned to the resident.

"How are you going to do it, Yuna?" the resident asked.

"I am a woman, Fyodor Yakovlevich," Yuna answered and smiled.

She was a young, energetic woman with a white-toothed friendly smile and always fashionable hair. The resident looked at her carefully.

— Comrade Sosnovskaya, for this it is not enough to be a woman. Can you imagine what might happen if you get caught?!

Yes, Comrade Karin. I weighed everything. It is very serious. But I'm sure everything will be fine, she answered.

Fifteen or twenty minutes passed before Yuna, the resident and his deputy entered the room where Japanese mail was being processed.

Through the window, one could clearly see how the police stopped passers-by — some were released, others were rudely grabbed and taken somewhere.

"How will Yuna slip through their dense ranks?" we thought with concern.

- Look, it's her! Erik Takke suddenly shouted, pointing to the window with his hand.

Eric, a German by nationality, was a seasoned and courageous guy, but now his voice trembled. We all knew that he and Yuna loved each other. He lit a cigarette, and we began to carefully look out the window. A woman in a light coat, tied with a colorful scarf, has just come down the steps of the porch of the reception room of our Consulate General. So she passed the yard, entered the garden, sat down on a bench, took out a handkerchief from her purse and covered her face with it. She then walked slowly towards the exit. How different was the tall girl with a thin waist from the one we saw. In the courtyard of the Consulate General, a plump woman, dejected by something, was walking. Here she came out of the gate and, a little

shaking

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As she walked, she went straight into the line of policemen, occasionally putting a handkerchief to her eyes.

We held our breath. It was Yuna, after all. Posing as pregnant, she carried important mail from the Japanese military mission.

When Yuna approached the officer and he began to ask her about something, Eric could not stand it and jumped up. His tall figure loomed in the semi-darkness of the large room. Here the officer stepped towards Yuna, extended his hand to her. Yuna pulled away from the policeman in fear. Then she smelled the flaps of her coat, took out some piece of paper from her purse and handed it to the Chinese.

The officer took the paper, turned it over, then turned around and, apparently, called someone - a Chinese man in civilian clothes ran up to him. He took a piece of paper and pointed to the building of the Consulate General. Yuna nodded and put the handkerchief over her eyes.

She can be identified! ~ we were worried.

It really could happen. After all, all the employees of Soviet institutions in Harbin, including Yuna, became familiar to the Chinese police, who guarded the Soviet Consulate General around the clock.

We breathed a sigh of relief when Yuna hid the piece of paper returned to her by the officer in her bag and slowly walked through the line of policemen.

In the meantime, we tried to destroy everything that could compromise us.

On the third day, after a strong protest from the Consulate General, the police "siege" was finally lifted. Yuna is back. She told how, having passed the police cordon, she carefully checked herself and, making sure that she was not being followed, she safely reached the safe house. At the appointed time, she went to a meeting with the liaison agent and returned the materials to him.

When Yuna offered to leave the building under the guise of a pregnant visitor to our Consulate General, documents were urgently prepared for her: a petition on behalf of a Russian emigrant who wanted to go to Russia to settle her property affairs, and an official refusal of this request. "Offended visitor" managed to lull the vigilance of the Chinese police.

Later, the station in Harbin set up a transfer and receiving center that successfully operated under the guise of a grocery store, the "owner" of which was a Chinese - a devoted agent. Not far from the shop, they bought a reliable secret apartment. It processed postal materials that continued to arrive, among which there was a lot of information that was of great intelligence interest.

The case with the Tanaka memorandum was continued in Korea, and it can be said with full confidence that there was a unique

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a case in the practice of intelligence services, when the same secret document was obtained almost simultaneously by our intelligence officers in different countries.

Seoul, 1927 A young Soviet illegal, acting under the guise of an employee of the well-known trading company in the Far East and China, Churin and K *, managed to recruit a Japanese police officer and through him to arrange the flow of secret documentary information about the political and economic situation in the Far East, in China, Korea, the work of the Japanese special services against the USSR, including the agents of the Japanese from among the white emigrants, Chinese and Koreans sent to the territory of the Soviet Far East for the purpose of espionage and subversive actions.

The result of one of the operations brilliantly carried out by the intelligence officer was the receipt of a secret document called the Tanaka Memorandum. This was Ivan Andreevich Chichaev (1896-1984), a well-known Soviet intelligence officer. After Korea, he worked in Finland, Sweden, Latvia and Estonia. During the Great Patriotic War he was in England. He was entrusted with the task of maintaining official contact with the British

Russian intelligence. I.A. Chichaev was awarded many orders and medals of the USSR.

Baron Giichi Tanaka (1863-1929) was Japan's Minister of War from September 1918 to June 1921 and then from September 1923 to January 1924. Since 1927 - Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan. One of the main leaders of the armed intervention in the Far East.

* Karin Fedor Yakovlevich (1896-1938). In the state security bodies since 1919. Illegal Scout in Romania, Austria, Bulgaria (1922-1924). Resident in Harbin (1924-1927). Worked from illegal positions in the USA. He headed illegal residencies in Germany and France (1927-1933). Since 1934 he worked in the Intelligence Agency of the Red Army. He was awarded two badges "Honorary Che

cyst." In 1938 he was sentenced to death. Rehabilitated posthumously in 1956.

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Japanese military plans

Soviet embassy in Tokyo. January 1928. Among the diplomatic baggage, which was sent under the reliable protection of the NKID couriers to Moscow, an outwardly inconspicuous package was delivered. Having come a long way, he was redirected to Lubyanka, the head of the INO OGPU. After that, a telegram with a conditional text was sent to Tokyo by open international telegraph, which confirmed the receipt of the mail.

So for the first time the "legal" residency of Soviet intelligence in Tokyo designated itself for the first time, so far in the person of one operative ...

Gradually, the composition of the residency expanded, an additional reconnaissance point was opened in a large port in Hokkaido - Hakodate, where the Soviet consulate worked.

By today's standards, the overall level of operational training of ordinary employees was low, especially in regional studies and knowledge of the Japanese language. Here is an excerpt from the description of one Soviet intelligence officer who was working in Tokyo at that time: "... one of the printers, he is literate, understands the tasks he faces and tries to fulfill, but everything rests on ignorance of the Japanese language, not to mention even though about German or French There is no that diplomatic "gloss" inherent in the local foreigners ... "

Time did not give the slightest relief - I had to turn around "from the wheels": go out into the city, learn a foreign language, search for promising connections. Of course, similar difficulties had to be overcome by the young Soviet intelligence in many countries of Europe or Asia. But in Japan they were especially great. A serious obstacle complicating work in Tokyo was the strict guardianship of the Japanese counterintelligence, which saw practically every foreigner as a potential spy. For each foreign worker, Japanese counterintelligence established a personal "tail", from which it was almost impossible to break away. And the places to visit were limited: as soon as a foreigner appeared there,

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where they usually did not go (outside the city center, around the imperial palace and the most famous quarters of the Japanese capital - Ginza, Shibuya, Ueno), as vigilant Tokyo citizens considered it their duty to immediately report the "suspicious foreigner" in

the police. The ubiquitous Japanese boys shouting "Gaijin, gaijin!" (foreigner) were in a hurry to detect the presence of a "stranger" in an inappropriate place.

In difficult conditions of total gendarmerie surveillance, in an atmosphere of general suspicion and traditional Japanese distrust of foreigners, the residency managed to establish work in a fairly short time and bring the Soviet leadership into the course of Japan's secret military preparations.

Already in the late 1920s and early 1930s (before entering Manchuria), the Japanese General Staff developed a strategic plan code-named "Otsu", which provided for the deployment of an army group on the border with the USSR, with the capture of Manchuria in September 1931 this plan was refined and detailed. Additional military units were transferred to the territory of Northeast China from the Japanese islands, which were to be used to "strike at the USSR". Of the 30 divisions that were supposed to be additionally formed in Manchuria, 24 were allocated for conducting military operations against the USSR. The plan provided for the development of an offensive in the first days of 1932. The offensive operation was divided into two parts: breaking through the border, advancing to the east and striking to the northwest, in the area of Lake Baikal,

Some documents directly related to plans for war with the Soviet Union soon ended up in Moscow. This happened largely thanks to the agent of the Tokyo residency, who worked for more than 10 years under pseudonyms: "Krotov", "Kot", "Kostya"... The value of this source is evidenced by the information that he transmitted: the annual mobilization plans of military districts, schemes of redeployment of military units in Japan, Korea and Manchuria, information about moods and political movements in the Japanese imperial army, cipher tables and books not only of Japanese military intelligence, but also of the USA, China, Germany, Tokyo air defense plans, data on personnel changes in the Japanese military leadership, information on the development of new types of weapons.

For obvious reasons, the real name of the source cannot be disclosed even now.

Working in the special services of Japan, "Krotov", thanks to his connections, had access to almost all the information that was of interest to Soviet intelligence at that time. In addition, he had the opportunity to

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of documents of the 3rd branch of the Main Gendarmerie Directorate, where all information about the Soviet Union was processed.

The recommendations of the Center on working with Krotov stated the following: <... that he is the main agent of your residency, we spoke during your stay here (we are talking about the briefing that the resident of Soviet intelligence Boris Gudz on the eve of a business trip to Tokyo). It is forbidden to use him as a gunner for new recruits. It should be aimed at obtaining precisely documentary materials, since they are especially valuable to us ... Of course, we should take into account all the difficulties of documentary work and make this work as easy as possible for K. by appointing visits and technical means that are convenient for him.

The turnouts for such a valuable source were really selected taking into account the maximum provision of its security. Meetings were held in the evening in sparsely populated places - on the beach, in parks, and sometimes even in places such as public toilets, where the transfer of materials took place through a gap in the wall between the booths. In case of unforeseen circumstances, to meet with the agent, it was enough to send a postcard written by him with greetings from a certain "Mr. Yamamoto" to his home address, or you could simply call "Krotov" himself at work by phone and call him. Despite the apparent danger of such a call from a foreigner who spoke Japanese with an accent, this did not cause much confusion or questions from his colleagues. Pre-war Tokyo was a rather motley ethnographic picture, in a foreign colony

Japanese special services had quite a few agents. It was also envisaged that instead of the resident, someone else could come out to meet with Krotov. In this case, the half of a torn yen banknote (which, by the way, is still kept in his personal file) served as a real password for them.

In the meantime, almost ideal conditions had developed for the work of the source: a special photo laboratory was organized at the 3rd department of the Main Gendarmerie Directorate for processing incoming materials, to which our source had unhindered access. The desires of the Japanese coincided perfectly with the plans of Soviet intelligence, which sought to protect their agent as much as possible and to establish an effective transmission of information, which it became increasingly difficult for him (physically) to carry to meetings and then return after reshooting in residency to the place. Now the procedure for extracting materials was put on a planned basis - at first, Krotov filmed only the table of contents of documents, from which the most interesting ones were then selected from the point of view of intelligence, which received the most detailed coverage. And of course, for the legend of his

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Teresa to the special photo laboratory, the agent, on the recommendation of the resident, began to enthusiastically master photography and bought a Leika camera with "reward" money, which, in turn, further increased the efficiency and volume of intelligence information from Tokyo.

The information transmitted by Krotov about Japanese mobilization plans in northeast China helped to determine not only the timing and scope of the deployment of the Kwantung grouping, but also to calculate the main directions of a probable strike against the Soviet Union. Copies of messages from the Japanese military mission in Harbin, orders to second many well-known intelligence officers, experts on Russia and the Soviet Union, made it possible to conclude that undercover intelligence activities against the USSR from adjacent territories were intensified. All this was highly valued in Moscow, where one of the permanent recipients of Krotov's information was the General Staff of the Red Army.

In addition to the already mentioned plan "Otsu", after the capture of Manchuria, a more detailed plan "Hei" appeared. In particular, the concentration of the main forces in Manchuria was initially planned. At the first stage of hostilities against the USSR, it was planned to capture Nikolsk-Ussuriysky, Vladivostok, Iman and then launch an offensive against Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk. At the same time, an invasion of Mongolia was planned. The calculations contained in this documentary information from Krotov almost completely coincided with the plan received after the defeat of the Kwantung Army in 1945. It is worth adding to this the statement of the Minister of War of Japan, which became known in Moscow, who spoke at a closed meeting in the Main Gendarmerie Directorate and emphasized that "in pursuing its policy, Japan must inevitably collide with the Soviet Union, therefore Japan must militarily seize territories of Primorye, Transbaikalia and Siberia ... "

However, gradually something incomprehensible began to happen in working with Krotov: the agent began to get nervous, refer to employment, changing working conditions, tightening the secrecy regime, and began to demand large amounts of remuneration.

Warning signs began to appear in his behavior: usually cautious and accurate, he suddenly began to clearly neglect elementary security measures. Things got to the point that, at the request of the agent, meetings with him were moved to Hibiya Park in the very center of Tokyo, opposite the Imperial Palace. Nearby was the Main Gendarmerie Directorate, from the windows of which it was possible to observe not only the walking couples, but also the contact of the agent with the Soviet intelligence officer...

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Disturbing transformations began to occur with the information transmitted by the source - the documents were still authentic, the information represented an undoubted

interest, but for some reason the agent "forgot" to take pictures of the most important pages of the mobilization plans, the film he took did not allow us to see the location on the map of the new Japanese aviation regiments on the border with the Soviet Union, and at the next meeting there followed an incomprehensible explanation that "documents have already gone upstairs"...

The accumulated facts began to cause serious concerns about the credibility of the source, and the Center decided to conduct a detailed analysis of the "Krotov" case. The investigation revealed some additional points: with the well-known Japanese system of rotation of civil servants, he actually worked in one place for 10 years! The bosses changed four times, the personnel was updated almost annually, and Krotov continued to sit in the same place and a huge flow of secret information passed through his hands, the flow of which to Soviet intelligence was completely in his power to regulate. In addition, the source suddenly began to demonstrate too clearly his political sympathies for the Soviet system and its ideology, began to actively collect data on other employees of Soviet institutions in Tokyo.

These and other moments alerted the Center, which recommended to adhere to a neutral line of conduct in working with the source, and in the future to gradually curtail contacts with it.

Apparently, the situation in working with the agent developed approximately as follows: a source who worked quite normally and successfully came to the attention of his own colleagues, who concluded that his relationship with the Soviet representative could go beyond the framework of the explanations that were presented to them to justify their contacts with the Soviet diplomat. This situation could be used by the Japanese counterintelligence to organize an operational game with the Soviet residency. The moment, it must be said, was the most appropriate: Japan began active preparations for a war with the Soviet Union, and it was hard not to use such a disinformation channel as Krotov.

His moral and mental state at that time was determined quite clearly: "...K. absent-minded comes to the last meetings, explains this by fatigue, a heavy workload ... Once a drunk appeared ... "

There was no more risk. The political consequences of a possible provocation could be too dangerous. It was decided to cut off communication with Krotov and "mothball" the agent for an indefinite period of time.

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Archives, like human memory, store a lot, but among the yellowed documents, it was not possible to find a continuation of the fate of "Krotov" - the main agent of the Tokyo residency of the 30s. His traces were lost in the turbulent whirlpool of wartime. There is only an indirect mention of his business trip to Manchuria. What happened next, whether he ended up in the active imperial army, whether he was captured during the defeat of the Kwantung Army or died during the allied bombardment of Tokyo is unknown.

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First foreign partners

Employees of the Foreign Department of the Cheka, in the course of operational work abroad, tried not to miss the opportunity to interact "on a personal basis" with local representatives of their profession, if this contributed to the solution of the tasks facing them.

Isolated cases of cooperation and one-time episodes of it gradually developed into one of the areas of intelligence activity, which was at the same time an integral element of the complex of bilateral interstate relations. The first foreign partners of Soviet foreign intelligence were the security agencies of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) and Turkish counterintelligence.

Mongolian friends

In accordance with the Soviet-Mongolian agreement in the spring of 1921, units of the Red Army and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (MNRA) carried out joint operations against the detachments of the leader of the counter-revolution in Transbaikalia, Baron Ungern. It was from that moment that the Cheka began to assist Mongolian friends not only in holding special actions, but also in creating their own security agencies. Thus, on the initiative and proposal of the Chekists, in June 1922, the State Internal Guard (GVO) was established at the headquarters of the MNRA, which assumed intelligence and counterintelligence functions. The first head of the GVO was Konstantin Batorun, a military Mongolian commander who graduated from the military academy in Moscow. Instructors from the staff of the Cheka were seconded to him and to the heads of the GVO subdivisions.

The main concern of the intelligence units of the Cheka and the GVO from the very beginning of their interaction was the protection of state sovereignty.

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theta of Mongolia from outside encroachment. A serious and very real danger was represented, in particular, by the remnants of the White Guard formations ousted from Russia and Mongolia to Manchuria. Command over them after the defeat of Baron Ungern was taken over by ataman Semyonov. The White Guards made devastating raids on Mongolian territory, robbed the local arat peasants, as they say, to the skin, stole their livestock, cruelly dealt with administrative and party workers, massacred their entire families, not sparing even children.

Ataman Semyonov's headquarters maintained, through its emissaries, tacit ties with anti-Soviet Russian emigrants, who often held important positions in the Mongolian state apparatus. The young revolutionary government was forced to use their services, as they did not have their own qualified specialists. The information received through this channel was used by the Semyonovites in subversive actions against the Mongolian People's Republic of Russia.

In 1927, the bodies of the GVO were able to establish undercover control over this "secret mail". In particular, from a letter from Colonel Vasiliev, who was part of Semenov's inner circle, one of these civil servants became aware of the plan of the White Guards' campaign against Mongolia, which was reminiscent of Ungern's. This information, along with information of this kind from other sources, helped the bodies of the GVO, with the assistance of the foreign intelligence of the USSR, to prepare and implement a series of measures to strengthen the borders of the MPR and fight the White Guard underground inside the country. For example, to repel the raids of the Semenovites, special combat field groups were formed, which included Soviet instructors. For many years, Mongolian friends remembered the Soviet instructors Chistyakov and Sazonov with kind words for their selfless and qualified assistance in organizing the actions of these special forces.

The North Chinese militarists Zhang Zuoling and Yang Xishan also haunted revolutionary Mongolia. From the end of the 1920s, the government of Chiang Kai-shek, which settled in Nanjing, began to make territorial claims against the MPR. The situation reached a particular tension in 1929 during the conflict on the CER. But thanks to the pre-emptive information of the Soviet and Mongolian intelligence services and the timely operations of the Red Army on the border between the USSR and China, a direct Chiang Kai-shek invasion of Mongolia was prevented.

Active reconnaissance against the MPR was carried out by Japanese military missions based in the Chinese border towns of Hailar and Manzhouli. They recruited agents among the representatives of the suspended

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feudal circles and the Buddhist clergy, who were dissatisfied with the measures taken by the new leadership of the country to limit private property and undermine the influence of the former princes and monasteries, who at that time had significant material and financial resources. The recruiting contingents of Japanese intelligence can be judged at least by the fact that the number of lamas monks exceeded a quarter of the entire male population of Mongolia. And the abbots of the monasteries quite often agreed with the proposals of the Japanese to turn their cloisters into espionage strongholds and even secret weapons caches.

The Japanese special services did not bypass the western regions of the MPR adjacent to Xinjiang, where uprisings of national minorities against the dominance of the Chinese broke out every now and then. For influence on the Mongols and Uighurs, they competed with British intelligence. In the south, in Inner Mongolia, which is part of China, the Japanese in every possible way encouraged the unification of Mongolian emigrants around the religious authority of the Panchen Bogdo, who, with the blessing of the Tibetan Dalai Lama, was gathering forces to invade the MPR.

In this difficult and troubled time, Soviet and Mongolian intelligence widely used such a sharp method of fighting opponents as operational games. So, an experienced Mongol scout was introduced into the environment of the Panchen-Bogdo, a lama by social status, whom Sukhe-Bator himself personally knew and highly appreciated, who more than once sent him on reconnaissance missions to the headquarters of Baron Ungern. This brave man was able to achieve that the Panchen-Bogdo appointed him the head of the center for communication with emissaries who worked illegally on the territory of Mongolia. As a result, regular receipt of the most valuable reliable information was established, which made it possible to develop and implement a whole series of acute operational measures to destroy and liquidate the Panchen Bogdo organization fostered by the Japanese.

Serious blows were also dealt to Chiang Kai-shek intelligence. In accordance with the plan of one of the joint operations in Ulaanbaatar, with the help of two specially trained agents, a private motor transport artel was created to transport goods and passengers to the Chinese city of Kalgan. Then this enterprise managed to interest Chinese intelligence and encourage it to use the artel as a cover for its employees. In this way, the State Internal Guard of Mongolia and Soviet intelligence took control of the communication channels of the Chiang Kai-shek with their agents and minimized the damage that they tried to inflict on the MPR and the Soviet Union.

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After Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931, the international position of the MPR became even more complicated, and the fight against the Japanese special services became the main direction of the joint efforts of the GVO and the foreign intelligence of the USSR. They constantly had to thwart the attempts of Japanese intelligence agents to expand their network of agents in the party state apparatus and the armed forces of the Mongolian People's Republic. The enemy tried to create an influential opposition force from representatives of the Buddhist clergy. In propaganda among the population, Japanese accomplices skillfully used the mistakes and leftist excesses made by the government and local governments. In particular, at the instigation of Japanese agents, the campaign to socialize private pastoral farms and the willful reduction in the number of lamas in Buddhist monasteries led to serious unrest and riots in a number of areas. In 1932, to pacify the rebels and conduct explanatory work among them, it was necessary to involve the GVO detachments, which included Soviet Chekists. It was not without losses. In May 1932, chief instructor Kiyakovsky, instructors Isakov and Kolosov died in these operations.

In Inner Mongolia, the Japanese formed a "national Mongolian army" from the Mongols and Buryats, which was assigned the role of "liberator of the motherland." In the area of Hailar and Qiqihar, 120 officers of the Kwantung Army, who knew the Mongolian language, were preparing the Mongolian invasion detachments. They also functioned under the auspices of Japanese intelligence.

courses for propagandists of the ideas of pan-Mongolism. Armed clashes were constantly provoked on the eastern borders of the MPR.

There are serious grounds for believing that the development of the situation in the Far East could have taken on a completely different character and direction if the Soviet and Mongolian secret services had not provided stubborn and selfless opposition to the Japanese militarists and expansionists. Sometimes their retaliatory strikes were quite powerful. Thus, in 1933, a large sabotage and insurrectionary organization created by Japanese intelligence was uncovered and neutralized in Mongolia. Its members attacked various economic facilities, incited MNRA military personnel to desert, spread rumors about the invasion of pan chen-bogdo detachments, their "victorious march" across the country and the imminent fall of the existing "anti-people power". This complex operation contributed to the stabilization of the political situation in a number of regions of the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Japanese secret services lost many sources of intelligence information. The contribution of the Mongolian and Soviet intelligence officers to the preparation of the defeat of the Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River in May-August 1939 was also unique in its value.

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On the whole, close cooperation between the Mongolian and Soviet intelligence services developed successfully in the 1920s and early 1930s and bore fruit for both sides. But, unfortunately, it was sometimes overshadowed by the growing general suspicion and spy mania in the Soviet Union, as well as the imperfection of the legal framework for cooperation. In particular, the justified dissatisfaction of the Mongolian friends was caused by the attempts of some Soviet instructors to organize the collection of intelligence information about the situation in the leadership of the MPR, which often bordered on open interference in the internal affairs of this sovereign country. Some Soviet security officers allowed themselves a tactless and arrogant attitude towards their Mongolian colleagues. There were, although not often, cases when it came to unpleasant incidents. For example, in 1927, Mongolian friends succeeded in expelling the chief Soviet instructor Y. Blyumkin because he ordered the arrest and deportation to the USSR of several Russian emigrants who had taken Mongolian citizenship and were in the service of the government of the MPR. Yes, it was the same Blyumkin, who became famous for his adventures, including the provocative assassination of the German ambassador Count Mirbach in Moscow in 1918. Later, at the insistence of especially zealous and overly "vigilant" Soviet colleagues, the Mongolian security agencies repressed a group of high-ranking figures as Japanese spies, including the head of the GVO Shijiya and the secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Lkhumbo. All of them were subsequently rehabilitated.

Relations with Mongolian friends were put on a clear legal basis by the summer of 1929, after the signing between the MPR and the USSR of the Agreement on the basic principles of interaction between the USSR and the MPR

Looking back and evaluating the events that have become part of history, one cannot but admit that everything positive, born of the fraternal cooperation of both countries, including through foreign intelligence, was and remains immeasurably greater and significant than the damage caused by misunderstandings, miscalculations, mistakes and even crimes of specific individuals.

The main result of the joint efforts of the Soviet and Mongolian intelligence officers of those years is that they managed to defend the state sovereignty of the Mongolian People's Republic and strengthen the strategic positions of the Soviet Union in the Far East, which played an important role during the Great Patriotic War.

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Contacts with Turkish counterintelligence

In 1927, Soviet foreign intelligence established covert but official contact with Turkish counterintelligence. It is noteworthy that the initiative to maintain mutually beneficial relations and coordinate work with the OGPU came from the Turkish side.

Negotiations between representatives vested with broad powers took place for quite a long time. There was no lack of reasonable caution, attempts to anticipate the results and possible consequences of each step. As a result, an agreement was reached on “honest partnership” and cooperation on those problems that seemed to be the most important for each of the services. In particular, Soviet intelligence considered the subversive activities of the White Guard and nationalist emigre organizations, which had their headquarters in Turkey, to be especially dangerous for themselves and their country in this region. Their leaders did not hide the fact that the Soviet Union was their main enemy, and actively cooperated on an anti-Soviet basis with intelligence agencies of foreign states. First of all, this applied to England.

For Turkish partners, the main source of concern was the intrigues of British and Italian intelligence in their country, as well as anti-Kemalist and Dashnak movements outside Turkey.

It was on these issues that the exchange of information was organized and carried out. Turkish colleagues, by their own admission, also received very important assistance from the OGPU in organizing the encryption and decryption business.

The results of cooperation between the security agencies of Turkey and the USSR were repeatedly highly appreciated by the governments of both countries.

These contacts were maintained until mid-1931. Later, when the international situation became more complicated, and the leadership of Turkey took a course towards rapprochement with the Western European powers, the Turkish counterintelligence began to gradually reduce the volume and frequency of communication with their Soviet colleagues, who were forced to answer them the same. As a result, contacts ceased, although none of the parties officially declared their desire to do so.

The period of relatively short interaction with the Turkish counterintelligence showed that state-political circles and special services appeared in the world, which, on their own initiative, went to establish covert ties with the Soviet foreign intelligence as a strong and profitable partner. It should be emphasized that our interaction with the Turkish counterintelligence officers, despite some mutual political sympathies, was based mainly on strict consideration of coinciding interests and was not burdened with any ideological or political obligations.

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